How would you answer this (discussion of evil)?

[john_doran]

MichaelLewis:

The dictionary definitions I’ve looked at define conceivability as being synonymous with imaginably.

i am using the words as philosophical terms of art; colloquial language is poorly suited to express the nuanced meanings required by ontology and metaphysics.

MichaelLewis:
I share your sense that there is a difference; that the conceivable is the logically possible. It seems to me, however, that while not all conceivable things are imaginable,* all* imaginable things are conceivable. A classic example is the 1000-sided figure. I can’t imagine it, but I can conceive of it—that is, it is clear that a figure that meets that description could exist. On the other hand, I can’t even conceive of a round square—“round” can’t be taken as a description of the two-dimensional figure known as a square.
your example uses an analytic falsehood - i.e. a falsehood that wears its inconceivability on its semantic sleeve, so to speak - . there are other kinds of necessary untruths - untruths the necessity of whose falsity only becomes evident upon protracted investigation.

 

[john_doran]

MichaelLewis:
You hold that the imaginable may not be conceivable; but clearly I don’t have the power to imagine a contradiction, do I? Could you give an example of something inconceivable that we can imagine?
this depends on what you mean by “imagine”. for example, your example of “round square” is an example of a broadly speaking visual object - an object composed of shapes - which is, of course, particularly conducive to the mental picturing involved in your garden variety imaginings.

but what does it mean to “imagine” mathematical postulates or proofs? what does it mean to “imagine” philosophical hypotheses? i suspect that what you take it to mean is that you entertain the proposition in your head, and then get a kind of sense as to the logical consistency of the concept - it just feels possible or not. or something like that, anyway - perhaps husserl has described the phenomenology of it somewhere.

at any rate, what we are talking about here are modal properties: is it possible to “imagine” a proposition that is nonetheless necessarily false, and thus inconceivable?

well, all of math and philosophy deals with modal concepts: the most general and world-independent features of this, the actual world. anything that is true in math is necessarily true; that which is false, necessarily so. the same goes for ontology and metaphysics and logic (and, arguably, every other purely philosophical discipline).

so that’s where one might look to discover examples of imaginable but inconceivable concepts, and it’s there that we find boatloads of them.

for example, Frege believed the (naive) set theory in his mathematical logic to be not only imaginable, but (necessarily) true; however, Russell pointed out an inconsistency in his axioms which, in fact, rendered the theory, as originally stated by Frege, necessarily false.

then there’s the continuum hypothesis - the hypothesis that there is no cardinality between the cardinality of the set of integers (aleph-null) and the cardinality of the set of real numbers (the continuum). cantor - the original proponent of the hypothesis - believed it to be true - i.e. believed it’s truth not only to be imaginable, but necessary - but he was never able to prove it. then godel and cohen demonstrated that the conntinuum hypothesis is undecidable. but godel himself (as do many set theoreticians) believed it to be false.

which means, obviously, that the “imaginability” of a proposition doesn’t allow you to draw any conclusions as to the modal properties of that proposition.

and philosophy is no different. for instance, questions about the nature of things like numbers, and propositions, and god, and knowledge, and possible worlds, and modal logic, are all questions about the modal properties of certain popositions.

but that is as may be. the point is that nothing much of logical interest follows from the putative imaginability of a concept. what is definitive is logical proof.

which means, of course, that your ability to picture a world where everything goes right and everyone avoids evil entails nothing about the logical possibility of such a world (in fact, alvin plantinga formulates an argument that such a world is logically impossible).

keep in mind also that, for every proposition whose necessary falsehood (or truth) is demonstrable, there are about a million unproved propositions that are nonetheless either necessarily true or necessarily false (e.g. Goldbach’s conjecture); what do you think one’s (in)ability to imagine those propositions allows one to conclude?

 

[john_doran]

MichaelLewis:

This is from Dictionary.com. I intended something like Def. 3 and deliberately avoided talking about God’s “goodness”, as I think it is useless to argue over unqualified moral terms. I apologize for not being clearer.

i’m unsure as to what you believe follows from that particular definition; it certainly doesn’t entail your original statement that “if a deity were perfectly benevolent, then by definition he would not permit suffering if agents could be perfectly happy without it”.

MichaelLewis:

You may want to say that I shouldn’t judge God; well, it may be imprudent

to judge him, if he exists (and it may not), but given that I’m judging him with respect to his relationship to human beings, there is some sense in using human standards and concepts.
i’m saying that you cannot develop any (good) normative arguments concerning god’s conduct - arguments about what god ought or ought not to do - without having a good theory of divine morality. and you don’t.

