How God could create a being with free will?

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Why we should depend on reasoning and motivation when it comes to a decision making then?
Church teaching is much more developed and insightful than suggesting only reason and emotion are the factors at play in decision making,

In the Church’s understanding there are seven virtues or “powers of the soul” that together factor in the decision making of the will.

Four of these are “natural” though enlivened by grace. Prudence is the virtue that allows the good to be identified or discerned; justice and fortitude strengthen the will to pursue the good; and temperance moderates the effects of appetites and pleasures.

The four virtues along with the three supernatural virtues (faith, hope and charity) empower the will to rationally identify best action toward the final good in any circumstance and carry out the decision to secure it.

It is not simply that reason or motive cause or determine a behaviour, but that in the interplay of appetite, desire, considerations of “the good” in any situation and the influence of grace, the will is empowered by the seven virtues to act, not under impulsion or compulsion, but rather as a free moral agent. The will is not causally determined by any factor but may freely decide a course of action from a number of options.

I would also note that free will is a capacity or power that needs to be exercised, it is not a “given.” The human agent can give in to compulsions and abdicate “free will” over time by allowing themselves to be coerced or act strictly in response to appetite or emotion. In this case, such an agent is a “prisoner” or “captive” or “slave” (in modern parlance, “addicted”) who must be saved from the coercive power of sin by grace.

Free will is the power to act “free from” coercion towards the good. In the Catholic understanding, this is what redemption essentially is - being freed from the coercive power (enslavement) of sin to act towards one’s final best interests. Redemption is essentially the means by which freedom is to be gained.

Some extracts from the Catechism:
1805 Four virtues play a pivotal role and accordingly are called “cardinal”; all the others are grouped around them. They are: prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance …
1806 Prudence is the virtue that disposes practical reason to discern our true good in every circumstance and to choose the right means of achieving it…
1807 Justice is the moral virtue that consists in the constant and firm will to give their due to God and neighbor…
1808 Fortitude is the moral virtue that ensures firmness in difficulties and constancy in the pursuit of the good…
1809 Temperance is the moral virtue that moderates the attraction of pleasures and provides balance in the use of created goods…
The virtues and grace
1810 Human virtues acquired by education, by deliberate acts and by a perseverance ever-renewed in repeated efforts are purified and elevated by divine grace. With God’s help, they forge character and give facility in the practice of the good. The virtuous man is happy to practice them.
1811 It is not easy for man, wounded by sin, to maintain moral balance. Christ’s gift of salvation offers us the grace necessary to persevere in the pursuit of the virtues. Everyone should always ask for this grace of light and strength, frequent the sacraments, cooperate with the Holy Spirit, and follow his calls to love what is good and shun evil.
II. THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES
1812 The human virtues are rooted in the theological virtues, which adapt man’s faculties for participation in the divine nature…
1813 The theological virtues are the foundation of Christian moral activity; they animate it and give it its special character. They inform and give life to all the moral virtues. They are infused by God into the souls of the faithful to make them capable of acting as his children and of meriting eternal life. They are the pledge of the presence and action of the Holy Spirit in the faculties of the human being. There are three theological virtues: faith, hope, and charity.77
1814 Faith is the theological virtue by which we believe in God and believe all that he has said and revealed to us, and that Holy Church proposes for our belief, because he is truth itself. By faith “man freely commits his entire self to God.”…
1817 Hope is the theological virtue by which we desire the kingdom of heaven and eternal life as our happiness…
1818 The virtue of hope responds to the aspiration to happiness which God has placed in the heart of every man; it takes up the hopes that inspire men’s activities and purifies them so as to order them to the Kingdom of heaven; it keeps man from discouragement; it sustains him during times of abandonment; it opens up his heart in expectation of eternal beatitude. Buoyed up by hope, he is preserved from selfishness and led to the happiness that flows from charity…
1822 Charity is the theological virtue by which we love God above all things for his own sake, and our neighbor as ourselves for the love of God.
 
I meant what I said: What you would do if you are in a situation that the outcomes of your decision is not known or you are in a situation that the outcomes are equally likely. Let me give you example of second case: You are in a situation that to chose between A and B but cannot have both. For example reasoning ask you to pick up A but desire ask you to pick up B. Your decision might take time but you eventually you make a decision.

