If God does not exist, then everything is permissible

[Ender]

Well the propensity is biological (being caring and non-harmful to those in your family in order to maintain and continue progeny); the social tendency aids it (we apply this internal tendency to strangers - an indirect family, of sorts; apply it at the level of your own species).

It may be a biological inclination but it is not logical in application and we are certainly capable of overcoming our biological inclinations. Logically, we shouldn’t care about anyone or anything that is not beneficial to us.

Is there a basis on which to claim that culture A is morally superior to culture B? If everything is permissable (which I think, in purely material terms, it is), then no. If we suppose some behaviours, on a social level, to be destructive to human life, either by termination or reduction in quality, then we might fancy ours to be superior.

But if human life has no intrinsic value then hunting people would be no different than hunting rabbits and logically I should be unconcerned with whether something is destructive to human life or not. I should not, for example, care a whit about what happened in Haiti nor contribute anything at all to alleviate their problems.

Morality and the whole bit is entirely a thing of our own divising (and a good thing, too!).

A “good” thing? You really shouldn’t use value laden terms if you don’t believe in values - I assume you meant “That behavior is beneficial to me.”

Ender

 

[Ender]

Right, but the conditional used in the argument suggests that no ethical considerations matter without God, whether he exists or not.

I’m unsure of your meaning here so I’ll provide my own and you can explain how we differ.

If God does not exist then morality itself doesn’t exist. What seem to me to be value judgments are nothing more than personal preferences: I prefer blue suits to brown ones, you prefer hunting people to hunting rabbits and I am no more justified in criticizing your choice than you are in criticizing mine. My believing in a god who does not exist no more makes morality real than believing in Santa Clause will increase my supply of goodies on Christmas. Neither the believer nor the unbeliever can behave morally because the term has no meaning.

If God does exist then morality exists whether or not I believe in its source. Both the believer and the unbeliever can behave morally because the term has an objective meaning independent of what anyone believes about it.

I’m not afraid that anyone will dismiss morality because they lack belief in God…

But isn’t that the only logical conclusion to make?

… but this sort of reasoning does encourage theists to associate atheists as “moral nihilists” (which you have mistakenly done with me, I might add) or “those people who disbelieve in something so they don’t have to be obedient to it.”

It is certainly illogical to assume that atheists don’t have values and don’t behave morally, but because there is nothing compelling them to behave morally other than the inclinations they wake up with in the morning, shouldn’t I be somewhat concerned that they may at some point grow tired of hunting just rabbits?

There are a good deal of bigots in this world, and arguments like this only give them ammunition (and permission to continue being bigots).

If you don’t suffer from their bigotry why would you care?

Ender

 

[hatsoff]

It may be a biological inclination but it is not logical in application and we are certainly capable of overcoming our biological inclinations. Logically, we shouldn’t care about anyone or anything that is not beneficial to us.

But if human life has no intrinsic value then hunting people would be no different than hunting rabbits and logically I should be unconcerned with whether something is destructive to human life or not. I should not, for example, care a whit about what happened in Haiti nor contribute anything at all to alleviate their problems.

A “good” thing? You really shouldn’t use value laden terms if you don’t believe in values - I assume you meant “That behavior is beneficial to me.”

I fail to see how you have logically deduced your “should” from an “is.” What logic is capable of that?

 

[Ender]

I fail to see how you have logically deduced your “should” from an “is.” What logic is capable of that?

Sorry, I don’t understand your question. Which statement of mine are you contesting? More specificity would be helpful.

Ender

 

[AntiTheist]

Right, but the conditional used in the argument suggests that no ethical considerations matter without God, whether he exists or not. That’s a dangerous thought for you to toss to impressionable people offhandedly, don’t you think?

You and Prodigal are talking about two different things here. You’re talking about these considerations “mattering” in the immediate, in society and human interactions; he’s talking about these considerations “mattering” in some abstract fantasy-land “ultimate reality” that he’s constructed in his head.

In the context of what he means, I am quite willing to say that “ethical considerations” do not matter one bit and in fact may intefere with life (for example, someone who makes self-sacrifice in all cases a virtue a priori might end up living a miserable life of self-denial).

