How to argue with subjective moralists

[Betterave]

I sense that your objective revolves around “the subjective constitution of objectivity,” which is a meaningless phrase unless you explain it further. I really hope it’s not something as silly as “our values inform what we consider ‘objective.’” I really hope it’s not.

It’s a meaningless phrase…? Do you mean to say that you don’t understand it, not one little bit? If that’s the case, please just be up front about it. There’s no point in me using terminology that you are clueless about… Mind you, there would be no point in you using terminology that you’re clueless about either… Please explain.

 

[AntiTheist]

Guessing it correctly, you mean? I don’t think that’s going to happen! I’d really prefer that you didn’t guess. Just read what I wrote; I already answered your question. (If you don’t understand my explanation, just say which part you don’t understand and ask for clarification - it might just be that ‘objectively’ it makes sense, although ‘subjectively’ you have trouble understanding.)

Honestly, you’re tiring me out here. I do not understand what is wrong with my paraphrase – please rephrase the original statement.

If you don’t explain what you mean, the only option left to me is to guess. If you don’t want me to guess, then explain yourself.

The fact of there objectively being a tree outside your window depends on the existence of a tree there. Likewise, the fact of there objectively being morality in the world depends on the existence of moral beings with moral awareness.

Here’s where you’re going wrong. The existence of a tree is necessary for a tree to be there objectively, sure. The existence of a morality apart from minds – i.e. there being a good or bad apart from thinking minds – is necessary for there to be an objective morality.

If there were an objective morality, it wouldn’t depend on moral beings – it would depend on there being absolute standards of conduct to which all beings are subject (whether any beings actually exist or not); it would be something in the fabric of the universe that a thinking mind could come along and perceive, but it wouldn’t depend on any thinking mind.

I’m not responding to the rest of your post because it’s pointless until we settle this point.

 

[Leela]

Here’s where you’re going wrong. The existence of a tree is necessary for a tree to be there objectively, sure. The existence of a morality apart from minds – i.e. there being a good or bad apart from thinking minds – is necessary for there to be an objective morality.
.

The fact that morality applies to people does not make it necessarily all subjective. The assertion that “it is wrong to be cruel to infants” would cease to be true if there were no humans for it to be true about, but so would the fact that humans tend to have two eyes which I assume we can agree is an objective fact even though it depends on the existence of humans.

 

[Betterave]

Honestly, you’re tiring me out here. I do not understand what is wrong with my paraphrase – please rephrase the original statement.

If you don’t explain what you mean, the only option left to me is to guess. If you don’t want me to guess, then explain yourself.

I did explain myself already. But I’ll take another stab at it.

ME: you appear to be content to say something that is “not contradictory” (not cogent either) and consider your view justified; do you apply the same justificatory liberality to Prodigal?
YOU: The first half of this statement is false. I do not consider a view justified simply because it doesn’t contradict itself. Yet you use this false statement to argue that I’m a hypocrite.

AND (my statement) and BECAUSE (your paraphrase) are different words with significantly different meanings. Right? (Do I need to say more?)

Here’s where you’re going wrong. The existence of a tree is necessary for a tree to be there objectively, sure. The existence of a morality apart from minds – i.e. there being a good or bad apart from thinking minds – is necessary for there to be an objective morality.

But you’re still missing the point: talking about “the existence of a morality apart from minds” is like talking about the existence of a tree apart from some thing that is a tree, i.e., apart from some thing that has the nature of a tree. Or, more directly, it is like talking about the existence of a judgment apart from a judge. All of these “apart from” clauses are nonsensical; they are not “necessary” for morality or trees or judgments to be objective - unless, that is, you meant objective in the old Scholastic and Cartesian sense as precisely meaning “characteristic of an intentional object,” i.e., wholly dependent on (the correlate of) a subject with intentionality - but that’s obviously the opposite of what you want to say, right?

If there were an objective morality, it wouldn’t depend on moral beings – it would depend on there being absolute standards of conduct to which all beings are subject (whether any beings actually exist or not); it would be something in the fabric of the universe that a thinking mind could come along and perceive, but it wouldn’t depend on any thinking mind.

