How to transit from the concept of God to the existence of God

[CandideWest]

Certainly, the First Way reads as follows: " I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways.

…

And since it causes movement and change, it causes the forms and existence of the forms which are the subject of motion and change. Obviously any being which can do this must be a living being, and it must be intelligent. And if it is intelligent, it must be self-aware.

Ok, the vast majority of the text you’ve written is just providing background, the bit above is the only relevant part really. In this case your argument to show that the “thing” proven by the first way MUST BE self aware appears to be the word “obviously”.

Well it’s not obvious as far as I can tell, we know that many things which cause movement and change are NOT living, let alone intelligent, let alone self aware. So claiming that anything which can cause movement and change MUST BE a self aware being quite clearly fails.

Currently your argument is not only invalid, it also requires things which are directly contrary to observed reality.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Ok, the vast majority of the text you’ve written is just providing background, the bit above is the only relevant part really. In this case your argument to show that the “thing” proven by the first way MUST BE self aware appears to be the word “obviously”.

Well it’s not obvious as far as I can tell, we know that many things which cause movement and change are NOT living, let alone intelligent, let alone self aware. So claiming that anything which can cause movement and change MUST BE a self aware being quite clearly fails.

Currently your argument is not only invalid, it also requires things which are directly contrary to observed reality.

On the contrary, it is perfectly cogent. Nor does it contradict observed reality.Read Thomas’ First Way again. The First Mover can only be a Being having no potency, a pure act, a spirit, owing its existence to no other. Thomas, after Aristotle, begins with " observed reality," things which are moved and changed. But one cannot go on endlessly in such a series. One must come to some Being which is pure act.

This is the culmination of Thomas’ analysis of Aristotle’s entire philosophy ( with necessary corrections, which is summed up in Thomas’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics ( dhspriory.org/thomas/ ).

Thomas immediately recognized such a Being met the criteria of the God of Christianity. God said to Moses, " …tell the Israelites I Am sends you…" This is Thomas’ conclusion to the First Way. Then he proceeds in the remainder of Part 1 of the Summa to analyse and explain the attributes of the Unmoved Mover, which necessarily follow.

This is perfectly legitimate and is no different than the what science does; for example, following out the " implications " involved in General and Special Relativity. Except that science is drawing out the physical " implications, " whereas Thomas is drawing out the metaphysical or ultimate underlying causes/meaning of his discovery.

Edward Feser gives a good analysis of the Five Ways in his Aquinas with further explanations in his blogspot ( edwardfeser.blogspot.com/ ) and he explains many of the underlying principles in his forthcoming book, Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction…

Of course all of this is simply an intellectual explanation of what St. Paul meant when he said, " The evidence of Him is in the things He has made. "

Feser gives concrete examples of the causes of the movement of things which are moved.

I will give you a concrete example based on Aristotle’s notion of Nature. Aristotle gives a detailed explanation of this Principle in his Physics which is thoroughly analysed in Thomas’ Commentary of this work. Aristotle teaches that, " Nature is the principle of motion and rest in those things to which it belongs per se." Fr. John A. Weisheiple ( RIP ) in his Motion and Change in the Middle Ages, explains and draws out the implications of this principle in a detailed, exhaustive manner. My example is based on his exposition.

Take a body, natural or man made, hurtling through space. This object is moving under some power, there is a cause of its motion. It does not " move it self, " as Aristotle has proven. This object has a potency to be moved or it would not move, which principle he has proven. Nothing moves itself from potency to act, from non being to being. Something has given this object the power of movement. Something then must have moved it. It is obvious that nothing is accompanying the object in its motion, so the power of motion is in the object, it is something flowing from its very nature. Its nature has been changed so that it retains the power of moving through the external application of some impetus. The cause of this impetus, ultimately, can only be a Being which is Pure Act, which has created the " thing’s " Nature, giving it the potential to be modified by an externally applied impetus. In other words the object is moved, naturally by its modified nature and will continue to move until it encounters some other contrary force.

Linus2nd

 

[CandideWest]

On the contrary, it is perfectly cogent. Nor does it contradict observed reality.Read Thomas’ First Way again. The First Mover can only be a Being having no potency, a pure act, a spirit, owing its existence to no other. Thomas, after Aristotle, begins with " observed reality," things which are moved and changed. But one cannot go on endlessly in such a series. One must come to some Being which is pure act.

This is the culmination of Thomas’ analysis of Aristotle’s entire philosophy ( with necessary corrections, which is summed up in Thomas’ Commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics ( dhspriory.org/thomas/ ).

