How is free will possible when God knows every "move" we'll ever take?

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No, I am assuming no such thing. I am assuming that God knows and therefore can tell the truth, but that if ‘I will drink beer is a truth’ , I cannot choose not to drink beer, so I am not free in the libertarian sense

That’s ,again, assuming Molinism. If you want to continue discussing Molinism, then just say so, but try not to mess up things.

Yes, through Middle Knowledge, you might know this.

I debated Middel Knowledge on a totally different basis, and you were the one claiming that Middle Knowledge isn’t essential to your views. But it seems it is, because you keep bringing it up.

I am open to all objections, provided they stay on topic and do not mess things up.
It appears to me that you are making a bad assumption. That being “I will drink a beer is a truth” is an absolute truth. This is not the case. It is a contingent truth. It is contingent on you actually making the choice to drink a beer. So, until you actually make the choice “I will drink a beer” is neither true nor false.
 
**The creator’s plan of the universe would thus be left blank as to many of its actual details, but all possibilities would be marked down. **The realization of some of these would be left absolutely to chance; that is, would only be determined when the moments of realization came. Other possibilities would be *contingently *determined; that is, their decision would have to wait till it was seen how the matters of absolute chance fell out. But the rest of the plan, including its final upshot, would be rigorously determined once for all. So the creator himself would not need to know all the details of actuality until they came; and at any time his own view of the world would be a view partly of facts and partly of possibilities, exactly as ours is now. Of one thing, however, he might be certain; and that is that his world was safe, and that no matter how much of it might zigzag he could surely bring it home at last."

des.emory.edu/mfp/JamesDilemmaOfDeterminism.html
Tony

The title of this thread was
“How is free will possible when God knows every “move” we’ll ever take?”

This quote from William James does not speak of a God who knows every move we’ll ever take.
So, James’s view may be correct, but it is no objection to any argument I have made here.
 
It appears to me that you are making a bad assumption. That being “I will drink a beer is a truth” is an absolute truth. This is not the case. It is a contingent truth. It is contingent on you actually making the choice to drink a beer. So, until you actually make the choice “I will drink a beer” is neither true nor false.
Then, until I actually make the choice, God cannot know through factual foreknowledge whether I will drink beer or not, which actually proves my point.

God might know this through Middle Knowledge, but not through factual foreknowledge.
 
Then, until I actually make the choice, God cannot know through factual foreknowledge whether I will drink beer or not, which actually proves my point.
It seem to me you point is only proven if you can show that God is contrained to time.
God might know this through Middle Knowledge, but not through factual foreknowledge.
Since God exists in the eternal now, the term foreknowledge is a meaningles term from God’s perspective.
 
It seem to me you point is only proven if you can show that God is constrained to time.
I don’t have to show this. My argument works the same way with a time-traveller. I wouldn’t say a time-traveller is constrained by time.
Since God exists in the eternal now, the term foreknowledge is a meaningles term from God’s perspective.
You are actually right, but that proves my point. If my drinking beer is part of the eternal now, then my not drinking beer isn’t. Which means everything is determined, and God telling me I will drink beer means that I will drink beer and I cannot freely decide not to

And how does is an ‘eternal now’ compatible with ‘until you actually make the choice “I will drink a beer” is neither true nor false.’ For God, if ‘"I will drink beer’ is eternally ‘now’, it is true before I actually make the choice, unless I also make this choice in the eternal now.
 
We are not talking about a future God ‘wants to bring about’. You are still assuming Molinism here. I am arguing against the compatibility of factual foreknowledge with libertarian free will, not against the possibility of counterfactual foreknowledge (aka as Middle Knowledge).
Factual foreknowledge means knowledge of future facts.
‘I will drink beer tomorrow’ , if known by God through pure or factual foreknowledge means that it is true that I will drink beer tomorrow but if he communicates this knowledge, I, as a free being, have the possibility to do exactly the opposite of the ‘truth’ God tells me, which means the ‘thruth’ God tells me isn’t a truth.
Sure God telling something would be part of my future, the problem is that God can decide to tell me I will drink beer, or God can decide to tell me I won’t drink beer and know the outcome in advance, but he cannot tell me the truth and know the outcome in advance, because there is always a chance, provided LFW is true, that I will do something else.
Buddy, I don’t know how many ways to tell you the same thing.

You are assuming a proposition from the set of factual foreknowledge. YES. But you are then disproving something that was not part of that set of factual foreknowledge.