If there were an objective morality, it wouldn’t depend on moral beings as to its essence or nature. Likewise, if there were objective trees, they wouldn’t depend on particular trees as to their essences or natures. Is that what you mean? But we’re talking about real existence here, aren’t we? For morality to really exist or for tree-nature to really exist, there must exist particular morally-minded beings and particular trees.

It sounds as if you’re perhaps engaging in Cartesian scepticism about morality: Sit down and think away the whole world until you’re left with the pure thinking mind which then (supposedly) encounters the universe as a perfectly objective phenomenon, freed from all of its prior dubitable commitments, free to encounter exactly what really is. Is this what you’re going for? (Your version of “just introspect!”)

 

[AntiTheist]

The fact that morality applies to people does not make it necessarily all subjective.

You are correct – this claim about morality, in and of itself, does not demonstrate that it is necessarily subjective.

The assertion that “it is wrong to be cruel to infants” would cease to be true if there were no humans for it to be true about

I disagree. If it is absolutely true that “it is wrong to be cruel to infants,” then this statement would always be true, whether there actually are any infants around for individuals to observe and apply the absolute.

In a similar way, the logical absolute called the law of identity (A is A and not not A) applies in all cases, even hypothetical and potential cases that don’t exist, even if there is nothing in the universe (nothing is nothing and not not nothing).

The difference is that we can demonstrate the law of identity. No one can demonstrate that it’s “objectively wrong” to be cruel to infants, and for very good reason: “wrong” is a judgment, not a perception about the universe.

I dispute the claim that “wrong” has any meaning outside of thinking minds. “Wrong” is a value judgment made by a human being, not some property inherent in the universe that a human “observes.”

Betterave:

(Do I need to say more?)

No, you don’t.

 

[Ronald_E]

if there are no objective morals, there simply are no morals at all. every proposed moral system is nothing but their opinion. its simply an attempt to make a universal or “objective” moral system that fits what they think should be the standard. (funny how it always looks like Christain morality, minus the ones that restrict fornication and homosexuality. i wonder why?)

if they list any system, utilitarianism, the golden rule, etc. point out that such a system is little more than an attempt to make a universal or “objective” moral system and is therefore self defeating. when that is dealt with make the point that if there is no moral authority that is objective, then each man is his own moral authority, ergo, why should we worry about other people at all? why not just an anarchy where everyone can do as he pleases, regardless of its effects on others? the golden rule and its variations only benefit those who are weakest. complete anarchy benefits and therefore contributes to the happiness of the strong. why then should we care about others rights?

in the end, moral authority can only stem from that legitimate authority of the Creator, over His Creations, and if there be no Creator, there are no morals at all. anything else, any other basis for authority requires an artificial assignation of authority to a third party, be that another individual, or to society as a whole.

It is impossible for an objective morality to exist without its subjective. What is subjective anyway? Do you know how to understand subjective language? Do you know that it is a language? Do you know that it is the most important language we have and it is given to us by God?

 

[Prodigal_Son]

The difference is that we can demonstrate the law of identity.

You can? Really?

If so, be my guest.

 

[AntiTheist]

You can? Really?

If so, be my guest.

Ok, here goes. My keyboard is a keyboard and not not a keyboard. That was true an hour ago, and it’s still true now. It was true since the moment the keyboard was created from its parts, and it will be true until it rots away or, more likely, until I get frustrated enough with it that I smash it into a little pieces.

In all seriousness, there is a ton of evidence that things are themselves and not not themselves (always within the same frame of reference, of course – you can obviously take a tree and turn it into paper, but when it’s a tree, it’s a tree and not not a tree, and when you make paper, it’s paper and not not paper).

There’s so much evidence for it, in fact, that virtually no one challenges it. We can even hypothetically apply it to nothingness (“Nothing is nothing and not not nothing”), so it’s not even dependent on anything in the universe.

Now you similarly demonstrate that something is objectively wrong.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Ok, here goes. My keyboard is a keyboard and not not a keyboard. That was true an hour ago, and it’s still true now. It was true since the moment the keyboard was created from its parts, and it will be true until it rots away or, more likely, until I get frustrated enough with it that I smash it into a little pieces.

In all seriousness, there is a ton of evidence that things are themselves and not not themselves (always within the same frame of reference, of course – you can obviously take a tree and turn it into paper, but when it’s a tree, it’s a tree and not not a tree, and when you make paper, it’s paper and not not paper).

