How do you answer the omnipotence paradox?

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So the question is: do the words “a stone so heavy that God (or a “Greatest Conceivable Being”) cannot lift it” describe a potential state of affairs? The answer seems to be clearly no. Because if such a being could not lift such a stone, then he would not be a greatest conceivable being, because we could conceive of a greater being, one that could lift the stone, and that being would be God.
There is a problem with your reasoning: “the concept of greatest conceivable being” is already incoherent. Two reasons, one: “what is considered great” is a subjective phenomenon. (My concept of “greatness” is not necessarily the same as your concept of greatness. And if they differ, who will be the arbiter to decide? Both of us could dig in our heels and assert that “my greatness” is greater than “your greatness”, but that would be pretty childish. :))

The other one is that even we could agree about greatness, it would still be a “composite” attribute - made up of several “simple attributes”. And thus it is not clear if the same being could be maximal in regard of attribute “A” and also attribute “B”. A simple example, if “greatness” would be a composite of the “tallest” and the “fattest” human, it is not necessary that the tallest person is also the fattest (though it may be).

For example, it is impossible to decide what would be the “greatest conceivable dinner”. Or the “greatest conceivable entertainer”. Pretty much the “greatest conceivable anything…”.

Before God’s case could be examined, the question is: “what is omnipotence?”. Can it be meaningfully defined at all? I contend that it cannot be.
God’s omnipotence, then should be seen as his ability to actualize any logically possible state of affairs
Clearly this is incorrect. There is no logical impossibility about God being able to lie, and yet, Catholics assert that God is “unable to lie”, this being contrary against God’s nature. (Protestants have a different opinion.) Another example, there is no logical impossibilty about God’s nonexistence, and yet it is asserted that God is unable to “disappear”. Therefore the definition that “omnipotence is the ability to actualize all the logically possible states of affairs” is not valid.
 
… this paradox is meaningless.
Because G-d is precedent to logic. The existence of logic is contingent on G-d. Had G-d chosen to do so He could have created us and the rest of the universe so that contradictions did not exist. Our inability to imagine how a logical contradiction is true is no restriction on G-d.
 
The other one is that even we could agree about greatness, it would still be a “composite” attribute - made up of several “simple attributes”. And thus it is not clear if the same being could be maximal in regard of attribute “A” and also attribute “B”. A simple example, if “greatness” would be a composite of the “tallest” and the “fattest” human, it is not necessary that the tallest person is also the fattest (though it may be).
Let us say that the greatest man is one who must conform to specific proportions in terms of height to width ratio. There is always the possibility of a conceivable God whose specific proportions are perfect and whose height and weight surpass all other conceivable gods of the limits of our imagination about the greatest height and the greatest width. Of course, if we can’t agree about the proportions, which is a matter of taste, we could have a political debate that tends to infinity or tends in ever decreasing steps to a limit that constitutes the endpoint of all further discussion. That was my tallest and widest conceivable response to this “proportionate reasoning” argument. My shortest and leanest response would be “What’s your point?”. (Just poking fun at circular debates that can’t come to agreement about proper ends or proper means.)
Clearly this is incorrect. There is no logical impossibility about God being able to lie, and yet, Catholics assert that God is “unable to lie”, this being contrary against God’s nature. (Protestants have a different opinion.) Another example, there is no logical impossibilty about God’s nonexistence, and yet it is asserted that God is unable to “disappear”. Therefore the definition that “omnipotence is the ability to actualize all the logically possible states of affairs” is not valid.
To say that God is “unable to lie” is to say that God is “perpetually unwilling to lie”. Those who say “unable to lie” are simply glossing for sake of brevity. Unwillingness to actualize a possibility through free will has the same net effect as incapability by virtue of a decision to withhold the power to do so forever.
 
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Spock:
“the concept of greatest conceivable being” is already incoherent. Two reasons, one: “what is considered great” is a subjective phenomenon. (My concept of “greatness” is not necessarily the same as your concept of greatness. And if they differ, who will be the arbiter to decide? Both of us could dig in our heels and assert that “my greatness” is greater than “your greatness”, but that would be pretty childish.
But happily we are not discussing my greatness or your greatness, but the greatness of God, which remains what it is regardless of what you or I mistakenly think about it. Your objection confuses God being the greatest conceivable being (GCB) with our discerning what properties a GCB must possess, which is obviously a very different thing. The fact that you might not be sure what properties a GCB would posses does not render our definition of God as a GCB incoherent.

