Humans and other sentient beings

[Bagheera]

polytropos:

The unclearness may have come from the fact that you used the equality of two mathematically identical objects to make a point about two numerically distinct physical objects that do not share all of each other’s features.

Yes! And this is the point. When I say “two” and you say “two” there is no reason to assume that the same neurons fire in our different brains. Moreover, when I say “two” and a German says “zwei”, we definitely have different neurons firing. It does not matter, as long as we agree that we refer to the same abstract concept. But that does not eliminate the fact that in both cases there are physical neurons firing.

Let’s examine a human-robot exchange. In the robot’s brain there are electronic circuits, not neurons. There is a difference between the physical methods of processing the information. But the same kind of “agreement” holds here, too. Words, propositions have no “intrinsic meanings”. We assign them mutually agreeable meanings in a communication channel. If we want to, we can create a “private” language, just you and I. We can agree that in our private conversation when we say the word “two”, we actually mean “three”, and vice versa. So the very same neuron firings will carry one specific meaning when we talk to each other, and a different meaning when we talk to others. But that does not invalidate that those pesky neurons keep firing.

polytropos:

I think you are missing the point of the thought experiment. I am a human; I have intentional and qualitative thoughts. The argument is that there could be a zombie with physical states identical to mine without intentional and qualitative thoughts. Obviously they cannot be told apart - that’s the point. The point is that if there were a mental difference, the physical facts wouldn’t tell you about it.

Just like the German and you saying “zwei” and “two”. There is no mental difference, only different physical representations of it. Just like (1 = .999999…)

polytropos:

You seem to be reifying the problem of other minds. But so long as other humans are of the same kind that I am, it seems reasonable to suppose that they have minds.

Certainly. And it has nothing to do with the “infrastructure”.

polytropos:

But since other considerations inform me that the physical facts alone can’t account for their minds, I am unjustified in thinking that a purely physical object that I create - an android, say - likewise has a mind.

Those “other considerations” account for nothing. You still refuse to consider that the physical infrastructure is inseparable from its activity. And those – together – account for the mind. Just like you can have the same source code, compile it onto two very different computer architectures, run them on two different computers and get the same result. The “hardware” is different, just like a human and an android or a robot, the “software” (the object code or executable) is different, but the source code and the result are the same.

polytropos:

From which part of “whether or not we can tell the difference” did you get “now we can tell the difference”?

You said it right here:

polytropos:

Of course we care, whether or not we can tell the difference. It’s quite useful to know whether you’re talking to a conman or an honest salesman. Maybe the conman’s a good enough actor that we can’t tell. So much the worse for us, because regardless of the functional equivalence, the conman and the honest salesman have very different mental lives!

And I asked: “on what grounds do you call one of them a “con man”? Why do you “care” if there is nothing to “care about”?

polytropos:

There is a way to tell which was the original.

No, there is not. Just like you cannot tell if one of salesmen is a con man.

 

[polytropos]

Yes! And this is the point. When I say “two” and you say “two” there is no reason to assume that the same neurons fire in our different brains. Moreover, when I say “two” and a German says “zwei”, we definitely have different neurons firing. It does not matter, as long as we agree that we refer to the same abstract concept. But that does not eliminate the fact that in both cases there are physical neurons firing.

Actually, no, that does not seem to be the point. I said that functionalism was incomplete because it ignores intentionality and qualia. You said that if it’s impossible to distinguish the emulation from the original, then we shouldn’t posit the difference (like 1 = 0.999999…).

But that’s all irrelevant, for no one is positing a difference in the first place. The problem with functionalism is that it ignores an indisputable difference - that we have qualitative and intentional states which don’t seem to be present (even in principle) in things that are functionally equivalent. The case is made clear by the first-person actor who is functionally equivalent to the person he’s mimicking. Function is the same - but we know the mind is not. One can’t say that we just have an incomplete view of function and need to examine the actor’s brain more closely, because then the function ceases to do any of the theory’s work, and the theory collapses into something more reductive and less plausible. If we just eliminate the qualities that the theory can’t explain, then it’s incomplete.

There is a difference, which we are aware of, which the theory does not account for. Which is a fundamental failure of the theory.

