Hylomorphic dualism, meaning, and brain states

[ccmnxc]

So recently, I have taken an interest in the argument from meaning as a response to the naturalistic worldview. The argument goes something like this (pulled from Feser’s work):

Intentionality, in the words of Dr. Edward Feser, “is that feature of a mental state in virtue of which it means, is about, represents, points to, or is directed at something, usually something beyond itself.”
Your thoughts about your homework, for example, is about your homework – it means or represents your homework, and thus “points to” or is “directed at” your homework. In this way, it is like the word homework, which is about, or represents, homework in general. The word “homework,” however, as ink or graphite marks means absolutely nothing at all on its own. It requires thinking, intentional, language-using people like us to impart meaning upon it. The puzzle is that brain processes, by themselves, are devoid of any meaning. They are simply meaningless patterns of electrochemical activity that take place in your brain. Our thoughts, however, do have meaning, which allows them to impart meaning on other things (like the word “homework”). It is a mystery then, how our mindless brain processes, which are void of any meaning, can be correlated to our thoughts, which definitely have meaning. The two are conceptually in contrast to each other, which is a problem that materialism has great difficulty getting over.

Now, if one’s brain is in a state of disarray or distress, the way it confers meaning will be altered. This is sometimes used to show that despite the apparent difficulties that may face materialism when it comes to meaning, the brain is still in charge of it. Now, I am not sure if you would find a different response with a Cartesian Dualist as opposed to a hylomorphic dualist, but if you were the latter, how would you answer the objection? Thanks.

 

[ellzeena]

So recently, I have taken an interest in the argument from meaning as a response to the naturalistic worldview. The argument goes something like this (pulled from Feser’s work):

Now, if one’s brain is in a state of disarray or distress, the way it confers meaning will be altered. This is sometimes used to show that despite the apparent difficulties that may face materialism when it comes to meaning, the brain is still in charge of it. Now, I am not sure if you would find a different response with a Cartesian Dualist as opposed to a hylomorphic dualist, but if you were the latter, how would you answer the objection? Thanks.

The brain is not “mindless”, it somehow encapsulates “mind” (and brain cells have been found in cardiac tissue). It is designed, apparently, as a filter for what is actually in front of us: our eyes do not “see” immediately, what is in front of us; it is filtered by the brain. So are the “delusions” of the mentally ill REALLY delusions do they lack (for whatever reason, not structural because autopsy does not show structural abnormalities - neural, chemical, a mystery actually) or are these people REALLY “seeing” without the benefit of the DESIGNED filter?

The brain is not in charge of materialism, it is a filter for it. And honestly, what’s the point of this topic? Are you writing a thesis? I think you’re in the wrong forum. Try Harvard, they must have one.

 

[meltzerboy]

The brain is not “mindless”, it somehow encapsulates “mind” (and brain cells have been found in cardiac tissue). It is designed, apparently, as a filter for what is actually in front of us: our eyes do not “see” immediately, what is in front of us; it is filtered by the brain. So are the “delusions” of the mentally ill REALLY delusions do they lack (for whatever reason, not structural because autopsy does not show structural abnormalities - neural, chemical, a mystery actually) or are these people REALLY “seeing” without the benefit of the DESIGNED filter?

The brain is not in charge of materialism, it is a filter for it. And honestly, what’s the point of this topic? Are you writing a thesis? I think you’re in the wrong forum. Try Harvard, they must have one.

But there are structural abnormalities in the brains of schizophrenic people, and preliminary research suggests this may also be the case for major depressive disorder. Also, there is usually a distinction made between the biochemical brain and the psychosocial mind, which may not always use the brain as its biological substrate. That is, sometimes culture and always context influence the brain processes.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

So recently, I have taken an interest in the argument from meaning as a response to the naturalistic worldview. The argument goes something like this (pulled from Feser’s work):

Now, if one’s brain is in a state of disarray or distress, the way it confers meaning will be altered. This is sometimes used to show that despite the apparent difficulties that may face materialism when it comes to meaning, the brain is still in charge of it. Now, I am not sure if you would find a different response with a Cartesian Dualist as opposed to a hylomorphic dualist, but if you were the latter, how would you answer the objection? Thanks.

What do you mean by " hylomorphic dualist ? " I think you need to define exactly what you mean. It means nothing to me.

Linus2nd

 

[Alberti_Devoveo]

What do you mean by " hylomorphic dualist ? " I think you need to define exactly what you mean. It means nothing to me.

Linus2nd

I could be wrong, but I think OP means hylemorphic dualism. Perhaps David Oderberg’s essay could be helpful, if this term still means nothing to you.