As to your second objection, simply saying such attributes may not be compatible is not sufficient, for they also may be compatible. As long as they are, then the concept of a GCB remains valuable. If you wish to show the concept incoherent, you must actually show that not coherent understanding of those attributes may be united in a GCB, and I await this demonstration.

Perhaps you would claim that omnipotence is incompatible with moral perfection, since God cannot do evil. This is a popular claim, but easily answered when you understand that evil is a mark of weakness not strength or ability. God, as a GCB, is without defect, ability to do evil is a defect, so obviously a GCB is not able to do evil. To put this in terms I use about possible states of affairs, the question is: do the words, “a greatest conceivable being is able to do evil” describe a possible state of affairs? The answer is clearly, “no.” Because then we could conceive a greater being, one unable to do evil, and that would be a greatest conceivable being and hence God. So God remains omnipotent because the words “a GCB can do evil” do not describe a possible state of affairs. God remains omnipotent because he can actualize all possible states of affairs (there are a couple qualifications to this we can discuss if it becomes relevant).
For example, it is impossible to decide what would be the “greatest conceivable dinner”. Or the “greatest conceivable entertainer”. Pretty much the “greatest conceivable anything…”
Those are incoherent concepts, though. A probable quality of a GCB would be necessary existence; since those things you mention cannot exist necessarily, they cannot be greatest conceivable. They are problematic for other reasons as well, but God can be clearly understood to exist necessarily, so we can conceive of him as a GCB, but not conceive of a greatest conceivable dinner, which is nonsense.
Clearly this is incorrect. There is no logical impossibility about God being able to lie, and yet, Catholics assert that God is “unable to lie”, this being contrary against God’s nature. (Protestants have a different opinion.) Another example, there is no logical impossibilty about God’s nonexistence, and yet it is asserted that God is unable to “disappear”. Therefore the definition that “omnipotence is the ability to actualize all the logically possible states of affairs” is not valid.
What I have said above answers this, then. If lying is always evil, then the words “A GCB lying” do not describe a possible state of affairs," so God would remain omnipotent and be able to actualize all states of affairs (like I say, there are a couple qualifications to this.) Lying then would be a defect, and as a GCB, God is without defect. God’s non-existence is indeed inconceivable (as opposed to merely imaginable). Again, the words “a GCB can not exist” do not describe a potential state of affairs because a being that could not exist would not be a GCB."
 
But happily we are not discussing my greatness or your greatness, but the greatness of God, which remains what it is regardless of what you or I mistakenly think about it.
Let me rephrase that: “But happily we are not discussing my greatness or your greatness, but the greatness of THE PERFECT DINNER, which remains what it is regardless of what you or I mistakenly think about it”. You see (I hope) the error of what you said. There is no such thing as “greatness”, there is only what we consider “greatness”. The greatness of a dinner is just as subjective as the greatness of an entertainer, or the greatness of a athlete, or the greatness of whatever!
Your objection confuses God being the greatest conceivable being (GCB) with our discerning what properties a GCB must possess, which is obviously a very different thing. The fact that you might not be sure what properties a GCB would posses does not render our definition of God as a GCB incoherent.
But it does. We are exchanging ideas about a subject (which happens to be the GCB in this instance). If the words cannot be defined in a mutually agreeable fashion, then there is no conversation.
As to your second objection, simply saying such attributes may not be compatible is not sufficient, for they also may be compatible. As long as they are, then the concept of a GCB remains valuable. If you wish to show the concept incoherent, you must actually show that not coherent understanding of those attributes may be united in a GCB, and I await this demonstration.
It is impossible to define just what “simple” properties make up “greatness”.
Perhaps you would claim that omnipotence is incompatible with moral perfection, since God cannot do evil. This is a popular claim, but easily answered when you understand that evil is a mark of weakness not strength or ability.
Only in your opinion. I will say that doing “good” is the mark of weakness, of being a “wuss”. And you cannot refute my definition, you can just disagree. Of course I cannot refute your definition either. We have two differing opinion, and who can decide which one is “right”? There is no “right”. Moreover, in my opinion, I consider someone greater, who could do “evil” but chooses not to do it. The God as you describe him has no “freedom” to do or not to do “good”, he is “condemned” to do good, just like any other good little robot.
Those are incoherent concepts, though.
Indeed. If the “greatest conceivable X” is incoherent, then it is incoherent no matter what you substitute into “X”. Necessary “existence” does not help you, either. There is no such thing as “necessary existence” - and of course it can be proven logically.
Again, the words “a GCB can not exist” do not describe a potential state of affairs because a being that could not exist would not be a GCB."
Hehe. Creating by “definition”. Does not work!
 