Thomas immediately recognized such a Being met the criteria of the God of Christianity. God said to Moses, " …tell the Israelites I Am sends you…" This is Thomas’ conclusion to the First Way. Then he proceeds in the remainder of Part 1 of the Summa to analyse and explain the attributes of the Unmoved Mover, which necessarily follow.

This is perfectly legitimate and is no different than the what science does; for example, following out the " implications " involved in General and Special Relativity. Except that science is drawing out the physical " implications, " whereas Thomas is drawing out the metaphysical or ultimate underlying causes/meaning of his discovery.

Edward Feser gives a good analysis of the Five Ways in his Aquinas with further explanations in his blogspot ( edwardfeser.blogspot.com/ ) and he explains many of the underlying principles in his forthcoming book, Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction…

Of course all of this is simply an intellectual explanation of what St. Paul meant when he said, " The evidence of Him is in the things He has made. "

Feser gives concrete examples of the causes of the movement of things which are moved.

I will give you a concrete example based on Aristotle’s notion of Nature. Aristotle gives a detailed explanation of this Principle in his Physics which is thoroughly analysed in Thomas’ Commentary of this work. Aristotle teaches that, " Nature is the principle of motion and rest in those things to which it belongs per se." Fr. John A. Weisheiple ( RIP ) in his Motion and Change in the Middle Ages, explains and draws out the implications of this principle in a detailed, exhaustive manner. My example is based on his exposition.

Take a body, natural or man made, hurtling through space. This object is moving under some power, there is a cause of its motion. It does not " move it self, " as Aristotle has proven. This object has a potency to be moved or it would not move, which principle he has proven. Nothing moves itself from potency to act, from non being to being. Something has given this object the power of movement. Something then must have moved it. It is obvious that nothing is accompanying the object in its motion, so the power of motion is in the object, it is something flowing from its very nature. Its nature has been changed so that it retains the power of moving through the external application of some impetus. The cause of this impetus, ultimately, can only be a Being which is Pure Act, which has created the " thing’s " Nature, giving it the potential to be modified by an externally applied impetus. In other words the object is moved, naturally by its modified nature and will continue to move until it encounters some other contrary force.

Linus2nd

Well you’ve written a lot there, but none of it answers my actual question. Remember I asked you to show that the cause of the universe shown by the 5 ways is some self aware being.

There doesn’t even appear to be an attempt to achieve this in any of the above.

If you like (to help you progress) I will accept that we need a “something” which is “pure act” why would we conclude that it MUST BE some self aware being? How about you go from there?

 

[Partinobodycula]

On the contrary, it is perfectly cogent.

Okay, I may be extremely dense, but I still don’t see how it’s obvious or cogent that the first cause must be either living or intelligent. Could you possibly flesh this argument out a bit further?

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Well you’ve written a lot there, but none of it answers my actual question. Remember I asked you to show that the cause of the universe shown by the 5 ways is some self aware being.

There doesn’t even appear to be an attempt to achieve this in any of the above.

If you like (to help you progress) I will accept that we need a “something” which is “pure act” why would we conclude that it MUST BE some self aware being? How about you go from there?

I explined that in the previous post. All you have to do is connect the dots - if you prefer not to research the material I have provided. ( and, really, that is the problem with the Critics, most of them feed off of each others observations without going to Thomas and his reliable commentators. They erroneously assume that their own observers have done the necessary research. A fallacy Feser and others have often pointed out. Neither I nor anyone else can make you study the questions yourseves.).

However, given a First Causse, an Unmoved Mover, a Being that is Pure Act, we have the principle, proven by Aristotle, backed up by Thomas, and by common sense, that nothing acts without an end in " mind. " Having an end or intention is a prerequsite for acting. This is obvious in intelligent beings such as man. No man or woman acts without purpose, that presupposes an intellect that decides on doing something and then acts to achieve that end…

Likewise, the Unmoved Mover would not move or change anything unless it had a determined end or goal for acting. Therefore the Unmoved Mover, is a Pure Intellect, an actually existing Mind, that acts for a reason. No Mind, no reason, no action, no causality, an unmoved, unchanging universe…

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Okay, I may be extremely dense, but I still don’t see how it’s obvious or cogent that the first cause must be either living or intelligent. Could you possibly flesh this argument out a bit further?

See post 365 above. No, you are not dense, you just need to apply yourself to the sources I have given you.

Got lots to do today gang - no rest for the wicked . Until, much later than.

Linus2nd

 

[polytropos]

Alas that he didn’t simply state his assumptions.

Which assumptions do you mean? If you mean assumptions about the divine attributes, then you seem to be mistaken. Aquinas argues for God’s existence in Part I, Question 2 of the Summa, and spends the next 25 questions arguing for God’s nature.

For example, could you answer the question I asked Linus - how do you show that the cause of the universe MUST be a self aware being?

