How is free will possible when God knows every "move" we'll ever take?

[belorg]

A determined future doesn’t necessarily mean that past events determined the future as Compatibilist claim.

It could be that God, knowing EXACTLY who you are, knows what you are freely going to do when presented with a situation, he can just put you there.

Which, again, entails Middle Knowledge. And we are not discussing MK here. If you want to go back to discussing MK, then just say so.

Now you keep saying that this is not LFW anymore. But you are missing the fact that the person is FREELY choosing it.

Freely choosing a determined future entails compatibilist free will, not LFW.

It appears to me that the “LFW” you are talking about is actually not even possible for a human being because it doesn’t seem to take in to account that each human beings have something unique to them.

Actually, I do not think LFW is possible for a human being, but I am not using that in my current argument.

So when I say something like “John will never freely choose to believe Belorg in any Universe”, you think John is not free in the “Libertarian” sense because he cannot exercise the opposite and believe you.

That follows from the definition of libertarian free will. But it will become more obvious if you use ‘possible world’ instead of ‘universe’

But essentially you are saying John has no qualities that are unique to him. John might as well be renamed to Belorg and we would be ok in your view. There is no nature that is true about John that is not true about Belrog in your view.

Maybe that is true, but it has nothing to to with my current argument.

But that is not an acceptable position for a Catholic and even for you I think.

I do not care too much whether somethin g is an acceptable position for a catholic or not. If something does not make any sense, I accept that it does not make any sense.
But if you want to discuss this in more detail, we should chnage the subject, because this does not have anything to do with foreknowledge.

To put it bluntly, I can see you making such an argument

1. For God to be free, he must be able to do Good and Bad
2. God won’t do Bad because it is against his nature
3. Therefore God is not free in the LFW sense

That’s a good argument, actually. I hadn’t thought of that. But, I think the evindetial problem of evil shows that God is capable of doing bad, so, he apparently does have libertarian free will.

So for you, there appears to be no nature of a person.

I think there IS a nature in a person.

On a side note, you say that “nor have I ever claimed, that foreknowledge entails our actions are caused by God”. If that is true, then you have agreed that LFW and foreknowledge are possibly TRUE.

No, I haven’t agreed that. Because “our actions are not caused by God” does not entail LFW. Our actions could be caused by lots of things.
And, remember, in the **current **discussion I have not said that foreknoledge and LFW are incompatible, what I claim is that factual foreknowldge is incompatible with libertarian free will.
BTW, I do think that, if God exists, our actions are caused by Him, but I haven’t used that in this discussion, because I want to stick to the topic at hand. But if you want my opinion on this, just ask.

 

[tonyrey]

belorg;8513792:

1. Decisions don’t exist until they are made.
2. Therefore decisions cannot be known until they are made
3. Decisions can be known as soon as they are made…

Sure
I’m glad you agree! Please note that all these facts have a reference to time.

4. God knows all decisions because He transcends time and space.

yes, but, according to you, He only knows them as soon as they are made.God knows them - full stop. His knowledge is not restricted to specific moments in time.

That means that, if God tells me about a choice I am going to make tomorrow, this choice, from God’s pov has already been made. That means that I cannot do anything else than what He knows I am going to do.
And that means I don’t have libertarian free will.

“if” is the key word. Free will necessitates that we don’t know what God knows! Otherwise we would be constrained by that knowledge.

And this goes for every choice you, I and everybody else is ever giong to make. All these choices, from God’s pov have already been made, so they are factual. But libertarian free will, as I have stated several time already, entails counterfactual choices. Until the moment I actually (or factually )make a choice, the choice isn’t factual, and cannot be known for a fact, so even God cannot know which decision I am going to make until after I have made it.
Therefore factual foreknowledge is impossible with LFW.

All these temporal references are inapplicable to God’s knowledge. Either God transcends time or He doesn’t…

5. Knowledge of decisions does not entail causality when the power to make decisions is delegated.

That is true. But knowledge of a fact entails that it is a fact, so it isn’t counterfactual. I am not claiming, nor have I ever claimed, that foreknowledge entails our actions are caused by God. What I claim is, that, in order for God to have factual knowledge about the future, the future must be determined, which mean LFW is false. Now, a determined future might still allow us free will, but such free will is called compatibilist free will. The future is not determined because it depends on God’s choices and our choices. God is subject to no rules or causes because He causes everything to exist. Determinism entails fatalism because it excludes self-determinism, rationality and responsibility. It subjects persons to physical causes and purports to explain all their thought and activity mechanistically. It is self-destructive in its reduction of reasons, choices and decisions to physical events - or their effects.

