You lost me at this point. Assume God has perfect foreknowledge of the future. … You seem to be saying He might not know “the road not taken,” if I understand you correctly.
That’s pretty close. It comes down to the question of whether God has perfect knowledge of those things in the future that never come to pass. If Sally marries John, and they have a baby with blue eyes, then God – with perfect ‘foreknowledge’ of the ‘future’ – knows that their baby has blue eyes. However, if Sally would have married Tom (but doesn’t, in fact, marry him) and they would have had a baby (but don’t, in fact, give birth to that baby), does God know the color of the eyes of the baby who will never be born of the marriage that never will occur? That’s the question. PA’s assertion implicitly assumes that God has knowledge of everything that never happens, and that’s something that’s debated. If PA wants us to assent to the thought experiment, then PA must necessarily demonstrate that its premises are true. No such proof has even been offered.
God makes Mary and Sally. They both have free will, and God foresees that Mary will end up in Heaven and Sally in Hell. If God then decides that he won’t create Sally because she will end up in Hell, how does that affect Mary and Mary’s free will? Mary and Sally are not dependent variables, they are independent.
Let’s presume, for the sake of discussion, that God ‘knows’ Sally (who never comes into existence). The question, then, isn’t about Mary (as an individual) but about humanity (collectively). In play here is the difference between determinism (i.e., every human act is pre-determined) and free will (i.e., every human act is the result of a person’s choice). If God only creates non-sinners, then He has
predetermined that free will choices to disobey will never occur. In other words, He has stacked the deck and predetermined the outcome. (There’s a difference between ‘foreknowledge’ and ‘predetermination’; if PA wants to assert the presence of ‘free will’, he needs to show the presence of foreknowledge and the absence of predetermination. His thought experiment fails on the latter consideration.)
You also made a comment about being able to “prove” God’s knowledge…since we can’t “prove” anything at all about God, does that make sense?
That’s a reasonable objection. My question is this: if there is no possible way to distinguish between ‘A’ and ‘B’, can we really say that ‘A’ or ‘B’ even exist? Rather, we can only say that there is some observable condition ‘C’, which does not give any insight as to the presence of either ‘A’
or ‘B’.
Lost me again. See my paragraph above about Mary and Sally. If creation with both Sally and Mary is NOT determinism, how is it determinism if Sally is never created? The creation of Sally has nothing to do with Mary. Mary will be created and turn out the way she will no matter if Sally is around or not. No connection.
I’m a math guy, so let me explain things in that context. I don’t know whether it’ll be helpful or not.
Let’s suppose that I have two sets (people and hair color). The two sets are related by a particular relationship: each member of the set ‘people’ maps to one attribute in the set ‘hair color’.
For example:
People include {‘Tom’, ‘Dick’, ‘Harry’, ‘Sally’}
Hair Color includes {‘blond’, ‘brunette’, ‘redhead’}
Let’s suppose that the mapping goes like this:
Tom → blond
Dick → redhead
Harry → blond
Sally → brunette
With this mapping, we can say that we have the following set:
{(Tom, blond); (Dick, redhead); (Harry, blond); (Sally, brunette)}
Now, what PA is suggesting is a counter-factual: he’s asking the question “what happens if Tom and Harry do not exist?” That is, he’s proposing that the following set of real people is only:
{(Dick, redhead); (Sally, brunette)}
In other words, he’s saying “Blond” is an actual attribute of a person… even though there are no people who are blond. That is, being ‘blond’ is a mathematical possibility, but it doesn’t exist.
To use the categories of our example, we have:
{(Tom, sinner who has free will); (Dick, non-sinner who has free will)); (Harry, sinner who has free will); (Sally, non-sinner who has free will)}
But PA posits that it is possible to instead have:
{(Dick, non-sinner who has free will); (Sally, non-sinner who has free will)}
My objection is two-fold:
First, there is no way to distinguish PA’s set from {(Dick, non-sinner who does not have free will); (Sally, non-sinner who does not have free will)}, and therefore, there is no logical reason to assume that free will actually exists. This would imply that the premises of PA’s thought experiment are logical, and therefore, we must reject the thought experiment.
Second, it seems that there is an Occam’s Razor rebuttal to PA’s thought experiment: the most simple explanation for his proposed universe is not ‘free will’ (which allows a variety of results – none of which are present in the universe) but rather, ‘determinism’ (which allows only one result – that is, the result that’s present in the universe). If all we have is ‘non-sinner’, then Occam’s Razor requires us to conclude that free will does not exist in that ‘possible world’, but rather, that only determinism is present. Therefore, in that case, PA’s thought experiment fails, since it presumes that free will is present.
Either way, PA has created a case that is
enumerable (that is, it may be conceived) but not
possible (that is, it cannot exist in the way that he posits that it exists). PA’s thought experiment fails scrutiny in all cases, and therefore, must be rejected as a logical impossibility.