Just like the German and you saying “zwei” and “two”. There is no mental difference, only different physical representations of it. Just like (1 = .999999…)

You again seem to be confusing the argument I am making with something. I am not arguing that multiple realizability itself causes issues for materialism (since you are not arguing for type-identity). I am arguing that the physical facts of the system do not tell you that anything mental is happening at all. They are physical facts; if the physical facts about the human cannot in principle tell you that the human is thinking, then the physical facts about the robot don’t either. But we know on separate grounds that we do have intentional states (which we don’t know about the robot).

Those “other considerations” account for nothing. You still refuse to consider that the physical infrastructure is inseparable from its activity. And those – together – account for the mind. Just like you can have the same source code, compile it onto two very different computer architectures, run them on two different computers and get the same result. The “hardware” is different, just like a human and an android or a robot, the “software” (the object code or executable) is different, but the source code and the result are the same.

Actually, I am quite willing to accept that physical infrastructure is inseparable from its activity. But we have no reason to accept that “its activity” includes qualitative or intentional states (since we find those nowhere in computer science or neurobiology), while we on the contrary have other reasons for accepting that qualitative and intentional states are not explicable with relation to the physical infrastructure (what I mean by “other considerations” - particularly I would refer to Jame F. Ross’s article which I cited previously, and am willing to defend, but which probably should be carried on elsewhere). So we have no basis for accepting that the physical infrastructure is responsible for our qualitative or intentional states.

This is evident given that your theory seems to tend toward eliminativism about intentional and qualitative states. It is defined without any reference to them (but rather with reference to function) and they need not occur if your theory is to be an accurate description of mind.

You said it right here:

And I asked: “on what grounds do you call one of them a “con man”? Why do you “care” if there is nothing to “care about”?

Huh? It doesn’t matter if I care. Ontology is not determined by whether I care about or can discover the difference or not. My second example where you are the actor is more to the point. You know there is a difference between your mind and that of the person you are (let’s say) flawlessly imitating.

But to an external observer there is not an observable difference. Perhaps the external observer also doesn’t care whether there is a difference of mind. Those are both far afield of the point I’m making. The point is that the difference of mind is there, whether you can observe it physically or whether you care about it. The other point is that we as agents, if not as observers, know about the difference of mind, and so can draw conclusions from the principle difficulties that any physical model would face.

No, there is not. Just like you cannot tell if one of salesmen is a con man.

Suppose your “copy machine” is arranged thus: At position a you place an object X. When the machine is turned on, it creates an object Y with the exact microphysical structure of X at location b. You watch this occur.

After the fact, the two objects may have the exact same molecular composition, but you still know which is the original and which is the copy.

 

[polytropos]

(what I mean by “other considerations” - particularly I would refer to Jame F. Ross’s article which I cited previously, and am willing to defend, but which probably should be carried on elsewhere)

Perhaps in the next couple weeks I’ll create a more accessible topic on Ross’s argument against materialism and functionalism.

 

[Bagheera]

polytropos:

The case is made clear by the first-person actor who is functionally equivalent to the person he’s mimicking. Function is the same - but we know the mind is not.

No, you do not know that. You do not even know if the person is “mimicking” anything or not. He knows, but you don’t. You surmise it, and there is absolutely no justification for it. You cannot peek into the “black box”, your only clues are what you observe.

polytropos:

Ontology is not determined by whether I care about or can discover the difference or not.

What you call ontology is only an assumption. On what grounds do you call someone a “con man” if there is no indication of it?

polytropos:

Suppose your “copy machine” is arranged thus: At position a you place an object X. When the machine is turned on, it creates an object Y with the exact microphysical structure of X at location b. You watch this occur.

After the fact, the two objects may have the exact same molecular composition, but you still know which is the original and which is the copy.

At least until you blink. Anyhow, you introduced extra information, by stipulating that you “saw” the process. You must decide which one is the original without using extra information, just like you cannot torture the “actor” to decide if he is acting or not. It is a pure epistemological problem.

To talk about “ontology” is nice. But without a sound epistemological underpinning it is only empty speculation.

 

[polytropos]

No, you do not know that. You do not even know if the person is “mimicking” anything or not. He knows, but you don’t. You surmise it, and there is absolutely no justification for it. You cannot peek into the “black box”, your only clues are what you observe.

What you call ontology is only an assumption. On what grounds do you call someone a “con man” if there is no indication of it?

But this is all in favor of the argument I am making. I don’t know whether the person is mimicking or not. But the person does. You can have two functionally equivalent persons with different thoughts. The only way to make functionalism consistent is to eliminate the difference. But since, in some cases, we are the subjects of the philosophical investigation, we know that the difference is still there: I can be a conman, and those observing me can’t figure it out (if I’m good enough).