To break this down to you

You first assume that “Belrog will freely have a glass of wine tomorrow” is factual. If that is factual, then obviously God is not going to tell you that. It is factual because he has ALREADY decided not to tell you about it and bring about that truth.

But then you go and create a dilemma. You say God will tell you about it. But then that truth you assumed as ACTUAL was not true to begin with. So your argument fails.

If indeed the truth was already actual, then God won’t tell you about it and you will drink the wine.

This is really simple but for some reason you keep missing the point. Your thought experiment is faulty.
 
Tony

The title of this thread was
“How is free will possible when God knows every “move” we’ll ever take?”

This quote from William James does not speak of a God who knows every move we’ll ever take.
So, James’s view may be correct, but it is no objection to any argument I have made here.
The OP specified that “At times I’ve thought that even though he gives us free will he knows what we ultimately will do”. He added:
I know that some people don’t think it’s not a trivial matter but maybe I’m saying that because I’d rather not know my ultimate fate because it might cause some like** predestination** paradox.
 
Neil, 46, Amsterdam
“This is my second time that I used Levitra. It is ok medication able to solve my erection problems. It worked me up as with other similar drugs I was lost.”
Kamagra, Female Viagra, Viagra Super Active, Proscar Etc
 
How is free will possible when God knows everything we’ll do? Simple.

God did make us, yes, and He does know everything we’ll do, but predestination is not inherent to that. I’m sure there have been quite a few examples, but here is one:

I go out to a river. Then I craft a boat, which will be piloted by a squirrel, and sail it down the river. Is the squirrel predestined to sail down the river? Yes, but is he predestined to dock in a specific place down the river? No.

God may have made us and our surroundings, and He knows where we are going, but He does not force us to do anything other than to go down a general path. Think of the squirrel in his boat. He IS going down a general path with limited options, but if he knows how to steer the boat he can choose where exactly he goes down that path - that’s free will. God has us on a similar path, and we have the ability to alter our course. The only difference between you watching a squirrel and God watching you is that you don’t know where exactly the squirrel will land. God knows where we will go though, and even though He does, He respects our free wills enough to refrain from directly altering our courses.

If you really want to believe the notion that we are predestined then go ahead, but if the Church has this issue set in stone, I highly doubt its worth continuing to do so. The Church is comprised of over 2000-years-worth of knowledge - how about you? One can convince himself of anything he wants to if he pleases, so the only reason I personally can see for believing in predestination is to alienate one’s self from the Church’s doctrine. I’m not saying that every person who believes in predestination is trying to undermine the Church, or that we shouldn’t question our beliefs *, but when logic comes knocking, it’s disgraceful, stupid and ignorant not to at least answer the door and consider all the options.

In other words - none of the Church’s teachings have been disproved to this very day, and since the Church says we are not predestined, and there is nothing to contradict that statement unless one creates his own flawed philosophical laws to compete, I think it is quite logical and safe to agree.*
 
Buddy, I don’t know how many ways to tell you the same thing.

You are assuming a proposition from the set of factual foreknowledge. YES. But you are then disproving something that was not part of that set of factual foreknowledge.

To break this down to you

You first assume that “Belorg will freely have a glass of wine tomorrow” is factual. If that is factual, then obviously God is not going to tell you that.
That’s the whole point. If it is factual, then whether God tells me or not would not make a difference to the outcome. The fact that God can tell (not necessaroly does tell) me about it means that it is factual.
The reason why God would not be able to tell me is that the future is NOT factual, because, as lots of people here claim: free will decisions aren’t factual by counterfactual

IOW factual foreknowledge (as in ‘to God the future is present’) is incompatible with counterfactual free will (or libertarian free will), which is, to use your favourite phrase “really simple but for some reason you keep missing the point”.
To reconcile foreknowledge with LFW, you have to appeal to Middle Knowldge.
It is factual because he has ALREADY decided not to tell you about it and bring about that truth.
And thta’s exactly what you do here. God 'bringing abouit( a certain future entails Middle Knowledge, which in this argument I wasn’t assuming, and which you said wasn’t necessary for your view. As it turns out, your view collpases without Molinism, so we had better discuss this instead of discussing something we actually both agree on, but for some reason you do not want to admit it.
But then you go and create a dilemma. You say God will tell you about it.
No, I don’t say thta. I am saying that God can tell me.
But then that truth you assumed as ACTUAL was not true to begin with. So your argument fails.
No, the arguiment does not fail, because that’s exactly what the argument is trying to establish, namely that, because of God’s ability to tell all truths, ‘I will freely drink beer tomorrow’ cannot be a truth, because it is dependent on God telling or not telling
If indeed the truth was already actual, then God won’t tell you about it and you will drink the wine.
So, the truth is NOT actual, which is my point.
This is really simple but for some reason you keep missing the point. Your thought experiment is faulty.
Well, just read my argument more carefully before you start patronizing me.
 