There are multiple routes that the Thomist would take. The preferred route in a work of systematic theology would be to present both the First and Fifth Ways and to argue that the entities disclosed by each are (because both purely actual) identical (the First Way giving us the first mover of the universe, the Fifth Way giving us the supreme intellect). From there God’s self-cognition can be derived from the doctrine of divine simplicity, ie. that God’s intellect is the same as his being and thereby is the same as its object, so God’s knowledge is a sort of self-knowledge. (Even his knowledge of creation is a knowledge of what he creates.)

The argument could be made without averring to the Fifth Way by defending and invoking the principle of proportionate causality and well as considerations from philosophy of mind. In Aquinas’s philosophy of mind, intellection is the possession of forms (Aquinas’s philosophy of mind is defended a bit here, though the author is addressing issues of personal identity more than cognition). The unmoved mover (or first cause) of the First and Second Ways must possess the forms it creates/sustains virtually or eminently (if not formally), and is thereby an intellect (analogically speaking). From there one would be able to argue like above from the doctrine of divine simplicity to God’s self-cognition. (I take you to mean self-cognition by self-awareness. To predicate self-awareness of God is not necessarily wrong, but the term “awareness” more than “cognition” tends to connote a subjective passibility, which is foreign to God.)

I would not expect anyone to defend either of those broad approaches in a forum post, but they are conclusions for which Aquinas and subsequent Thomists have argued, and for which his theology and metaphysics have the resources.

None of your statements above close out these possibilities.

I pointed out that Aquinas offers a series of arguments that rule out those possibilities. I did not purport to have given those arguments.

A team of pixies isn’t a problem under Aquinas’ ways as long as none of them preceded the others (ie they were either all uncaused or caused each other mutually from eternity).

Yes they are. Pure act excludes multiplicity.

If there were two distinct uncaused causes, one would have to differ by some potentiality relative to the other, but that is to say that one of them would not be pure act, and so would not be an uncaused cause.

I don’t need to believe that Zeus or any other gods had a beginning. I could believe they’d always existed but still been gods other than the Christian one.

The Flying Spaghetti Monster doesn’t have physical noodly appendages, you’ve misunderstood the concept there.

Fair enough. If you would like to alter the signification of the term “Zeus”, you are free to do so. But the issue is similar to that of the pixies. If I propose some attribute of the Christian God (divine simplicity, say), you may either admit that Zeus and the Flying Spaghetti Monster possess it (and so are not composed of potency and act), so that “Zeus” and “Flying Spaghetti Monster” just become alternate names for God by the above argument, or you can deny that they possess it, in which case they are less than purely actual, and so cannot serve as unmoved movers.

And the multiverse is only mutable from a perspective within time. Just as the concept of god can do things within time without changing itself. The multiverse includes all space and time, so looking at in changing with time is incorrect.

Hmm, perhaps I am not exactly clear on what the “multiverse” is. I was using the term loosely. If it refers to a collection/set of entities (universes), then it has no power qua collection to cause anything; its causal powers would be dependent on its constituent entities. (There is not an object, a multiverse, which stands over and above the universes, but rather the collection of universes is called the multiverse.) So as long as “multiverse” stands for the abstract designation of the collection of all universes (correct me if this is not what the term means–from what I gather there is not a consensus on what it is), it does not seem to make sense to grant it causal power apart from that of its constituents. But if its constitutents are spatio-temporal, then they can change.

 

[CandideWest]

I explined that in the previous post…

No, you just used the word “obviously” then stated your conclusion. That isn’t an argument.

However, given a First Causse, an Unmoved Mover, a Being that is Pure Act, we have the principle, proven by Aristotle, backed up by Thomas, and by common sense, that nothing acts without an end in " mind.

Then by all means give us this proof. Thus far I have not seen it, and I HAVE studied the source material.

And as for common sense, mine tells me that there’s no need for something to have a mind in order to act. For example, when a radioactive nuclide spontaneously decays I know of no reason to believe that it has some reason for doing so “in mind”.

" Having an end or intention is a prerequsite for acting. This is obvious in intelligent beings such as man.

Yes, it’s obvious in intelligent beings, like us. But why would we therefore believe that it must necessarily apply to anything?

You seem to be leaning towards making your argument circular here by making the claim that any act which does not appear to have a mind behind it actually has Gods mind behind it, thus making your argument tautological.

I’m hoping you aren’t aiming for something like that here, that would be very disappointing.

 

[Partinobodycula]

To Everyone, (Including KingCoil)

This thread has been ongoing for quite some time now, with some degree of animosity, and very little movement toward a resolution. So in order to move the discussion along in a positive direction I propose that we begin from a point around which we can all agree. This may seem impossible to achieve, but I would like to attempt to do just that.