There is no such thing as “greatness”, there is only what we consider “greatness”. The greatness of a dinner is just as subjective as the greatness of an entertainer, or the greatness of a athlete, or the greatness of whatever!


But it does. We are exchanging ideas about a subject (which happens to be the GCB in this instance). If the words cannot be defined in a mutually agreeable fashion, then there is no conversation…

Hehe. Creating by “definition”. Does not work!
Since you insist on comparing the idea of a greatest conceivable being to a greatest conceivable dinner, I’m going to have to be more direct in addressing this.
  • One feature of a GCB is necessary existence. A being that could cease to exist is less great than one that exists necessarily. There is nothing problematic about the idea of necessary existence per se, so is not a problem. However, the idea of a dinner that exists necessarily is incoherent. Such a dinner would have to be able to exist in a universe in which the atomic matter never formed. But anything that could exist in such a situation would not be a dinner. God, on the other hand, being immaterial, could exist in such a situation. hence the notion of necessary existence applies well to God, but not to a dinner, or unicorn, or purple and pink polka dotted hippopotamus or whatever other suggestion you care to make.
Now your claim that we can’t agree on what a GCB is and therefore the notion is meaningless, and how can we judge whose conception is correct is simply mistaken. Our uncertainty over what properties a GCB has does nothing to invalidate the definition of God as a GCB. We know what the words “great,” “conceivable,” and “being,” mean, and so we know what we are saying when we call God a GCB and we know that we are saying something meaningful. The conversation may begin with this.

And what do you mean, we can’t know what “greatness” is? Of course we do. You, I assume, know the different between greatness and squareness, or saltiness, etc? The words have meaning and this lets the conversation go on.

We then try to understand what traits this GCB will possess. Here our discussion, which you fear cannot happen, will continue as we discuss whether a being with some trait is greater than a being without it. We do this by presenting arguments that we will rationally evaluate. And you actually seem to tacitly admit this when you try to argue that a being that can do evil and won’t is greater than one that can’t. Now, your argument is mistaken, but it shows that even you admit that the discussion can take place.

The next important point to make is that the issue is not whether or not you can come up with some incoherent understanding of a GCB, but whether or not the theist can come up with a coherent understanding of such a being. And you have given little reason to doubt that this is possible and that I have done this.

I assume you are being simply deliberately silly when you suggest that doing good is the mark of a wuss since otherwise this would entail that a man who refuses to kill and rape a child is more of a wuss than one who does, which is simply morally offensive. Indeed this is one way to assess the stupidity of that notion. Such a notion completely goes against our moral sense and our perception of morality. Now we trust our physcial senses to tell us about the world, similarly, I trust my moral sense to tell me about the moral world. Furthermore, your suggestion is absurd since you imply that a good man may be a wuss, that is lack the courage, to do evil. But doing evil does not often require courage and you can offer no reason for thinking that when God does good he is displaying a defect in courage. The ability to do evil is a defect in goodness and, as a perfect being, God is without defect, therefore unable to do evil. Part of your trouble here come from your misunderstanding of divine freedom. God’s freedom is different from human freedom. His freedom lies in that he is compelled by no force outside of himself. He is fully free to actualize his nature, free from external hindrance.
Again, the words “a GCB can not exist” do not describe a potential state of affairs because a being that could not exist would not be a GCB."
Hehe. Creating by “definition”. Does not work!

Here you don’t even bother to offer an argument, you just mock. As you wish, but any time you care to offer a reason for rejecting this rather than mere scorn, I will be happy to consider it.

When God’s omnipotence is understood in terms of his ability to actualize logically possible states of affairs, many problems vanish.
  • “God can not exist”
  • “A GCB (God) can create a square circle”
  • “A GCB can do evil”
  • A GCB can make a rock so heavy he can’t lift it.
Now none of these describe logically possible states of affairs. A being that could not exist would not be a GCB because then we could conceive of a greater being, one that could not vanish from existence, and then that being would be God.

The purpose of this is to show that there is a coherent understanding of God’s omnipotence possible. And if we go further, a coherent understanding of his other greatness making properties. The skeptic can’t mock this as simply “playing with definition” because by trying to claim that the notion of God or a GCB or omnipotence is incoherent, that is precisely what he is doing! The non-theist will try to show that no conceivable understanding those a GCB or those attributes is possible based on the meaning of a GCB and those attributes. The theist does the same, just to the other reason. He tries to show that a coherent understanding of a GCB and those attributes is possible, and if he can show that there is, then he has done his job.
 
Since you insist on comparing the idea of a greatest conceivable being to a greatest conceivable dinner, I’m going to have to be more direct in addressing this.
  • One feature of a GCB is necessary existence.
Stop it right there. Says who?

