If God is pure act then how could he decide to create one world over another?

[Asimis]

Wouldn’t a complete lack of potentiality in God, as it is maintained in Catholic theology, entail that he can’t make decisions? How can God conceive of a divine plan and a world to create (as opposed to some other) if he is on pure act with absolutely no potentiality at all?

In the state where God has yet to create the universe, the universe still must exist potentially in it’s cause (which would be God), but since it is said there is no potentiality in God, then it couldn’t possibly exist, unless, of course it is maintained that the universe is co-eternal with God (and Aquinas seems to allow this possibility).

 

[Latinitas]

This is a good question. I would respond to it this way: You must remember that time did not exist before the earth; hence, there’s before and after, but only conceptually, not really (scholastic terminology). God, having decided from all eternity to create the world created it, and time with it. Hence, conceptually God made a decision to create the world, and then to create this world over that one, and then actually do it, but since there’s no time, it cannot be conceived as if God were doing these things in sequence, but ‘simultaneously’, meaning that from all eternity He has decided to create the world, from all eternity decided to create this world over that one, and from all eternity actually create it.

This does not necessarily mean that the world has existed from all eternity, since God has created a finite world, He from all eternity created a world with limited time, at ‘which point’ in eternity He did it. Remeber, that eternity is not time, there’s conceptual order, not temporal order.

I figure you handle the intense theological language, since you ask such a good question . I hope this was helpful.

Benedicat Deus,
Latinitas

 

[DrTaffy]

Hence, conceptually God made a decision to create the world, and then to create this world over that one, and then actually do it, but since there’s no time, it cannot be conceived as if God were doing these things in sequence, but ‘simultaneously’, meaning that from all eternity He has decided to create the world, from all eternity decided to create this world over that one, and from all eternity actually create it.

(Emphasis added)

But if this world (“universe”, I would say) is contingent - that is to say that it could have been different or even nonexistent - then does that not mean mean that any God that ab aeterno was decided to create this universe and not another universe or none was also contingent? That is to say that he could have been different?

 

[fred_conty]

God “is” all knowledge/love. It isn’t as if he decided between different acts of knowledge which takes a period of time. In this he is quite different from us, being his knowledge. Can we understand this as humans, absolutely not. It is beyond mortal experience, understanding, and concept…and time.

Then the question arises…why us and not different beings? And the only answer I have is, why not us? A different material body is not that important. It is the soul, that can know a person and grow to love them. And the freedom to grow and to give that love. And that describes us.

May God our Father give you grace and peace.

 

[fhansen]

Wouldn’t a complete lack of potentiality in God, as it is maintained in Catholic theology, entail that he can’t make decisions? How can God conceive of a divine plan and a world to create (as opposed to some other) if he is on pure act with absolutely no potentiality at all?

In the state where God has yet to create the universe, the universe still must exist potentially in it’s cause (which would be God), but since it is said there is no potentiality in God, then it couldn’t possibly exist, unless, of course it is maintained that the universe is co-eternal with God (and Aquinas seems to allow this possibility).

Why would God need to decide anything? Why should there be any other possible worlds?

 

[DrTaffy]

Why would God need to decide anything? Why should there be any other possible worlds?

The argument is often made that this universe is ‘contingent’ - that it could have been different - and that therefore its existence must be based on something that is necessary. Something that could not be different from what it is. Yet if creating a contingent universe is a quality of that necessary something, how does that not make it contingent?

If this universe could not be different, or if the potential differences are dismissed as ‘accidental’ then this argument fails.

 

[seagal]

Why would God need to decide anything? Why should there be any other possible worlds?

Those are my questions. The way I see it, since God is omniscient he doesn’t weigh the alternatives and pick the one he wants. He Knows what is necessary and creates it.

 

[Shike]

Wouldn’t a complete lack of potentiality in God, as it is maintained in Catholic theology, entail that he can’t make decisions? How can God conceive of a divine plan and a world to create (as opposed to some other) if he is on pure act with absolutely no potentiality at all?

In the state where God has yet to create the universe, the universe still must exist potentially in it’s cause (which would be God), but since it is said there is no potentiality in God, then it couldn’t possibly exist, unless, of course it is maintained that the universe is co-eternal with God (and Aquinas seems to allow this possibility).

The reason why this appears to be a very good argument is that it is equivocating the scholastic notion of potentiality with the more common notion of potential (or power). In other words, potentiality is not the same as potential.

Actuality and potentiality (act and potency) are fundamental principles of the created world, and are so fundamental that they are both found in all created being and can even be found characterizing your notion of potential (power). Therefore, the scholastic notion of potentiality and the common notion of potential (power) are on two different levels of explanation.