There’s so much evidence for it, in fact, that virtually no one challenges it. We can even hypothetically apply it to nothingness (“Nothing is nothing and not not nothing”), so it’s not even dependent on anything in the universe.

By using a word in your justification (and you used several), you begged the question. You cannot assume that “keyboard” means “keyboard” as a premise, because that is precisely what you are trying to prove. Perhaps you could just gesture at your keyboard, as if to say, “Hey, that’s what it is!” This, of course, would be assuming that hand gestures meant what they meant and not something else. So nice dice there, either.

You might say that all communication presupposes the law of identity, and this is quite right. But you cannot prove that all reality conforms to the law of identity, although certainly it would be nonsense to even consider how such a claim could not be true. We take it as an axiom.

You may also say that all morality presupposes the existence of moral truths. And I cannot prove that there is such a thing as moral objectivity, nor can I explain how it works. And you might say that it is not necessary to assume the existence of moral truths, and of course this is true – although not assuming their existence may get you into trouble. Neither is it necessary to assume the existence of the law of identity, which is – by the way – a rational standard that we expect reality to conform to. Of course, assuming that there is no law of identity will involve you in manifold contradictions, but it is not necessary to assume identity.

We have faith, it would seem, that the world conforms to our ideas about the world. This, ultimately, is the sole justification for all our fundamental axioms.

 

[AntiTheist]

You might say that all communication presupposes the law of identity, and this is quite right.

The law of identity might start out as a presupposition, but that presupposition is confirmed the more we use it (i.e. experience in employing this logical absolute shows us that there’s something to it, for if it were not true, we wouldn’t be able to do the things with it that we do). Since the law of identity forms the basis of communication, as you say, everything we do and say and experience provides more evidence that the law of identity is true.

That is precisely the opposite of the case with morality. Morality is not necessary as a premise in the way that the law of identity is necessary, and it doesn’t confirm itself with experience the way that the law of identity does.

It’s not necessary, for example, to assume that it’s wrong to steal things. It might be necessary for a society to have a punishment for this act – assuming the society values the idea of individual property, which most of them do – but there’s nothing that necessitates the proposition “it’s wrong to steal” in the way that the proposition “objects are themselves and not not themselves” is necessary.

And again unlike logical absolutes, experience does not confirm that moral presuppositions are necessarily true. The fact that a society that punishes thieves works better than a society that doesn’t punish thieves doesn’t indicate the “rightness” or “wrongness” of theft – the society would work better by punishing thieves even if stealing were not wrong (and this is unlike the logical absolutes, where communication could not work if they were false).

Now, of course, you could always define morality as “that which works for a particular society,” but in that case, it wouldn’t be universal and would not be objective morality in the sense that I’ve been defining it. Furthermore, it would leave you open to the possibility of Nazis claiming that genocide “works” for them and that therefore, by this definition, the act is “moral.” So that argument won’t help you.

We have faith, it would seem, that the world conforms to our ideas about the world. This, ultimately, is the sole justification for all our fundamental axioms.

No, it’s not a simple matter of faith. It’s that those axioms are confirmed through the evidence of our experiences and our successful communications. Morality is totally different because it is not confirmed through experience.

What you’re trying to argue is that logic is as arbitrary as your moral beliefs, and that argument will not cut it.

 

[Betterave]

Betterave: No, you don’t.

Well that’s a terse reply! What do you mean by it?

Anyway, I’m wondering: are you familiar with the distinction between alethic truth and truth as correspondence/adequation?

 

[Prodigal_Son]

The law of identity might start out as a presupposition, but that presupposition is confirmed the more we use it (i.e. experience in employing this logical absolute shows us that there’s something to it, for if it were not true, we wouldn’t be able to do the things with it that we do). Since the law of identity forms the basis of communication, as you say, everything we do and say and experience provides more evidence that the law of identity is true.

That is precisely the opposite of the case with morality. Morality is not necessary as a premise in the way that the law of identity is necessary, and it doesn’t confirm itself with experience the way that the law of identity does.

It’s not necessary, for example, to assume that it’s wrong to steal things. It might be necessary for a society to have a punishment for this act – assuming the society values the idea of individual property, which most of them do – but there’s nothing that necessitates the proposition “it’s wrong to steal” in the way that the proposition “objects are themselves and not not themselves” is necessary.