MichaelLewis:

A Christian might say that our understanding of what is best for us is irrelevant, I suppose, but that really is just to avoid dealing with the problem of suffering, to the extent that it is a problem.

well, to the extent that christians believe there is an all-powerful, all-good, all-loving god, they believe that such a god necessarily has good reasons for permitting whatever suffering there is. which means that it’s just not a problem. at all.

 

[eptatorata]

john doran:

well, to the extent that christians believe there is an all-powerful, all-good, all-loving god, they believe that such a god necessarily has good reasons for permitting whatever suffering there is. which means that it’s just not a problem. at all.

I call this the “greater good” defense and it is a major problem. I will measure a deity by my own moral standards and according to them, the Christian god is immoral beyond my capacity to fathom.

The way I see it, the problem with monotheistic religions is that their deity gets all the credit, but none of the blame.

 

[john_doran]

eptatorata:

I call this the “greater good” defense and it is a major problem. I will measure a deity by my own moral standards and according to them, the Christian god is immoral beyond my capacity to fathom.

sure. and i will measure a mountain by my own standards of linear measurement and declare that a mountain is microscopic…

look, leaving aside for the moment that human moral standards are inapposite for judging divine conduct, there is still the even more basic problem that even if you could apply them, there’s no way to do so.

i am not sure what “your own” ethical standards are, but assuming that they’re more robust than something like “good is whatever i stipulate to be good; and likewise for evil”, then how do you know that what god is doing is wrong?

keep in mind that your argument would have to demonstrate either the necessity or the significant likelihood that god does evil in permitting the suffering you see. but how can you do that?

on the one hand if you’re a (rule/act) utilitarian/consequentialist, then you would have to show that the amount of suffering there is entails that god fails to bring about the greater good. and how can you prove something like that? i mean, utlilitarians can’t even agree about what makes human actions better or worse (quantity of good? quality? what’s “the good”? is it pleasure? happiness? how can you quantify something like that? where do the consequences of an action end? and so on), let alone the actions of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being.

on the other hand, if you’re an agent relativist, and something like the intention or moral reasoning of the agent determines the moral quality of an action, how do you propose to be sure what god’s intentions are concerning us if you can’t even be sure of a ***person’s ***intentions?

what the christian does is appeal to premises about which he is more certain - i.e. those relating to the nature of god - which in turn entail the substantive moral conclusion that whatever he does is good. and in that way, the christian avoids the necessity of formulating a substantive theory of divine morality.

anyway. the basic point is that the argument from evil is a moral argument, and a moral argument about the moral norms that apply to god; and until you can give a good account of those, your argument is dead in the water.

 

[asquared]

the existence of evil is a proof of the existence of God, moreover of a God who created intelligent beings who are capable of knowing and loving him and who have free will to choose union with and obedience to him. God is all good, evil is the absence of good, so those who know, yet reject God must by definition continue existence in a state removed from God. All evil results from free will choice of intelligent created beings to disobey God’s commands, which are inherent and readily discernible from the nature of these created beings, and results in separation from God and the natural ill effects of contradicting their nature.

cold is the proof of the existence of heat. cold is the absence of heat. if there were no heat, there would be no cold. darkness is the proof of the existence of light, if there were no light there could be no darkness.

 

[itsjustdave1988]

The trouble is, in this sort of discussion, he always says something like this, “Well, society determined what is good collectively.” Or “People as a group decided what are the standards for moral behavior.”

The Aryans society decided it was “good collectively” to rid themselves of the Jews. The “groups” decided that killing the Jews was within their standards of moral behavior. I suppose that should unveil the absurdity in this moral system, no?

 

[eptatorata]

john doran:

your argument is dead in the water.

What argument?

I have stated that I uniformly apply my own moral standards, whatever they may be, and I do not accept the special pleading that deities are exempt.I do not owe you an explanation of my moral philosophy, though.

 

[AuntMartha]

eptatorata:

What argument?

I have stated that I uniformly apply my own moral standards, whatever they may be, and I do not accept the special pleading that deities are exempt.I do not owe you an explanation of my moral philosophy, though.

Which then begs the question - why are you posting on a Catholic board if you are not Catholic or have no interest in learning about the faith or opening your mind to the faith? Are you just here to troll? To prove all those catholics how “wrong” they are?

Aunt Martha

 

[eptatorata]

AuntMartha:

Which then begs the question - why are you posting on a Catholic board if you are not Catholic or have no interest in learning about the faith or opening your mind to the faith? Are you just here to troll? To prove all those catholics how “wrong” they are?

My reasons are my own.

 

[john_doran]

eptatorata:

What argument?