God does not know the nature of a non-existent decision, i.e. a decision that has not been made, because it is a logical contradiction! God knows the effects of decisions and therefore knows indirectly the nature of those decisions. Consequently His knowledge in no way affects those decisions. Free decisions are not determined by God - or anything else for that matter except the person who makes them!

Your argument implies that God cannot create beings who can make free decisions, thereby imposing an arbitary restriction on His omnipotence. Yet He can and does share His power with His creatures and enable them to frustrate His Will. There is so much diabolical evil in the world precisely because we have this supernatural power to control ourselves and the course of events to the extent of being able to destroy all life on this planet. Your objection to free will is based on the assumption that determinism is true whereas in fact it would undermine all your arguments and everyone else’s! The truth makes us free but we have to be free to arrive at the truth…

 

[belorg]

belorg;8513792:

I’m glad you agree! Please note that all these facts have a reference to time.

Sure they have

God knows them - full stop. His knowledge is not restricted to specific moments in time.
“if” is the key word. Free will necessitates that we don’t know what God knows! Otherwise we would be constrained by that knowledge.

Constrained by knowledge? How can we be constrained by knowledge?

All these temporal references are inapplicable to God’s knowledge. Either God transcends time or He doesn’t…

If time can be transcended, then the notion of past, present and future are illusions. There really is no such thing from the one true prespective, which would be God’s I guess.

The future is not determined because it depends on God’s choices and our choices. God is subject to no rules or causes because He causes everything to exist. Determinism entails fatalism because it excludes self-determinism, rationality and responsibility.

That may be so, and that’s why lots of people reject detreminism. unfortunately, your view on divine foreknowledge entails it.

It subjects persons to physical causes and purports to explain all their thought and activity mechanistically.

Or to metaphysical causes. If God determines everything, e.g. this would not be a physical cause, but nevertheless everybody would be determined.

It is self-destructive in its reduction of reasons, choices and decisions to physical events - or their effects.

Maybe it is, but if you think it is, you should abandon your view on foreknowledge.

God does not know the nature of a non-existent decision, i.e. a decision that has not been made, because it is a logical contradiction!

I am glad you agree to this.

God knows the effects of decisions and therefore knows indirectly

the nature of those decisions.

AKA Middle Knowledge, or Molinism.

Consequently His knowledge in no way affects those decisions.

I have never claimed that God’s knwoldge affects any decision.

Free decisions are not determined by God - or anything else for that matter except the person who makes them!

That would indeed be free decisions. But I am not here disputing the existence of free decisions, I am disputing the compatibility of libertarian free decisions and factual foreknowledge, something you seem to agree with.

Your argument implies that God cannot create beings who can make free decisions,

Which of my arguments implies that?

Your objection to free will is based on the assumption that determinism is true

No, it is not based on that assumption. Detreminism may be true or false, but if God has factual knowldge about the future, then the future is a fact, which would mean determinism is true.

Passer by seems to think I am the only person on earth who thinks this, but he’s wrong. One of the reasons Molina came up with Middel Knowledge was precisely to save divine foreknowldge while avoiding determinism.
I happen to think Molinism actually entails an even harder form of determinism, but that’s another discussion.

whereas in fact it would undermine all your arguments and everyone else’s! The truth makes us free but we have to be free to arrive at the truth…

 

[tonyrey]

Constrained by knowledge? How can we be constrained by knowledge?

If we know that God knows - **and **tells us - what we are going to do we would do it, as if we were mesmerised…

If time can be transcended, then the notion of past, present and future are illusions.

There really is no such thing from the one true perspective, which would be God’s I guess.

They are not illusions but facts in a world where physical change occurs.

The future is not determined because it depends on God’s choices and our choices. God is subject to no rules or causes because He causes everything to exist. Determinism entails fatalism because it excludes self-determinism, rationality and responsibility.

That may be so, and that’s why lots of people reject determinism. unfortunately, your view on divine foreknowledge entails it.

Why?

It subjects persons to physical causes and purports to explain all their thought and activity mechanistically.

Or to metaphysical causes. If God determines everything, e.g. this would not be a physical cause, but nevertheless everybody would be determined.

God need not determine everything because He can share His power with us.

It is self-destructive in its reduction of reasons, choices and decisions to physical events - or their effects.

Maybe it is, but if you think it is, you should abandon your view on foreknowledge.

I’m not a determinist!

God does not know the nature of a non-existent decision, i.e. a decision that has not been made, because it is a logical contradiction!

I am glad you agree to this.

Good.

God knows the effects of decisions and therefore knows indirectly the nature of those decisions.

AKA Middle Knowledge, or Molinism.

I prefer statements and explanations to labels.

Consequently His knowledge in no way affects those decisions.