If we’re using the strictest definition of “nihilism,” then I contend that there are no nihilists. Nihilism is the position that ethics are worthless because, quite simply, nothing is of worth. The claim is not that value is subjective, but rather that value doesn’t exist in any form.

We’re running into a semantic difficulty here because I have labeled myself as a “moral nihilist” before. I use this term not to mean that individual values don’t exist – obviously, everyone has values that motivate action – but that moral statements, like all value judgments, have no truth value.

Further, I don’t think that anything in and of itself possesses value without a human consciousness around to assign value to it.

Whether this is actually “nihilism” or might be better described as something like “error theory,” I don’t really know or particularly care that much. But I have always taken it to be the case that nihilism frequently motivates the construction of individual values (cf. Nietzsche, who actually perceived the “death of god” and nihilism as problems to be overcome).

An illustration: “I am holding an apple” is a statement that has a truth value. We can investigate whether it is true or not, independent of my mind.

“Apples tastes good” is a value judgment that does not have a truth value. My consciousness imposes that judgment upon the object, and the statement is not true independent of my mind.

“That man is committing murder” is a statement that has a truth value. We can investigate whether it is true or not, independent of my mind.

“Murder is bad” is a value judgment that does not have a truth value. My consciousness imposes that judgment upon the act, and the statement is not true independent of my mind.

Murder is “permissible” in the “ultimate” sense that Prodigal means. Obviously, you could murder someone and, if you were never caught by a human and if you never felt really guilty about it, you would face no punishment. That’s so obvious that it’s hardly worth mentioning.

Murder only becomes “impermissible” when you have a group that comes together and decides that it won’t allow it. I’m glad murder is impermissible in my society and in virtually every other society in the world because that matches up with my values, which highly regard living in a safe environment where murder is not allowed.

In none of the above does “morality” enter the picture anywhere. We have perfectly good reasons for not allowing people to go around murdering each other without having to resort to nonsense like “morality.” And if it bothers you that a murderer who is never caught “gets away with it” (because there’s no Big Brother waiting to punish him in the afterlife), then that’s too bad. It’s not a justification for inventing fables to make yourself feel better. You have to face reality on its own terms, and in reality, criminals sometimes get away. If your values don’t like that, then it’s all the more reason to build a better justice system in this life.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

If your values don’t like that, then it’s all the more reason to build a better justice system in this life.

What is a reason? Do you mean an actual reason or an apparent reason?

 

[AntiTheist]

What is a reason? Do you mean an actual reason or an apparent reason?

Um. Let’s say that I don’t like the fact that the justice system allows some criminals to get away. I therefore make the choice that I want to improve the justice system. My decision follows from my value – that is, my value serves as the reason for making my decision.

I don’t understand the distinction you’re trying to make between an “actual” and “apparent” reason, and I fear it’s more doublespeak from you.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Um. Let’s say that I don’t like the fact that the justice system allows some criminals to get away. I therefore make the choice that I want to improve the justice system. My decision follows from my value – that is, my value serves as the reason for making my decision.

I don’t understand the distinction you’re trying to make between an “actual” and “apparent” reason, and I fear it’s more doublespeak from you.

Well, first of all, let me say that your use of the word “doublespeak” seems at best unnecessary, and perhaps even disingenuous. You and I disagree about a fundamental issue. I will agree that, if I am wrong, the statements “happiness is inherently good” or “a person ought to have good reasons for his opinions” are not just false; they are meaningless. If that’s what you mean by doublespeak, then you may simply call my statements meaningless. The word “doublespeak” was coined by George Orwell for the totalitarian definition of thought, and I am no way demanding people to think the way I think.

As for actual and apparent reasons, consider the difference between the concept of “something that motivates” and “something that counts in favor of”. Something that motivates accounts for an action; Columbus’s thought he would arrive in China was his reason for sailing West. This was his apparent reason. But, in actuality, this was not a (good) reason to sail due West, although it might have been a reason to sail southwest. The proximity of China did not count in favor of sailing West. If there was a good reason for Columbus’s action, it was that he would discover the New World. This was an *actual *reason.

When you say that “my value serves as the reason for making my decision,” I think you are saying that it motivates you.