I have stated that I uniformly apply my own moral standards, whatever they may be, and I do not accept the special pleading that deities are exempt.I do not owe you an explanation of my moral philosophy, though.

ok - your reasoning.

it’s not “special pleading”. any more than it’s “special pleading” to exempt things like my car, for example, from the uncertainty principle and other quantum mechanical particle properties.

and you’re right: you don’t owe me anything at all.

 

[SamCA]

abcdefg:

What guards an atheist’s conscience? if he believe he can do evil things unnoticed(or “unpunishable”) by others, will he go for it?

It depends on the atheist.

(Just as some Christians, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, and Raelians do bad things if they think they can avoid temporal punishment for it.)

 

[wcknight]

eptatorata:

I call this the “greater good” defense and it is a major problem. I will measure a deity by my own moral standards and according to them, the Christian god is immoral beyond my capacity to fathom.

The way I see it, the problem with monotheistic religions is that their deity gets all the credit, but none of the blame.

That’s quite laughable, you’re sitting in judgement of the Almighty. AS if you have any idea about what God’s plan is, or what role if any He has in ‘allowing’ evil to happen in the world.

Sure God could have made a world full of automatrons. Everyone would always make the right choices, no temptations, no evil. It would be a pretty boring place, but I doubt it would be better than it is now.

wc

 

[SamCA]

wcknight:

Sure God could have made a world full of automatrons. Everyone would always make the right choices, no temptations, no evil. It would be a pretty boring place, but I doubt it would be better than it is now.

The idea that the only alternative to a world with suffering is a world of automatons is an obvious strawman. It is integral to one of the most fundamental aspects of Christian theology that God can create a world in which there is simultaneous free will and a total lack of suffering: Heaven. (This was already pointed out upthread.)

For that matter, we’re told in the Bible that the original design plan for human beings was for them to be without sin. Want to imagine a world where there is free will and no sin? Imagine a world where Adam and Eve never fell, and you’ve got one.

 

[eptatorata]

wcknight:

That’s quite laughable, you’re sitting in judgement of the Almighty.

Laugh if you wish.

Technically, I am sitting in judgement of Christian theology. However, even in the event that there is one or more deities, I would still judge them by my own standards.

what role if any He has in ‘allowing’ evil to happen in the world.

What role, if any? If there is a role, then you know what my opinion of that role is. If there is no role, then I’ll spare you my assessment.

 

[AuntMartha]

eptatorata:

My reasons are my own.

Got it. (Troll)

Aunt Martha

 

[eptatorata]

AuntMartha:

Got it. (Troll)

Just as my reasons are my own, your conclusions are your own.

 

[MichaelLewis]

John wrote:

i am using the words as philosophical terms of art; colloquial language is poorly suited to express the nuanced meanings required by ontology and metaphysics.

I grant you that, but neither my philosophical dictionary nor the online one that I checked defined “conceivable”. In any case, I share your definition; the conceivable is the logically possible.

…i suspect that what you take it to mean is that you entertain the proposition in your head, and then get a kind of sense as to the logical consistency of the concept - it just feels possible or not. or something like that, anyway - perhaps husserl has described the phenomenology of it somewhere.

Not at all. I understand that we can be quite convinced of the truth of necessary falsehoods, but in such cases we aren’t imagining them in their entirety. There are perhaps very few things we can imagine, but being happy without suffering is one of them. Many of us don’t need to imagine it, we have experienced it. Now ‘perfect’ happiness is another story, I grant. But imperfect happiness without suffering, continuing forever, would be far better than what we have now. (Granted, God might have to periodically modify our minds so as to keep the experience of being happy ‘fresh’; but that shouldn’t be a problem for him. As it is, he lets our memories fade quite rapidly over time; and those we retain are partly or even fully our own constructions, as experimental psychology has established.) In any case, as heaven is supposed to be perfect happiness lasting forever, The Christian God should be capable of providing it right away.

i’m unsure as to what you believe follows from that particular definition; it certainly doesn’t entail your original statement that “if a deity were perfectly benevolent, then by definition he would not permit suffering if agents could be perfectly happy without it”.