There is no “necessary” existence. Nothing exists “necessarily”. The concept of “necessary” existence came from the concept of “possible world”. It is asserted that there is something that exists across all the possible worlds - and that would be a necessarily existing “thing”. If you would like to prove it, you need to examine ALL the possible worlds, - of which there are infinitely many! - and show that “this particular stuff” exists in all of them. Needless to say this is impossible. However, to prove the opposite is child’s play. All we need to find is 2 possible worlds, which have nothing in common, and we disproved the notion of “necessary” existence. I leave this exercise as a homework for you. But it is very easy.

And if one of the features of GCB is “necessary existence”, and - as we can prove - necessary existence is bogus, then we proved that the GCB is also bogus. And if God is a GCB then God is bogus. 🙂 Not what you expected, is it?
A being that could cease to exist is less great than one that exists necessarily.
Nonsense. Even if there would be necessary existence, I would contend that there is an even “greater” being, the one who keeps existing when he wants to, and is able to volitionally cease to exist at his whim, and then again come back into exitence at will. (And don’t say that he cannot come back into existence, because if he does not exist, then he he has no volition. That would simply be a “mystery” - on par with the other asserted Christian “mysteries”.)
There is nothing problematic about the idea of necessary existence per se, so is not a problem.
There is everything problematic with this “concept”. Mostly that there is no such thing.
God, on the other hand, being immaterial, could exist in such a situation.
Please, get real. You cannot bring in God (whose existence you wish to prove) by stipulating his existece as one of the premises.
Our uncertainty over what properties a GCB has does nothing to invalidate the definition of God as a GCB.
You got to be kidding. **If the GCB cannot be defined, then saying that God is the GCB is totally incoherent! **
And what do you mean, we can’t know what “greatness” is? Of course we do. You, I assume, know the different between greatness and squareness, or saltiness, etc? The words have meaning and this lets the conversation go on.
There is a huge difference. “Saltiness” is a simple and objective attribute, however “tastiness” is not. Saltiness can be measured objectively, based upon the salt molecules in the food. “Tastiness” cannot be measured, and what is tasty to me, is not necessarily tasty to you. And “tastiness” is just another “simple” attribute, but subjective and not objective. Greatness would be a composite attribute. Who is the greater “entertainer”, a superbly good actor, or an excellent athlete? How to compare the incommensurables?

There are two ways to approach the idea of GCB. You can stipulate that the GCB is maximal in EVERY respect. Clearly that is nonsense, since the GCB should be maximally tall AND maximally short, and also maximally good AND maximally evil, etc… The other way is to select SOME attributes, and stipulate that the GCB is maximal in respect to those attributes only. But that is clearly subjective. Why should anyone agree with your selection of attributes? There is no reason. No matter how you twist it, the GCB remains either nonsensical or subjective.
 
What do you mean by ‘it’s not an idea’? It is certainly an idea: namely the idea of a rock that no matter what cannot be lifted (even by God). Even if such an idea cannot have its realization in reality (for say hardcore metaphysical reasons), that does not say anything about its being a meaningful idea.
No, a weight that necessarily cannot be moved or lifted is not a weight. It’s in the whole definition of a weight that it is an object, and objects are moveable. We have no idea of an object that is not moveable.

This paradox is phoney. We are asking God to do something that we cannot understand, not to do something that appears impossible.
 
Here you don’t even bother to offer an argument, you just mock.
Actually it is not “mocking”, just pointing out that your argument was simply an attempt to define something into existence. This is what you said: “Again, the words “a GCB can not exist” do not describe a potential state of affairs because a being that could not exist would not be a GCB.”. Fist you assume that there is a GCB (still undefined!) and then you say that this “whatever” must exist, because if it did not exist, it would not be a GCB! Totally circular line of thought. How can you say such obvious nonsense?
When God’s omnipotence is understood in terms of his ability to actualize logically possible states of affairs, many problems vanish.
They do not. There is nothing logically impossible about a world which contains only material objects. No conscious beings, just “dead” matter. This world is logically posiible, yet God is unable to instantiate it - as long as God is accepted as a being which is “omnipresent” (which is yet another bogus attribute).

So you need to refine your concept of “omnipotence”.
The purpose of this is to show that there is a coherent understanding of God’s omnipotence possible.
Not yet. You need to posit something “better” then you did so far.
 
So you need to refine your concept of “omnipotence”.

Not yet. You need to posit something “better” then you did so far.
To us from drifting off topic and losing the original point, I’m going to start briefly from the beginning.