I would like to propose an opening argument that we can all agree upon. If anyone has any objections to this argument please feel free to amend it, criticize it, or merely insult me for proposing it. But it is only that, a proposed beginning.

The basic argument is as follows:

1. Something exists. (Hopefully we can all agree on this point as being self-evident. If anyone were to disagree, you would think that it would be me, the solipsist)
2. There is only one something. (To have two somethings they would have to be separated by something, because they can’t be separated by nothing. This would make the two separate somethings in actuality one continuous something. Therefore there can only be one something)
3. Something cannot move. (Movement is relative. It must be defined relative to something else. Since there can only be one something, something cannot move.)
4. Something has always existed. (“Nothing” occupies no space, and no time. Therefore the amount of time in which nothing has existed, is zero. Thus all of time is occupied by something.)

I propose this as a tentative opening argument. The result of which are the initial attributes of “something”

It exists
There is only one
It cannot move
It has always existed

What this “something” is, or what further attributes can be ascribed to it, I gladly leave open to discussion. I have a couple of ideas, but would like to get some feedback on the initial argument first.

Any comments, objections, or insights are welcome, and indeed encouraged.

Even yours KingCoil

 

[Sochi]

It exists
There is only one
It cannot move
It has always existed

Commentary:

It exists: This posits a subject/object relationship, and might be contrasted with such a statement as “existence IS” independent of any particular perceiver of it. It may even be said that existence is a totally subjective phenomenon in that it is solely dependent on an observer, despite any postulates on that observers part that, because there exist in his perception “others,” in the absence of himself those observers cease as well to exist from that point of view. This necessity opens a whole can of worms regarding objective existence as such, independent of an observer, and all the semantic ramifications that come with it.

There is only one: Given. The totality of that one may experientially be notated as 1=0, as to the mind, ALL is incomprehensible and is perceptually blank or null. The term “Self” in the non personal sense might apply. It is a habituation of common usage that we use that term, wrongly, I think, to apply to person, and more rightly to the feeling of identity, the root meaning of which is telling, which could be a doorway to the experiential apprehension of “There is only one.”

It cannot move: Agreed. Yet the non movement of it includes the law of conservation of mass and energy often described as E=MCsquared, perhaps on non perceived and non surface measurable levels as well.

It has always existed.

Yes, as that is experientially true relative to the sense of identity and by scientific analysis, despite the appearance of an arrow of time: it is understood that time as we perceive it is completely and only relevant to personal, or human, experience and in fact does not exist save as a perceptual factor.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

No, you just used the word “obviously” then stated your conclusion. That isn’t an argument.

Then by all means give us this proof. Thus far I have not seen it, and I HAVE studied the source material.

And as for common sense, mine tells me that there’s no need for something to have a mind in order to act. For example, when a radioactive nuclide spontaneously decays I know of no reason to believe that it has some reason for doing so “in mind”.

Yes, it’s obvious in intelligent beings, like us. But why would we therefore believe that it must necessarily apply to anything?

You seem to be leaning towards making your argument circular here by making the claim that any act which does not appear to have a mind behind it actually has Gods mind behind it, thus making your argument tautological.

I’m hoping you aren’t aiming for something like that here, that would be very disappointing.

You can draw whatever conclusions you want. My arguments were solid. To claim they violate some rule of logic or that it doesn’t seem reasonable to you doesn’t mean that is so. I don’t mind disagreement, but false charges do not seem fair. But I didn’t and don’t ever expect fairness from those lined up against the arguments.

The great thing is that the views can read the arguments and decide for themselves.
Linus2nd

 

[polytropos]

1. There is only one something. (To have two somethings they would have to be separated by something, because they can’t be separated by nothing. This would make the two separate somethings in actuality one continuous something. Therefore there can only be one something)

What you mean by separation would have to be spelled out more. Is it just spatial separation? If that is the case, then I would dispute that separation need be by something. What the argument seems to be saying is that if you have x and y separate, then there must be some z “between” (?) x and y so that x and y are separated by something.

But to conclude that an “xzy” is some sort non-separated something seems to beg the question, since the idea that “adjacent” things should necessarily be regarded as “connected” (I put these in scare quotes because they are spatial terms, and I’m not sure if that is what you mean by “separated,” but they may be appropriate analogically in any case) is what is at issue in discussions about multiplicity and unity.

1. Something cannot move. (Movement is relative. It must be defined relative to something else. Since there can only be one something, something cannot move.)

I would say that movement must be specified relative to something else. It doesn’t follow that movement does not correspond to any absolute phenomenon.

 

[KingCoil]

Well, readers of this thread, I am through with this thread.

I will start a new one on “How certain are we that God exists?”