When you said, “If your values don’t like that, then it’s all the more reason to build a better justice system in this life,” you seemed to be describing an *actual *reason. But it seems that you were not; you were describing something that would be a mere motivator. Are there, in your view, any actual reasons to act in a certain way, apart from mere desires?

 

[AntiTheist]

Well, first of all, let me say that your use of the word “doublespeak” seems at best unnecessary, and perhaps even disingenuous.

I think you’re correct. Consider “doublespeak” changed to “meaningless.”

When you said, “If your values don’t like that, then it’s all the more reason to build a better justice system in this life,” you seemed to be describing an *actual *reason. But it seems that you were not; you were describing something that would be a mere motivator.

I was talking about a motivator.

Are there, in your view, any actual reasons to act in a certain way, apart from mere desires?

I’d have to think about it more, but my inclination is to say “no.” However, “desires” is an oversimplification. I might, for example, have a desire to punch someone in the face, but I might have a greater desire not to get into a drawn-out fist-fight or not to be sued for breaking someone’s face. Our reasons for acting are often a complicated weighing of various desires and values.

 

[Oreoracle]

No *purely *ethical consideration does matter without God.

What’s the rationale for this assertion?

If you can do wrong in secrecy without penalty, they you are permitted to do wrong, in the most absolute sense of “permitted”.

Apparently, I don’t share your definition of “permitted” or at least not in its “most absolute sense.” If I do something and I am punished for it, the circumstances still permitted the action. Quite frankly, the external world doesn’t give a hoot if I suffer or not, so it doesn’t care if I “get away with it.” Again, the action was prohibited by people, but permitted by the world. You MUST provide a context or permissibility is meaningless.

By the way, speaking of getting away with things, how does one objectively determine whether one has “gotten away with” an action? Keep in mind that there is no such thing as a “punishment” in the world of objects; there are only events. Your emotions allow you to deem certain events as punishments or rewards, but without emotions, those labels are meaningless.

Is this a dangerous thought? Well, yes, of course. But if people do not realize this thought consciously, it still operates on them unconsciously; better to have it all out in the open. And I, after all, am seeking for the truth. Not for “safe” thoughts.

Apparently you aren’t seeking to substantiate your thoughts either.

They won’t dismiss rule-following, but I don’t see why they should hold onto morality-as-such.

What’s the difference between “morality” and “morality-as-such?”

If they’re left in a room with a thousand dollars that aren’t theirs, and no one will ever know they took it, how would it be rational (absent God) for them to leave the money on the table?

You’ll have to rephrase the question or define “rational.” We were talking about ethics, not rationality.

Assuming that you pose your question in such a way that it’s relevant to ethics, I would first ask why the money won’t be missed by its owner. If the owner will never realize it’s gone, I would suppose they didn’t plan on returning for it. From there, I can also speculate that they will never need the money. If I need the money more than they, then I will benefit from possessing it more than they would, no? Of course, if you’re looking for the best course of action, I might consider donating a decent portion of it.

I know you frown on utilitarianism and ethical philosophies that regard consequences in general, so I don’t know if you would consider my reasoning to be an appreciation for morality-as-such. Personally, I don’t believe anyone does good for the sake of good, but I guess that depends on your definition of “good.” It’s a bit like cooking for the sake of cooking–who does that? If we can’t eat the food, and if we don’t derive enjoyment from cooking, why would anyone ever cook?

There are more things in heaven and earth, Oreoracle, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.

Actually, I pride myself in having a philosophy devoid of dreams; that is, lacking nonsensical or otherwise unlikely fantasies. You have no evidence that your consciousness will exist after your body decays in the ground. Is it sad to think it’s game over after you die? Yes. Is it true? Seems like it.

Why, on your account, should there be a purpose to death?

I meant to say, rather, that knowing we have eternal life would reduce the perceived significance of death. What reason would we have to cry at funerals, after all? I know that the members of my family, religious though they are, don’t cry because they fear their fallen friend will be in hell. No, they realize that the deceased may wink out of existence after their deaths, and that terrifies them.

But verification amounts to the same thing as proof; I see no difference.