So we agree on that.

You eventually would chose one over another for one reason. I mean if neither reasoning nor motive cannot help you in such a situation then what is the third thing. That is something that people call all it free will. My question is what it this quality if it is possible to define or understand it. It is crucial that we put ourselves in such a thought experiment that neither reasoning not motives could not define the outcome of our decision otherwise we turn to agent controlled by reasoning and motives in all situations and as a result don’t have any virtue like free will.
I gave an explanation for the bolded part, there’s no **ultimate ** explanation as to why you choose one thing over another. You could say that to freely will something does not admit further explanations just as there no further explanations as to why triangles are triangular. This “quality” you find puzzling is simply the will’s ability to choose, period. The will wills just as heat heats.

Reasons are partial explanations as to why we choose something (If there weren’t reasons for something our actions would be random) but they are not ultimate explanations. The ultimate reason for our volitions lies solely on the will’s ability to choose. And that is why I see no force in your thought experiment: It sems that you assume what I deny, namely, that reason is or can be the ultimate explanation for our volitions.
 
Peter Plato:
I would also note that free will is a capacity or power that needs to be exercised, it is not a “given.” The human agent can give in to compulsions and abdicate “free will” over time by allowing themselves to be coerced or act strictly in response to appetite or emotion. In this case, such an agent is a “prisoner” or “captive” or “slave” (in modern parlance, “addicted”) who must be saved from the coercive power of sin by grace.
I would caution here against the notion that we can lose our free will by repeatedly submitting to coercion or appetite/emotion/desires.
 
Church teaching is much more developed and insightful than suggesting only reason and emotion are the factors at play in decision making,

In the Church’s understanding there are seven virtues or “powers of the soul” that together factor in the decision making of the will.

Four of these are “natural” though enlivened by grace. Prudence is the virtue that allows the good to be identified or discerned; justice and fortitude strengthen the will to pursue the good; and temperance moderates the effects of appetites and pleasures.

The four virtues along with the three supernatural virtues (faith, hope and charity) empower the will to rationally identify best action toward the final good in any circumstance and carry out the decision to secure it.

It is not simply that reason or motive cause or determine a behaviour, but that in the interplay of appetite, desire, considerations of “the good” in any situation and the influence of grace, the will is empowered by the seven virtues to act, not under impulsion or compulsion, but rather as a free moral agent. The will is not causally determined by any factor but may freely decide a course of action from a number of options.

I would also note that free will is a capacity or power that needs to be exercised, it is not a “given.” The human agent can give in to compulsions and abdicate “free will” over time by allowing themselves to be coerced or act strictly in response to appetite or emotion. In this case, such an agent is a “prisoner” or “captive” or “slave” (in modern parlance, “addicted”) who must be saved from the coercive power of sin by grace.

Free will is the power to act “free from” coercion towards the good. In the Catholic understanding, this is what redemption essentially is - being freed from the coercive power (enslavement) of sin to act towards one’s final best interests. Redemption is essentially the means by which freedom is to be gained.

Some extracts from the Catechism:
Thank you very much for your post. I however have problem with the concept of soul as I could not understand how it could such a immaterial thing like soul could interact with matter. I however don’t have any problem with those virtues that we can put them in box of motive for a second. I have problem with definition of a couple of virtues but that is outside the topic of discussion of this thread. Now we are going to previous discussion: You have to accept either reasoning A and motive A is enough for behaviour B or not. If yes then what behaviour B is the result of them otherwise you have to tell what other quality could cause behaviour B. Free will for example which is unexplainable quality can allow us to do behaviour B in spite the fact that reasoning A and motive A define behaviour C as a outcome.
 
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Bahman:
I however have problem with the concept of soul as I could not understand how it could such a immaterial thing like soul could interact with matter.
If God is omnipotent (has unlimited power), why can’t He make souls that have limited power (power = the ability to make something happen)? I don’t know why everyone seems to think the interaction problem is valid. It’s such a ridiculous argument, it hardly even requires refutation. The whole thing revolves around the assumption that things need to be of the same nature to interact. What grounds are there for this assumption?
 