I don’t call someone a conman if I can’t tell. That’s exactly the point. Unless there is a physical cue, I can’t tell whether the salesman is a conman or not, because his being a conman is dependent on his mental life, not on his functional states.

Anyhow, you introduced extra information, by stipulating that you “saw” the process. You must decide which one is the original without using extra information, just like you cannot torture the “actor” to decide if he is acting or not. It is a pure epistemological problem.

Well, I had to introduce other information, since you underdefined the problem. Is the process seen? Do I put the object to be copied into a chamber where it will be scanned, and the duplicate is reconstructed in a separate chamber? Either of these seem plausible and would give us a way to distinguish the two objects - but if you don’t specify the limitations, then of course it is impossible for anyone to respond to your thought experiment. I suppose you could ad hoc specify the problem in such a way that it can’t be answered.

So yes, as I’ve been saying, it’s an epistemological point. It does not mean that the distinction between the original and the copy is “meaningless” - as I’ve noted, there are plausible theoretical situations that might make it knowable, even.

To talk about “ontology” is nice. But without a sound epistemological underpinning it is only empty speculation.

I agree. But this is the main problem with the argument as a whole. This is an ontologically and epistemologically sound claim: I have qualitative and intentional thoughts.

But the claim that any functionally equivalent emulations of me have qualitative and intentional states is epistemologically vacuous - and dubious, altogether. But that’s what functionalism depends on (if it doesn’t just eliminate qualia and intentionality altogether).

 

[MPat]

What else? That is all available to you. There is no way to get into the “black box”, and find out “how it works”? All you can do is observe the behavior, and draw inferences.

Er, if we are talking about natural and artificial hearts or “natural humans” and “electronic humans”, we can get into the “black box”. We give it the (name removed by moderator)ut “autopsy” and get different outputs. Therefore, if we define “functional equivalence” as “giving the same outputs after getting the same (name removed by moderator)uts”, we had no “functional equivalence” here.

Now if you try to limit the (name removed by moderator)uts and outputs that are necessary for “functional equivalence” according to the “function”, you run into another problem: how can you define “function”? It is easy for Aristotle: he can define “function” as “final cause”. You cannot: teleology is not available in your system. Actually, it looks like you have avoided the questions about definition of “function” so far…

And, as you can see, I didn’t have to talk about mind or soul or qualia here. You might pretend that qualia do not exist or “are meaningless”. Can you pretend that dissection does not exist…?

Ah, but what is the “real” deal? What is the difference between the perfect emulation, and the “real” thing? If it is impossible to distinguish the emulation from the original, then it is meaningless to posit a “difference”. What is the difference between “1” and “0.999999999999….”? There is no difference.

Not incomplete. Sufficient. Consider a perfect actor, who can emulate any and all behaviors he chooses to. Why should the observer care if the actor “has” those feelings he displays, or not? Can ANYONE tell the difference?

Well, the actor himself can. Doesn’t he count as “anyone”…?

So, who must be able to distinguish two things in order for you to count them as “different”…? Anyone? Everyone? Or just you? Would you say that “difference” is relative to observer? (Actually, at this moment I don’t see how you can avoid that.)

That’s why I have asked you about speed of light: if St. Thomas Aquinas (using the tools at his disposal) could not tell the difference between infinite and large but finite speed of light, does it mean that his conclusion that speed of light is infinite is correct?

I’m afraid that consistency would require you to agree that the conclusion “speed of light is infinite” is correct. But then not much would be left of any kind of science…

 

[Bagheera]

polytropos:

I don’t know whether the person is mimicking or not. But the person does.

Correct, but beside the point. Of course a good actor can emulate some emotions he does not “feel”. But as long as there is no epistemological method to find out if he is “mimicking” or not, you have no grounds to assume that he does. This is the case when you must make a decision based upon appearances – since that is all you have. Of course you may be mistaken, but that is part of the “game”.

polytropos:

But since, in some cases, we are the subjects of the philosophical investigation, we know that the difference is still there: I can be a conman, and those observing me can’t figure it out (if I’m good enough).

You cannot be a con man, if you do not act like one. If you think about yourself as one, you only delude yourself.

polytropos:

I don’t call someone a conman if I can’t tell. That’s exactly the point. Unless there is a physical cue, I can’t tell whether the salesman is a conman or not, because his being a conman is dependent on his mental life, not on his functional states.