I have never claimed that God’s knowledge affects any decision.

Good.

Free decisions are not determined by God - or anything else for that matter except the person who makes them!

That would indeed be free decisions. But I am not here disputing the existence of free decisions, I am disputing the compatibility of libertarian free decisions and factual foreknowledge, something you seem to agree with.

I have pointed out the gaps in “foreknowledge”:

God does not know the nature of a non-existent decision, i.e. a decision that has not been made, because it is a logical contradiction! God knows the effects of decisions and therefore knows indirectly the nature of those decisions.

Free decisions come “out of the blue” and cannot therefore be predicted - which is not surprising if they have a divine origin and are due to participation in God’s creative power.

Your argument implies that God cannot create beings who can make free decisions,

Which of my arguments implies that?

Determinism.

Your objection to free will is based on the assumption that determinism is true

No, it is not based on that assumption. Detreminism may be true or false, but if God has factual knowledge about the future, then the future is a fact, which would mean determinism is true.

In spite of the gaps?

whereas in fact it would undermine all your arguments and everyone else’s! The truth makes us free but we have to be free to arrive at the truth…

You agree?

 

[passer_by]

That’s not something I now wnat to say, that’s something I have been saying all along.

So your argument is actually not at foreknowledge and free-will anymore. It is rather with proving that not being able to tell you something that God knows factually goes against his omnipotence. Because your conclusions hinges on this one.

I for one cannot see such an argument. You are welcome to present one.

No that is not the same. It is like knowing for a fact that you are going to tell me the truth about what you’ll drink tomorrow and actually doing it. God should be able to do it if

1 He has factual foreknowledge
2 My future decision is a fact
3 He is omnipotent.

But if 2 is correct, I do not have libertarian free will.

But you are merely stating what you are about to prove. You are simply saying "My future decision is a fact, so it cannot be LFW. The burden is on you to prove that it is incompatible with LFW.

And , inn case you doubt whether God would do something like it, if you belive the Bible, then God on several occasions did tell people about their future decisions. He told Peter he would betray Jesus. Now Peter was convinced he wasn’t goingt o do that, but could not escape his faith. Peter did not have liberatarian free will in this case.

Sure, maybe that was part of the fact. As in, God knows as a fact that he is going tell you the future, and subsequently what you would do factually. I see nothing wrong with that.

You are essentially claiming what you are yet to prove i.e. Factual knowledge of the future violates LFW.

It is obvious. It is a direct consequence of the definition of factual and counterfactual.
Do I really have to argue for this?
Factual foreknowledge entauls that the future is a knowable fact and countyrefactual foreknowledge entails that the future is not a fact. It’s like saying I am supposed to prove that 1 + 1 cannot be 3.
If you think 1 + 1 can be 3, then you have to argue for it.

I think I have to apologize for making a mistake.

I want you to show why Factual knowledge of the future = no LFW. As far as I know, LFW merely requires that God not be the one who caused the act. Your definition of LFW seems to not take in to account anything to with a creatures specific nature.

So for you, LFW means Belrog can be anyone or anything in some possible universe. That is not acceptable. I don’t mean this religiously either.

I am assuming that as true, but I was not assuming that as true in my argument. My argument was meant as an analogy in order to make it more understandable.

But you said it yourself. Your argument is more of an illustration. As I can understand, now the whole success of the argument hinges on you proving that God’s omnipotence is somehow violated in him not being able to change a fact. To me it seems by definition a meaningless thing for you to argue. But I am willing to hear something you have to say.

I argued from the accepted defiinition of words, gave an illustration that you obviously cannot understand. But if you want me to prove that black isn’t white, then I am going to quit this discussion.

Haha don’t get so hasty. But I don’t really think you are going to change your mind honestly.

But hey, I will answer whenever I can and it could be fun

If you dodn’t have an open mind, then any type of discussion is useless, Passer.

I am afraid the same applies to you. I think it also safe to say that your arguments need to be more rigorous. Right now, they are very vague. We’ve started off with foreknowledge and LFW and ended up hinging on you been able to prove that Omnipotence of God is violated by not being able to tell you the future in all cases.

That’s not a good sign of a rigorous argument. It’s more like now you are trying to plug the boat before it sinks.

 

[passer_by]

Actually, I do not think LFW is possible for a human being, but I am not using that in my current argument.

Your notion of LFW leaves much to be desired.

But if its not possible for a human being according to your notion of LFW, since God can’t do logically impossible things, I see no reason why he has to give your form of LFW.

That follows from the definition of libertarian free will. But it will become more obvious if you use ‘possible world’ instead of ‘universe’

No it does not follow from the definition of LFW. That’s bizzare. So what exactly defines who Belorg is? According to your view, Belorg does not even have a will to call his own. His will is similar to that of mine or anyone else’s.