That’s the whole point. If it is factual, then whether God tells me or not would not make a difference to the outcome. The fact that God can tell (not necessaroly does tell) me about it means that it is factual.
The reason why God would not be able to tell me is that the future is NOT factual, because, as lots of people here claim: free will decisions aren’t factual by counterfactual

IOW factual foreknowledge (as in ‘to God the future is present’) is incompatible with counterfactual free will (or libertarian free will), which is, to use your favourite phrase “really simple but for some reason you keep missing the point”.
To reconcile foreknowledge with LFW, you have to appeal to Middle Knowldge.
IF IT IS FACTUAL it does not mean that it is true regardless of what God tells your or not. How did that come about? Because God telling you or not is also already FACTUAL.

I am not patronizing you either, I think its quiet evident to anyone that your argument has an error.

You are jumping between different assumptions within your own argument.

Whats worse, you are implicitly assuming things as true that have nothing to do with foreknowledge.

If God knows something factual about your future, that means God has already decided whether he will be telling you or not as well. Therefore you would do exactly what God knows. But you keep saying that God is now going to tell you about it, which was not part of the original factual truth, and you will decide otherwise. I don’t think that even means any logical sense 🤷 God telling you was also either part of the fact. But you keep talking at the beginning as if it wasn’t. Then toward the end of the argument you talk about the dilemma that happens when God talks to you.

Your argument is essentially of this form
  1. It is a known fact that all houses are blue for all time
  2. But if its a fact, and am told, then I will paint my house green
  3. Oh, but it contradicts (1)
  4. Therefore, there are no facts about houses
The conclusion you make is the most bizarre one ever. By bizzare I mean the most illogical.

Correct conclusions would be that

*) “All houses are blue” was never a fact to begin with.
*) Premise (2) is never going to happen since (1) is fact so premise (2) is invalid

So in short, your argument is flawed but you want me to take it seriously. Perhaps there is something important that you really have observed here. But your current argument really isn’t doing you any favors in conveying it.
 
IF IT IS FACTUAL it does not mean that it is true regardless of what God tells your or not. How did that come about? Because God telling you or not is also already FACTUAL.
What excatly would God be telling me that is factual.The point is, his telling me the truth CANNOT be factual unless there is no free will.

A. God tells me I will drink beer so I freely decide not to drink beer.
B. God tells me I won’t drink beer so I freely decide to drink beer

Now, one of this is factual.
But the point is , if A is factual, then if God tells me I will drink beer, he doesn’t tell the truth, and if B is factual, God doesn’t tell the truth either.
And, what’s more, God cannot tell the truth, because if it is factual that he tells me, it is no longer the truth.
I am not patronizing you either, I think its quite evident to anyone that your argument has an error.
I think it’s quite evident to everyone that you simply do not understand tyhe argumennt.
You are jumping between different assumptions within your own argument.
No, I am not.
If God knows something factual about your future, that means God has already decided whether he will be telling you or not as well. Therefore you would do exactly what God knows.
As I have demonstarted, you are wrong, because God cannot possible know the truth and tell about it at the same time.
But you keep saying that God is now going to tell you about it, which was not part of the original factual truth, and you will decide otherwise.
I am not teling that such was not part of the original truth, that’s a strawman.
I don’t think that even means any logical sense 🤷 God telling you was also either part of the fact.
Of course it was.
But you keep talking at the beginning as if it wasn’t.
No I don’t. That’s yoyr erroneous interpretation of my argument.
Then toward the end of the argument you talk about the dilemma that happens when God talks to you.
Your argument is essentially of this form
  1. It is a known fact that all houses are blue for all time
  2. But if its a fact, and am told, then I will paint my house green
  3. Oh, but it contradicts (1)
  4. Therefore, there are no facts about houses
The conclusion you make is the most bizarre one ever. By bizzare I mean the most illogical.
If you prefer to k,ock down a srtawman instead of trying to refute my actual arguemnt, then be my guest, passer.
So in short, your argument is flawed but you want me to take it seriously.
I want you to read it and point to the flaw in my actual argument, not in your strawman version of it.
Perhaps there is something important that you really have observed here. But your current argument really isn’t doing you any favors in conveying it.
I don’t think you’ll ever understand it, but maybe someone else will.
 