KingCoil

 

[CandideWest]

You can draw whatever conclusions you want. My arguments were solid.

Er, what arguments? As far as I can tell, thus far the only argument to show that the cause of the universe is self aware that you have presented is the word

“Obviously”

That’s a pretty feeble argument by any standards.

To claim they violate some rule of logic or that it doesn’t seem reasonable to you doesn’t mean that is so.

I haven’t claimed your argument violates some rule of logic as such, I’ve just pointed out that “obviously” doesn’t constitute a logical argument. As yet that appears to be your only argument.

I don’t mind disagreement, but false charges do not seem fair. But I didn’t and don’t ever expect fairness from those lined up against the arguments.

Well, what arguments and what charges? Thus far I’ve seen neither, (unless you’re referring to my statement that “obviously” is not an argument as a “charge”).

If you have something to work with, why not just write out in as simple a structure as you are able whatever argument you believe shows that the cause of the universe MUST BE some self aware being. That way we can work with that.

The great thing is that the views can read the arguments and decide for themselves.

Exactly, and I’d encourage anyone out there who has the dedication required, to read the source material in the Summa itself. Once you get your head around it the shortfalls become obvious and you are much less open to deceptions that many seek to peddle as “proof”.

 

[Partinobodycula]

It exists: This posits a subject/object relationship, and might be contrasted with such a statement as “existence IS” independent of any particular perceiver of it. It may even be said that existence is a totally subjective phenomenon in that it is solely dependent on an observer, despite any postulates on that observers part that, because there exist in his perception “others,” in the absence of himself those observers cease as well to exist from that point of view. This necessity opens a whole can of worms regarding objective existence as such, independent of an observer, and all the semantic ramifications that come with it.

Thank you for pointing this out. While there would likely be an almost universal agreement on the existence of something. Agreement on the nature of that something, is another matter entirely. For instance, it’s true that in this argument existence is not definitively shown to be either objective or subjective. But for the sake of establishing a working argument let’s simply assert that something exists, and leave the nature of that something open for further discussion. The important thing at this point I think, is that we are in agreement as to the basic premise that something exists. Even I as a solipsist am quite comfortable acceding to this point.

What you mean by separation would have to be spelled out more. Is it just spatial separation? If that is the case, then I would dispute that separation need be by something. What the argument seems to be saying is that if you have x and y separate, then there must be some z “between” (?) x and y so that x and y are separated by something.

But to conclude that an “xzy” is some sort non-separated something seems to beg the question, since the idea that “adjacent” things should necessarily be regarded as “connected” (I put these in scare quotes because they are spatial terms, and I’m not sure if that is what you mean by “separated,” but they may be appropriate analogically in any case) is what is at issue in discussions about multiplicity and unity.

I agree, this needs to be better clarified. I’m leaning toward the following: “Something” is anything for which its dimensions are nonzero. “Nothing” then being anything for which its dimensions are zero. Also, anything that has the potential to contain “something”, is “something”.

Thus if we had two separate somethings, that which separates them, must also be something, for if it were nothing then its dimensions would be zero and there would be no point of distinction between the two somethings. They would thus constitute one something. Likewise any space around that something that had the potential to contain something, would also be part of the something.

Is this any better at clarifying why there can only be one something?

I would say that movement must be specified relative to something else. It doesn’t follow that movement does not correspond to any absolute phenomenon.

Hopefully my attempt to clarify the definition of “something” will have helped to clarify this point also. For something to move, the space around it must have the potential to contain something, but per the prior definition, if it has the potential to contain something, then it is something. Thus any movement can only take place within something, and cannot be a movement of something itself.

This gives an inkling, but not a definite proof as far as I’ve worked out, that there may be another attribute ascribable to “something”. And that is: Something is infinite. I’m not ready to add that one to the list just yet, but it may be possible to show that this is true. If you’d like to weigh in on this one, be my guest.

Anyway, has this post helped to clarify the arguments that there can only be one something, and that that something cannot move?

If anyone has any objections, questions, or insights please post them. Hopefully you’re not expecting me to work this all out on my own. If you hadn’t noticed, you guys are the brains of this operation.

 

[CandideWest]

Which assumptions do you mean? If you mean assumptions about the divine attributes, then you seem to be mistaken. Aquinas argues for God’s existence in Part I, Question 2 of the Summa, and spends the next 25 questions arguing for God’s nature.

For example his assumption that each of the things shown by his 5 ways are actually the same thing.

There are multiple routes that the Thomist would take. The preferred route in a work of systematic theology would be to present both the First and Fifth Ways and to argue that the entities disclosed by each are (because both purely actual) identical…

I’ve seen attempts to show this but none successful yet. If you know of a route to demonstrate this must be the case is be interested.