One note at the beginning though, you insist on mocking me for playing with definitions or such, but you seem not to understand that this is precisely the point. The skeptic says no meaningful definition of omnipotence (or a GCB) is possible; my task, then is to do nothing more than to see if there is a conceivable definition possible. You can’t dismiss this as “playing with definitions,” because that is precisely the issue, can we define omnipotence (or a GCB) in a way that makes sense.

The question we are trying to get a grip on is the old stone paradox, “can an omnipotent being make a stone so heavy he cannot lift it?” Now this is a largely outdated paradox, not taken seriously even by many atheist philosophers today, though it retains some popularity on the internet. The question, then is, how do we express the problem with it. When omnipotence is merely understood as a matter of raw, infinite power, this is a problem (and what does infinite power mean anyway?). But philosophers of religion recognize that omnipotence is not best understood as a matter of raw power, but in terms of the ability to actualize states of affairs. An omnipotent being is one capable of actualizing any possible state of affairs (with a couple qualifications, but let’s leave this here for the sake of argument). The words, “a stone so heavy God cannot lift it” do not describe a possible state of affairs. Therefore, God remains omnipotent even though he cannot make a stone so heavy he cannot lift it, because the very concept of a stone that God cannot lift is nonsense and empty words. Rather like a square circle.
  • This is because God is by definition a “Greatest Conceivable Being.” If he could not lift the stone, we could conceive of a greater being, one that could lift the stone and then that being would be God.
Now, I would argue that one feature of a GCB is logically necessary existence, since it is greater to exist necessarily than not. You launch some misguided attacks on the notion of necessary existence. You are simply mistaken in thinking that the idea of necessary existence comes from possible worlds semantics. Possible worlds semantics is a fairly recent development, while the concept of God as a necessary being goes back at least centuries. More, your suggestion that to claim that something exists necessarily, I must “search” (whatever that means) all (infinite) possible worlds first is frankly absurd. (I have heard this idea suggested by another atheist on this board before; it makes me wonder what infidel website you are pulling it from). Now since there are (maybe) infinite possible worlds, I could never conclude that anything exists necessarily. Woe is me. Except, this seems obviously wrong. For instance, I seem rationally justified in holding that 2+2 necessarily equals 4. That is, in every possible world 2+2=4. Yet, if I had to “search” all possible worlds until I could conclude that, then I could never finish, and so, never conclude that 2+2 necessarily equals 4, which is obviously absurd! You clearly cannot invalid the notion of necessary existence in this way. (I should note, though, that even if there were some problem with considering God to be a logically necessary being, I could still consider him a factually necessary being (as John Van Engen does), so the existence of God would hardly be imperiled).

So obviously I don’t have to “search” all possible worlds and find God in them in the way you mean, as if possible worlds are like opening an infinite number of boxes and checking inside. Your phrasing this as “search” is badly phrased since it invites this misunderstanding. Possible worlds aren’t parallel universes we look into, a possible world is just a complete description of the way the world could be.

Now, since you are about to try to claim that you personally can “search” two possible worlds and not find God there, and therefore God cannot exist necessarily, let me anticipate this claim. By saying that you can conceive God not existing, you are confusing “metaphysical conceivability” with “imaginability.” You may think that you are imagining a world, and then imagining God not existing in it, but when you really understand what is meant by God as a GCB, then I would deny that God’s non-existence is conceivable, as opposed to merely imaginable.
  • Or consider it this way. You can conceive of a Cosmos without conceiving that 2+2=4, but it does not follow that you are conceiving of a cosmos where 2+2 does not equal 4. 2+2 still necessarily equals 4. The same principle applies. It is really far harder to conceive of God not existing than you seem to think.
Another reason you cannot have GC dinner, but can have a GCB is that the characteristics that make up a GCB have maximal traits. Omniscence is the property of knowing only and all truths. One cannot know more truths than that. But such a dinner, on the other hand, could always have more salt, or italian seasonings etc.

More briefly then, your claim that a being that can cease to exist and then recall itself into existence is incoherent as you seem to recognize yourself. Besides the reason you give, such a being would have to be in the position of creating itself, which would mean it would have to be prior to itself, which is obviously absurd. Your gratuitous and irrelevant appeal to Christian “mysteries” is simply a red herrring.
 