That said, you may still then be wondering: if actuality and potentiality characterize my notion of potential (power), then to be consistent we should not say that God has potential (is powerful), right? The reality of the situation is that when scholastics attribute potential (power) to God, they do so in an analogical way: the core notion of potential or power is the ability to realize effects; the emphasis is on the effects of the agent, not on the agent being affected. That leaves enough room to allow for denying the principle of potentiality in God while still legitimately attributing potential (power) to God, albeit analogically.

So think of it like this: God has Potential (Power) even though there is no potentiality in Him.

Any questions, please ask!

• Michael

 

[Latinitas]

(Emphasis added)

But if this world (“universe”, I would say) is contingent - that is to say that it could have been different or even nonexistent - then does that not mean mean that any God that ab aeterno was decided to create this universe and not another universe or none was also contingent? That is to say that he could have been different?

No. Since the universe is not part of the divine essence, but exterior and distinct from it, God can create another universe and yet not affect His essence, and since God is His essence, God also would not be different.

God could not have created the universe - He certainly did not and does not need it - or created it differently, as He is free from necessity, but, since God is His essence, and His essence is that of supreme moral perfection, God will only create that which brings the greatest good possible, and in this way, God ‘could not’ have created another universe.

If anything here is incorrect, I humbly submit to the correct teaching,
Benedicat Deus,
Latinitas

 

[Shike]

God could not have created the universe - He certainly did not and does not need it - or created it differently, as He is free from necessity, but, since God is His essence, and His essence is that of supreme moral perfection, God will only create that which brings the greatest good possible, and in this way, God ‘could not’ have created another universe.

But how does this square with God’s omnipotence, His ability to always create something better? As I have usually heard, there is no such thing as a greatest possible world – just like there is no such thing as a greatest possible island (how many palm trees does it take to make the greatest possible island?)

You seem to be saying, of ontological possibility God could have created a different universe, but given His moral character this is the only universe He would choose to make… and this based on what? Because He has already chosen to start making it?

It seems to me that if God chooses to create and therefore it is necessary which world will be chosen, then there is no possibility that God could create a different world. Especially given the doctrine of Divine Simplicity.

 

[DrTaffy]

…since God is His essence, and His essence is that of supreme moral perfection, God will only create that which brings the greatest good possible, and in this way, God ‘could not’ have created another universe.

(Emphasis added)

In which case this universe is not contingent but necessary. So this particular argument for god fails.

 

[JapaneseKappa]

I’ve been meaning to make a thread like this for a little while now. The issue as I see it is this:

Proofs for God basically argue that God is required to explain the existence of the universe. That’s fine, but it doesn’t actually answer the question “why does the universe exist?” I would ask the question

What causes “God’s causing this universe?”

The answer I think must fall into one of three categories (1, 2a, or 2b below)

1. “God’s causing the universe” was uncaused.
2. “God’s causing the universe” was caused. This offers two possibilities:
   2a. “God’s causing the universe” was caused by God’s essential nature.
   2b. “God’s causing the universe” was not caused by God’s essential nature.

Option 1 means that we’ve ultimately answered the question “why does the universe exist?” with “it just does” because God made the universe for no reason. The obvious issue is that if “God’s causing the universe” can be uncaused, then the universe itself can be uncaused, and there would be no need to posit God in the first place.

Option 2a means that the universe is not contingent, and is in fact necessary. If God must exist with a certain nature, and that nature mandates he create this universe, then it is not possible for God to not create this universe. This of course means that it is impossible for “God’s causing the universe” to not exist, which means that it is impossible for the universe to not exist. That is equivalent to concluding the universe is necessary.

Option 2b cannot be the case because this implies that there is some potential within God that was actualized by a contingent (i.e. non-necessary) entity. This cannot be the case because God is pure actuality. However, for the sake of argument, lets call whatever it was that caused God to create the universe thing_X. Since thing_X is contingent, God must have caused it. We can therefore ask the same question about thing_X: "What causes “God’s causing this thing_X?” This leads to the same three options, except about thing_X instead of the universe. This means we will eventually end up with either Option 1, Option 2a, or an infinite regress of Option 2b.

 

[Shike]

I’ve been meaning to make a thread like this for a little while now. The issue as I see it is this:

Proofs for God basically argue that God is required to explain the existence of the universe. That’s fine, but it doesn’t actually answer the question “why does the universe exist?” I would ask the question

The answer I think must fall into one of three categories (1, 2a, or 2b below)

1. “God’s causing the universe” was uncaused.
2. “God’s causing the universe” was caused. This offers two possibilities:
   2a. “God’s causing the universe” was caused by God’s essential nature.
   2b. “God’s causing the universe” was not caused by God’s essential nature.