And again unlike logical absolutes, experience does not confirm that moral presuppositions are necessarily true. The fact that a society that punishes thieves works better than a society that doesn’t punish thieves doesn’t indicate the “rightness” or “wrongness” of theft – the society would work better by punishing thieves even if stealing were not wrong (and this is unlike the logical absolutes, where communication could not work if they were false).

You have just mentioned a value: that communication should be possible. For consider: If communication were not a value, then it would be in no sense necessary that we communicate. But it is in some sense necessary that we communicate. We communicate, among other reasons, in order to survive. Therefore communication is a value.

You might call this “weak sense necessity”. If you are saying that communication is necessary in this weak sense, I agree with you. But its instrumental necessity does not entail its actual necessity. Moral virtues, by the way, seem to be necessary in the same way. Aristotle says they are necessary for the attainment of happiness, and happiness is an absolute good. Kant would say that the a good will is necessary because it conforms with the reality of what a human being is – a lawgiver.

Whatever reasonable answer we give, we find that the actions entailed by the system are remarkably similar. And, when you live out your life in such a way, it is remarkably beautiful, though not void of suffering.

No, it’s not a simple matter of faith. It’s that those axioms are confirmed through the evidence of our experiences and our successful communications. Morality is totally different because it is not confirmed through experience.

How can A=A be confirmed through experience? You either fail to understand the point I was making in the last post, or you willfully ignore it. It is impossible that any empirical evidence show us anything about relations between ideas. Consider:

Bob has a .5 degree of confidence that A → A. Now he goes out to look at the world. He sees a duck. He calls it “duck” and says “that duck is a duck”. Does this support A=A? He now has a relation of ideas, expressed by the phrase “duck is duck”. But these ideas do not contain the duck. His confidence remains at .5. Saying duck=duck is equivalent to saying 5=5. Would you say that a mathematician should go out into the world to make sure of this fact about his own brain?

The fundamental premise of all empirical thought: The world conforms to our ideas about the world. If this claim is supported, it can only be supported by intuitions, not by facts about the world. Once this is realized, a person can begin to realize the richness of a fuller ontology, an ontology that does not arbitrarily exclude intuition.

What you’re trying to argue is that logic is as arbitrary as your moral beliefs, and that argument will not cut it.

Neither logic nor morality are arbitrary. My own moral beliefs are not arbitrary either, but I wouldn’t trust my intuitions over the laws of logic.

Oh, and by the way, I know you’ll want to respond to the first point here by saying that communication is a *subjective *value. But this just commits you to saying that no one is at all obligated to communicate. **Then how is it necessary? ** I’m hoping you’ll agree that logic and morality are on the same footing, at least in this respect.

 

[Betterave]

Prodigal says: “The fundamental premise of all empirical thought: The world conforms to our ideas about the world. If this claim is supported, it can only be supported by intuitions, not by facts about the world. Once this is realized, a person can begin to realize the richness of a fuller ontology, an ontology that does not arbitrarily exclude intuition.”

What would be “an ontology that does arbitrarily exclude intuition”? I’m confused by what you mean by this.

Also, isn’t the fundamental premise of empirical thought that our ideas about the world conform to the world, rather than vice versa? And whether we include or exclude some such notion, isn’t such an inclusion or exclusion equally arbitrary? And so I gather you want to appeal to a notion of faith or subjective valuing or intuition, so as to ground our basic practices of thinking and communication. But this construal of our basic practices as theoretically justifiable phenomena arises from our habits of language, whereby we take such justifications to be intelligible and helpful and justifiable - and indeed, where we use language consistently, that language use is ‘confirmed,’ to use Anti’s term. (Anti seems to confuse such ‘confirmation’ with epistemic ‘justification.’)

But Wittgenstein writes (PI, 241):
“So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?” - It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions * but in form of life [Lebensform].

In Wittgenstein’s quite compelling, I think, view, the notion of Lebensform is more fundamental than any act of faith after the fact. The act of faith in (or subjective valuing of) communication, for instance, is always an artificial after-the-fact rationalization in response to absurd demands for (or, as in Anti’s case, claims of) justification from people who don’t understand that theory is not ultimately grounded in reason but in life, that reason is always a part of life and must be interpreted in light of this fact; it is not something that rises above life so as to make pronouncements about what would be the case even if no minds existed, i.e., even if there was no life and there were no beings endowed with reason. What do you think?*

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Interesting questions, Ave.