Now, as to your continued insistence on claiming that a GCB is not defined, this is obviously wrong. You know, I suppose what the words “greatest”, “conceivable” and “being” mean? In your post number 27, despite your claims, you seem to clearly understand what the word “great” means. Excellent, this gives us a starting point for discussion. Since God is by definition a GCB, we can now consider what traits a GCB would. And despite your claim we can of course, come to come agreement. For instance, you dropped your absurd (and if you were serious, frankly offensive) suggestion that moral perfection is a defect and that a being who does evil is greater than one who doesn’t. It also seems reasonable to suggest that an omnipotent being is greater than one who is not omnipotent, wouldn’t you agree? It doesn’t seem very controversial that a GCB would be omnipotent, morally perfect, omniscient (the property of knowing only and all truths). More, it makes sense that such a being would be metaphysically necessary provided that (as seems to be the case) metaphysical necessity is a plausible concept. (If not, such a being would simply be factually necessary.)
Now perhaps, we are not such of other attributes (atemporal or temporal?), or we are not sure of exactly what omniscience entails (seeing the future or not?), this does nothing to render the term “omniscience” meaningless, and so we have the basis of an idea of a GCB.
They do not. There is nothing logically impossible about a world which contains only material objects. No conscious beings, just “dead” matter. This world is logically posiible, yet God is unable to instantiate it - as long as God is accepted as a being which is “omnipresent” (which is yet another bogus attribute).
So you see why this is wrong. When you understand that God is a GCB, then you also understand that no such possible world is metaphysically conceivable, as opposed to merely imaginable. .

One last comment, Spock. From time you time you still complain about me messing with definitions. Of course! This is precisely what we are discussing, whether a coherent understanding of God’s omnipotence or status as a GCB is possible. This means try to find understandings those words that are coherent. And you are doing just the opposite in trying to show that no reasonable definition is possible, so you are messing with definitions just as much as me. The only difference is that I only have to show that there is a possible understanding of God’s omnipotence where you have to show that no such understanding is even possible. This you have not done.

So it still seems perfectly reasonable to consider omnipotence in terms of actualizing possible states of affairs. This solves the stone paradox and allows a coherent understanding of God’s omnipotence that also has the benefit of being easily reconcilable with God’s other traits (such as moral perfection.
 
Since God created the universe then He is able to create a rock larger than the universe. If He does this the gravitational pull of said rock would throw the universe into disarray, reversing orbits, causing planets and stars to crach into each other, ending all known and unknown life in the universe. So you want God to destroy every living thing in the cosmos to prove a point to you? Who do you think you are? Try that on an atheist.😉
 
  1. There was a point at which the universe didn’t exist, and now it does. If this is true, how could something have been created from nothing?
Both ideas are logically IMPOSSIBLE, and yet one MUST be true. It’s the same situation.
#2 is not impossible; something can be created from nothing. Read up on virtual particles and uncertainty principles if you are interested.
 
To us from drifting off topic and losing the original point, I’m going to start briefly from the beginning.
You are still trying to define something into existence. What you do is essentially a handwaving, like this:
  1. Let’s define God as the being who is unable not to exist. (necessary being).
  2. Let’s assume that God does not exist.
  3. That assumption contradicts #1, and as such it is impossible, therefore God exists!
This is ridiculous. A total circular reasoning based upon an unsupported premise. It can be found among these hundreds of “proofs” here…

Now for the “necessary existence”.

The definition of a “possible world” is a hypothetical state of affairs, which is different from ours. So far, so good. Your example of 2 + 2 = 4 is misguided. Concepts do not have ontological existence. They do not exist unless there is a conscious being who can conceptualize them. In a hypothetical world without conscious beings there is no “2”, there is no “+” and there is no “4”. You seem to think that mathematical truths are “absolute”. Nothing could be further from the “truth”. All mathematical truths depend on the selected axioms. And the axioms can only be selected if there is someone, who makes those selections.

To prove that there is no necessarily existing “anything” all we have to do is find two possible worlds which have nothing in common.

Here it is: We take our existing universe and remove the Milky Way. The remaining state of affairs is a possible universe - let’s call it “A”. Then we take the original universe, and remove everything, except the Milky Way. This is also a possible state of affairs, we can call it “B”. Since “A” and “B” have nothing in common, we have two possible universes, where their intesection is the “null-world”. As such it is proven that there is no necessary being. Contrary to what you think, I do not have to examine all possible worlds. Two of them was enough.
 
When you understand that God is a GCB…
This is another error. We are not talking about God at all. We are talking about purely secular, philosophical concepts, like omnipotence, omnisicence, greatness, etc… If these concepts have no validity, unless you refer to some god, then these concepts have no meanings on their own! What you keep on doing is defining these concepts based upon God, and then defining God based upon these attributes. Circular reasoning… how many times do I have to point it out?
then you also understand that no such possible world is metaphysically conceivable, as opposed to merely imaginable. .
Error again. Metaphysically conceivable is the same as logically possible. There is no logical contradiction in a world without a god, therefore it is metaphysically possible.
 