In short, in your view of LFW, Belorg could just as well be Passer_by in some possible universe.

Maybe that is true, but it has nothing to to with my current argument.

Actually it does. You have gone and defined a very weird extreme of LFW. It entails something the Catholics can’t even believe and even many philosophers would disagree with.

So as far as this argument is concerned, I am only interested if you want to prove that Divine foreknowledge and Free-will are incompatible in the way it is defined by Christians.

Anyone can of course come up with some random definition and say things are incompatible but that is obviously of no importance to the Theist.

I do not care too much whether somethin g is an acceptable position for a catholic or not. If something does not make any sense, I accept that it does not make any sense.
But if you want to discuss this in more detail, we should chnage the subject, because this does not have anything to do with foreknowledge.

Whether it makes sense or not depends on the definitions you work with. You can’t try to make sense of two things which are not true.

I would admit, your notion of LFW is not satisfiable. But honestly, who cares? I can come up with a notion of LFW which is just as unsatisfiable. It doesn’t say anything about whether Christian definition of foreknowledge and free-will are compatible.

That’s a good argument, actually. I hadn’t thought of that. But, I think the evindetial problem of evil shows that God is capable of doing bad, so, he apparently does have libertarian free will.

Actually that is a very poor argument and Problem of Evil does not show that God does evil. It operates on the hypothesis that a certain action which appears evil to you is actually evil and caused solely by God. There is a reason why many in Academia are moving away from the Problem of Evil.

In any case, that argument was mainly poor because it fails to take in to account the nature of a person. It’s notion of free-will ironically means that a person must do what he does not freely want to do in some possible universe.

Is it just me or does that not sound self-refuting?

I think there IS a nature in a person.

I am sure you do. I am yet to meet a person that doesn’t. But I don’t think you take it in to account in your notion of LFW.

No, I haven’t agreed that. Because “our actions are not caused by God” does not entail LFW. Our actions could be caused by lots of things.
And, remember, in the **current **discussion I have not said that foreknoledge and LFW are incompatible, what I claim is that factual foreknowldge is incompatible with libertarian free will.
BTW, I do think that, if God exists, our actions are caused by Him, but I haven’t used that in this discussion, because I want to stick to the topic at hand. But if you want my opinion on this, just ask.

I suggest we also stick to the topic at hand starting by you showing why your claim (bolded above) is true.

That is something you are yet to prove. And please, don’t try to work with a crazy notion of LFW.

For a Catholic, LFW means being able to logically DO something other than what they choose at a given a time.

So when Belorg is buying a book, it should be logically/scientifically possible for him to not buy the book i.e. it is not forced on belorg. If Belorg wants to buy the book because he has a deep desire for it and that is what makes Belorg a BELORG and not a Passer, it does not mean that Belorg is not free in the LFW sense.

Now if you want to say that you want to work with your notion of LFW, I will grant you that such a notion is impossible to satisfy. I think you claimed somewhere before that you even thought it was not possible for a human being to have your notion of LFW.

So I feel that there is no need to discuss logical impossibilities anyway, especially when Christian doctrine does not even require it to be true.

 

[belorg]

Your notion of LFW leaves much to be desired.

No it does not follow from the definition of LFW.

In short, in your view of LFW, Belorg could just as well be Passer_by in some possible universe.

Actually it does. You have gone and defined a very weird extreme of LFW. It entails something the Catholics can’t even believe and even many philosophers would disagree with.

Anyone can of course come up with some random definition and say things are incompatible but that is obviously of no importance to the Theist.

Whether it makes sense or not depends on the definitions you work with. You can’t try to make sense of two things which are not true.

I would admit, your notion of LFW is not satisfiable. But honestly, who cares? I can come up with a notion of LFW which is just as unsatisfiable. It doesn’t say anything about whether Christian definition of foreknowledge and free-will are compatible.

I am sure you do. I am yet to meet a person that doesn’t. But I don’t think you take it in to account in your notion of LFW.

That is something you are yet to prove. And please, don’t try to work with **a crazy notion of LFW. **
For a Catholic, LFW means being able to logically DO something other than what they choose at a given a time.

OK, let’s examine ‘what LFW means for a catholic’ in some more detail.

So, LFW means being able to logically DO something other than what they choose at a given time.