Prodigal says: “The fundamental premise of all empirical thought: The world conforms to our ideas about the world. If this claim is supported, it can only be supported by intuitions, not by facts about the world. Once this is realized, a person can begin to realize the richness of a fuller ontology, an ontology that does not arbitrarily exclude intuition.”

What would be “an ontology that does arbitrarily exclude intuition”? I’m confused by what you mean by this.

What I’m thinking of, here, is the person who says that “observation” or “measurement” is sufficient for knowledge, but “intuition” is not. From this, they say that only things that can (in principle, at least) be measured or inferred from measurement can be said to exist. Of course, observation and measurement are forms of intuition; this is much like saying that textbooks are a good educational tools, but books are not. You can make a distinction, I suppose, but how is it not arbitrary?

Also, isn’t the fundamental premise of empirical thought that our ideas about the world conform to the world, rather than vice versa?

I think there is a powerful difference between the two, but I’m still wrapping my mind around it. Certainly the direction you said is true, but I don’t think it’s quite as fundamental. “Our ideas about the world conform to the world” is Hume’s issue – they ought to conform to the world, because all our ideas come from the world. And yet there are insuperable problems even here, the problems of induction.

But “all our ideas come from the world” is clearly incomplete; for our existence is a historical fact, and “what kind of being we are” obviously sets parameters for our ability to think. One such parameter is that we cannot comprehend what it would mean for something not to be itself. Is that evidence of its truth? I think we will all agree that it is a necessary assumption, but it is based on the structure of the mind, not on anything we can objectively evaluate.

Since we’re quoting Wittgenstein, how’s this: “The facts in logical space are the world.” The empiricist begins by saying that these all facts are somehow about the physical reality, which (I would claim) is a *subset *of the world.

And whether we include or exclude some such notion, isn’t such an inclusion or exclusion equally arbitrary? And so I gather you want to appeal to a notion of faith or subjective valuing or intuition, so as to ground our basic practices of thinking and communication. But this construal of our basic practices as theoretically justifiable phenomena arises from our habits of language, whereby we take such justifications to be intelligible and helpful and justifiable - and indeed, where we use language consistently, that language use is ‘confirmed,’ to use Anti’s term. (Anti seems to confuse such ‘confirmation’ with epistemic ‘justification.’)

But Wittgenstein writes (PI, 241):
“So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?” - It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions * but in form of life [Lebensform].*

Well, this is a deeper question. **If **our understanding of the world can be justified, it must be through intuition. But can it be justified?

In Wittgenstein’s quite compelling, I think, view, the notion of Lebensform

is more fundamental than any act of faith after the fact. The act of faith in (or subjective valuing of) communication, for instance, is always an artificial after-the-fact rationalization in response to absurd demands for (or, as in Anti’s case, claims of) justification from people who don’t understand that theory is not ultimately grounded in reason but in life, that reason is always a part of life and must be interpreted in light of this fact; it is not something that rises above life so as to make pronouncements about what would be the case even if no minds existed, i.e., even if there was no life and there were no beings endowed with reason. What do you think?

Interesting. I agree with the idea that epistemology is essentially involved in rationalization of behavior after the fact. I find it very interesting that Wittgenstein says that we are justified in the *practice *of a belief – this is how we do x – but not in its content. If he is wrong, I can only take it to be that epistemology is a discipline without a foundation (in order to make any sense, it must first deal with the metaphysical issue of connecting mind and world).

If he is right, however, then all (honest) epistemological claims seem to be true, but trivial. “I know there is a table here” simply means that I act as if this phenomenon is a table; the action justifies the belief.

So is epistemology utterly unjustified or just trivial? Those are the sorts of questions that an out-of-the-box thinker brings us to.

 

[Betterave]

What I’m thinking of, here, is the person who says that “observation” or “measurement” is sufficient for knowledge, but “intuition” is not. From this, they say that only things that can (in principle, at least) be measured or inferred from measurement can be said to exist. Of course, observation and measurement [and inferences from these] are forms of intuition; this is much like saying that textbooks are a good educational tools, but books are not. You can make a distinction, I suppose, but how is it not arbitrary?