Actually, the exact reverse is true. Whatever his mental states might be, it is his actions which will classify him as a con man or an honest person.

 

[Bagheera]

polytropos:

I don’t know whether the person is mimicking or not. But the person does.

On further contemplation I will have to amend my previous answer. It is not necessarily true that the person be aware of the emulation. Children frequently emulate their parents, without intending to do it. (And intention is a big part of your argument.) They do not “intentionally” decide: “from now on I will behave like Daddy does”. It is instinctive behavior - coming from the sub-conscious.

Another “semi-argument” comes from an excellent sci-fi short story, with the title: “Android” (what else?). In the story an android was built with the specific purpose that he would act like a human. The brain was constructed to fulfill that task, but was never informed about it. So the poor android actually considered himself to be a “true” human being. I am aware that it is “just” a story, but the point is that there is no logical impossibility about a pre-programmed entity, which might be unaware of “its” true nature, so the “mimicking” is not an “intentional” deception.

Add to this that you still have no epistemological method to make a decision from the outside.

This whole problem is a variant of the problem of “virtual reality” (or the Matrix). If someone is connected to a perfect VR environment, then there is no epistemological method to find out if the world is “real” or “virtual”. Yes, you can say that “ontologically” he is attached to a VR environment, but that is neither here nor there. He does not know and cannot know it.

 

[polytropos]

Correct, but beside the point.

Let’s step through this, because I think it is correct but precisely to the point.

Of course a good actor can emulate some emotions he does not “feel”.

Yes.

But as long as there is no epistemological method to find out if he is “mimicking” or not, you have no grounds to assume that he does.

I am not assuming that a particular person is mimicking if I have no evidence. But we don’t need an epistemological method here: we know that, regardless of the behavior, he might be mimicking, or he might not be. Both are possible; certainly both have occurred at some point in the history of humanity. And functional outputs don’t tell us which.

I don’t have to scientifically verify that someone is faking to know that it’s possible for someone to act in such a way that their intentions are not made manifest. This is because intentions are private. The fact that we have intentions that are not public to everyone else (if we want to hide them, and succeed at it) makes it clear that it is incoherent to define thinking in purely in terms of function.

This is the case when you must make a decision based upon appearances – since that is all you have.

I, as an external observer, have to make a decision based on appearances. That is only because I have limited information. But I know that I have limited information, because I know that everyone has non-public intentions. But the fact that everyone has non-public thoughts and intentions is a weakness of functionalism.

You cannot be a con man, if you do not act like one. If you think about yourself as one, you only delude yourself.

I think there is some equivocation couched in here.

Suppose I have decided to rip someone off. I am pretending and succeeding to be an honest salesman. But right before I am about to act on my conman-intentions, I have a change of heart, and do not rip my customer off. I complete the transaction honestly.

Was I a conman? Perhaps that’s just semantics. But what is important is that I was functionally an honest salesman, for my intentions were not manifested in action prior to my change of heart. But then what option has the functionalist? Surely I did not always think of myself as an honest salesman. Surely my thoughts were different during the period in which I was resolved to scam, compared to the period after my change of heart. But an external observer couldn’t tell the difference.

Anyone looking on would be just to consider me an honest salesman throughout, yes, because that’s how I was acting. But that is not the point: the point is that my thoughts and my function are not necessarily aligned. And anyone who has ever been a conscious, intentional agent (ie. humans) knows that this is possible and plausible, so functionalism can only succeed by ignoring what we know are real distinctions.

It is not necessarily true that the person be aware of the emulation. Children frequently emulate their parents, without intending to do it. (And intention is a big part of your argument.) They do not “intentionally” decide: “from now on I will behave like Daddy does”. It is instinctive behavior - coming from the sub-conscious.

Another “semi-argument” comes from an excellent sci-fi short story, with the title: “Android” (what else?). In the story an android was built with the specific purpose that he would act like a human. The brain was constructed to fulfill that task, but was never informed about it. So the poor android actually considered himself to be a “true” human being. I am aware that it is “just” a story, but the point is that there is no logical impossibility about a pre-programmed entity, which might be unaware of “its” true nature, so the “mimicking” is not an “intentional” deception.

I don’t think you understand the dynamic of the argument I am making. Counterexamples do not disprove my point, since I’m not claiming that in all cases, emulation is intentional. My point is that if we are to use function as a sufficient condition for thought, then there cannot be counterexamples to function serving as an indicator of thought. But there are such counterexamples. So function is not a proper indicator of thought. My claim is not that intentions are never manifest through actions, just that actions are not a sufficient condition, and thereby, functionalism crumbles.