The difference, I would say, is that proof produces certainties while verification is merely suggestive. Verification “allows for induction,” as you might say. If I wake up smelling smoke, coughing, and feeling heat in my face, there’s a good chance my house is on fire. It could be that the perceived danger is just an elaborate dream, but that seems unlikely. Proof, on the other hand, isn’t dependent on the relatively unreliable senses. As you say, proof only occurs in things such as math and logic.

There is no way I can verify any significant position about the meaning of life, not even the hypothesis that there are people who really love me. The most important beliefs – if not all beliefs about the external world – are impossible to verify.

Or rather, impossible to prove. The verifying evidence may be abundant, however.

*Why *does he prefer one set of circumstances to another? What is a value? If value is simply a thing that a person prefers, then the statement “those things people prefer are valuable to them” simply means “those things people prefer, they prefer”. How can that tautology be a truth about ethics?!?

You’re panicking over something that is common to most systems. For example, a hexagon is defined as a six-sided polygon. With this we can infer that if a postulated shape, “A,” is a polygon composed of six sides, it’s a hexagon. Alas, a hexagon is a polygon composed of six sides! Therefore, if A is a polygon composed of six sides, then A is a polygon composed of six sides. Whatever will we do with this tautology?! How can it possibly be a geometrical truth?!

 

[Oreoracle]

If God does not exist then morality itself doesn’t exist. What seem to me to be value judgments are nothing more than personal preferences: I prefer blue suits to brown ones, you prefer hunting people to hunting rabbits and I am no more justified in criticizing your choice than you are in criticizing mine.

Where do you get the idea that one isn’t justified in criticizing others’ preferences? Is that opinion not the result of a preference itself?

This is where the classic theist argument against moral subjectivism crumbles. They state that, if moral subjectivism is the case, then no ethical opinions are of any importance. But then, this claim in itself is an ethical opinion, so the assertion is self-contradictory.

Neither the believer nor the unbeliever can behave morally because the term has no meaning.

I agree that morality has no meaning without context. Given certain contexts, moral claims may have meaning, or at least be based on meaningful ideas.

But isn’t that the only logical conclusion to make?

Given what premises? Can those premises be substantiated?

It is certainly illogical to assume that atheists don’t have values and don’t behave morally, but because there is nothing compelling them to behave morally other than the inclinations they wake up with in the morning, shouldn’t I be somewhat concerned that they may at some point grow tired of hunting just rabbits?

Well perhaps you can descend from your high pedestal and tell me how your inclinations are derived from greater considerations than mine. To think that I just wake up each morning and rewrite my moral code without a second thought! You have some nerve, dude.

If you don’t suffer from their bigotry why would you care?

Because unlike yourself, my personal salvation, whatever I take that to be, isn’t all that concerns me. I’m able to care for the well-being of others because I prefer their happiness, too. Bigots don’t make for a happy population.

 

[Voice_of_Reason_1]

It may be a biological inclination but it is not logical in application and we are certainly capable of overcoming our biological inclinations. Logically, we shouldn’t care about anyone or anything that is not beneficial to us.

Caring about others is beneficial to us (you can certainly think of reasons why a system built on cooperation is more amenable to our survival than a system built on anarchy). That’s logical.

But if human life has no intrinsic value then hunting people would be no different than hunting rabbits and logically I should be unconcerned with whether something is destructive to human life or not. I should not, for example, care a whit about what happened in Haiti nor contribute anything at all to alleviate their problems.

You’re right. Fortunately, people have found social benefit in caring about these things, even to the point of internalizing such concerns.

A “good” thing? You really shouldn’t use value laden terms if you don’t believe in values - I assume you meant “That behavior is beneficial to me.”

Well it’s a good thing because it benefits everyone, not just me.
And I see **Prodigal_Son **has stopped arguing with me. Shall I take that as a victory on behalf of my reasoning? Thank you

 

[mrhenrik]

As for actual and apparent reasons, consider the difference between the concept of “something that motivates” and “something that counts in favor of”. Something that motivates accounts for an action; Columbus’s thought he would arrive in China was his reason for sailing West. This was his apparent reason. But, in actuality, this was not a (good) reason to sail due West, although it might have been a reason to sail southwest. The proximity of China did not count in favor of sailing West. If there was a good reason for Columbus’s action, it was that he would discover the New World. This was an *actual *reason.