First consider a factual future. That means it is true now and has been true ever since the beginning of creation that I will choose to buy a book tomorrow.
Now, how is it logically possible for me not to choose to buy this book tomorrow?
That’s only logically possible if it isn’t true now and hasn’t been true ever since the beginning of creation that I will choose to buy this book.
For me to have a libertarian choice in this, it is necessary that there is a possible future in which I don’t buy this book tomorrow.
It is often claimed that if I don’t buy this book tomorrow, then it would mean that God knows the factual future in which I don’t buy this book, IOW the future depends on my free choices, but God, being outside of time, sees time as if it were the present.
Now, if God sees time as if it were the present, his omnipotence would enable him to tell me with absolute certainty what I will do tomorrow, because what I will do tomorrow is a fact. But if he tells me ,I cannot do anything else than what He told me.
So, it is not true that I am able to logically do something else than what I choose to do.

Now, let’s suppose God has Middle Knowldge. This is often used as an escape route out of the problems I outlined above, but actually makes things worse.
Under MK, God not only knowns what I will do, but also what I would do in every possible situation.

So,if I choose to buy a book tomorrow, then it should be, under LFW, logically possible for me not to buy this book.
But, God’s MK entails that there is no possible world in which I don’t buy this book, because if there were such a possible world, God could not knwo with certainty that I was going to buy this book, it could only be a probabilistic knowledge on the part of God, Something like ‘Belorg will most probbably buy this book’

If God has MK, then what determines our decision is our nature. Belorg has such a nature that he will buy this book under circumstances A, B and C, and psser by has a nature such that he won’t buy this book under circumstances A, B and C, but only under D, E and F, e.g.
Catholics often say that ‘God does not wnat robots’, but how am I not a robot under these conditions.I am quite sure that, with some exercise, I will be able to programme a simple Belorg -robot who, when the light is green, starts moving and when the light is red, stops, and when the light is orange moves more slowly. The ‘Catholic notion of free will’ entails that my robot has free will.

 

[belorg]

If we know that God knows - **and **tells us - what we are going to do we would do it, as if we were mesmerised…

Why would God telling us ‘mesmerise’ us if we aren’t already mesmerised? If we have free will without God telling us, then why would we suddenly cease to have it as sson as God tells us.

God need not determine everything because He can share His power with us.

OK, but I fail to see the relevance of this.

I’m not a determinist!

Probably not, but you don’t seem to, believe in perfect foreknowldge eithe, so I really do not know what we are discussing here. It seems we agree.

I prefer statements and explanations to labels.

For an explanantion on Molinism, read my other posts.

Good.
I have pointed out the gaps in “foreknowledge”:

I do not have probmes with gaps in foreknowledge, my own foreknwoledge has a lot of gaps.

Free decisions come “out of the blue” and cannot therefore be predicted -

OK, now let’s try to convince passer_by.

which is not surprising if they have a divine origin and are due to participation in God’s creative power.

OK

Determinism.

I am not a determinist., and even if I were, the assumption of detreminism isn’t part of my argument.

In spite of the gaps?

If the futurs is a fact and God ha sperfect foreknowldge about that fact, there are no gaps.

You agree?

No, I don’t, but I just left it because it is a nice slogan. I don’t think we have to be free to arrive at the truth. It is logically possible that we are determined to arrive at the truth. I am not saying that is a fact, just that it is logically possible. It is in principle possible to brianwash someone to believe something you want him to believe. And God could similarly brainwash you into believing in him and brainwash me into not believing in him. You would then ‘know’ the truth and I would not know the truth but neither of us would be free.

 

[tonyrey]

Why would God telling us ‘mesmerise’ us if we aren’t already mesmerised? If we have free will without God telling us, then why would we suddenly cease to have it as sson as God tells us.

You obviously don’t realise the full implications of knowing for certain that God exists and is now telling you what you will do!

God need not determine everything because He can share His power with us.

OK, but I fail to see the relevance of this.

Self-determinism replaces determinism.

I’m not a determinist!

Probably not, but you don’t seem to, believe in perfect foreknowldge eithe, so I really do not know what we are discussing here. It seems we agree.

Good!

I prefer statements and explanations to labels.

For an explanation on Molinism, read my other posts.

I know what it means but labels are often inadequate substitutes for sentences.

I do not have probmes with gaps in foreknowledge, my own foreknwoledge has a lot of gaps.

I don’t think yours is divine!

Free decisions come “out of the blue” and cannot therefore be predicted

OK, now let’s try to convince passer_by.

Why?

which is not surprising if they have a divine origin and are due to participation in God’s creative power.

OK

More support from my case!

I am not a determinist., and even if I were, the assumption of detreminism isn’t part of my argument.

In your view facts determine that free will is an illusion.

If the future is a fact and God has perfect foreknowledge about that fact, there are no gaps.

The nature of future decisions is not a fact.

You agree?