The argument could be made without averring to the Fifth Way by defending and invoking the principle of proportionate causality and well as considerations from philosophy of mind. In Aquinas’s philosophy of mind, intellection is the possession of forms (Aquinas’s philosophy of mind is defended a bit here, though the author is addressing issues of personal identity more than cognition). The unmoved mover (or first cause) of the First and Second Ways must possess the forms it creates/sustains virtually or eminently (if not formally), and is thereby an intellect (analogically speaking).

Ok, why is it thereby an intellect?

I would not expect anyone to defend either of those broad approaches in a forum post, but they are conclusions for which Aquinas and subsequent Thomists have argued, and for which his theology and metaphysics have the resources.

Fair enough, I’ve yet to find this shown successfully anywhere. I’m not saying it can’t be done, but if it can be I have not found it.

Yes they are. Pure act excludes multiplicity.

If there were two distinct uncaused causes, one would have to differ by some potentiality relative to the other, but that is to say that one of them would not be pure act, and so would not be an uncaused cause.

Why would one have to differ by some potentiality relative to the other? Why can we not have two instances of pure act?

Fair enough. If you would like to alter the signification of the term “Zeus”, you are free to do so. But the issue is similar to that of the pixies. If I propose some attribute of the Christian God (divine simplicity, say), you may either admit that Zeus and the Flying Spaghetti Monster possess it (and so are not composed of potency and act), so that “Zeus” and “Flying Spaghetti Monster” just become alternate names for God…

Sure, and I’d say that using an alternate names would be an improvement, it would at least cut down on people attaching undemonstrated characteristics to the “first mover” etc.

Hmm, perhaps I am not exactly clear on what the “multiverse” is. I was using the term loosely. If it refers to a collection/set of entities (universes), then it has no power qua collection to cause anything; its causal powers would be dependent on its constituent entities. (There is not an object, a multiverse, which stands over and above the universes, but rather the collection of universes is called the multiverse.) So as long as “multiverse” stands for the abstract designation of the collection of all universes (correct me if this is not what the term means–from what I gather there is not a consensus on what it is), it does not seem to make sense to grant it causal power apart from that of its constituents. But if its constitutents are spatio-temporal, then they can change.

Why would it need causal power? If the multiverse is the “pure act” then it needs no potentiality to cause anything. And as I said, since the multiverse includes all of time there can be no change.

 

[Sochi]

Why would it need causal power? If the multiverse is the “pure act” then it needs no potentiality to cause anything. And as I said, since the multiverse includes all of time there can be no change.

This really is the crux of the point, one which will not be resolved by argument or logic as we commonly use it, for a simple reason: causality is a concept built into most languages as a self evident assumption. Fact is, causality is an abstraction from experience, and like many “common sense” presumptions, is at its root false. In other words, unless there is a deep examination of on’es experience at the sense level heavily steered by critical analysis, causality is a persistent illusion and pervades even the thinking of such greats as Aquinas. Other factors pertain as well.

Further, since causality is a relativism existing only in a limited interpretation of the manifest through an inadequate logic, to promote causality as a “proof” of the alleged christianist god is counter spiritual. It is counter spiritual and infantile, in fact. Logic more accurately based on the assumption, especially experientially arrived at, that IS IS,* or 1=0, works far better. What I am trying to point to here is that these arguments ignore at least half the picture, the other half being a critically examined component of mystical experience. To do less is dishonest and incomplete at best.

Otherwise, kept to the realms reason and of “common sense,” human sense itself being less than 1% of the spectrum of possible perception, this argument is both silly and unsolvable. In fact, on examination, it is an example of sin being visited unto the seventh generation. And let us remember that “sin” really means “to miss the point.” This argument, in fact, points to why, after great angst, I left Catholicism: As far as I can tell, It simply is stuck–as as institution promoting a view, not necessarily enlightened members of it, including some of its Doctors,–in the lack of understanding that Jesus was an exponent of non-dualim.

Yes, that is a HUGE leap, but given the kind of effort and consideration it takes to arrive at that perception, and the general level of scholarship and spiritual understanding common in the third century, it is little wonder that such a gap of clarity exists and that any movement toward it is condemned. Well, save by such as St. John of the Cross, or St. Teresa of Avila and other such. But we know what happened to them, right?

But all that is why I am so encouraged and heartened by Pope Francis! His actions, as best he knows how, are pointing to where all this actually came from: the essential Unicity of Being manifest as the totality of Universe. We might well look at the span of the Universe as we can see it, and note that we might be a bit egocentric in our little spats about origin.

*I like this one, lol! It has overtones irritating to some which reference feminism and Egyptian religion. Yet those actually make it more inclusive.