How God could create a being with free will?

Because it would have been pointless to create a being without free will. 😉
 
Thank you very much for your post. I however have problem with the concept of soul as I could not understand how it could such a immaterial thing like soul could interact with matter. I however don’t have any problem with those virtues that we can put them in box of motive for a second. I have problem with definition of a couple of virtues but that is outside the topic of discussion of this thread. Now we are going to previous discussion: You have to accept either reasoning A and motive A is enough for behaviour B or not. If yes then what behaviour B is the result of them otherwise you have to tell what other quality could cause behaviour B. Free will for example which is unexplainable quality can allow us to do behaviour B in spite the fact that reasoning A and motive A define behaviour C as a outcome.
Your problem here is that for a causal paradigm to even be plausible you are required to supply a probative “proof” that Cause A results in Effect B inevitably in every instance. That is the burden of proof required to demonstrate a causal relationship.

If I add heat to a thermometer bulb, the alcohol inevitably expands and the level rises in the tube. There is a defined causal relationship between adding heat and a rise in level. You cannot call it a causal relationship if the level of the liquid may or may not rise in the tube if heat is applied.

As soon as you allow either Reason A or Motive A may exist and Behaviour B does not come about, then there is no longer a causal relationship between the antecedent condition and the effect since either Reason A or Motive A may or may not result in the action. Action B is no longer inevitable and, therefore, can not be an effect as per causal relationship.

For example if Reason A exists but Behaviour B does not come about that is sufficient reason for demonstrating a causal relationship is not present. You even admitted as much in Post 99
I have also experience situation in which I neither follow reasoning nor motive. I do agree with you that causal paradigm does not apply to human agency. My question is what it is otherwise? I mean if reasoning A and motive A does not determine behaviour B then what does it?
The answer to your question was provided by DanAl in Post 101: free will.
 
If God is omnipotent (has unlimited power), why can’t He make souls that have limited power (power = the ability to make something happen)? I don’t know why everyone seems to think the interaction problem is valid. It’s such a ridiculous argument, it hardly even requires refutation. The whole thing revolves around the assumption that things need to be of the same nature to interact. What grounds are there for this assumption?
This is beyond the scope of this thread but lets to discuss it anyway.

I agree with you that things have to be in the same nature to interact. The problem arises from the fact that these two quality do not have the same nature so they could not interact and as a result could not have any effects on each other. Simply two beings living in two parallel universes. One need to fuse these two beings together in order to a change on one cause some effect on other and vise versa.
 
Your problem here is that for a causal paradigm to even be plausible you are required to supply a probative “proof” that Cause A results in Effect B inevitably in every instance. That is the burden of proof required to demonstrate a causal relationship.

If I add heat to a thermometer bulb, the alcohol inevitably expands and the level rises in the tube. There is a defined causal relationship between adding heat and a rise in level. You cannot call it a causal relationship if the level of the liquid may or may not rise in the tube if heat is applied.

As soon as you allow either Reason A or Motive A may exist and Behaviour B does not come about, then there is no longer a causal relationship between the antecedent condition and the effect since either Reason A or Motive A may or may not result in the action. Action B is no longer inevitable and, therefore, can not be an effect as per causal relationship.

For example if Reason A exists but Behaviour B does not come about that is sufficient reason for demonstrating a causal relationship is not present. You even admitted as much in Post 99
I agree with you that there are three main attributes, namely reasoning, motive and free will that determine our behaviour. Free will to my understanding is a dominant one. My main problem is that you cannot know what would be the outcome of a decision on a situation because of the presence of free will. This means that we can’t never ever know what would be the outcome of a decision on a situation. This however causes serious problem that I call it unpredictability of free will. When I say something is unpredictable I mean that it is unpredictable from our reference of view and from God reference of view. There are two basic dilemmas arise if you think otherwise:
  1. What would be the point from God point of view to create something which is predictable its point of view?
  2. Moreover how you could fuse two different qualities for one attribute from two reference of views? I mean its quite ironic for me to accept that free will is intrinsically predictable and unpredictable at the same time.
If we could agree upon this fact that our decision is not know to God as well then we deal with a dilemma that how God could create a quality which is unpredictable (or undefinable as I used for my first post) to itself.
 