You could also say that God created logic, therefore He can break the laws too. But for a non-believer that argument wouldn’t go over so well :o
That wasn’t a very cool thing to say duude. What do you mean when you say that God created logic?
 
Hey, Spock. It’s been a long time. Good to see ya.
… it is usually held that God created the laws of nature, and thus he can violate them. Of course that is not true either. Can God create a minus one Kelvin cold? Heat is the Brownian motion of the molecules. At zero Kelvin the Brownian motion would stop. Therefore minus one Kelvin is a physical impossibility - yet impossible for God to achieve it.
God is only limited by a law of nature if by breaking it He would also be breaking a law of logic. I assume you’re suggesting that something logically cannot be slower than complete motionless, right? Well, then, if that’s true, God cannot create something colder than zero Kelvin because it goes against logic. This is consistent with the traditional Catholic view of omnipotence.
From the Catholic version it follows that “omnipotence” is even more restricted than “able to do anything except logical contradictions”.
Nope. It’s still just that.
There is a problem with your reasoning: “the concept of greatest conceivable being” is already incoherent. Two reasons, one: “what is considered great” is a subjective phenomenon.
Not if it’s defined as “that which has the most being” which is how it is defined in that argument.
Before God’s case could be examined, the question is: “what is omnipotence?”. Can it be meaningfully defined at all? I contend that it cannot be.
Once again, it is the ability to do anything (“thing” as defined as the Scholastics traditionally defined it, that is, as any being with intrinsic possibility … i.e. a being whose existence does not break the principle of non-contradiction).
Clearly this is incorrect. There is no logical impossibility about God being able to lie, and yet, Catholics assert that God is “unable to lie”, this being contrary against God’s nature.
From natural reason, I don’t think you can prove that God cannot lie. However, Christian revelation claims an insight into God’s nature, namely, that when He speaks, He always tells the Truth. If this is true, then it would be a logical contradiction for Him to tell a lie if, in fact, He always tells the Truth.
Only in your opinion. I will say that doing “good” is the mark of weakness, of being a “wuss”. And you cannot refute my definition, you can just disagree. Of course I cannot refute your definition either. We have two differing opinion, and who can decide which one is “right”? There is no “right”.
So, God DOES exist for some people but not for others, depending on the definition of goodness? Well, then, based on our definition of goodness, would you then say it follows that God exists?
The God as you describe him has no “freedom” to do or not to do “good”, he is “condemned” to do good, just like any other good little robot.
Not exactly. He cannot commit moral evils (i.e. He cannot do what He shouldn’t do) but He can commit all kinds of others (e.g. physical evils … like disease and death).
There is no “necessary” existence. Nothing exists “necessarily”.
Then, the universe has no reason to necessarily exist. And yet it exists. Why? It either exists for no reason or it exists because something made it exist. The former answer is unreasonable, and then latter is the only reasonable answer. This thing that created the universe must necessarily exist (otherwise, there would be no universe). Hence, some things DO necessarily exist. And, of course, this is God.
Nonsense. Even if there would be necessary existence, I would contend that there is an even “greater” being, the one who keeps existing when he wants to, and is able to volitionally cease to exist at his whim, and then again come back into exitence at will.
Such a being cannot logically exist. Obviously. I think you would agree.
They do not. There is nothing logically impossible about a world which contains only material objects. No conscious beings, just “dead” matter. This world is logically posiible, yet God is unable to instantiate it - as long as God is accepted as a being which is “omnipresent” (which is yet another bogus attribute).
Once again, it is unreasonable to believe a purely material world could exist for no reason. Material things don’t necessarily exist (as you can even find space in this universe where they don’t exist … like between atoms). So, since they don’t necessarily exist, something had to create them. Ultimately, of course, you need a necessarily existing being. God. He is the reason why material things exist and maintains their existence (for there is no reason why they should continue to exist). And since He constantly acts on them to keep them in existence, He is said (analogously, of course) to be present in them (for, where an immaterial thing acts, there it is present … as the Scholastics say).
 
You are still trying to define something into existence. What you do is essentially a handwaving, like this:
  1. Let’s define God as the being who is unable not to exist. (necessary being).
  2. Let’s assume that God does not exist.
  3. That assumption contradicts #1, and as such it is impossible, therefore God exists!
This is ridiculous. A total circular reasoning based upon an unsupported premise. It can be found among these hundreds of “proofs” here…

Now for the “necessary existence”.