 

[polytropos]

Why would one have to differ by some potentiality relative to the other? Why can we not have two instances of pure act?

If two things are distinct, then they differ in some way. But if “two” things are pure act, then neither has any potentiality, so there is nothing that one has that the other lacks, so they do not differ in any way, and are thereby not distinct. (Another way of framing this is that pure act is absolutely simple, and so is not composed of matter and form, and so is not even individuated in the sense that we apply that term to created things. We speak of God as “one” because he is undivided and indivisible. There can be no multiplicity or individuation in pure act.)

For example his assumption that each of the things shown by his 5 ways are actually the same thing.

This isn’t an assumption, if he can show that each of the things shown by his Five Ways is purely actual, since he later argues that only one thing can be purely actual.

I’ve seen attempts to show this but none successful yet. If you know of a route to demonstrate this must be the case is be interested.

Fair enough, I’ve yet to find this shown successfully anywhere. I’m not saying it can’t be done, but if it can be I have not found it.

I think Ed Feser has constructed a pretty good case, though I’m hoping someday he issues a work of systematic theology that is more encompassing and less introductory than the books he has published so far.

Another route one could take is that of Barry Miller. He has (in my opinion, convincingly) challenged the idea that existence cannot be a first-order predicate, and has used his new analysis in a new cosmological argument (derived loosely from Aquinas’s Second Way) and theology. (He introduced the notion of “limit cases” as opposed to “limits simpliciter,” a limit simpliciter simply being the greatest element in a set, a limit case being an element outside of a set to which the other elements “tend,” but which differs from them absolutely. The distinction captures a lot of what I think is strong in traditional natural theology, ie. a robust doctrine of simplicity, and what has been lost in the more effete versions advocated by theists like Plantinga and Swinburne. It is difficult to properly argue for the unity and mutual entailment of God’s properties, as well as the uniqueness of the object of a cosmological argument, without a robust doctrine of simplicity, in my opinion, and the notion of God as a limit case instance of existence is capable of articulating God’s transcendence.) Unfortunately his books aren’t too easy to get a hold of if you don’t have access to an academic library.

Ok, why is it thereby an intellect?

Because it must possess the forms of the things it creates qua universals, and that (to possess formal universals “eminently”) is what it is to be an intellect on Aquinas’s philosophy of mind. (In this case God is analogically an intellect.)

Sure, and I’d say that using an alternate names would be an improvement, it would at least cut down on people attaching undemonstrated characteristics to the “first mover” etc.

I think it’s an unfortunate consequence of apologetics that discussions usually focus on cosmological arguments and do not get to discussions about the divine attributes. There is also the issue that the arguments made most often in the public eye (the kalam cosmolgocial argument, the fine tuning argument, the design argument) do not have robust ways of demonstrating the divine attributes.

In Aquinas’s works (and those of his commentators) it is generally rather straightforward to distinguish what Aquinas has shown and what has not, what elements are ascribed to the unmoved mover by philosophical argument and which by faith.

Why would it need causal power? If the multiverse is the “pure act” then it needs no potentiality to cause anything. And as I said, since the multiverse includes all of time there can be no change.

Pure act does not have any potentialities. A fortiori pure act does not have a potentiality to cause (or not cause) anything. Pure act creates. It is correct to say, “It is possible that pure act creates” and “It is possible that pure act not create.” But it is false to say that “Pure act possibly creates” or “Pure act possible does not create”, as the latter two de re modalities attribute a potentiality to pure act which is foreign to it.

So the multiverse, if it is to sustain/change the universe in the way that pure act does, must stand in causal relations. But there is still the issue, as I pointed out, it’s not clear that the “multiverse” is more than a mereological sum, and therefore cannot stand in causal relations apart from its constituents.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

If two things are distinct, then they differ in some way. But if “two” things are pure act, then neither has any potentiality, so there is nothing that one has that the other lacks, so they do not differ in any way, and are thereby not distinct. (Another way of framing this is that pure act is absolutely simple, and so is not composed of matter and form, and so is not even individuated in the sense that we apply that term to created things. We speak of God as “one” because he is undivided and indivisible. There can be no multiplicity or individuation in pure act.)

This isn’t an assumption, if he can show that each of the things shown by his Five Ways is purely actual, since he later argues that only one thing can be purely actual.

I think Ed Feser has constructed a pretty good case, though I’m hoping someday he issues a work of systematic theology that is more encompassing and less introductory than the books he has published so far.