Bahman said:
2) Moreover how you could fuse two different qualities for one attribute from two reference of views?

I am not sure what you mean by this.
 
I agree with you that there are three main attributes, namely reasoning, motive and free will that determine our behaviour. Free will to my understanding is a dominant one. My main problem is that you cannot know what would be the outcome of a decision on a situation because of the presence of free will. This means that we can’t never ever know what would be the outcome of a decision on a situation.
If you compare animal behaviour to human behaviour, this “unpredictability” issue clearly arises. Animals with less complex nervous systems behave in quite predictable ways, higher order animals do as well, it just takes scientists a longer time to work out the complexities of responses endemic to these animal species.

With humans, however, expectations are wide open.

Look, for example, at how animals, such as birds, build homes. Specific bird species have a well defined pattern in terms of how nests are constructed and these virtually always follow the same technique. With humans, homes are as varied as individuals that live in them.

Arts are another example. The creativity found in human arts is creative precisely because it is unpredictable. No other animal engages in what are properly considered “creative” arts. Unpredictability is part and parcel of what creativity means.

Unpredictability is perhaps the risk that God is willing to take when it comes to human beings. I am not clear why that would be a problem. Creativity (aka unpredictability) would seem to enrich existence, not empoverish it. Sure, there are risks involved, but that goes with the territory.
This however causes serious problem that I call it unpredictability of free will. When I say something is unpredictable I mean that it is unpredictable from our reference of view and from God reference of view. There are two basic dilemmas arise if you think otherwise:
  1. What would be the point from God point of view to create something which is predictable its point of view?
  2. Moreover how you could fuse two different qualities for one attribute from two reference of views? I mean its quite ironic for me to accept that free will is intrinsically predictable and unpredictable at the same time.
If we could agree upon this fact that our decision is not know to God as well then we deal with a dilemma that how God could create a quality which is unpredictable (or undefinable as I used for my first post) to itself.
I am not clear why these “dilemmas” are problematic. What makes a human being “a person” with moral agency rather than a robot or android is that a person is a unique identity capable of originating novel courses of action. In creating human beings, God seems to be willing to accept the risks involved precisely because free agents are unique beings with autonomy and the potential to think out and create new activity and artifacts. This is not a bad thing, in principle, though some outcomes might be undesirable and some, perhaps, even pernicious, but in the balance it would seem to be worth the risk.

Would you rather have a child that is free to be their own being, with creative and unique potential or would you prefer they were completely predictable and robotic?
 
If you compare animal behaviour to human behaviour, this “unpredictability” issue clearly arises. Animals with less complex nervous systems behave in quite predictable ways, higher order animals do as well, it just takes scientists a longer time to work out the complexities of responses endemic to these animal species.

With humans, however, expectations are wide open.

Look, for example, at how animals, such as birds, build homes. Specific bird species have a well defined pattern in terms of how nests are constructed and these virtually always follow the same technique. With humans, homes are as varied as individuals that live in them.

Arts are another example. The creativity found in human arts is creative precisely because it is unpredictable. No other animal engages in what are properly considered “creative” arts. Unpredictability is part and parcel of what creativity means.

Unpredictability is perhaps the risk that God is willing to take when it comes to human beings. I am not clear why that would be a problem. Creativity (aka unpredictability) would seem to enrich existence, not empoverish it. Sure, there are risks involved, but that goes with the territory.

I am not clear why these “dilemmas” are problematic. What makes a human being “a person” with moral agency rather than a robot or android is that a person is a unique identity capable of originating novel courses of action. In creating human beings, God seems to be willing to accept the risks involved precisely because free agents are unique beings with autonomy and the potential to think out and create new activity and artifacts. This is not a bad thing, in principle, though some outcomes might be undesirable and some, perhaps, even pernicious, but in the balance it would seem to be worth the risk.

Would you rather have a child that is free to be their own being, with creative and unique potential or would you prefer they were completely predictable and robotic?
It is problematic since in first case, God creates something which is predictable and in second case we are dealing with a paradox in which our action is predictable from God point of view and unpredictable from our point of view. A quality like free will either is intrinsically predicable or not.