What excatly would God be telling me that is factual.The point is, his telling me the truth CANNOT be factual unless there is no free will.
So you are already assuming what you are about to prove.

That’s not a deductive argument.
A. God tells me I will drink beer so I freely decide not to drink beer.
B. God tells me I won’t drink beer so I freely decide to drink beer
What part of God knowing that factually you will drink beer requires him to TELL YOU about it?

Perhaps he is not going to tell you and that is why IT IS FACTUAL.
Now, one of this is factual.
But the point is , if A is factual, then if God tells me I will drink beer, he doesn’t tell the truth, and if B is factual, God doesn’t tell the truth either.
And, what’s more, God cannot tell the truth, because if it is factual that he tells me, it is no longer the truth.
You are creating a false dilemma here. Why does God have to TELL YOU ANYTHING? Foreknowledge does not entail FORETELLING.
I think it’s quite evident to everyone that you simply do not understand tyhe argumennt.
I see. Well as far as I can understand, there really is no argument. You are either assuming what you are about to prove or you are assuming things like “God has to tell me what he knows” so it creates a dilemma then.
As I have demonstarted, you are wrong, **because God cannot possible know the truth and tell about it **at the same time.
Pay attention to the bolded part above. Your words not mine.

Which part of Divine foreknowledge required God to tell you truths from that knowledge?

So you have been attacking a straw man all along. Good job!
I am not teling that such was not part of the original truth, that’s a strawman.
Yep, I get you now. You are attacking a straw man. Divine foreknowledge does not entail Divine foretelling.
If you prefer to k,ock down a srtawman instead of trying to refute my actual arguemnt, then be my guest, passer.

I want you to read it and point to the flaw in my actual argument, not in your strawman version of it.
Quiet ironically, your argument is attacking a straw man. In your own words, you are trying to show that “God cannot possible know the truth and tell about it at the same time”

But that is irrelevant to Divine foreknowledge since nothing about it says that God needs to tell you anything.
I don’t think you’ll ever understand it, but maybe someone else will.
Oh I think I understand it pretty well. Please understand what Divine foreknowledge is first.
 
What part of God knowing that factually you will drink beer **requires **him to TELL YOU about it?

Perhaps he is not going to tell you and that is why IT IS FACTUAL.

You are creating a false dilemma here. Why does God **have to **TELL YOU ANYTHING? Foreknowledge does not entail FORETELLING.

Which part of Divine foreknowledge **required **God to tell you truths from that knowledge?

Yep, I get you now. You are attacking a straw man. Divine foreknowledge does not entail Divine foretelling.

Quiet ironically, your argument is attacking a straw man. In your own words, you are trying to show that “God cannot possible know the truth and tell about it at the same time”

But that is irrelevant to Divine foreknowledge since nothing about it says that God needs to tell you anything.
Passer. I’ve bolded the parts where you keep missing the point by at least a couple of nautic miles.
God does not **have to **do anything, but an omnipotent God is supposed **to be able to **do anything that is not logically impossible. Yet, in the case of libertarian free will decisions,there obviously is something He cannot do. Now maybe this means that it is logically impossible to know in advance the consequences of libertarian free will decisions because they are not truths until they are really made. That would entail some kind of open theism.
Now my argumet isn’t meant to be a deductive argument. It is nothing more than an illustration.
The deductive argument would go something like this.

1 God has factual knowledge of the future
2 Libertarian free will decisions are counterfactual
3 conclusion: God cannot have factual foreknowledge of LFW decisions.

It seems obvious that it is logically impossible to have factual foreknowledge of a counterfactual. If you don’t think it is, please present a decent argument.
Otherwise, youi should seriously think about the rationality of your belief.
 
1 God has factual knowledge of the future
2 Libertarian free will decisions are counterfactual
3 conclusion: God cannot have factual foreknowledge of LFW decisions.