Option 1 means that we’ve ultimately answered the question “why does the universe exist?” with “it just does” because God made the universe for no reason. The obvious issue is that if “God’s causing the universe” can be uncaused, then the universe itself can be uncaused, and there would be no need to posit God in the first place.

Option 2a means that the universe is not contingent, and is in fact necessary. If God must exist with a certain nature, and that nature mandates he create this universe, then it is not possible for God to not create this universe. This of course means that it is impossible for “God’s causing the universe” to not exist, which means that it is impossible for the universe to not exist. That is equivalent to concluding the universe is necessary.

Option 2b cannot be the case because this implies that there is some potential within God that was actualized by a contingent (i.e. non-necessary) entity. This cannot be the case because God is pure actuality. However, for the sake of argument, lets call whatever it was that caused God to create the universe thing_X. Since thing_X is contingent, God must have caused it. We can therefore ask the same question about thing_X: "What causes “God’s causing this thing_X?” This leads to the same three options, except about thing_X instead of the universe. This means we will eventually end up with either Option 1, Option 2a, or an infinite regress of Option 2b.

If this is the direction you want to go, you should probably make another thread dedicated to it with an appropriate title. That way, more people who are interested will see it.

That said, it may help to take a good look at your definition of cause and reason. For a scholastic, one look and they see that you do not see the difference. Cause is one kind of reason.

Personally, I would choose option 1 and say since God is uncaused, yes it is uncaused… but so what–it does not mean that there was/is no reason. Furthermore, whether or not we can know that reason is another issue. But this is a secondary question given the necessary requirement of God as ground of existence. The context must never be forgotten.

• Michael

 

[Nihilist]

Wouldn’t a complete lack of potentiality in God, as it is maintained in Catholic theology, entail that he can’t make decisions? How can God conceive of a divine plan and a world to create (as opposed to some other) if he is on pure act with absolutely no potentiality at all?

In the state where God has yet to create the universe, the universe still must exist potentially in it’s cause (which would be God), but since it is said there is no potentiality in God, then it couldn’t possibly exist, unless, of course it is maintained that the universe is co-eternal with God (and Aquinas seems to allow this possibility).

I think the expression “Pure Act” needs to be put to rest. It is a misleading, and useless term. Who says God has no potential?- remember He is omnipotent. Therefore, He has the potential to do anything.

To say He is pure act is to say He is doing everything He could do- but this is contrary to God’s omnipotence.

 

[Shike]

I think the expression “Pure Act” needs to be put to rest. It is a misleading, and useless term. Who says God has no potential?- remember He is omnipotent. Therefore, He has the potential to do anything.

To say He is pure act is to say He is doing everything He could do- but this is contrary to God’s omnipotence.

Pure Act is a scholastic philosophy term, been around so long that it would confuse way more people if it was changed. It does not mean God is doing everything He could do, for relevant purposes it only means God can cause change without undergoing it or being affected.

Definitely not useless if you study the kinds of change within philosophy.

 

[JapaneseKappa]

If this is the direction you want to go, you should probably make another thread dedicated to it with an appropriate title. That way, more people who are interested will see it.

That said, it may help to take a good look at your definition of cause and reason. For a scholastic, one look and they see that you do not see the difference. Cause is one kind of reason.

Personally, I would choose option 1 and say since God is uncaused, yes it is uncaused… but so what–it does not mean that there was/is no reason. Furthermore, whether or not we can know that reason is another issue. But this is a secondary question given the necessary requirement of God as ground of existence. The context must never be forgotten.

• Michael

I think my description isn’t exactly the same as what the original poster was asking, but I think that by answering the problem as I posed it, we would also answer the titular question.

Sure, the distinction between cause and reason is somewhat subtle and introduces some nuance to the questions as you point out. However, I think you can simply substitute in “reason” for “cause” and the outcome will be just as problematic. Also you are correct to note that I wasn’t asking if God was uncaused, I was asking if “God’s causing the universe” was.

I assume that you would say that God is uncaused, but the reason he exists because he is logically necessary. That’s fine, I’ve basically been trying to tease out whether or not his creation of this universe is likewise logically necessary. If it is not, then we need to find out if God had a reason or cause to make this universe. I don’t necessarily need to know what that reason or cause was, just if it exists and how it came about.

Put another way: if you had a complete and accurate understanding of God, would you know what sort of universe he creates?

 

[balto]

Pure Act is a scholastic philosophy term, been around so long that it would confuse way more people if it was changed. It does not mean God is doing everything He could do, for relevant purposes it only means God can cause change without undergoing it or being affected.

Definitely not useless if you study the kinds of change within philosophy.

Yes, this is a good point. Being Pure Act allows for God to have so-called “active potencies” which are powers that can be exercised without being moved by another. What God cannot have are “passive potencies” which would require an external agent to actualize.