There is another problem arises which is related to my original post. If we accept that free will is an intrinsically unpredictable quality then how God could create a creature with such a quality that its/her/his action is not clear/definable/predictable to God. There is a serious problem in designing the creature since something that its behaviour is unpredictable cannot be designed and as a result cannot be created. It is like that God knows the creature since it is able to create it at the same time doesn’t know it since otherwise the creature could not have free will.
 
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Bahman:
I meant how possibly outcome of free will could be predictable from God reference of view and unpredictable from our reference of view.
God isn’t ‘forseeing’ our actions, he’s already seen them. Since God is outside of time, all time is equally ‘the present’ to him. Thus, he is able to act in the present in light of the future.
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Bahman:
There is another problem arises which is related to my original post. If we accept that free will is an intrinsically unpredictable quality then how God could create a creature with such a quality that its/her/his action is not clear/definable/predictable to God. There is a serious problem in designing the creature since something that its behaviour is unpredictable cannot be designed and as a result cannot be created.
This seems to be begging the question.
 
God isn’t ‘forseeing’ our actions, he’s already seen them. Since God is outside of time, all time is equally ‘the present’ to him. Thus, he is able to act in the present in light of the future.

This seems to be begging the question.
Do you mean that the outcome of free will is unpredictable or unknowable?
 
God isn’t ‘forseeing’ our actions, he’s already seen them. Since God is outside of time, all time is equally ‘the present’ to him. Thus, he is able to act in the present in light of the future.
Do you mean that the outcome of free will is unpredictable or unknowable? One quality like free will cannot be unpredictable and predictable at the same time. The outcome of a situation can however be knowable to God and unknowable to us but that means that free will is just an illusion since we just cannot know the outcome of situation. Free will without unpredictability to my understanding is an illusion.
This seems to be begging the question.
Why it is begging?
 
The outcome of a situation can however be knowable to God and unknowable to us but that means that free will is just an illusion since we just cannot know the outcome of situation and don’t need free will in our decision making since the outcome of a situation is known anyway. Free will without unpredictability to my understanding is an illusion.
This is not correct. There is no connection between a course of action being known by another party and that course of action being unvolitional. Since there are two distinct subjects involved, the subject (human agent) willing and carrying out the action and the subject (God) who knows from eternity what course is taken by the human agent, there is no causal connection between them. God knowing what the agent will do does not determine what the agent will do. God knows what the agent did because the agent did it, the agent did NOT do it because God knows he did it.

CS Lewis discussed this idea of God simply seeing (and not foreseeing) human actions from a perspective in eternity. This means God sees human action as humans create the actions.
But suppose God is outside and above the Time-line. In that case, what we call “tomorrow” is visible to Him in just the same way as what we call today." All the days are “Now” for Him. He does not remember you doing things yesterday, He simply sees you doing them: because, though you have lost yesterday, He has not. He does not “foresee” you doing things tomorrow, He simply sees you doing them: because, though tomorrow is not yet there for you, it is for Him. You never supposed that your actions at this moment were any less free because God knows what you are doing. Well, He knows your tomorrow’s actions in just the same way—because He is already in tomorrow and can simply watch you. In a sense, He does not know your action till you have done it: but then the moment at which you have done it is already “Now” for Him.
C. S. Lewis Mere Christianity Touchstone:New York, 1980 p.149
It could still even be argued that foreknowledge does not “determine” results, either.

Suppose a crystal ball existed that actually revealed specific future events. We would not say that the future event had to come about because the crystal ball determined it to be so. No, whatever factors, including the volitional free will of the agent, that determined the event are still the conditions that brought about the event. The fact that these conditions and the event itself were known or seen is incidental and do not contribute in the least to the outcome event actually transpiring.

Another example can be provided from science itself. That scientific experiments can make causal events predictable - for example, colored alcohol rising in a thermometer when heat is applied - does not mean that the fact they are predictable beforehand is what determines the results to come about. My certain knowledge that pressing my thumb onto the bulb of a thermometer will make the level of alcohol in the tube rise is NOT the cause of the alcohol rising. My knowledge or certainty is not a determining factor in the outcome, in the least. What caused the level to rise was the expansion of alcohol under heat.

