How does God think if he is immutable?

[GEddie]

divine intellect (not mind )

ISTM that it’s not a significant error to speak of the divine “mind.”

Especially since to non-Aquinas-speakers, for the most part, intellect = mind.

Thinking is how a mind gathers knowledge (if a human mind). But knowledge, not thinking, is what makes a mind a mind.

ICXC NIKA.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

When defining a concept all we can do is use more words, upon which you will ask what are the meaning of these words. Lol.

I wouldn’t, I promise!.. Unless you use synonyms.

I think for Aquinas what it means to grasp something is to have the form of the thing in your mind. So while the form of a thing exists in the thing itself, for a mind with an intellect, that form can exist in its mind as well. So for instance while physical objects like a stone can only have one form in them, their own, and so could not possibly be considered intelligent, whereas a mind can hold many forms of other things in them. It can grasp the form of a rock without actually becoming a rock. And all of us with minds can grasp the form of a rock, otherwise we would not be able to talk about rocks.

We are able to talk about God too, but it does not mean that we have the “form” of God in our minds.

Would you say, for example, that the form of a sphere is x2 + y2 + z2 <= r2, (where x, y, and z represent variable numerical values while r represents a fixed numerical value), or something else?

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I think everybody’s thoughts come into internal conflict, driven by the states of their bodies, and by conflict with other persons.
ICXC NIKA

It seems to me that you are moving now towards much more common views. We were talking about processes as something… fundamental. Now, you are talking about bodies, “everybodies” and persons.

 

[GEddie]

It seems to me that you are moving now towards much more common views. We were talking about processes as something… fundamental. Now, you are talking about bodies, “everybodies” and persons.

Well, OK. “Conflict” implies that there is more than a simple process going on. When you brought up “conflict,” ISTM that that raised the ante a notch, because conflict can only occur where persons are involved.

Hydrogen cannot be “in conflict” with oxygen, nor can your hands be in conflict with your legs; but your thoughts can be in conflict inside your head, because your mind makes you a personal being.

ICXC NIKA

 

[fisherman_carl]

I wouldn’t, I promise!.. Unless you use synonyms.

We are able to talk about God too, but it does not mean that we have the “form” of God in our minds.

Would you say, for example, that the form of a sphere is x2 + y2 + z2 <= r2, (where x, y, and z represent variable numerical values while r represents a fixed numerical value), or something else?

That is the formula (comes from latin word form) of a sphere. The definition of a sphere though is a round surface such that every point on it’s surface is equidistant from its centre.

God is not a composite of form and matter. He doesn’t fit into any classification of existing things. As his existence is his essence. He is not a genus of anything.

 

[fisherman_carl]

Aquinas says that “God thinking is his essence”??? Where do you see that?

:

Where is God’s intellect the same as his essence? Because of the doctrine of divine simplicity.

One famous implication of this doctrine is that though we distinguish in thought between God’s eternity, power, goodness, intellect, will, and so forth, in God himself there is no distinction between any of the divine attributes. God’s eternity is his power, which is his goodness, which is his intellect, which is his will, and so on. Indeed, God himself just is his power, his goodness, and so on, just as he just is his existence, and just is his essence. Talking or conceiving of God, God’s essence, God’s existence, God’s power, God’s goodness, and so forth are really all just different ways of talking or conceiving of one and the very same thing. Though we distinguish between them in thought, there is no distinction at all between them in reality. For, again, if there were such a distinction, then we could distinguish parts in God, and being absolutely simple, God has no parts.

(Aquinas, Feser)

 

[eddie_too]

thinking is what created persons do. God is far above us creatures and our concept of thinking.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

That is the formula (comes from latin word form) of a sphere. The definition of a sphere though is a round surface such that every point on it’s surface is equidistant from its centre.

And that is precisely what the equation (or formula) says! (Well, I wrote an inequality, but never mind).

We could eliminate the term “z2” in the inequality and what remains would represent a circle. Or we could add another term, like “w2” and we would get something that we cannot imagine, but which we can conceive, and the three inequalities share the same general form:

x2 + y2 <= r2

x2 + y2 + z2 <= r2

x2 + y2 + z2 + w2 <= r2

Now, when you say that your mind holds the form of the sphere, or the form of the circle, or the form of the other mathematical entity, it is obvious to me that your mind does not become circular, or spherical or, whatever. What happens is that you establish certain variables and determine certain relations between them, and you even might realize that you can generalize those relations to use them in situations which apparently have nothing to do. A similar thing happens when you say your mind holds the form of a rock or any other object. When Mendeleev was classifying the chemical elements that he knew, he realized that there should be some other elements which he did not know yet; but he was able to predict some of their physical chemical properties. When those elements were discovered, it was shown that Mendeleev’s predictions were correct. How could that be? Because he generalized correctly some relations that he had established among the elements that he already knew.

When we say we understand, or comprehend, or have the concept of, or the idea of, or the form of something, it means that we have identified some variables among which we have established a set of relations.