Okay, so you’re thinking of a person who is just confused about their own practice, not someone who actually excludes intuitions from their ontology somehow?

I think there is a powerful difference between the two, but I’m still wrapping my mind around it. Certainly the direction you said is true, but I don’t think it’s quite as fundamental. “Our ideas about the world conform to the world” is Hume’s issue – they ought to conform to the world, because all our ideas come from the world. And yet there are insuperable problems even here, the problems of induction.

Insuperable problems? I wonder if that’s true. I tend to think Hume discovers big problems with induction because he has a naive and artificial view about what induction is.

But “all our ideas come from the world” is clearly incomplete; for our existence is a historical fact, and “what kind of being we are” obviously sets parameters for our ability to think. One such parameter is that we cannot comprehend what it would mean for something not to be itself. Is that evidence of its truth? I think we will all agree that it is a necessary assumption, but it is based on the structure of the mind, not on anything we can objectively evaluate.

It depends what is meant by world here. World, as I conceive of it, is something that is intrinsically related to our historical being. Speaking of an abstract world apart from the historical situation of some beings or other who possess some form or other of world-historical consciousness is not really intelligible. Berkeley’s esse est percipi has a great deal more truth in it than its “common sense” refuters would like to admit.

Since we’re quoting Wittgenstein, how’s this: “The facts in logical space are the world.” The empiricist begins by saying that these all facts are somehow about the physical reality, which (I would claim) is a *subset *of the world.

But not all empiricists are physicalists, right?

Well, this is a deeper question. **If **our understanding of the world can be justified, it must be through intuition. But can it be justified?

If we do justify it, then it can be justified. But the question then just shifts to one about what justification is. But this is just a question about seeing correctly what our practice of justification consists of; and it would be silly to further try to justify that this should count as a justification. We have to defer to sth like a Lebensform. A form of life can only be pointed to - if someone refuses to look and to see (or to come and see, in the words of our Lord), and instead insists that we justify our basic practices, or arbitrarily pretends that he can justify some, while arbitrarily refusing to apply the same procedure of ‘justification’ to others, he is choosing to blind himself to the (‘objective’) nature of (‘subjective’) reality.

Interesting. I agree with the idea that epistemology is essentially involved in rationalization of behavior after the fact. I find it very interesting that Wittgenstein says that we are justified in the practice of a belief – this is how we do x – but not in its content. If he is wrong, I can only take it to be that epistemology is a discipline without a foundation (in order to make any sense, it must first deal with the metaphysical issue of connecting mind and world**).

Only if it was already burdened with that issue to begin with. But if it was, then it was never just epistemology. And in fact, that is correct: epistemology is never just epistemology, it is always also metaphysics, and vice versa. (People who dismiss metaphysics in favor of epistemology are simply confused about what they’re doing.)

If he is right, however, then all (honest) epistemological claims seem to be true, but trivial. “I know there is a table here” simply means that I act as if this phenomenon is a table; the action justifies the belief.

I think I would want to say that the action is the substance of the belief, but that the belief is not one of those for which reasonable (sane) people offer justifications. And I would want to emphasize that action and behavior includes linguistic acts and behaviors. So I wouldn’t want to say that the (conceptual/linguistic) content of a belief is not justified, since it is somehow not ‘the practice of a belief.’

So is epistemology utterly unjustified or just trivial?

Epistemology is as epistemology does.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Okay, so you’re thinking of a person who is just confused about their own practice, not someone who actually excludes intuitions from their ontology somehow?

Exactly. To exclude intuition for your ontology is, of course, impossible.

Insuperable problems? I wonder if that’s true. I tend to think Hume discovers big problems with induction because he has a naive and artificial view about what induction is.

What’s the non-naive view?

It depends what is meant by world here. World, as I conceive of it, is something that is intrinsically related to our historical being. Speaking of an abstract world apart from the historical situation of some beings or other who possess some form or other of world-historical consciousness is not really intelligible. Berkeley’s esse est percipi has a great deal more truth in it than its “common sense” refuters would like to admit.