Another route one could take is that of Barry Miller. He has (in my opinion, convincingly) challenged the idea that existence cannot be a first-order predicate, and has used his new analysis in a new cosmological argument (derived loosely from Aquinas’s Second Way) and theology. (He introduced the notion of “limit cases” as opposed to “limits simpliciter,” a limit simpliciter simply being the greatest element in a set, a limit case being an element outside of a set to which the other elements “tend,” but which differs from them absolutely. The distinction captures a lot of what I think is strong in traditional natural theology, ie. a robust doctrine of simplicity, and what has been lost in the more effete versions advocated by theists like Plantinga and Swinburne. It is difficult to properly argue for the unity and mutual entailment of God’s properties, as well as the uniqueness of the object of a cosmological argument, without a robust doctrine of simplicity, in my opinion, and the notion of God as a limit case instance of existence is capable of articulating God’s transcendence.) Unfortunately his books aren’t too easy to get a hold of if you don’t have access to an academic library.

Because it must possess the forms of the things it creates qua universals, and that (to possess formal universals “eminently”) is what it is to be an intellect on Aquinas’s philosophy of mind. (In this case God is analogically an intellect.)

I think it’s an unfortunate consequence of apologetics that discussions usually focus on cosmological arguments and do not get to discussions about the divine attributes. There is also the issue that the arguments made most often in the public eye (the kalam cosmolgocial argument, the fine tuning argument, the design argument) do not have robust ways of demonstrating the divine attributes.

In Aquinas’s works (and those of his commentators) it is generally rather straightforward to distinguish what Aquinas has shown and what has not, what elements are ascribed to the unmoved mover by philosophical argument and which by faith.

Pure act does not have any potentialities. A fortiori pure act does not have a potentiality to cause (or not cause) anything. Pure act creates. It is correct to say, “It is possible that pure act creates” and “It is possible that pure act not create.” But it is false to say that “Pure act possibly creates” or “Pure act possible does not create”, as the latter two de re modalities attribute a potentiality to pure act which is foreign to it.

So the multiverse, if it is to sustain/change the universe in the way that pure act does, must stand in causal relations. But there is still the issue, as I pointed out, it’s not clear that the “multiverse” is more than a mereological sum, and therefore cannot stand in causal relations apart from its constituents.

I was going to suggest to Candide that she/he simply exchange the term Unmoved Mover or First Cause, etc. whenever he/she ran into the term God in Thomas’ works, since, he/she has such an aversion to the term God.

Thomas discusses the Knowledge of the " Unmoved Mover " in S.T., Part 1, Qs 14-18.
I had previously pointed out the same thing you did, but in a round about way. To act, an agent must will to act, and to will, an agent must have knowledge of what to will ( the universal forms you mention ). And to have knowledge and to will are signs of intelligence.

P.S. the " Unmoved Mover " moves and causes as well as creates.

Linus2nd

 

[polytropos]

This really is the crux of the point, one which will not be resolved by argument or logic as we commonly use it, for a simple reason: causality is a concept built into most languages as a self evident assumption. Fact is, causality is an abstraction from experience, and like many “common sense” presumptions, is at its root false. In other words, unless there is a deep examination of on’es experience at the sense level heavily steered by critical analysis, causality is a persistent illusion and pervades even the thinking of such greats as Aquinas. Other factors pertain as well.

I see the claims that causality is “at its root false” and “a persistent illusion [that] pervades even the thinking of such greats as Aquinas.” I do not, however, see an argument for such sweeping claims, unless these three points are to count as an argument: (a) “causality is a concept built into most languages as a self evident assumption”, (b) “causality is an abstraction from experience”, and (c) causality is a “‘common sense’ presumption”.

But those can’t be sufficient for the assertion that causality is a false illusion. The existence of an external world is a concept built into most (if not all) languages and is a common sense presumption.

The second condition strikes me as a bit strange, as there is nothing abstract about causal explanations in day-to-day life (as the insistence that causality is a common sense presumption would seem to indicate). Regardless of the particulars of the analogy with the existence of an external world, it does not seem to follow that something is an illusion if it is an abstraction from experience.

What I am trying to point to here is that these arguments ignore at least half the picture, the other half being a critically examined component of mystical experience.

I think it is a misconception to believe that the arguments of natural theology aim to present the whole picture. It is a sociological fact that most people do not convert on the basis of argument. There are a couple exceptions (Edward Feser, and perhaps Peter Geach). I returned to the Catholic Church before I understood Aquinas’s Five Ways or found them particularly cogent. Their major function seems to be to aim at a greater knowledge of God. (Speaking of Feser and Geach, an appropriate post here.)

I do think that they help people arrive at a greater understanding of their faith, and that they can disabuse some of the idea that faith and reason are opposed. And there is no reason why one cannot be drawn to accept them under the operation of grace. But the arguments of natural theology are not meant to be sufficient for faith, nor a substitute for mystical experience or anything of the sort.