Now, what is a relation? I say that it is a “conatus” whose substrate is our intellectual faculty, or our imagination, or in many instances even our body. I cannot conceive that applied to God. That is a tremendous defect compared to the notion of God as actus purus.

God is not a composite of form and matter. He doesn’t fit into any classification of existing things. As his existence is his essence. He is not a genus of anything.

I don’t know if with this you are trying to respond to my objection (“We are able to talk about God too, but it does not mean that we have the “form” of God in our minds”), but if so, I have to say it is not a proper response.

We are able to talk about God because we have established certain relations between Him and His creatures, which we call “analogies”. This is one of the principal ways in which we, as rational beings, proceed. Now, our analogies can be very poor, and I think that to attribute thoughts to God is one of those very poor analogies. It is hard to me to think that God knows by analogy.

 

[Randy_Carson]

As far as I know the doctrine of immutability does not contradict God having internal thoughts that are characteristic with his nature.

Also, on a related topic is God’s impassability. I looked to see if impassability is a dogma. And I can not find it. God’s immutability is listed. But I don’t see impassable mentioned.
I am looking at holyjoe.org/dogmas.doc. . Is this a dogma that must be believed? If so where is it? And also what do we mean by it? Because some seem to mean that God does not suffer or change internally. While others include that God has no emotion.

Does God having thoughts conflict with him being unchangeable? And if not then what would be the difference with having emotions?. How would that conflict while thoughts do not? How far do we take the doctrine? Any help would be appreciated.

God is not a being. He is being itself.

God does not think. He knows. It might even be said that He is knowledge itself.

(But I would have to check that to be sure before getting dogmatic about it. )

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Well, OK. “Conflict” implies that there is more than a simple process going on. When you brought up “conflict,” ISTM that that raised the ante a notch, because conflict can only occur where persons are involved.

Hydrogen cannot be “in conflict” with oxygen, nor can your hands be in conflict with your legs; but your thoughts can be in conflict inside your head, because your mind makes you a personal being.
ICXC NIKA

Sure, but, still, aren’t we, persons, processes? Or do you think that, in general, what you call a person is not a process?

 

[Gorgias]

Where is God’s intellect the same as his essence?

Hold on a second! You didn’t claim that Aquinas said that “God’s intellect is the same as His essence” – you claimed that God’s thinking is the same as His essence! Big difference, there! Aquinas doesn’t claim that God ‘thinks’.

Because of the doctrine of divine simplicity.

Begging the question. You’re asking whether God thinks, and then – without demonstrating that He thinks – assert that His intellect is His thinking, and His thinking is His essence. That just doesn’t hold up… :nope:

 

[fisherman_carl]

And that is precisely what the equation (or formula) says! (Well, I wrote an inequality, but never mind).

We could eliminate the term “z2” in the inequality and what remains would represent a circle. Or we could add another term, like “w2” and we would get something that we cannot imagine, but which we can conceive, and the three inequalities share the same general form:

x2 + y2 <= r2

x2 + y2 + z2 <= r2

x2 + y2 + z2 + w2 <= r2

Now, when you say that your mind holds the form of the sphere, or the form of the circle, or the form of the other mathematical entity, it is obvious to me that your mind does not become circular, or spherical or, whatever. What happens is that you establish certain variables and determine certain relations between them, and you even might realize that you can generalize those relations to use them in situations which apparently have nothing to do. A similar thing happens when you say your mind holds the form of a rock or any other object. When Mendeleev was classifying the chemical elements that he knew, he realized that there should be some other elements which he did not know yet; but he was able to predict some of their physical chemical properties. When those elements were discovered, it was shown that Mendeleev’s predictions were correct. How could that be? Because he generalized correctly some relations that he had established among the elements that he already knew.

When we say we understand, or comprehend, or have the concept of, or the idea of, or the form of something, it means that we have identified some variables among which we have established a set of relations.

Now, what is a relation? I say that it is a “conatus” whose substrate is our intellectual faculty, or our imagination, or in many instances even our body. I cannot conceive that applied to God. That is a tremendous defect compared to the notion of God as actus purus.

We are able to talk about God because we have established certain relations between Him and His creatures, which we call “analogies”. This is one of the principal ways in which we, as rational beings, proceed. Now, our analogies can be very poor, and I think that to attribute thoughts to God is one of those very poor analogies. It is hard to me to think that God knows by analogy.

I agree with you here. It may be a poor analogy to associate God with having thoughts but we use it all the time. For example, one might ask what does God think about this or that. Most of us don’t talk in philosophical technical terms but in the everyday language. By saying that God does not think like us does not tell us how he does do it. Nor could we ever know. So everything even attributing knowledge and intellect to God is an analogy according to Feser.

 

[fisherman_carl]

Hold on a second! You didn’t claim that Aquinas said that “God’s intellect is the same as His essence” – you claimed that God’s thinking is the same as His essence! Big difference, there! Aquinas doesn’t claim that God ‘thinks’.

