batteddy writes:
philosophy began with the being of God and deduced or inferred its conclusions from
there.
Maybe you mean that
Catholic philosophy begins or began with God. Greek philosophy certainly didn’t. Perhaps medieval philosophy did in
some sense, but medieval philosophers such as Aquinas and Anselm still felt it was worth while to provide proofs for God’s existence rooted in nature or just the mind. If Descartes was wrong, so were they. I’ve mentioned this several times and no one has addressed it.
says:
“After
Descartes, philosophy became a science of pure thought. Both the created
world and the Creator remained within the ambit of
Descartes’ ‘I think, therefore I
am’ as the content of consciousness. God was reduced to an element within human
consciousness and so God was no longer considered to be the ultimate explanation for
human beings”.
This simply doesn’t follow from Descartes’ arguments. God was not ‘reduced’ to an element in human consciousness. I don’t know whom the Pope thinks interpreted Descartes in this way, but if such persons exist, it is completely their fault, not Descartes’. As I indicated in a previous post, the Meditations can be read online. It is a short, interesting book (in which the
idea of the Cogito is expressed, though the actual phrase does not appear) by one of your fellow Catholics. If you want to understand where Descartes was coming from, take a look at it.
Investigations, Wittgenstein exposes
Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am” as a piece of
philosophical nonsense. He does this chiefly by means of what has become known as
the private language argument. For
Descartes even to begin to be able to say “*I *think,
therefore *I *am” he would need a language. And language is by definition public.
Therefore “I think, therefore I am” is an impossible place from which to start a
programme of philosophical speculation.
I could just argue that the private language argument is flawed (it is, I think), but that would be time consuming and unnecessary. If you just look at Descartes argument in CONTEXT you can easily see that it (Wittgenstein’s arguement) is irrelevant. Even if “a language is by definition public” Descartes allowed for a “public”—the evil, god-like daemon that he supposed might be deceiving him. Descartes imagined that this daemon might be deceiving him respecting
everything he thought he knew, including the impressions he had of other people (be they actual memories of past direct experiences or artificial memories). Thus Descartes need not have developed his concept of self (which, on the other hand, you probably
do need other beings to develope under normal circumstances) in apparent isolation. It
seemed to Descartes as if he had been interacting with the “public” his whole life. (I must say, I don’t see how transubstantiation is compatible with Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. It seems odd that you would evoke it.)
In any case, all Descartes did was observe that he could not coherently suppose that he was being deceived in to thinking that he existed. If I am deceived, I must exist, otherwise how could I be deceived? Is this argument itself flawed (for this is the argument the thread is about)?
Could Descartes have been deceived into thinking that he existed when in fact he did not exist?
(cont…)