Very interesting. Nobody ever reads Berkeley’s preface, by the way, where he explains that he is trying to *save *ordinary ideas about reality. Philosophy since Aquinas has been focusing more and more on stuff, and less and less on substance. Maybe it’s time for a reversal.

But not all empiricists are physicalists, right?

Not at all. Empiricism begins as common sense; the biggest problem comes in when you combine empiricism with reductionism. Ugh.

A form of life can only be pointed to - if someone refuses to look and to see (or to come and see, in the words of our Lord), and instead insists that we justify our basic practices, or arbitrarily pretends that he can justify some, while arbitrarily refusing to apply the same procedure of ‘justification’ to others, he is choosing to blind himself to the (‘objective’) nature of (‘subjective’) reality.

“He who has ears, let him hear.”

 

[Betterave]

What’s the non-naive view?

Well I suppose there are a number of different views with different degrees of naivete. First, let’s see if we’re on the same page as far as Hume goes. Hume’s view, as I understand it, is that we must just passively *see *B follow A *repeatedly *and we have a “custom” or “habit” of believing that A is really connected to B as its cause. But since this view is grounded *solely *in “habit,” we have no rational grounds for thinking that there is any metaphysical reality in the cause-effect relationship (he seems to be a nominalist about this essentially). That sound right to you?

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Well I suppose there are a number of different views with different degrees of naivete. First, let’s see if we’re on the same page as far as Hume goes. Hume’s view, as I understand it, is that we must just passively *see *B follow A *repeatedly *and we have a “custom” or “habit” of believing that A is really connected to B as its cause. But since this view is grounded *solely *in “habit,” we have no rational grounds for thinking that there is any metaphysical reality in the cause-effect relationship (he seems to be a nominalist about this essentially). That sound right to you?

Yes, this sounds right. I think that Hume would also say that we have no rational grounds for thinking there is *not *metaphysical reality in the cause-effect relationship. It is simply a matter which we can never issue any educated opinion about.

More broadly, Hume claims that any attempt to prove induction (“the sun will rise tomorrow”, for example) is circular, since it assumes that the unobserved will resemble the observed.

 

[bridgeforsale]

if there are no objective morals, there simply are no morals at all. every proposed moral system is nothing but their opinion. its simply an attempt to make a universal or “objective” moral system that fits what they think should be the standard. (funny how it always looks like Christain morality, minus the ones that restrict fornication and homosexuality. i wonder why?)

Arguably this body of human virtues you’re calling Christian morality long pre-dates Christianity or Judaism (at least as far as we can tell). If you only look at the evidence (and one doesn’t accept the assumptions made by any particular religion without critical examination) it shows morality, or what we might describe as our innate sense of right and wrong, was developed through both natural selection and social evolution.

Indeed I offer as proof the Third Reich. How was it that a nation, where virtually all but a small minority were believing Christians (a roughly even split between Catholics and Lutherans) collectively abandoned any preexisting sense of virtue and became the sheep of a madman, and all at once turned to savagery?

I believe it was it was, very simply, self-interest and group think dynamics. Indeed when we examine our history IMHO the evidence shows virtue is more closely connected to mutual benefit (e.g. self-interest) rather than any invisible force.

if they list any system, utilitarianism, the golden rule, etc. point out that such a system is little more than an attempt to make a universal or “objective” moral system and is therefore self defeating. when that is dealt with make the point that if there is no moral authority that is objective, then each man is his own moral authority, ergo, why should we worry about other people at all? why not just an anarchy where everyone can do as he pleases, regardless of its effects on others? the golden rule and its variations only benefit those who are weakest. complete anarchy benefits and therefore contributes to the happiness of the strong. why then should we care about others rights?

What about the obvious logic of acting in ways to advance our mutual interests, and the impact of having our subconsciousness shaped by a society that has come to appreciate the obvious benefits of a social order built on mutual benefit?

 

[Leela]

Arguably this body of human virtues you’re calling Christian morality long pre-dates Christianity or Judaism (at least as far as we can tell). If you only look at the evidence (and one doesn’t accept the assumptions made by any particular religion without critical examination) it shows morality, or what we might describe as our innate sense of right and wrong, was developed through both natural selection and social evolution.

Hi bridgeforsale,

Love the name. Do you consider yourself a subjective moralist?

Best,
Leela