No, I don’t, but I just left it because it is a nice slogan. I don’t think we have to be free to arrive at the truth. It is logically possible that we are determined to arrive at the truth. I am not saying that is a fact, just that it is logically possible. It is in principle possible to brianwash (a delightful typo!) someone to believe something you want him to believe. And God could similarly brainwash you into believing in him and brainwash me into not believing in him. You would then ‘know’ the truth and I would not know the truth but neither of us would be free.

That logical possibility presupposes the existence of a god who is satisfied with creating robots!

 

[belorg]

You obviously don’t realise the full implications of knowing for certain that God exists and is now telling you what you will do!

Do you mean ‘tell’ as in ‘commands’ or ‘tell’ as in ‘predicts’?

Self-determinism replaces determinism.

OK

I know what it means but labels are often inadequate substitutes for sentences.

Sure, but the kind of foreknowledge you propose has its logical implications.

I don’t think yours is divine!

Not really, but if even divine foreknowldge has its gaps, I am not sure how that is compatinle with catholicism. Your view seems to entail (sorry for the ‘label’) some kind of open theism. There is nothing a priori wrong with that, but it is not the view of classical catholicism.

Why?

Because he sems to think that free decisions can be predicted, which is really what our discussion is about.

In your view facts determine that free will is an illusion.

T

Yes, but, apparently this is true for your view too. And I do not claim that free decisions are facts, just that IFF they are facts, determinism is true.

The nature of future decisions is not a fact.

Maybe not. Anyway, I am not here arguing they are facts.

That logical possibility presupposes the existence of a god who is satisfied with creating robots!

Which is, as far as I can tell, a logical possibility.

 

[tonyrey]

Do you mean ‘tell’ as in ‘commands’ or ‘tell’ as in ‘predicts’?

It makes no difference if you’re convinced God is informing you in some way what you will do.

Sure, but the kind of foreknowledge you propose has its logical implications.

Such as?

Not really, but if even divine foreknowldge has its gaps, I am not sure how that is compatible with catholicism. Your view seems to entail (sorry for the ‘label’) some kind of open theism. There is nothing a priori wrong with that, but it is not the view of classical catholicism.

Classical Catholicism does not maintain that omniscience entails knowing that which doesn’t exist.

Because he seems to think that free decisions can be predicted, which is really what our discussion is about.

We’re all entitled to our opinions…

Yes, but, apparently this is true for your view too.

Please explain why.

And I do not claim that free decisions are facts, just that IFF they are facts, determinism is true.

Then you have the best of both worlds!

The nature of future decisions is not a fact.

Maybe not. Anyway, I am not here arguing they are facts.

Again you have the best of both worlds!

That logical possibility presupposes the existence of a god who is satisfied with creating robots!

Which is, as far as I can tell, a logical possibility.

Not if God is benevolent - which is a Catholic doctrine.

 

[belorg]

It makes no difference if you’re convinced God is informing you in some way what you will do.

If it makes no difference, then how can I have free will on such occasions?

Such as?Classical Catholicism does not maintain that omniscience entails knowing that which doesn’t exist.

I’m sure there are lots of catholic theologians who do not agree wityh open theism.

We’re all entitled to our opinions…

Of course we are. But passer_by seems to think my opinion is exravagant.

Please explain why.

Because if future decisions are facts, then LFW does not exist.

Then you have the best of both worlds!

No, that’s just realism. I do not know whether decisions are facts, and I don’t think you know that either. This is a dipsute that has been going on for more than 2000 years already. If the answer was so obvious, there wouldn’t be a dispute anymore.

Again you have the best of both worlds!

I do have an opinion on these matters, but it’s irrelevant to our discussion.

Not if God is benevolent - which is a Catholic doctrine.

Benevolence has nothing to do with it.

 

[passer_by]

OK, let’s examine ‘what LFW means for a catholic’ in some more detail.

Sure.

So, LFW means being able to logically DO something other than what they choose at a given time.

Yep. Agreed. Please note that only it be a logical possibility is required, and the act is considered apart from the person’s will.

First consider a factual future. That means it is true now and has been true ever since the beginning of creation that I will choose to buy a book tomorrow.
Now, how is it logically possible for me not to choose to buy this book tomorrow?
That’s only logically possible if it isn’t true now and hasn’t been true ever since the beginning of creation that I will choose to buy this book.

I think this is false.

God knows that you will buy the book tomorrow as a fact because its simply what YOU would do. It won’t be what I would do. But it would be part of who you are and what you would do.

For me to have a libertarian choice in this, it is necessary that there is a possible future in which I don’t buy this book tomorrow.

I think this is in error because if that were true, there is no such Person called Belorg. The Belorg we know in this Universe could in another Universe be a Passer_by.

