T
Tannhauser_1509
Guest
I have had the same question before. It is claimed by Thomists that understanding the essence of a thing does not entail that one can know the existence of any particular being having that essence. However, this argument makes sense to me only if the agents concerned exercise free will. In the case of a lion, however—which I will assume is acting deterministically—it would seem to me that having a perfect scientific knowledge of the world would, in theory, enable one to predict the existence of a particular being having the essence of a lion. So could not all beings therefore be considered “necessary beings”?But wouldn’t fully knowing the essence of a lion, for example, entail knowing its existence? In other words, wouldn’t existence be part of its essence? I could conceive that fully knowing a lion’s essence would include knowing its biological reality, and once I know that reality (say, as a product of evolution, etc.), then I would know lions indeed exist.