Add to this that you still have no epistemological method to make a decision from the outside.

I don’t need one. The possibility of the scenarios I’ve given cannot be coherently denied. Thought simply need not correspond with function. I may have no idea whether someone is scamming me, based on his actions. Once again, that’s the point, because whether he is thinking of scamming me is separate from his actions.

 

[MPat]

Correct, but beside the point. Of course a good actor can emulate some emotions he does not “feel”. But as long as there is no epistemological method to find out if he is “mimicking” or not, you have no grounds to assume that he does. This is the case when you must make a decision based upon appearances – since that is all you have. Of course you may be mistaken, but that is part of the “game”.

You cannot be a con man, if you do not act like one. If you think about yourself as one, you only delude yourself.

Actually, the exact reverse is true. Whatever his mental states might be, it is his actions which will classify him as a con man or an honest person.

On further contemplation I will have to amend my previous answer. It is not necessarily true that the person be aware of the emulation. Children frequently emulate their parents, without intending to do it. (And intention is a big part of your argument.) They do not “intentionally” decide: “from now on I will behave like Daddy does”. It is instinctive behavior - coming from the sub-conscious.

Another “semi-argument” comes from an excellent sci-fi short story, with the title: “Android” (what else?). In the story an android was built with the specific purpose that he would act like a human. The brain was constructed to fulfill that task, but was never informed about it. So the poor android actually considered himself to be a “true” human being. I am aware that it is “just” a story, but the point is that there is no logical impossibility about a pre-programmed entity, which might be unaware of “its” true nature, so the “mimicking” is not an “intentional” deception.

Add to this that you still have no epistemological method to make a decision from the outside.

This whole problem is a variant of the problem of “virtual reality” (or the Matrix). If someone is connected to a perfect VR environment, then there is no epistemological method to find out if the world is “real” or “virtual”. Yes, you can say that “ontologically” he is attached to a VR environment, but that is neither here nor there. He does not know and cannot know it.

Yes, a con man might mistakenly pay with real bank notes while intending to pay with fake ones. But do you think that happens often…?

And that is another point. You claim that “ontology” does not matter because we cannot observe it directly, and thus only “behaviour” matters. That “mental states” of the seller do not matter, because both seller who intends to deceive and seller who intends to be honest might act in the same way. And that “ontology” should be disregarded, as it has no practical application.

But in reality it is your supposedly “practical” approach that proves to be purely speculative, theoretical and impractical. In reality “perfect copies”, “perfect actors” and “con men who act as honest men” are about as rare as “philosophical zombies”. And in practice trying to find out “mental states” (the task for which, according to you, no “epistemological method” is supposed to exist, because of “perfect actors”) is often more useful than trying to find out the future behaviours directly.

For example, by itself the fact that the face of seller became red (“behaviour”) is not very important for a buyer. And it does not allow the buyer to predict that the change is going to be fake money, the goods being sold are fake, or that they are stolen (since all those possibilities exist). But it might make it possible to suspect that the seller is not honest (a mental state) - and this fact does have a clear practical application. Thus acting as if ontology is important (even if we cannot find out everything about it with complete certainty) is more practical than acting as if ontology was of no importance and only behaviour mattered.

It wouldn’t be much of a problem for us, since we believe truth can be sought for its own sake, but it is a problem for you, since you seem to claim that truth having no practical application does not matter…

 

[polytropos]

In reality “perfect copies”, “perfect actors” and “con men who act as honest men” are about as rare as “philosophical zombies”. And in practice trying to find out “mental states” (the task for which, according to you, no “epistemological method” is supposed to exist, because of “perfect actors”) is often more useful than trying to find out the future behaviours directly.

In fairness, I brought up perfect actors and conmen, I believe, because they are simple counterexamples to the claim that, if it seems to think, then it thinks.

It is more natural to say that we attribute thinking to others not because they look like they think, but because they seem to be of our own kind (and few doubt that we think). But of course, we are more acquainted with our own thoughts than anything, so no one seriously doubts that a person is not thinking just because he is not acting or performing a function.

The actors and conmen are not the best examples, anyway, since materialists develop more nuanced theories regarding supervenience etc. I do not think many professional materialists would argue that the conman is not a conman if he doesn’t act like a conman.