So I think what is necessary for LFW is that you be able to logically choose the opposite. But the fact that you don’t in any possible universe does not contradict LFW.

It is often claimed that if I don’t buy this book tomorrow, then it would mean that God knows the factual future in which I don’t buy this book, IOW the future depends on my free choices, but God, being outside of time, sees time as if it were the present.
Now, if God sees time as if it were the present, his omnipotence would enable him to tell me with absolute certainty what I will do tomorrow, because what I will do tomorrow is a fact. But if he tells me ,I cannot do anything else than what He told me.

The above is yet to be proven.

It is certainly possible that knowing the future and telling it to you is a meaningless thing.

Think about it this way

1. God knows that he won’t tell Belorg about drinking wine tomorrow
2. But God is going to tell Belorg about him drinking wine tomorrow

As you can see, the 2nd statement above becomes meaningless. It’s like saying what I thought was fact was not fact. So God in his omnipotence can’t tell you about it because its what he has also factually decided to do.

So, it is not true that I am able to logically do something else than what I choose to do.

Unfortunately this conclusion does not follow because I don’t see why God’s omnipotence necessitates that in every case he has to be able to tell you the future he knows.

Why can’t it be that God created the future a certain way while taking in to consideration his actions and therefore he himself has decided facts about his own actions?

Now, let’s suppose God has Middle Knowldge. This is often used as an escape route out of the problems I outlined above, but actually makes things worse.

I honestly think it doesn’t make anything worse and not many philosophers would even agree with you. Now you are yet to prove that there is something wrong with the first thing according to your argument as well.

It seems to be like your argument hinges solely on Omnipotence being contradicted.

I am not saying Molinism is not up for debate. I have certainly read very interesting objections against it. But yours I feel is not valid or at-least hasn’t been shown to be valid yet.

Under MK, God not only knowns what I will do, but also what I would do in every possible situation.

So,if I choose to buy a book tomorrow, then it should be, under LFW, logically possible for me not to buy this book.
But, God’s MK entails that there is no possible world in which I don’t buy this book, because if there were such a possible world, God could not knwo with certainty that I was going to buy this book, it could only be a probabilistic knowledge on the part of God, Something like ‘Belorg will most probbably buy this book’

If God has MK, then what determines our decision is our nature. Belorg has such a nature that he will buy this book under circumstances A, B and C, and psser by has a nature such that he won’t buy this book under circumstances A, B and C, but only under D, E and F, e.g.
Catholics often say that ‘God does not wnat robots’, but how am I not a robot under these conditions.I am quite sure that, with some exercise, I will be able to programme a simple Belorg -robot who, when the light is green, starts moving and when the light is red, stops, and when the light is orange moves more slowly. The ‘Catholic notion of free will’ entails that my robot has free will.

How is you having a nature making you a robot?

The whole point of you having a nature makes it such that you can’t be programmed to be someone else.

In other words, Belorg is who you are. The Belorg that is you, in every possible universe will have the same nature.

On the other hand, if we take what you say as there are possible worlds in which Belorg chooses A or ~A in the same circumstance, then it sure does look like you are a robot. More than that, it looks like you are nobody i.e. have no nature. You could have been me or any other person in this Universe.

Do you see what I am saying?

 

[belorg]

Sure.

God knows that you will buy the book tomorrow as a fact because its simply what YOU would do. It won’t be what I would do. But it would be part of who you are and what you would do.

He only knows what I would do if He has Middle Knwoledge, and that’s the second option I am discussing. So, will you please stick to the actual argument and not conflate things?

So I think what is necessary for LFW is that you be able to logically choose the opposite. But the fact that you don’t in any possible universe does not contradict LFW.

Soorry, but I prefer to discuss this with someone who is a little bit familiar with formal logic and possible world semantics. Saying, as you do that, although there is no possible world in which I do something, it is still logically possible for me to do something shows that you do not really know what you are talking about.
FYI ‘it is logically possible that X’ and ‘there is a possible wolrd in which X’ are synonyms.

The above is yet to be proven.

The above is only to be proven if you hold to a different kind of logic than anybody else.

It is certainly possible that knowing the future and telling it to you is a meaningless thing.

OK, then how would this be possible?

Think about it this way

1. God knows that he won’t tell Belorg about drinking wine tomorrow

That’s no problem at all. God isn’t required to tell me anything. If you really think my argument requires that God tells me anything, then we have nothing to discuss anymore…

Unfortunately this conclusion does not follow because I don’t see why God’s omnipotence necessitates that in every case he has to be able to tell you the future he knows.

Then He isn’t omnipotent.

Why can’t it be that God created the future a certain way while taking in to consideration his actions and therefore he himself has decided facts about his own actions?