It seems obvious that it is logically impossible to have factual foreknowledge of a counterfactual. If you don’t think it is, please present a decent argument.
Otherwise, you should seriously think about the rationality of your belief.
  1. Decisions don’t exist **until **they are made.
  2. Therefore decisions cannot be known **until **they are made.
  3. Decisions can be known **as soon as **they are made.
  4. God **knows **all decisions because He **transcends time **and space.
  5. Knowledge of decisions does not entail causality when the power to make decisions is delegated.
 
God did make us, yes, and He does know everything we’ll do, but predestination is not inherent to that. I’m sure there have been quite a few examples, but here is one:

I go out to a river. Then I craft a boat, which will be piloted by a squirrel, and sail it down the river. Is the squirrel predestined to sail down the river? Yes, but is he predestined to dock in a specific place down the river? No.

God may have made us and our surroundings, and He knows where we are going, but He does not force us to do anything other than to go down a general path. Think of the squirrel in his boat. He IS going down a general path with limited options, but if he knows how to steer the boat he can choose where exactly he goes down that path - that’s free will. God has us on a similar path, and we have the ability to alter our course. The only difference between you watching a squirrel and God watching you is that you don’t know where exactly the squirrel will land. God knows where we will go though, and even though He does, He respects our free wills enough to refrain from directly altering our courses.
A delightful analogy! 🙂
 
  1. Decisions don’t exist **until **they are made.
  2. Therefore decisions cannot be known **until **they are made
  3. Decisions can be known **as soon as **they are made…
Sure
  1. God **knows **all decisions because He **transcends time **and space.
yes, but, according to you, He only knows them as bsson as they are made. That means that, if God tells me about a chioce I am going to make tomorrow, this choice, from God’s pov has akready been made. That means that I cannot do anything else than what He knowns I am going ,to do.
And that means I don’t have libertarian free will

And this goes for every choice yoi, I and everybody else is ever giong to make. All these choices, from God’s pov have alreday been made, so they are factual. But libertarian free will, as I have stated several time already, entails counterfactual choices. Until the moment I actually (or factually )make a choice, the choice isn’t factual, and cannot be known for a fact, so even God cannot know which decision I am going to make until after I have made it.
Therefore factual foreknowldge is impossible with LFW.
  1. Knowledge of decisions does not entail causality when the power to make decisions is delegated.
That is true. But knowldge of a fact entails that it is a fact, so it isn’t counterfactual.I am not claimojg, nor have I ever claimed, that foreknowledge entails our actions are caused by God. What I claim is, that, in order for God to have factual knowledge about the future, the future must be determined, which mean LFW is false. Now, a determined future might still allow us free will, but such free will is called compatibilist free will.
 
Passer. I’ve bolded the parts where you keep missing the point by at least a couple of nautic miles.
God does not **have to **do anything, but an omnipotent God is supposed **to be able to **do anything that is not logically impossible. Yet, in the case of libertarian free will decisions,there obviously is something He cannot do. Now maybe this means that it is logically impossible to know in advance the consequences of libertarian free will decisions because they are not truths until they are really made. That would entail some kind of open theism.
Now my argumet isn’t meant to be a deductive argument. It is nothing more than an illustration.
The deductive argument would go something like this.

1 God has factual knowledge of the future
2 Libertarian free will decisions are counterfactual
3 conclusion: God cannot have factual foreknowledge of LFW decisions.

**It seems obvious that it is logically impossible to have factual foreknowledge of a counterfactual. If you don’t think it is, please present a decent argument. **
Otherwise, youi should seriously think about the rationality of your belief.
Haha, alright, so now you want to say, LFW and Foreknowledge are irreconcilable because it leads to a conflict with God’s omnipotence :rolleyes:

God knowing something factually, and him not telling you about it does not contradict omnipotence. Its by definition a meaningless thing to do i.e. logically impossible. It’s like saying I know for a fact that I won’t tell you tomorrow that you will drink wine, but I am going to tell you tomorrow. Either you are using confusing language here or its pretty evident that the proposition is meaningless/self-refuting.

Finally, you say it is impossible to have factual knowledge of a counter-factual. You say it is obvious and ask me to prove to you otherwise 🙂 I was actually pretty surprised you would say something like that because you are essentially SAYING what you are trying to PROVE here as obvious.

I made this clear to you long time ago and you insisted that NO, you are not assuming that as true. Yet lo and behold, here were are and you are making the claim that it is OBVIOUS (I assume you mean self-evident too because you are not proving that?).

So Belrog, with all due respect, I think you need to really think about your arguments. If its obvious to you, that’s good. But you can’t expect others to accept your position by saying that it is obvious. Either produce a deductive argument (not some illustration, all of which so far have not been helpful) or I am afraid this argument is going nowhere.
 