 

[Bagheera]

polytropos:

I, as an external observer, have to make a decision based on appearances. That is only because I have limited information. But I know that I have limited information, because I know that everyone has non-public intentions. But the fact that everyone has non-public thoughts and intentions is a weakness of functionalism.

Weakness – in the sense that it is not 100% accurate – yes! But then in analyzing the external reality we cannot have absolute, perfect mathematical-type certainty or “proof”. We always play the percentages, based upon the appearances. And what are the chances that we are mistaken? Which is the optimal way to go? By acting on the appearances or acting against them?

polytropos:

Suppose I have decided to rip someone off. I am pretending and succeeding to be an honest salesman. But right before I am about to act on my conman-intentions, I have a change of heart, and do not rip my customer off. I complete the transaction honestly.

Was I a conman? Perhaps that’s just semantics.

No, it is not just semantics. It goes to the heart of the matter. You intended to play the role of a con man – for a while, but you did not act on it. Then you changed your mind and decided to play honestly. THAT decision was reflected by your action – so there was a one-to-correspondence between your internal state and your functionality. Therefore you were NOT a con man.

It is true that not all of our “thoughts” are manifested in actions, so those thoughts remain hidden. No external observer has any information about them.

So there are three possibilities:

1. The agent’s actions reflect their internal state.
2. The agent’s actions do not reflect their internal state.
3. The agent’s non-actions reflect nothing.

Since we cannot have a perfect Cartesian certainty (in principle) what are we to do? Can you offer anything better than “playing the percentages”? Obviously there is no way to estimate the exact numbers, but I would assume that at least in 99% of the cases our thoughts correspond to our actions. There is an extremely strong positive correlation there, and even though correlation does NOT imply causation, this “playing the percentages” gives a much better payoff than the nonexistent strategy you did not offer – so far.

polytropos:

But what is important is that I was functionally an honest salesman, for my intentions were not manifested in action prior to my change of heart. But then what option has the functionalist? Surely I did not always think of myself as an honest salesman. Surely my thoughts were different during the period in which I was resolved to scam, compared to the period after my change of heart. But an external observer couldn’t tell the difference.

And we are back to the same problem. If there are two objects in front of us, which are identical all the way to the last electron… etc… You say that ontologically there is a difference, but you cannot offer any epistemological method to tell the two objects apart. Moreover you deny that this lack of epistemology is relevant.

polytropos:

Anyone looking on would be just to consider me an honest salesman throughout, yes, because that’s how I was acting. But that is not the point: the point is that my thoughts and my function are not necessarily aligned. And anyone who has ever been a conscious, intentional agent (ie. humans) knows that this is possible and plausible, so functionalism can only succeed by ignoring what we know are real distinctions.

No, what you CONSIDER the “real” distinctions.

polytropos:

I don’t need one. The possibility of the scenarios I’ve given cannot be coherently denied. Thought simply need not correspond with function.

Sure, everything is “possible”. It is possible that I am just a highly sophisticated computer, sent back from the future for the sole purpose to organize a quiet network to destroy this civilization – but are you going to act on this “possibility”? And since you are a good philosopher (or emulate one very convincingly ) to hear that you do not consider epistemology important… is rather shocking.

Anyhow, I suggest we conclude this conversation and continue in the thread you started. I already conceded the “weakness” of the functionalism

 

[edwest2]

Humans are the only truly sentient beings. Animals can be trained but they remain animals. The most sophisticated, i.e. human-like, AI would never be a human being or entitled to anything. It would be a tool to use as we see fit, only.

Peace,
Ed

 

[Bagheera]

edwest2:

Humans are the only truly sentient beings.

It is so embarrassing to be ignorant among these omniscient posters!

edwest2:

Animals can be trained but they remain animals.

But then they reveal that they are not so omniscient after all. They don’t know that humans are animals. They probably were missing the day when it was explained to them in the biology class. Whew!… and I felt inferior for a split of a second.

 

[N0X3x]

In another thread the question of sentient beings came up, and I presented a short (maybe not exhaustive list) of different sentient beings. I asked how these different entities should be treated.
There was no answer. So I will try in a new thread.

