How is free will possible when God knows every "move" we'll ever take?

[Julia_Mae]

All such conversations as this are ultimately futile…So much Dust in the Wind.

Actually, no one has illustrated that the initial assumption is even correct. No one can. I’ll agree with the futility part.

 

[Julia_Mae]

Julia, I wish you well in your search for truth. Obviously I have been of no help. Resorting to ridicule and insults along with continually telling me what I believe and what my views are rather than asking me for clarification where you obviously misunderstand will get neither of us anywhere.
As I believe you are truly searching for answers and not just argument,

I do not need help, I didn’t insult you, I didn’t tell you what you believe and I am not, in this case, searching for anything. I post on forums to exchange views.

You post something from the CE and you interpret what it says in a way that supports your position. I interpret it in another way, which supports mine.

This whole argument depends on the definition people have of “omniscient” which means making assumptions no one can ever prove. What it comes down to, in fact, is how we perceive God. We differ.

 

[passer_by]

I do not need help, I didn’t insult you, I didn’t tell you what you believe and I am not, in this case, searching for anything. I post on forums to exchange views.

You post something from the CE and you interpret what it says in a way that supports your position. I interpret it in another way, which supports mine.

This whole argument depends on the definition people have of “omniscient” which means making assumptions no one can ever prove. What it comes down to, in fact, is how we perceive God. We differ.

You can differ but the Church through its teachings of Scripture and Tradition have clearly stated what it means.

You are of course allowed to freely choose ANY position even when it is contrary to the church but the fact remains that it is not acceptable for a Catholic to choose certain positions. Please see my previous post in case you missed it.

 

[Julia_Mae]

Your position is known in official terms as “Open Theism” and is not an acceptable position for a Catholic.

Well, you don’t get to decide who is Catholic or not. “Open Theism” is too loose a construction for anyone to be accused of it anyway. And the Church does not require me to believe what you believe, so, let’s just chill with the “not acceptable for a Catholic” unless you are Benedict XVI in disguise.

As for proof that your view is wrong, the following

No, a bunch of Scripture quotes aren’t proof and just lead to playing Scripture Battleship and are always open to personal interpretation, just like the CA reference in another post here.

As to this:

But God protects and governs by His providence all things which He made, “reaching from end to end mightily and ordering all things sweetly” [cf. Wisd. 8:1]. For "all things are naked and open to His eyes [Heb. 4:13], even those which by the free action of creatures are in the future. – (Dei Filius, Vatican I)

I posted some images ITT that demonstrate exactly this: God’s knowledge is perfect as to all things. Which does not presuppose He knows which thing we will choose.

So, I presume we are done here? I am, I cannot state my position more clearly than I have.

 

[passer_by]

LOL! There we go! The refuge of all CAF memebers who find their belifs do not hiold up to ratuional scrutiny is: Your a heretic and not Catholic!!"

Well, you don’t get to decide who is Catholic or not. “Open Theism” is too loose a construction for anyone to be accused of it anyway. And the Church does not require me to believe what you believe, so, let’s just chill with the “not acceptable for a Catholic” unless you are Benedict XVI in disguise.

I think you are a bit over confident about yourself.

Your position that God does not know human choices is unacceptable for a Catholic. You are directly contradicting what Vatican I taught

"But God protects and governs by His providence all things which He made, “reaching from end to end mightily and ordering all things sweetly” [cf. Wisd. 8:1]. For “all things are naked and open to His eyes [Heb. 4:13], even those which by the free action of creatures are in the future”. – (Dei Filius, Vatican I)

So I would think its pretty clear to anyone.

No, a bunch of Scripture quotes aren’t proof and just lead to playing Scripture Battleship and are always open to personal interpretation, just like the CA reference in another post here.

Sigh, what can I say. You seem to have already decided you are right and want to find confirmation. Thats not how Catholicism works. It tells you what is true. You can either take it or leave it.

In this case, Vatican I has clearly stated how it interprets Divine foreknowledge. The Tradition of the church is also very clear about it.

As to this:
I posted some images ITT that demonstrate exactly this: God’s knowledge is perfect as to all things. Which does not presuppose He knows which thing we will choose.