Likewise, that God sees or knows the outcome of someone’s free choice is not what determines the outcome, the volitional free will of the agent did create the outcome despite that God knows from eternity what the person freely chose. It was still the person’s free will that “determined” the outcome, not God’s knowledge of it that did. This is still an example of retrospective determinism to claim God’s knowledge affected the outcome.
*Retrospective determinism – the argument that because some event has occurred, its occurrence must have been inevitable beforehand.
*
 
This is not correct. There is no connection between a course of action being known by another party and that course of action being unvolitional. Since there are two distinct subjects involved, the subject (human agent) willing and carrying out the action and the subject (God) who knows from eternity what course is taken by the human agent, there is no causal connection between them. God knowing what the agent will do does not determine what the agent will do. God knows what the agent did because the agent did it, the agent did NOT do it because God knows he did it.
Lets examine a thought experiment to see what would be the consequence of God’s omniscience and free will.

A person reaches to a situation with two choices X and Y at time T and location A.

Does God knows what would be the outcome of that situation? If we assume that God has omniscience (strong) then that means yes. Now assume that God knows that the person chooses X over Y. Now lets to go back to the person and see how he/she is dealing with that situation. The person reaches to that situation at time T and location A and realize that he has two choices, namely X and Y. Then one of the following has to happen
  1. Person chooses X. This doesn’t have any problem with omniscience of God.
  2. Person chooses Y. The problem here is whether the choice was a feasible option at all. Your answer to this question is no. Choice Y is not a feasible option since it oppose the omniscience of God. Now remove the second option and read backward through my statement to see what would you conclude? The conclusion is that the person has only one feasible choice.
Apply this example to every action takes places in our life and see what would you conclude: all our actions are known by God and we have no feasible option to do otherwise since otherwise it contradict God omniscience.
CS Lewis discussed this idea of God simply seeing (and not foreseeing) human actions from a perspective in eternity. This means God sees human action as humans create the actions.

It could still even be argued that foreknowledge does not “determine” results, either.

Suppose a crystal ball existed that actually revealed specific future events. We would not say that the future event had to come about because the crystal ball determined it to be so. No, whatever factors, including the volitional free will of the agent, that determined the event are still the conditions that brought about the event. The fact that these conditions and the event itself were known or seen is incidental and do not contribute in the least to the outcome event actually transpiring.

Another example can be provided from science itself. That scientific experiments can make causal events predictable - for example, colored alcohol rising in a thermometer when heat is applied - does not mean that the fact they are predictable beforehand is what determines the results to come about. My certain knowledge that pressing my thumb onto the bulb of a thermometer will make the level of alcohol in the tube rise is NOT the cause of the alcohol rising. My knowledge or certainty is not a determining factor in the outcome, in the least. What caused the level to rise was the expansion of alcohol under heat.

Likewise, that God sees or knows the outcome of someone’s free choice is not what determines the outcome, the volitional free will of the agent did create the outcome despite that God knows from eternity what the person freely chose. It was still the person’s free will that “determined” the outcome, not God’s knowledge of it that did. This is still an example of retrospective determinism to claim God’s knowledge affected the outcome.
I believe there is an inconsistency between the picture of God being in state if timeless at the same time having the ability to experience us (creation in general). I mean before, now and after have a clear meaning for us as without them, everything would be static from our point of view, there would be not any action, neither any changes. I mean I am here now and will be at other place sometimes later. You could easily observe me and have a understanding from my situation. But God is the sate of timeless, no before, no after… how God could possibly distinguish between those two cases since one of them occurs after another one.
 
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Bahman:
  1. Person chooses Y. The problem here is whether the choice was a feasible option at all. Your answer to this question is no. Choice Y is not a feasible option since it oppose the omniscience of God.
God’s knowledge does not determine the person’s choice, but vice versa. If the person chose Y, then God would have known this already, because he can see the future as clearly as the present.
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Bahman:
But God is the sate of timeless, no before, no after… how God could possibly distinguish between those two cases since one of them occurs after another one.
God can distinguish between any two things that are not identical, since if there is a difference he could spot it easily with his omniscience. In this scenario, there is a difference between X and Y because they are just different choices. Thus, God can tell the difference.
 
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