Wait, what? Am I completely missing the point here or is this completely illogical?

Columbus went to the west because it was such a hassle going around the horn of Africa and he figured he’d check if sailing around the globe would be a short cut. Nobody knew that America was there (except for the Vikings, but they didn’t feel like telling anyone), so that couldn’t have been his actual reason. I’m confused. He wasn’t even heading for China, he was going to India.

 

[Mystic_Banana]

Caring about others is beneficial to us (you can certainly think of reasons why a system built on cooperation is more amenable to our survival than a system built on anarchy). That’s logical.

The problem is, that although this does work, those within such societies can then seek personal benefit (or personal gratification) at the expense of others, relying on the virtue of others to buoy up society for their benefit

If you see caring about others in terms of benefiting ourselves, then you are not really making an ethical decision. You are making a tactical one based on mutual self-interest.

You’re right. Fortunately, people have found social benefit in caring about these things, even to the point of internalizing such concerns.

The fact is, I think this argument really bypasses something rather essential, specifically that life has very little real point if every conscious entity has a finite existence. So, I suppose the question is, in this Godless Universe, is there an afterlife? And does what we do effect the nature of existence there?

Well it’s a good thing because it benefits everyone, not just me.
And I see **Prodigal_Son **has stopped arguing with me. Shall I take that as a victory on behalf of my reasoning? Thank you

Nicely assumed, but I’m yet to find anything resembling logic in any atheist argument for purposeful living… on the assumption you are a materialist, I see little in the way of any real value of any action, beyond a deliberately blinkered focus on the short term, if we are bound by finite existence

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Wait, what? Am I completely missing the point here or is this completely illogical?

Columbus went to the west because it was such a hassle going around the horn of Africa and he figured he’d check if sailing around the globe would be a short cut. Nobody knew that America was there (except for the Vikings, but they didn’t feel like telling anyone), so that couldn’t have been his actual reason. I’m confused. He wasn’t even heading for China, he was going to India.

Let us say, for the sake of argument, that a reason is something that “counts in favor” of some action. Now consider a situation: Fridays are my regular trash pick-up day, so I figured I had reason to take out the trash. This was my subjective reason, the thing that *seemed to *count in favor of the action.

But, as a matter of fact, the trash people are coming tomorrow, because of the holiday Monday. So I didn’t *actually *have reason to bring out the trash this morning. The difference is the difference between our perception of the state of the world, and the actual state of the world.

I admit that the Columbus example may have been unclear. But it is interesting that the word “reason” bears both these meanings, and I think that to think clearly about subjectivism, we must consider the distinction. Hopefully this clears things up!

 

[Mystic_Banana]

Hi Prodigal Son, I don’t want to hijack your argument, but I’d really like to see if I can find *any * reasonable argument for any approach to life from atheists that doesn’t somehow resemble nihlism, or escape into pseudo-theistic idealism

 

[Prodigal_Son]

And I see Prodigal_Son has stopped arguing with me. Shall I take that as a victory on behalf of my reasoning? Thank you

Hmmm. Your last bit of reasoning in our conversation was this:

Originally Posted by Prodigal_Son
Gee, you’re optimistic! I’m afraid, from what I’ve seen, that most people who do right do so because they are afraid of the consequences.

Yeah, so what are you getting at?

I really wasn’t “getting at” anything, so I didn’t respond. Perhaps I’ll get at something now though.

You seemed to be saying that people had an “inner dialogue, built into us” which kept us within the bounds of conventional morality. But if you look at history, it is quite clear that we don’t. Of course, in times of change and upheaval – where what is right is being redefined – we experience less of the power of evil over the human mind. This accounts for the optimism many modern thinkers have about ethics. When you have accustomed your body to heat, heat seems less hot. When you have accustomed yourself to sin, you can’t even recognize it anymore.

But you can’t redefine right and wrong to everyone’s liking forever.

 

[Sair]

Hi Prodigal Son, I don’t want to hijack your argument, but I’d really like to see if I can find *any * reasonable argument for any approach to life from atheists that doesn’t somehow resemble nihlism, or escape into pseudo-theistic idealism

::sniff::

Do I detect the faint aroma of a false dichotomy here…?