 

[prodigalson2011]

So recently, I have taken an interest in the argument from meaning as a response to the naturalistic worldview. The argument goes something like this (pulled from Feser’s work):

Now, if one’s brain is in a state of disarray or distress, the way it confers meaning will be altered. This is sometimes used to show that despite the apparent difficulties that may face materialism when it comes to meaning, the brain is still in charge of it. Now, I am not sure if you would find a different response with a Cartesian Dualist as opposed to a hylomorphic dualist, but if you were the latter, how would you answer the objection? Thanks.

This is going to be a very rushed, poorly thought out answer, but based on my (admittedly limited) understanding of hylemorphic dualism, I would say that, as the brain and intellect are not separate substances but rather interacting components of one substance, what effects one will effect the other, just as one gear in a machine getting jammed will jam up other gears.

In the case of the malfunctioning brain, the brain’s inability to properly process and transmit information to the intellect will affect the intellect’s ability to properly understand, integrate and respond to that information. For example, if a stimulus which should normally produce feelings of calm, say a reassuring smile or a hand on the shoulder, rather cause the brain to produce signals that the soul associates with fear, the intellect will react accordingly. Or something like that. Does that make sense?

It’s an interesting question and one I’d like to take some time to think more about.

 

[ccmnxc]

I could be wrong, but I think OP means hylemorphic dualism. Perhaps David Oderberg’s essay could be helpful, if this term still means nothing to you.

My bad, I’ve seen it spelled different ways (I wanna say I’ve seen Oderberg use “hylomorphic”), but yeah, that’s what I mean.

 

[StrawberryJam]

The brain is not “mindless”, it somehow encapsulates “mind” (and brain cells have been found in cardiac tissue). It is designed, apparently, as a filter for what is actually in front of us: our eyes do not “see” immediately, what is in front of us; it is filtered by the brain. So are the “delusions” of the mentally ill REALLY delusions do they lack (for whatever reason, not structural because autopsy does not show structural abnormalities - neural, chemical, a mystery actually) or are these people REALLY “seeing” without the benefit of the DESIGNED filter?

The brain is not in charge of materialism, it is a filter for it. And honestly, what’s the point of this topic? Are you writing a thesis? I think you’re in the wrong forum. Try Harvard, they must have one.

The mind would be what without the brain?

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I could be wrong, but I think OP means hylemorphic dualism. Perhaps David Oderberg’s essay could be helpful, if this term still means nothing to you.

That article is too deep for me ! But on the face of it I would say that Aristotle’s theory of hylemorphism has absolutely nothing to do with human psychology. That seems to be Oderberg’s personal opinion and I can’t follow it.

Linus2nd

 

[ellzeena]

But there are structural abnormalities in the brains of schizophrenic people, and preliminary research suggests this may also be the case for major depressive disorder. Also, there is usually a distinction made between the biochemical brain and the psychosocial mind, which may not always use the brain as its biological substrate. That is, sometimes culture and always context influence the brain processes.

Schizophrenia is fundamentally a disorder of disrupted neural connectivity. While there are, thus, what one might call “structural” abnormalities, these are not visible on autopsy. Only the living brain, with PET scan, discloses these abnormalities. The brain itself has no visible abnormalities without specialized scans.

 

[ellzeena]

What do you mean by " hylomorphic dualist ? " I think you need to define exactly what you mean. It means nothing to me.

Linus2nd

David Oderberg:

The contemporary dualist reaction to materialism, however, has tended to be one of recoiling from the idea of any essential connection between body and soul, and hence between person and both. This has led, in turn, to making the apparently “obvious” move (for the dualist) of identifying person with soul, or at least of regarding person and soul as having an exclusive essential relationship.
For the hylemorphic dualist, on the other hand, the acceptance of a genuinely immaterial element in human nature means a greater flexibility in trying to comprehend just how human persons persist. The concept of form can be pushed heavily into service, as can the idea of the person as a compound substance, in this respect just like a material substance—namely, a substance composed of matter and form. Nevertheless, the hylemorphic dualist must avoid the disastrous fall into Cartesianism or Platonism, both of which diminish the role of the body in personhood. Once the soul is united to a body, it is the form of that body for all time, even after that body has ceased to exist. Its identity after death—and hence the identity of the person that is reduced to it—depends on its having once informed certain matter. The soul must always have a retrospective character, one that looks back on what choices it made when it actualized that matter, and hence on what the person did of which it was once the chief part. (Again, think of the chief executive who, long after his corporation’s demise, is forever tarred with the brush of responsibility for those decisions he made—and hence his corporation made—when he was its chief constituent.) The soul has, as it were, the indelible stamp of personhood, and due to its very nature as an actualizing principle of matter it has an essential tendency or direction toward the full flowering of its capacities in matter. Whether it may also look forward to a reuniting of itself with matter is, however, beyond the scope of philosophy to answer.