Well, it doesn’t matter what you think. Because Vatican I TAUGHT what God knows from foreknowledge. It said that God knows “even those which by the free action of creatures are in the future”. So really, I think it better to admit you were wrong and ‘chill’ a bit

 

[juno24]

I do not need help, I didn’t insult you, I didn’t tell you what you believe and I am not, in this case, searching for anything. I post on forums to exchange views.

You post something from the CE and you interpret what it says in a way that supports your position. I interpret it in another way, which supports mine.

This whole argument depends on the definition people have of “omniscient” which means making assumptions no one can ever prove. What it comes down to, in fact, is how we perceive God. We differ.

Fine. You are not searching for truth. My mistake. You did not tell me what my views are when you said, “In your view” and “according to your view,” and then twisting what I said. Again, my mistake. LOL!
I made no interpretation regarding the article in the CE. I simply presented it for your reading and then let you know that the article actually discusses your stated view (both in favor of and against). Oh, but again, I must be mistaken in thinking you said I made an interpretation when I did no such thing. My mistake.

And you did not insult another poster when you replied, “LOL! There we go! The refuge of all CAF memebers who find their belifs do not hiold up to ratuional scrutiny is: Your a heretic and not Catholic!!”" nor ridicule my statements (note, I never said you insulted or ridiculed ME). Again, my mistake.

This thread is no longer productive for me, so I will leave it you and others who may wish to continue.

 

[JRKH]

Originally Posted by JRKH View Post
All such conversations as this are ultimately futile…So much Dust in the Wind.

Exactly.

So perhaps we should all ask ourselves how much effort, energy and emotion we wish to put into something that is futile…

Better to leave this to God and move on to fulfilling things like “When I was thirsty…When I was hungry…” - - this will help us reach heaven, where discussing predestination will not.

Just some thoughts

Peace
James

 

[belorg]

No. Because the 2nd would be a false proposition about John. So its not that John can’t prevent himself from buying the book. It’s just that John will never FREELY choose to NOT buy the book.

What you are descibing here is compatibilist free will, not libertarian free will. LFW is, by definition, counterfactual. In order for LFW to obtain, there must be a possible world in which P chooses A and a possible world in which P chooses ~A

How does it follow from the proposition

(1) P in every possible world freely chooses to do A

that

(2) There is no Libertarian Free will?

Because it’s contrary to the definition of LFW. In order for LFW to obtain it must be possible for P to choose ~A, IOW there must be a possible world in which he does choose ~A

I would think to the contrary that Proposition (1) shows that P has libertarian free will. Why? Because no matter what takes place in every possible world causally prior to P making the choice, P would still follow his free will and choose A.

No, because what you describe here is a determined choice. P always chooses A, no matter what happens is true under determinism, but it cannot be true under non-determinism. It would mean that God created P in such a way that P in every situation chooses A.
Again, I am not denying that there is compatibilist free will here, but definitely not libertarian free will.

So it is not that P CANNOT choose ~A. It just happens that P would NEVER choose ~A. This might be what is throwing you off.

No, you are confused here, if ther is no possible world in which P chooses ~A, then P CANNOT choose ~A. The two staements are logically equivalent.
‘It just happens that P would never choose P’ actually translates as ‘there is a possible world in which P never chooses ~A and this possible world happens to be the actual world’, but your scenario translates as 'there is no possible world ijn which P chooses ~A, or even ‘necessarily, P chooses A’ …

Do you see the difference?

There is no difference. ‘There is no possible world in which P chooses ~A’ means completely the same as ‘P cannot choose ~A’. You are confusing possible worlds with actual future states. It is true that ‘there is no actual future state in which P chooses ~A’ does not mean ‘P cannot choose ~A’. But here we are talking about hypothetcial counterfactuals, and in your scenario there is no counterfactual to ‘P chooses A’.

 

[tonyrey]

1. Why should foresight be radically different from hindsight?
2. That assumption is based on the fallacy Post hoc ergo propter hoc.
3. It stems from the false belief that a cause must always precede the effect.
4. It overlooks the distinction between an efficient cause and a final cause.
5. It implies that decisions are not caused by the decision-maker.
6. It reduces purposes to results.
7. It implicitly equates autonomous persons with biological machines!