 

[balto]

I think my description isn’t exactly the same as what the original poster was asking, but I think that by answering the problem as I posed it, we would also answer the titular question.

Sure, the distinction between cause and reason is somewhat subtle and introduces some nuance to the questions as you point out. However, I think you can simply substitute in “reason” for “cause” and the outcome will be just as problematic. Also you are correct to note that I wasn’t asking if God was uncaused, I was asking if “God’s causing the universe” was.

I assume that you would say that God is uncaused, but the reason he exists because he is logically necessary. That’s fine, I’ve basically been trying to tease out whether or not his creation of this universe is likewise logically necessary. If it is not, then we need to find out if God had a reason or cause to make this universe. I don’t necessarily need to know what that reason or cause was, just if it exists and how it came about.

Put another way: if you had a complete and accurate understanding of God, would you know what sort of universe he creates?

Well I suppose that God’s reason for creating this universe are the goodness of this universe, where the goodness of this or any world is part of God knowing His essence in His single intellective act (God knows the goodness of the world by knowing Himself, not by knowing some independently-existing world He studies). If there are two possible worlds A and B, and God actualizes A and not B, God has reasons for actualizing A and B in both of these possible worlds, but creates A and not B on account of A’s goodness without any necessary reference to B’s goodness.

If you could know what world God creates, then God would not be pure act because His will would be moved by whatever world He decides to create, which is precisely what cannot be true of pure act.

 

[Shike]

I think my description isn’t exactly the same as what the original poster was asking, but I think that by answering the problem as I posed it, we would also answer the titular question.

I disagree. You both provide two very different arguments against the classical theistic conception of God as Pure Actuality. The argument in the OP (with author’s permission of course) can be summed up as:

1. God is Pure Act.
2. If God is Pure Act, then He cannot decide (and therefore create at all)
3. The universe exists

---

1. It is not the case that God is Pure Act

Your argument (with your permission of course) is summed up as:

1. There exists a reason for God creating the universe or there does not exist a reason.
2. (Given the classical theistic conception of God) If there exists a reason, then it is due to God’s essential nature and therefore the universe is necessary and may therefore exist without God.
3. If there does not exist a reason, then it becomes a brute fact and we might as well say the existence of the universe is also a brute fact and may therefore exist without God.

---

1. Therefore, either the classical theistic conception of God is wrong or the universe may exist without Him.

Answering the first argument by rejecting premise 2 based on an equivocation of potential and potentiality will not resolve the difficulty with the second argument.

I assume that you would say that God is uncaused, but the reason he exists because he is logically necessary.

That may in fact be the case, but I would never argue for it. The traditional Cosmological arguments are sufficient for coming to Pure Actuality, but they do not need to conclude to a being who is logically necessary. And if you happen to read Aquinas’ 5 Ways as modal like that you will have completely missed the bus.

Put another way: if you had a complete and accurate understanding of God, would you know what sort of universe he creates?

Sure, but then that might then be a case of “seeing” it rather than deducing it; I honestly do not know. But what I do know is that the reason why God creates does not have to be a necessitating one.
Also, proving the existence of God in the way the Cosmological argument does will indeed answer why the universe exists. That you look for further understanding (and a different kind of cause: formal rather than efficient) is besides the point given the context of the Cosmological argument.

Any questions?

 

[balto]

Sure, but then that might then be a case of “seeing” it rather than deducing it; I honestly do not know. But what I do know is that the reason why God creates does not have to be a necessitating one.
Also, proving the existence of God in the way the Cosmological argument does will indeed answer why the universe exists. That you look for further understanding (and a different kind of cause: formal rather than efficient) is besides the point given the context of the Cosmological argument.

Any questions?

I have a question if you’re still around . You said that if one had a complete understanding of God your knowing what universe He creates is not a matter of deducing but of seeing. Does that mean that God’s divine action is the same for any world, but the effects are different, because a different world was created? I think what JapaneseKappa is getting at if I am understanding him/her correctly is that if God creates a different world, then there is some difference in His action that you could look at and say “oh, well given that feature He is going to create this world.” But that would be to ask the question what causes God’s uncaused action to create the universe, which is to ask nonsense. Would it be the case that God actually “looks the same” in all possible worlds? He would certainly have a reason for creating the world He actually creates on account of the goodness of that world, but His creating it would be uncaused. So we could see why He created it but not be able to predict it from the essence of God because it is uncaused.

This is the conclusion I came to yesterday after reading the exchange in the combox of one of Prof. Feser’s recent blog posts between the posters “Brandon” and “dguller” discussing the difference between divine power and action: edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/08/science-dorks.html?commentPage=2 if anybody is interested in seeing it play out.