1. biologically human where the DNA is within the tolerance of the so far examined humans.
2. biologically human looking mutant, where the DNA is outside the known limits.
3. artificially grown human-like androids, whose DNA is close to the human DNA to the extent that they can “interbreed”.
4. artificially grown human like androids, whose DNA is incompatible with human DNA.
5. animals, which became sentient due to some natural, random mutation.
6. animals, which became sentient due to some artificially induced mutation.
7. animals (or biological beings), which are naturally sentient (space aliens).
8. hybrid beings, partially containing human tissue and partially composed of electronic equipment (cyborgs).
9. fully electronic sentient beings.

There is one thing in common among these beings: they behave like “normal humans do”. They have a “nervous system”, which allows them to think, to reason, which makes them capable of distinguishing themselves from the surrounding environment (self-conscious).

All these belong to the class of “sentient” beings, and all should be treated just like sentient humans should be treated – in my opinion, of course.

What is your opinion?

I think the word you’re looking for is sapient, rather than sentient. sentient merely refers to the ability to feel pleasure and pain, while sapience suggests knowledge, wisdom, and reasoning powers.

ultimately, the question that determines how we deal with these beings depends on whether or not they have subjective experience. Which, according to Catholic teaching as I understand it, depends on whether or not they have a soul.

So, that includes 1, 2, 5, 6, and 7. 8 depends on whether or not the entity started out biologically or mechanically. 3 and 4, to my mind, depend on whether the genetic material came from an existing biological being, or if the genome was chemically created.

But that’s just speculation. Each of these examples could possibly have a soul, if God willed it, but whether it would be a human or animal soul is another matter. it seems to me that the best stance to take is the one the church takes with embryos. We don’t know if they have a soul, so its best to treat them as if they do.

this has some very interesting implications. suppose that a computer can’t pass the Turing test, but it can after a minor adjustment. Is a computer not sapient until it passes the turing test? This seems like a completely arbitrary boundary. At the very least, it is a boundary created by human beings. God could very well insert a soul into a machine which does not, but which almost can, pass the Turing test. Sapience comes in degrees; it is not something which something either has or does not have. this means that even our everyday computers and calculators might have some moral worth!

 

[polytropos]

this has some very interesting implications. suppose that a computer can’t pass the Turing test, but it can after a minor adjustment. Is a computer not sapient until it passes the turing test? This seems like a completely arbitrary boundary. At the very least, it is a boundary created by human beings.

This is a point I’ve been thinking about in the other thread on the Turing test. It does seem rather absurd that a modification of the machine’s response in a single case should be able to determine its intelligence. Likewise, if I am socially inept and miss some cues in conversation with someone, it doesn’t seem that we would judge me as being less than intelligent for that alone.

 

[Bagheera]

NOX3x:

I think the word you’re looking for is sapient, rather than sentient. sentient merely refers to the ability to feel pleasure and pain, while sapience suggests knowledge, wisdom, and reasoning powers.

Let it be sapient. I liked the frequently used description from the science fiction literature and it is used pretty much as a synonym to sapient. But I am not “married” to it.
NOX3x:

ultimately, the question that determines how we deal with these beings depends on whether or not they have subjective experience. Which, according to Catholic teaching as I understand it, depends on whether or not they have a soul.

I know. There are two problems with that approach. 1) there is no coherent definition of what the “soul” is (and there are 3 types of this nebulous “soul”: vegetative soul, animal soul and rational soul – which is also believed to be “immortal”), and 2) there is no way to decide if someone has a soul or not. Yet, the question will have to be decided in some far (or maybe not that far) future, so it is prudent to get prepared for that contingency with the help of such thought experiments.
NOX3x:

But that’s just speculation. Each of these examples could possibly have a soul, if God willed it, but whether it would be a human or animal soul is another matter. it seems to me that the best stance to take is the one the church takes with embryos. We don’t know if they have a soul, so its best to treat them as if they do.

That is a logical approach, and it should be taken a step further. We don’t “know” if adults have an immortal, rational soul. That is also speculation. On the other hand, we know, beyond the shadow of a doubt that the brain contains a pleasure / pain center and when that center is “excited” by a mild electric current, the subject will feel pleasure or pain, depending where the electrodes are inserted. And that is an irrefutable evidence (but not proof!) for phisicalism
NOX3x:

this has some very interesting implications. suppose that a computer can’t pass the Turing test, but it can after a minor adjustment. Is a computer not sapient until it passes the turing test? This seems like a completely arbitrary boundary. At the very least, it is a boundary created by human beings.

There are many arbitrary boundaries which we create and which are taken very seriously. A medical student is not allowed to practice, until she is granted her diploma. Is there a better way to “define” sapience?