Silence implies assent!

 

[passer_by]

What you are descibing here is compatibilist free will, not libertarian free will. LFW is, by definition, counterfactual. In order for LFW to obtain, there must be a possible world in which P chooses A and a possible world in which P chooses ~A

What you say is a bit of self-contradiction is it not?

If there is a possible world that P necessary wills to do ~A, then how can that person be free?

I think you are misunderstanding free-will here. ~A is a possible action for P. But P just doesn’t choose ~A.

Because it’s contrary to the definition of LFW. In order for LFW to obtain it must be possible for P to choose ~A, IOW there must be a possible world in which he does choose ~A

Yes, and I do not disagree with that point.

You are confusing ‘possible for P to choose ~A’ with a world must exist that P will choose ~A. Libertarian free-will does not necessitate that there MUST be such a world.

No, because what you describe here is a determined choice. P always chooses A, no matter what happens is true under determinism, but it cannot be true under non-determinism. It would mean that God created P in such a way that P in every situation chooses A.
Again, I am not denying that there is compatibilist free will here, but definitely not libertarian free will.

I think its still the confusion here. But to add a bit more, think about it this way. If I could put you in different circumstance and realize that you WILL choose to be a Theist, do you think you are free?

No, you are confused here, if ther is no possible world in which P chooses ~A, then P CANNOT choose ~A. The two staements are logically equivalent.
‘It just happens that P would never choose P’ actually translates as ‘there is a possible world in which P never chooses ~A and this possible world happens to be the actual world’, but your scenario translates as 'there is no possible world ijn which P chooses ~A, or even ‘necessarily, P chooses A’ …

Aah, I think I sort of see the problem now.

When one says that ~A is never chosen by P, it does not necessarily mean that ~A is a meaningless proposition.

Why?

Because the reason ~A never occurs is because P just never chooses ~A. Actually, the very reason that such a world exists where P will never choose ~A means that he is FREE. There is nothing you can do, or no circumstance you can put him in that will bring about ~A.

There is no difference. ‘There is no possible world in which P chooses ~A’ means completely the same as ‘P cannot choose ~A’. You are confusing possible worlds with actual future states. It is true that ‘there is no actual future state in which P chooses ~A’ does not mean ‘P cannot choose ~A’. But here we are talking about hypothetcial counterfactuals, and in your scenario there is no counterfactual to ‘P chooses A’.

Ok, there is a distinction that you have made here with respect to contingent acts and actual acts.

Your mistake here is a different matter. Postulating from P doesn’t choose ~A that P is not free is the error.

It does not logically follow. If it does, please demonstrate.

This error might also be why you think Molinism is flawed in reconciling libertarian free will with Providence.

 

[belorg]

What you say is a bit of self-contradiction is it not?

If there is a possible world that P necessary wills to do ~A, then how can that person be free?

That’s not what I am saying, but it is what Molinism entails.

I think you are misunderstanding free-will here. ~A is a possible action for P.

If ~A is a possible action for P, then there is a possible world in which P chooses ~A. that’s the definition of LFW.

But P just doesn’t choose ~A.

There is no possible world in which P chooses ~A. That’s waht Molinism entails. No LFW.

Yes, and I do not disagree with that point.

What do you mean by ‘yes’ if you don’t agree with it?

You are confusing ‘possible for P to choose ~A’ with a world must exist that P will choose ~A. Libertarian free-will does not necessitate that there MUST be such a world.

LFW necessitates that there is such a possible world.

I think its still the confusion here. But to add a bit more, think about it this way. If I could put you in different circumstance and realize that you WILL choose to be a Theist, do you think you are free?

You mean free in the libertarian sense? I do not quite understand your scenario here, but No, I don’t think that in such a situation I would have LFW.

Aah, I think I sort of see the problem now.

When one says that ~A is never chosen by P, it does not necessarily mean that ~A is a meaningless proposition.

It’s not a meaningless proposition, it is just that P chooses ~A is logically impossible.

Why?

Because the reason ~A never occurs is because P just never chooses ~A.

The reason why P never chooses à is because it is impossible, There is no possibible wolrd in which he does so.

