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john_doran
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MichaelLewisI’m not evoking a *normative [/quote said:standard to evaluate God’s actions; I don’t need to. (I don’t evoke a normative standard to evaluate the effects of the force of gravity either.) It is enough that he values other things more than the alleviation of suffering and promotion of happiness (if he is all-powerful); I’m not interested in ‘judging’ him or his actions, just thier present and future implications for us.
don’t look now, but that’s a normative argument: all agents act to maximize some value.
and, again, you are applying the standard to god. which is something that can be done only by way of moral fiat.
i’m not sure how to be more clear about this: to say that maximal goodness entails maximizing (human) happiness, is a moral claim, with normative implications. it is also a controverted moral claim - one which i, for instance, reject - so application of the standard to god is something you are doing for which you need to marshall rational support. and that’s the part you haven’t done, nor which, in my opinion, is capable of being (compellingly) done.
MichaelLewis:![]()
but god may very well have been able to create them and simply chose not to. and he could have chosen thusly and still be omnibenevolent.In any case, the idea that it is logically possible that there could exist beings who enjoy heaven, but God can not create them directly, entails that God can not create all logically possible states of affairs. What is omnipotence if not the power to do just that?