Of course that can be, but that’s completely irrelevant.

How is you having a nature making you a robot?

The whole point of you having a nature makes it such that you can’t be programmed to be someone else.

And how is that? How can I not be progarmmed to accelerate if the light is green?

In other words, Belorg is who you are. The Belorg that is you, in every possible universe will have the same nature.

And in every possible wolrd is programmed to do exactly what God wants belorg to do. And you honestly think this has anything whatsoever to do with free will?
Who made belorg the way he is? God. And who is responsible for belorg’s actions? God. Belorg, under this scenario cannot do anything about it. .

On the other hand, if we take what you say as there are possible worlds in which Belorg chooses A or ~A in the same circumstance, then it sure does look like you are a robot.

Well, what you are describing here is actually the definition of libertarian free will For a Catholic, LFW means being able to logically DO something other than what they choose at a given a time. So inorder to have LFW, belorg must be able to choose A or ~A.
If that means belorg is a robot, then that’s a consequence of your belief system.

More than that, it looks like you are nobody i.e. have no nature. You could have been me or any other person in this Universe.

Do you see what I am saying?

Yes, passer_by, I see what you are saying. And I see now that I am wasting my time trying to discuss this with you. If you honestly believe that God creating a person not able to do anything else than what He programmed said person to do means this perosn has free will, then really, I can say no more.

So long.

 

[passer_by]

Soorry, but I prefer to discuss this with someone who is a little bit familiar with formal logic and possible world semantics. Saying, as you do that, although there is no possible world in which I do something, it is still logically possible for me to do something shows that you do not really know what you are talking about.
FYI ‘it is logically possible that X’ and ‘there is a possible wolrd in which X’ are synonyms.

I honestly give up.

As I said before, you can’t keep saying that something logically impossible if the action doesn’t take place in some possible world BY THAT PERSON.

The action A it-self is logically possible as long as SOMEONE can do that in some possible world.

But your argument hinges on the idea that EVERY PERSON must be able to do EVERY ACTION in SOME possible world for them to have LFW.

That to me is ridiculous because that means no person is unique.

Perhaps I am dumb and I don’t honestly understand you.

I could spend my time replying to the rest of your arguments but I honestly don’t think its worth it. Simply put, your notion of LFW is unacceptable to me and any other Catholic. So as far as my concern on this topic goes, there is nothing to discuss.

I have no regrets about you bowing out of the discussion. Good luck and God Bless you!

 

[tonyrey]

If it makes no difference, then how can I have free will on such occasions?

I’m sure there are lots of catholic theologians who do not agree wityh open theism.

Of course we are. But passer_by seems to think my opinion is exravagant.

Because if future decisions are facts, then LFW does not exist.

No, that’s just realism. I do not know whether decisions are facts, and I don’t think you know that either. This is a dipsute that has been going on for more than 2000 years already. If the answer was so obvious, there wouldn’t be a dispute anymore.

I do have an opinion on these matters, but it’s irrelevant to our discussion.

Benevolence has nothing to do with it.

We seem to be going nowhere! Here is a summary of my views on the subject:

		 			1. Why should foresight be radically different from hindsight?

1. That assumption is based on the fallacy Post hoc ergo propter hoc.
2. It stems from the false belief that a cause must always precede the effect.
3. It overlooks the distinction between an efficient cause and a final cause.
4. It implies that decisions are not caused by the decision-maker.
5. It reduces purposes to results.
6. It implicitly equates autonomous persons with biological machines!

 

[belorg]

We seem to be going nowhere! Here is a summary of my views on the subject:

1. Why should foresight be radically different from hindsight?

That seems to be what we have been discussing all along. And it’s in fact you who seems to think it is radically different from hindsight, because, whereas it is perfectly possible, especially if one is supposed to be ominscient, to know with 100% certainty what someone has freely chosen to do, according to you it is not possible to know with 100% certainty what someone is freely going to choose. There are ‘gaps’

1. That assumption is based on the fallacy Post hoc ergo propter hoc.

Where exactly did I make this fallacy? I don’t think I implied anything of the sort.

1. It stems from the false belief that a cause must always precede the effect.

Nowhere did I imply this. It isn’t relevant to our discussion at all.

1. It overlooks the distinction between an efficient cause and a final cause.

I haven’t even spoken about ‘causes’

1. It implies that decisions are not caused by the decision-maker.

Again, I fail to see the relevance of this.

1. It reduces purposes to results.

1. It implicitly equates autonomous persons with biological machines!

Honestly , Tony, this all sounds very interesting, but I fail to see how this is a summary of your views on the subject. Does your view, e.g. entail that foresight is not radically different from hindsight? If so, then you seem to have contradicted yourself.