Actually, the very reason that such a world exists where P will never choose ~A means that he is FREE.

I’m not talking about a possible world in which P will never choose ~A, I am talking about the fact that in every possible world (that is the same as necessarily), P will never choose ~A. That is a direct contradiction with LFW.

There is nothing you can do, or no circumstance you can put him in that will bring about ~A.

That’s true, but that does no entail frre will.

Ok, there is a distinction that you have made here with respect to contingent acts and actual acts.

Your mistake here is a different matter. Postulating from P doesn’t choose ~A that P is not free is the error.

I do not postulate that P is not free, I postulate that He does not have libertarian free will.

It does not logically follow. If it does, please demonstrate.

The definition of LFW (or counterfactual free will) enatils that there is a counterfactual to every choice, IOW there must be a possibility to choose A or ~A. But Molinism denies this, hence Molinism is incompatible with Libertarian Free will.

This error might also be why you think Molinism is flawed in reconciling libertarian free will with Providence.

Molinism is flawed in reconciling LFW with Providence, yes.

 

[JDaniel]

Pardon me for this butt-in, but,

1.) Is God Infinite?

2.) Is God Eternal?

3.) Is God omnipotent?

4.) Is God omni-love?

Therefore,

If He is all of these things (attributes) then many of us, on this thread, are operating from a rather naive notion of God.

Firstly, if God is Infinite, then He is outside of (our) Time;

Secondly, if God is Eternal, then He encompasses (our) Time;

Thirdly, if God is Omnipotent then He is capable of knowing precisely what each and every creature has, is, or will do, within the confines our our finite world and time.

Fourthly, if He is omni-Love, He might not create the place called Hell we are considering.

Therefore,

From “Firstly,” if one agrees that God is Infinite, then it really doesn’t matter whether or not He knows our “choices.” Wouldn’t that in fact mean that He witnesses them within the duration of an Eternal moment? Now, I realize that this sounds contradictory, but, how else can an Infinite Being perfectly comprehend the finite? Remember, all of this (and us) is a God-thought, which is completely understood by Him in a God-instant. Therefore, His Infinity is whence comes His Omniscience, at least where we are concerned.

From, “Secondly,” this merely (well, not merely, per se) reiterates the notions just given. Therefore, the conclusion from “First” can be attained in this way as well.

From, “Thirdly,” omniscience logically follows from First and Second. Analogically, when one looks down upon a mouse in a maze, does one not see each and every move the mouse makes?

And, finally, from “Fourthly,” nowhere does the Church tell us that there are People in hell. All we know is that there are lapsed Angels there, somewhere. We don’t even know if Hitler is there. So, how can we extrapolate that some of our activities will necessarily result in our being sent to hell? All we know is that we are able to, somehow, remove ourselves from ever seeing God’s Face. Ever.

We begin by being Freely supplied with Sufficient Grace. We can either choose to continue receiving it and the other Graces, or, we can choose to reject them. Many people that die have eternality changing epiphanies just before dying. But, in any event, God has provided all of us with a means of escape. It is called, Purgatory. That is not a place in which I would wish to remain for ever, but I know I will no doubt be there for a duration. If enough living compatriots will pray for my speedy release, I hope to be seeing His Face directly.

God bless,
jd

 

[passer_by]

Molinism is flawed in reconciling LFW with Providence, yes.

Ok let us say that what you said above is true. We can go back and forth at this for weeks but I think its a bit needless since for me its not a big deal if Molinism is false.

Now the problem for you is that there are other systems of thought that do reconcile Providence and Libertarian free-will.

What do you think of the solution by Fr. William G. Most?

ewtn.com/library/scriptur/predesti.txt

That is considered a pretty nifty solution and I would be very much interested to hear your thoughts on it.

 

[belorg]

Ok let us say that what you said above is true. We can go back and forth at this for weeks but I think its a bit needless since for me its not a big deal if Molinism is false.

Now the problem for you is that there are other systems of thought that do reconcile Providence and Libertarian free-will.

What do you think of the solution by Fr. William G. Most?

ewtn.com/library/scriptur/predesti.txt

That is considered a pretty nifty solution and I would be very much interested to hear your thoughts on it.