 

[ellzeena]

In the case of the malfunctioning brain, the brain’s inability to properly process and transmit information to the intellect will affect the intellect’s ability to properly understand, integrate and respond to that information. For example, if a stimulus which should normally produce feelings of calm, say a reassuring smile or a hand on the shoulder, rather cause the brain to produce signals that the soul associates with fear, the intellect will react accordingly. Or something like that. Does that make sense?

No. It isn’t the “soul” that associates anything with fear, it is a primary fight/flight response shared by every living creature. The “soul” is separate, it is not the body, it is in the body. It is not the intellect that is affected in serious mental illness, it is the entire endocrinological process beginning in the brain itself. Intellect is often the first “thing” to “go”. I see you’ve never lived with someone who has schizophrenia.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

David Oderberg:

The contemporary dualist reaction to materialism, however, has tended to be one of recoiling from the idea of any essential connection between body and soul, and hence between person and both. This has led, in turn, to making the apparently “obvious” move (for the dualist) of identifying person with soul, or at least of regarding person and soul as having an exclusive essential relationship.
For the hylemorphic dualist, on the other hand, the acceptance of a genuinely immaterial element in human nature means a greater flexibility in trying to comprehend just how human persons persist. The concept of form can be pushed heavily into service, as can the idea of the person as a compound substance, in this respect just like a material substance—namely, a substance composed of matter and form. Nevertheless, the hylemorphic dualist must avoid the disastrous fall into Cartesianism or Platonism, both of which diminish the role of the body in personhood. Once the soul is united to a body, it is the form of that body for all time, even after that body has ceased to exist. Its identity after death—and hence the identity of the person that is reduced to it—depends on its having once informed certain matter. The soul must always have a retrospective character, one that looks back on what choices it made when it actualized that matter, and hence on what the person did of which it was once the chief part. (Again, think of the chief executive who, long after his corporation’s demise, is forever tarred with the brush of responsibility for those decisions he made—and hence his corporation made—when he was its chief constituent.) The soul has, as it were, the indelible stamp of personhood, and due to its very nature as an actualizing principle of matter it has an essential tendency or direction toward the full flowering of its capacities in matter. Whether it may also look forward to a reuniting of itself with matter is, however, beyond the scope of philosophy to answer.

O.K., thanks. But I think it is wrong to attach the term " dualism " with traditional Thomistic and Catholic human psychology. I guess this has been going on in some philosophical circles but I think that it should not have been done since it tends to make people associate it with Cartisian Dualism.

Linus2nd

 

[polytropos]

The mind would be what without the brain?

Hylemorphic dualism does not really imply that the mind would be something without the brain. Indeed, the mind (or soul) pretty significantly depends on the brain and body for its action.

However, while I would not be alive without my heart, my being alive is not therefore reducible to my heart. Likewise, the action of my mind depends on the brain, but is not necessarily reducible to the brain. (Hylemorphic dualism rather agrees with the idea that damage to the brain should obstruct the proper functioning of the mind.)

Hylemorphic dualists do have specific reasons for believing that the soul continues after death, but they believe that in the absence of the body is it in a substantially reduced state (this is why it is necessary that our souls are reunited with our bodies at the end of time).

 

[meltzerboy]

Schizophrenia is fundamentally a disorder of disrupted neural connectivity. While there are, thus, what one might call “structural” abnormalities, these are not visible on autopsy. Only the living brain, with PET scan, discloses these abnormalities. The brain itself has no visible abnormalities without specialized scans.

Yes, the ventricles of the brain shrink and there is loss of brain tissue as the disease of schizophrenia progresses even though these changes may not always be visible during autopsy.

 

[StrawberryJam]

Hylemorphic dualism does not really imply that the mind would be something without the brain. Indeed, the mind (or soul) pretty significantly depends on the brain and body for its action.

However, while I would not be alive without my heart, my being alive is not therefore reducible to my heart. Likewise, the action of my mind depends on the brain, but is not necessarily reducible to the brain. (Hylemorphic dualism rather agrees with the idea that damage to the brain should obstruct the proper functioning of the mind.)

Hylemorphic dualists do have specific reasons for believing that the soul continues after death, but they believe that in the absence of the body is it in a substantially reduced state (this is why it is necessary that our souls are reunited with our bodies at the end of time).

And their reasoning for thinking such thoughts are based on what?