But it is actually made of something? Just not matter or energy?
Yes.
To quote directly from “the philosopher” (Aristotle) himself; “Substance, in the truest and primary and most definitive sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse”
That is to say; substance is the thing underlying “predicates” or definitions. So; if I was to describe my desk I could name all the predicates such as “wooden” “solid” and so forth; but underlying the desk there is a substance which we are
attributing the predicates too.
Now; the substance of the soul for humans have the “predicates” of immortal; rational and so forth; but these predicates (definitions) are applied to some underlying thing; which exists in reality.
However; the existence of the soul is not a material existance (like my desk) as if it was we could then sensibly apply predicates (definitions) such as “solid” too it. This would be confusing and illogical. So when we say we cannot apply “accidents” to the soul; it means we cannot apply material predicates such as “solid” to the soul, because the soul is of a different
genus.
Now; by Genus, Aristotle means things which are seperated by distinct “differentia” or differences; such as there is a Genus for animals, and a Genus for rocks. There is also a Genus for “physically material things”, “energeticly material things” and “spiritual things”; it is clear that we cannot apply all the predicates of “spiritual things” to “material things”; we cannot say this desk is “rational” in the same way we cannot say this soul is “solid”.
I hope that clears it up a bit.
So I guess the question is how can a spirit think if it has no parts?
It can think; because the soul is
really identical to the mind; they cannot exist without one another. However; they are
formally distinct. This distinction comes from Bl. Duns Scotus.
Well, the intellect is immaterial. It doesn’t need parts to think. At least, that’s what Saint Thomas teaches.
Aquinas recognised the fact that souls are really identical to mind’s, but never formulated a theory to justify how we see them as seperate. It was not until the secular clergyman Henry of Ghent developed the theory of
intentional distinctions that we see an emerging explantion; this explanation was finally completed by the Fransiscan theologian Bl. Duns Scotus in the Formal Distinction.