The definition of a “possible world” is a hypothetical state of affairs, which is different from ours. So far, so good. Your example of 2 + 2 = 4 is misguided. Concepts do not have ontological existence. They do not exist unless there is a conscious being who can conceptualize them. In a hypothetical world without conscious beings there is no “2”, there is no “+” and there is no “4”. You seem to think that mathematical truths are “absolute”. Nothing could be further from the “truth”. All mathematical truths depend on the selected axioms. And the axioms can only be selected if there is someone, who makes those selections.

To prove that there is no necessarily existing “anything” all we have to do is find two possible worlds which have nothing in common.

Here it is: We take our existing universe and remove the Milky Way. The remaining state of affairs is a possible universe - let’s call it “A”. Then we take the original universe, and remove everything, except the Milky Way. This is also a possible state of affairs, we can call it “B”. Since “A” and “B” have nothing in common, we have two possible universes, where their intesection is the “null-world”. As such it is proven that there is no necessary being. Contrary to what you think, I do not have to examine all possible worlds. Two of them was enough.
You have evidently not read my previous two posts since I anticipated this question and dealt with it directly there. I refer you to it again. The fact that you imagined a Cosmos without conceiving of God does not mean that you are conceiving of a cosmos without God any more than you conceiving of a cosmos without conceiving that 2 and 2 make four really means that you are conceiving of a cosmos where 2 and 2 does not make four. And as for 2+2 not necessarily equaling 4, are you seriously trying to deny that 2+2 necessarily equals four? Do you seriously think that there is a possible world where 2 and 2 do not make 4? Where they make 5? Where they make a pink rhinocerous? The fact that they are dependant on the Peano axiom for standard arithmetic (which is necessarily true) does not mean they are not necessarily true.

Furthermore, I have told you over and over that complaining about me playing with definitions is nonsense because you are doing precisely the same thing; you are simply arguing for the other side. You complain that I am trying to "define God into existence (though you only mock and never refute), well, you are doing the same, trying to define (and conceive) him out of existence. So your complaints on this score are rather hypocritical. (Though if you would like to discuss the ontological argument, we can have another thread for that).

Your reference to that absurd godlessgeeks website was interesting though since it explains your self confidence that is frankly out of proportion to your apparent understanding of the issues. That you are relying on a silly website made up of straw men and silly caricatures ( “ARGUMENT FROM META-SMUGNESS (1) **** you.(2) Therefore, God exists.”). You need to confront the actual arguments as they are actually made by serious philosophers and theologians, not an irrational website dedicated to mere sneering and mockery (come to think of it, that so-called argument from meta-smugness seems rather to describe the “arguments” on that heathen website you refer to.)
Circular reasoning… how many times do I have to point it out?
At least once more, since you have apparently neither read nor understand my position. The question is, can we come up with a coherent understanding of omnipotence. I would say yes, omnipotence is understood as the ability to actualize logically possible states of affairs. Notice, that despite your counter-claim, I have not yet brought God into the equation. When God comes into the equation is precisely when you, the non-theist, bring him in, when you claim that God cannot be omnipotent because he cannot do x. At this point, the theist properly responds that your claim is misguided for y reason. All well and good.
Error again. Metaphysically conceivable is the same as logically possible. There is no logical contradiction in a world without a god, therefore it is metaphysically possible.
And you misunderstand or ignore me again. I never denied that metaphysical conceivable is the same as logically possible. What i have denied is that metaphysical conceivability is the same as imaginability. See above and my previous posts, my explanation of why you cannot conceive God’s non-existence as easily as you believe, especially my example of conceiving a possible world where 2 and 2 does not equal 4. You may imagine a world without imagining that 2 and 2 make 4, but it does not follow that you are really conceiving a world where 2 and 2 do not make four.

So again, God’s omnipotence is not a matter of raw power, but a matter of ability to actualize possible states of affairs. The words, “a stone so heavy God cannot lift it” do not describe a possible state of affairs, therefore they are simply mere empty words and nonsense. God cannot do such a thing because it is nonsense.
 
Hey, Spock. It’s been a long time. Good to see ya.
Likewise. I am nor going to repeat the arguments I already stated. 🙂 Sorry. The point is that “omnipotence” and the other atrributes must be defined without referring to each other, and without referring to God. These are purely secular, philosophical concepts. What you suggested “that which has the most being” is completely meaningless.
 
Sorry, I lost interest. I gave you a constructive method to arrive at two worlds which have nothing in common, thereby proving that there is no necessary existence. I pointed out that you use circular arguments to define God into existence. Enough of wasting my time. Bye.
 
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