As I said, I intended something like Def. 3: “having or showing or arising from a desire to promote the welfare or happiness of others”. The only problem with Def. 3, I admit, is that ‘welfare’ is ambiguous. So more precisely: “having or showing or arising from a desire to promote the happiness of others”. An agent being ‘perfectly’ benevolent entails that benevolent action is an agent’s first priority, or if it is equal to other values, the agent would never fail to take a benevolent action to accommodate other values (what else could the ‘perfect’ indicate in this context?). As suffering diminishes happiness, and is at best an instrumental good (otherwise the experience in question should not be called suffering) if not simply a harm, part of maximizing happiness is eliminating suffering. An all-powerful being is capable of maximizing happiness (more on your free will defense in a bit). Therefore, if a perfectly benevolent, all-powerful being exists, there is no suffering, and happiness is maximized for all beings.
(cont…)

 

[MichaelLewis]

(cont. from previous post)

i’m saying that you cannot develop any (good) normative arguments concerning god’s conduct - arguments about what god ought or ought not to do - without having a good theory of divine morality. and you don’t.

I’m not evoking a normative standard to evaluate God’s actions; I don’t need to. (I don’t evoke a normative standard to evaluate the effects of the force of gravity either.) It is enough that he values other things more than the alleviation of suffering and promotion of happiness (if he is all-powerful); I’m not interested in ‘judging’ him or his actions, just thier present and future implications for us. (Though, of course, they probably will have an impact on the affection some people feel toward him.) To many of us non-Christians, like the poster’s relatives I assume, (Remember, this discussion arose in the context of how someone might reply to non-believers who reject God because of the argument from evil. I suggested the argument from suffering as a better way of framing the problem the poster’s relatives seem to have.) the way God is is significant apart from any moral judgments one might make concerning him.

To evoke an under-defined notion like (agent-libertarian) free will isn’t relevant to those who don’t, as a matter of faith, assume that it exists and has value. (I must say that don’t even know what I’m implicitly conceding might exist; ‘randomness that libertarians like’ is my conceptual placeholder for libertarian free will.) In any case, the idea that it is logically possible that there could exist beings who enjoy heaven, but God can not create them directly, entails that God can not create all logically possible states of affairs. What is omnipotence if not the power to do just that?

well, to the extent that christians believe there is an all-powerful, all-good, all-loving god, they believe that such a god necessarily

has good reasons for permitting whatever suffering there is. which means that it’s just not a problem. at all.

Yes, I understand that by Christian standards, whatever God does will be good. I never quarreled with that. It is fruitless to argue over moral definitions; if that were how we all used the word “good”, God would certainly be good. In fact I’m only proposing that God’s top priority is not to prevent suffering and promote happiness; in fact, existing evidence indicates he has very little interest in those goals. That may not matter to Christians, but to many of us it is relevant, whether we ‘judge’ God or not.

Have I now made it clear that I am not interested in making a moral argument? Please understand, I am not arguing that if God doesn’t share my values (or yours) then he doesn’t exist. If God does exist, I would be very surprised if he happened to share the common values of human beings. Furthermore, he wouldn’t need to for me to be glad that he existed and to be grateful to him for creating the world. To a great extent, I’m actually on the side of the Christian in that I don’t think it is too helpful to complain about what God does (if he does exist); but I sympathize with those who wish that God had both the ability and desire to arrange for a better world than we currently have.

Michael

 

[john_doran]

MichaelLewis:

Not at all. I understand that we can be quite convinced of the truth of necessary falsehoods, but in such cases we aren’t imagining them in their entirety. There are perhaps very few things we can imagine, but being happy without suffering is one of them. Many of us don’t need to imagine it, we have experienced it.

sure, but as i pointed out before, that’s not at issue - the question isn’t whether or not you are capable, at some time or another, of being happy without suffering. it is a question whether you can be always happy without suffering; whether everyone can always be happy without suffering.

and the conceivability of that state of affairs is not evident simply from your memory of being hurtlessly happy at some point in the past.

(i mean, it;s not even clear from that sort of memory whether or not your happiness was purchased at the price either of your own or someone else’s future or past suffering…)

MichaelLewis:

In any case, as heaven is supposed to be perfect happiness lasting forever, The Christian God should be capable of providing it right away.

he might be capable of doing so, but it does not follow that he ought to do so.

MichaelLewis:

So more precisely: “having or showing or arising from a desire to promote the happiness of others”. An agent being ‘perfectly’ benevolent entails that benevolent action is an agent’s first priority, or if it is equal to other values, the agent would never fail to take a benevolent action to accommodate other values (what else could the ‘perfect’ indicate in this context?). As suffering diminishes happiness, and is at best an instrumental good (otherwise the experience in question should not be called suffering) if not simply a harm, part of maximizing happiness is eliminating suffering. An all-powerful being is capable of maximizing happiness (more on your free will defense in a bit). Therefore, if a perfectly benevolent, all-powerful being exists, there is no suffering, and happiness is maximized for all beings.(cont…)

you assume, again, that god has a duty to “maximize happiness”. why believe that? i mean, i don’t even believe that’s a human obligation, let alone one for god.