This seems to be a a variation on the “God knowns what you will freely choose” theme.
The problems with this are less obvious than with Molinism, but nevertheless exist.

Let’s take a simple example.
God knows that I will drink wine this evening. In this view, this would translate as God knows that I will freely choose to drink wine this evening. So far, so good. But let’s add a little something.
The only way for God to know this with 100% certainty is if it is true that I will drink wine.
Now, God can tell me this truth. Now I am not such a great fan of the Christian God, so if I can prove Him wrong, I will freely choose to do so. So, if God tells me, I will definitely NOT drink wine this evening. But since it is a truth that I will drink wine, we have a contradiction. If it is true that I will drink wine, then I cannot freely decide not to drink wine.
Hence, foreknowldge is not compatible with lmibertarin free will in this “solution”.

 

[passer_by]

This seems to be a a variation on the “God knowns what you will freely choose” theme.
The problems with this are less obvious than with Molinism, but nevertheless exist.

Let’s take a simple example.
God knows that I will drink wine this evening. In this view, this would translate as God knows that I will freely choose to drink wine this evening. So far, so good. But let’s add a little something.
The only way for God to know this with 100% certainty is if it is true that I will drink wine.
Now, God can tell me this truth. Now I am not such a great fan of the Christian God, so if I can prove Him wrong, I will freely choose to do so. So, if God tells me, I will definitely NOT drink wine this evening. But since it is a truth that I will drink wine, we have a contradiction. If it is true that I will drink wine, then I cannot freely decide not to drink wine.
Hence, foreknowldge is not compatible with lmibertarin free will in this “solution”.

I am a little confused here. Perhaps you will have to be rigorous on what you are saying.

You are essentially saying what you are about to prove. i.e. Foreknowledge and free-will are incompatible.

So you say that God already knows what you are about to do. Then you say that because he knows it, you have no free choice. But that already assumes what you are about to prove.

Now it might be that you meant something else. But if I take what you said above, I think your objection is circular in nature and hence invalid. Do you see what I mean?

 

[belorg]

I am a little confused here. Perhaps you will have to be rigorous on what you are saying.

You are essentially saying what you are about to prove. i.e. Foreknowledge and free-will are incompatible.

So it seems, yes.

So you say that God already knows what you are about to do.

Well, that’s thed efinition of foreknowledge, isn’t it?

Then you say that because he knows it, you have no free choice.

No, that’s not what I am saying.

But that already assumes what you are about to prove.

Now it might be that you meant something else. But if I take what you said above, I think your objection is circular in nature and hence invalid. Do you see what I mean?

If that were my argument, it would be circular. But that’s not my argument.

 

[tonyrey]

Knowledge exists in the mind and has no bearing on what occurs in other minds!

 

[passer_by]

So it seems, yes.

Well, that’s thed efinition of foreknowledge, isn’t it?

No, that’s not what I am saying.

If that were my argument, it would be circular. But that’s not my argument.

Well, I am happy that it is not your argument but would you perhaps restate it more rigorously so that me or someone else could understand it?

 

[belorg]

Well, I am happy that it is not your argument but would you perhaps restate it more rigorously so that me or someone else could understand it?

I don’t know what’s so difficult to understand about my argument, but I’ll try to explain it a bit more.

1 God has complete foreknowledge of the future
2 Assumption: God knows (with 100% certainty) that I will freely choose to have a beer tomorrow.
3 That means that it is true now that I will freely choose to have a beer tomorrow.
4 God is omnipotent, so He can communicate all truths.
5 “I’ll freely choose to have a beer tomorrow” is a truth. (from 3)
6 God tells me today that I will freely choose to have a beer tomorrow.
7 I want to prove God wrong so I refuse to have a beer tomorrow.
now 7 contradicts 3.
Conclusion : libertarian Free Will is incompatible with complete foreknowledge.

Now, you may not agree with this argument, or there may even be flaws in it, but it is definitely not circular.

 

[belorg]

Knowledge exists in the mind and has no bearing on what occurs in other minds!

You mean that someone knowing what’s in your mind does not affect what’s in your mind?
That’s true, but my argument does not entail that God’s knowledge changes anything in your or my mind.