But since you ask, I’ll give it a shot. Firstly, the having of ideals doesn’t imply theism, or pseudo-theism. I think you’d be hard-pressed to find a person who has no ideals, unless they are suffering from severe clinical depression, or have had such a difficult and distressed life that they don’t know what it means to be happy or contented. Even in these cases, the glimmer of possibility for a better life may emerge. It is possible to exist without hope, but not really to live.

I think your post above - and indeed, the question posed by the OP - represent the situation in a manner that is heavily biased towards a theistic comprehension of the world. This isn’t a problem, given the nature of the forum - as long as you recognise that this bias exists, rather than supposing your assumptions to be universal or somehow logically necessary.

I’ll attempt to meet your challenge by addressing the OP directly. I have good reason to believe that the assertion “If God does not exist, everything is permissible” is a false assertion. That would mean that in the absence of a god, it is always permissible to murder, to abuse trust, to rape, to exploit, assault, or otherwise behave in an antisocial manner. Although I imagine there are some atheists out there who think this way, the majority (at least in my experience) do not.

The use of the word ‘permissible’ suggests that there must be someone around to either grant or withhold permission. In many cases, the law of the state fulfils this function, but often the rules about what ought and ought not to be done are inherent in the very nature of human society. Some behaviours are conducive to building community, and others are not. If I were to act on a belief that everything was permissible, the people who share my life in this world would quickly disabuse me of that notion - I would very soon find myself friendless and alone. The need for companionship is hardwired into humans - we are social animals, and this requires us to behave in such a way as to make harmonious social interaction possible.

Atheism is not a unified collection of doctrines, merely a supposition about the nature of the universe - ie: that it is godless. This does not imply a belief that we can do whatever we want, and damn the consequences, as demonstrated above. Nor does it make the possession of ideals in any way contradictory. We can all see that it is possible to attain happiness in this life, and that, I think, is a powerful ideal. It’s just that theists, and others who believe in an afterlife, tend to think they ought to defer the attainment of happiness until after they die. There are various understandings of what it means to be happy, and what is required for us to live happily - perhaps these are what you dismissively refer to as ‘pseudo-theistic idealism’, but I suspect that is because you see this life as only a prelude to the next - a testing ground to see if you’re worthy of paradise. For those of us who think this life is the only one we get, it’s important to make the best we can of it, for ourselves and our fellows.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Hi Prodigal Son, I don’t want to hijack your argument, but I’d really like to see if I can find *any * reasonable argument for any approach to life from atheists that doesn’t somehow resemble nihlism, or escape into pseudo-theistic idealism

Good to see ya, Banana! I am curious about the same thing. The proposition that “my valuing something makes it valuable” seems unique in its grammatical import. Would we ever say that “My believing something makes it credible” or “My trusting someone makes them trustworthy”?

But, in my experience, the valued-to-valuable leap is the best of a mediocre bunch of atheist attempts to salvage ethics. (Unless you call Kant’s system atheistic, which is quite a stretch).

 

[Prodigal_Son]

The use of the word ‘permissible’ suggests that there must be someone around to either grant or withhold permission. In many cases, the law of the state fulfils this function, but often the rules about what ought and ought not to be done are inherent in the very nature of human society. Some behaviours are conducive to building community, and others are not.

But why ought one care about community building? If one values thievery as their art and calling in life, and manages to elude all consequences through the resourcefulness, what ground do we have to criticize them? We can say that they do not conform to our ideas of good, but it seems that to impose our ideas of good upon them is wrong. But then again, why not ditch the “slave morality” that imposing our ideas is wrong? Why not have the majority dictate to the minority, or the powerful oppress the masses? Sure, there are social norms against this now, but why are these norms justified?

In other words, how does the atheist respond to Nietzsche?

It’s just that theists, and others who believe in an afterlife, tend to think they ought to defer the attainment of happiness until after they die.

An interesting statement, considering that devout believers (in any faith) are, statistically, among the most satisfied and happy demographic. Not that this wisdom is inaccessible to outsiders. Anyone who realizes that “in giving you receive” has immediately made himself healthier and happier.