Ok, well you still haven’t told me how you are defining thinking or a thought. If you are defining it as a process then of course God doesn’t do it. Since he is immutable. However, you say Aquinas doesn’t claim that God thinks. Yet, he doesn’t even mention the term in the quote you gave. So he doesn’t claim that God does not think either.

Begging the question. You’re asking whether God thinks, and then – without demonstrating that He thinks – assert that His intellect is His thinking, and His thinking is His essence. That just doesn’t hold up… :nope:

Its just an analogy. Even feser uses it in the comments section of the link I gave.

Here is feser using it in an analogy

Hello dguller,

It seems to me that you are misunderstanding Aquinas’s position. Here’s one way to think about it. Suppose we distinguish between:

Picture A:

God has the thought that things in the world can imitate Him in way X.

God has the thought that things in the world can imitate Him in way Y
.
God has the thought that things in the world can imitate Him in way Z.

Etc.

Picture B:

God has the thought that things in the world can imitate Him in ways X, Y, Z, etc.

Now you seem to be attributing to Aquinas something like picture A, which attributes to God several intellectual acts, and thus seems incompatible with divine simplicity. But in fact his position is more like picture B, which attributes to God only a single intellectual act, and is compatible with divine simplicity.

Of course, you might still object that even the single intellectual act attributed to Him in B entails Him having parts corresponding to the distinct concepts for X, Y, Z, etc. But that requires reading the attribution in a univocal rather than analogous way. The claim is that there is in God something analogous to what is going on in us when we have a thought like “Things in the world can imitate God in ways X, Y, Z, etc.” But whereas in us this involves distinction of a sort that is incompatible with simplicity, it doesn’t follow that the divine intellectual act involves this, because the attribution isn’t made univocally.

edwardfeser.blogspot.ca/2012/09/the-divine-intellect.html?m=1
Reply

 

[Gorgias]

Ok, well you still haven’t told me how you are defining thinking or a thought. If you are defining it as a process then of course God doesn’t do it. Since he is immutable.

Precisely. God does not ratiocinate. He possesses ideas, yet He does not think. You’ve got it!

However, you say Aquinas doesn’t claim that God thinks. Yet, he doesn’t even mention the term in the quote you gave. So he doesn’t claim that God does not think either.

Puh-leeze! Just because he doesn’t use the word ‘think’, he doesn’t make the case that God doesn’t do it?!?!?!? Look at the quote again:

t is likewise evident that God’s intellect does not understand in discursive fashion, proceeding from one truth to a knowledge of another, as is the case with our intellect in reasoning. A discursive process of this sort takes place in our intellect when we advance from the known to a knowledge of the unknown, or to that which previously we had not actually thought of. Such processes cannot occur in the divine intellect.

“God’s intellect does not understand in a discursive fashion” – as ours does, by the process of thinking! – and “such processes cannot occur in the divine intellect.” In other words: God. Doesn’t. Think. He simply understands. Don’t know how much more plain it can get…

Its just an analogy. Even feser uses it in the comments section of the link I gave.

No, he doesn’t. In your quote, you aren’t demonstrating that Feser says that “God thinks”; Feser is saying “God has a thought”. In other words, God simply possesses knowledge – that is, ideas (or analogously, ‘thoughts’) – but Feser is not making the claim that you’re making (that is, that God ‘thinks’). In fact, his argument is that one cannot make claim ‘A’ because it implies a process of thinking (i.e., “several intellectual acts”).

 

[fisherman_carl]

Precisely. God does not ratiocinate. He possesses ideas, yet He does not think. You’ve got it!

I agree because as Feser says it would violate divine simplicity. As well as since God is omnipotent.

Puh-leeze! Just because he doesn’t use the word ‘think’, he doesn’t make the case that God doesn’t do it?!?!?!? Look at the quote again:

“God’s intellect does not understand in a discursive fashion” – as ours does, by the process of thinking! – and “such processes cannot occur in the divine intellect.” In other words: God. Doesn’t. Think. He simply understands. Don’t know how much more plain it can get…

Yes if you are defining thinking as always understanding in a discursive fashion then you would come to your conclusions.

No, he doesn’t. In your quote, you aren’t demonstrating that Feser says that “God thinks”; Feser is saying “God has a thought”. In other words, God simply possesses knowledge – that is, ideas (or analogously, ‘thoughts’) – but Feser is not making the claim that you’re making (that is, that God ‘thinks’). In fact, his argument is that one cannot make claim ‘A’ because it implies a process of thinking (i.e., “several intellectual acts”).

I guess to me to think is to have a thought or an idea. Even if it is only one thought. I do like the word ‘intellectual act’ though. Maybe i should be using that word instead as it has less baggage.

I get what you are saying and I agree with you. The problem I am having is to define thinking as always some process of thoughts in a discursive fashion. When i ask how does God think I am assuming it is not going to be like how we humans do it. Such that the definition of thinking for God would be different than for humans. In other words we would be talking about something different for God but using the same word as an analogy. When you say God does not think you should clarify what you mean by that because it sounded like you are saying God is mindless. But now I know that you mean he doesn’t understand through a process. I think the problem has been how we define our terms.