That is true. But knowldge of a fact entails that it is a fact, so it isn’t counterfactual.I am not claimojg, nor have I ever claimed, that foreknowledge entails our actions are caused by God. What I claim is, that, in order for God to have factual knowledge about the future, the future must be determined, which mean LFW is false. Now, a determined future might still allow us free will, but such free will is called compatibilist free will.
A determined future doesn’t necessarily mean that past events determined the future as Compatibilist claim.

It could be that God, knowing EXACTLY who you are, knows what you are freely going to do when presented with a situation, he can just put you there.

Now you keep saying that this is not LFW anymore. But you are missing the fact that the person is FREELY choosing it.

It appears to me that the “LFW” you are talking about is actually not even possible for a human being because it doesn’t seem to take in to account that each human beings have something unique to them.

So when I say something like “John will never freely choose to believe Belrog in any Universe”, you think John is not free in the “Libertarian” sense because he cannot exercise the opposite and believe you. But essentially you are saying John has no qualities that are unique to him. John might as well be renamed to Belrog and we would be ok in your view. There is no nature that is true about John that is not true about Belrog in your view.

But that is not an acceptable position for a Catholic and even for you I think.

To put it bluntly, I can see you making such an argument
  1. For God to be free, he must be able to do Good and Bad
  2. God won’t do Bad because it is against his nature
  3. Therefore God is not free in the LFW sense
So for you, there appears to be no nature of a person.

On a side note, you say that “nor have I ever claimed, that foreknowledge entails our actions are caused by God”. If that is true, then you have agreed that LFW and foreknowledge are possibly TRUE.
 
Haha, alright, so now you want to say, LFW and Foreknowledge are irreconcilable because it leads to a conflict with God’s omnipotence :rolleyes:
That’s not something I now wnat to say, that’s something I have been saying all along.
God knowing something factually, and him not telling you about it does not contradict omnipotence. Its by definition a meaningless thing to do i.e. logically impossible. It’s like saying I know for a fact that I won’t tell you tomorrow that you will drink wine, but I am going to tell you tomorrow.
No that is not the same. It is like knowing for a fact that you are going to tell me the truth about what you’ll drink tomorrow and actually doing it. God should be able to do it if

1 He has factual foreknowledge
2 My future decision is a fact
3 He is omnipotent.

But if 2 is correct, I do not have libertarian free will.

And , inn case you doubt whether God would do something like it, if you belive the Bible, then God on several occasions did tell people about their future decisions. He told Peter he would betray Jesus. Now Peter was convinced he wasn’t goingt o do that, but could not escape his faith. Peter did not have liberatarian free will in this case.
Either you are using confusing language here or its pretty evident that the proposition is meaningless/self-refuting.
I am not confusing factual foreknowledge with counterfactual foreknowledge
Finally, you say it is impossible to have factual knowledge of a counter-factual. You say it is obvious and ask me to prove to you otherwise 🙂
It is obvious. It is a direct consequence of the definition of factual and counterfactual.
Do I really have to argue for this?
Factual foreknowledge entauls that the future is a knowable fact and countyrefactual foreknowledge entails that the future is not a fact. It’s like saying I am supposed to prove that 1 + 1 cannot be 3.
If you think 1 + 1 can be 3, then you have to argue for it.

I was actually pretty surprised you would say something like that because you are essentially SAYING what you are trying to PROVE here as obvious.
I made this clear to you long time ago and you insisted that NO, you are not assuming that as true.
I am assuming that as true, but I was not assuming that as true in my argument. My argument was meant as an analogy in order to make it more understandable.
Yet lo and behold, here were are and you are making the claim that it is OBVIOUS (I assume you mean self-evident too because you are not proving that?).
Yes, of course it is self-evident, as self-evident as 1+1 = 2
So Belrog, with all due respect,
It’s belorg, by the way.
I think you need to really think about your arguments. If its obvious to you, that’s good. But you can’t expect others to accept your position by saying that it is obvious.
I argued from the accepted defiinition of words, gave an illustration that you obviously cannot understand. But if you want me to prove that black isn’t white, then I am going to quit this discussion.
Either produce a deductive argument (not some illustration, all of which so far have not been helpful) or I am afraid this argument is going nowhere.
If you dodn’t have an open mind, then any type of discussion is useless, Passer.
 
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