So you need to refine your concept of “omnipotence”.
Not yet. You need to posit something “better” then you did so far.
To us from drifting off topic and losing the original point, I’m going to start briefly from the beginning.
One note at the beginning though, you insist on mocking me for playing with definitions or such, but you seem not to understand that this is precisely the point. The skeptic says no meaningful definition of omnipotence (or a GCB) is possible; my task, then is to do nothing more than to see if there is a conceivable definition possible. You can’t dismiss this as “playing with definitions,” because that is precisely the issue, can we define omnipotence (or a GCB) in a way that makes sense.
The question we are trying to get a grip on is the old stone paradox, “can an omnipotent being make a stone so heavy he cannot lift it?” Now this is a largely outdated paradox, not taken seriously even by many atheist philosophers today, though it retains some popularity on the internet. The question, then is, how do we express the problem with it. When omnipotence is merely understood as a matter of raw, infinite power, this is a problem (and what does infinite power mean anyway?). But philosophers of religion recognize that omnipotence is not best understood as a matter of raw power, but in terms of the ability to actualize states of affairs. An omnipotent being is one capable of actualizing any possible state of affairs (with a couple qualifications, but let’s leave this here for the sake of argument). The words, “a stone so heavy God cannot lift it” do not describe a possible state of affairs. Therefore, God remains omnipotent even though he cannot make a stone so heavy he cannot lift it, because the very concept of a stone that God cannot lift is nonsense and empty words. Rather like a square circle.
- This is because God is by definition a “Greatest Conceivable Being.” If he could not lift the stone, we could conceive of a greater being, one that could lift the stone and then that being would be God.
Now, I would argue that one feature of a GCB is logically necessary existence, since it is greater to exist necessarily than not. You launch some misguided attacks on the notion of necessary existence. You are simply mistaken in thinking that the idea of necessary existence comes from possible worlds semantics. Possible worlds semantics is a fairly recent development, while the concept of God as a necessary being goes back at least centuries. More, your suggestion that to claim that something exists necessarily, I must “search” (whatever that means) all (infinite) possible worlds first is frankly absurd. (I have heard this idea suggested by another atheist on this board before; it makes me wonder what infidel website you are pulling it from). Now since there are (maybe) infinite possible worlds, I could never conclude that anything exists necessarily. Woe is me. Except, this seems obviously wrong. For instance, I seem rationally justified in holding that 2+2 necessarily equals 4. That is, in every possible world 2+2=4. Yet, if I had to “search” all possible worlds until I could conclude that, then I could never finish, and so, never conclude that 2+2 necessarily equals 4, which is obviously absurd! You clearly cannot invalid the notion of necessary existence in this way. (I should note, though, that even if there were some problem with considering God to be a logically necessary being, I could still consider him a factually necessary being (as John Van Engen does), so the existence of God would hardly be imperiled).
So obviously I don’t have to “search” all possible worlds and find God in them in the way you mean, as if possible worlds are like opening an infinite number of boxes and checking inside. Your phrasing this as “search” is badly phrased since it invites this misunderstanding. Possible worlds aren’t parallel universes we look into, a possible world is just a complete description of the way the world could be.
Now, since you are about to try to claim that you personally can “search” two possible worlds and not find God there, and therefore God cannot exist necessarily, let me anticipate this claim. By saying that you can conceive God not existing, you are confusing “metaphysical conceivability” with “imaginability.” You may think that you are imagining a world, and then imagining God not existing in it, but when you really understand what is meant by God as a GCB, then I would deny that God’s non-existence is conceivable, as opposed to merely imaginable.
- Or consider it this way. You can conceive of a Cosmos without conceiving that 2+2=4, but it does not follow that you are conceiving of a cosmos where 2+2 does not equal 4. 2+2 still necessarily equals 4. The same principle applies. It is really far harder to conceive of God not existing than you seem to think.
Another reason you cannot have GC dinner, but can have a GCB is that the characteristics that make up a GCB have maximal traits. Omniscence is the property of knowing only and all truths. One cannot know more truths than that. But such a dinner, on the other hand, could always have more salt, or italian seasonings etc.
More briefly then, your claim that a being that can cease to exist and then recall itself into existence is incoherent as you seem to recognize yourself. Besides the reason you give, such a being would have to be in the position of creating itself, which would mean it would have to be prior to itself, which is obviously absurd. Your gratuitous and irrelevant appeal to Christian “mysteries” is simply a red herrring.