If God is pure act then how could he decide to create one world over another?

[Latinitas]

But how does this square with God’s omnipotence, His ability to always create something better? As I have usually heard, there is no such thing as a greatest possible world – just like there is no such thing as a greatest possible island (how many palm trees does it take to make the greatest possible island?)

You seem to be saying, of ontological possibility God could have created a different universe, but given His moral character this is the only universe He would choose to make… and this based on what? Because He has already chosen to start making it?

It seems to me that if God chooses to create and therefore it is necessary which world will be chosen, then there is no possibility that God could create a different world. Especially given the doctrine of Divine Simplicity.

Remember, God’s omnipotence does not mean that God can make Himself, for example, or sin, or do anything like that. No one knows why God created this universe, or why He judged this universe better than all others He could create - that’s a complete mystery. The error in the comparison is that the number of palm trees do not necessarily make an island good, but the judgment of God, Who is goodness itself, does make something good by necessity. That is not to say that this judgment is arbitrary, since God is goodness itself, but it does mean that God’s judgment of good is, on the one hand, always sound and correct, and on the other hand and simultaneously (conceptually, not temporally) free and good on the account of His judgment. The famous Euthyphro dilemma is resolved in this way: things are not good just because God declares them good (it is because God is goodness itself, ontological as well as moral, meaning He knows perfectly and is perfect morally, and it is on the congruence of something to Himself by which He declares something good), neither is God good because of some amorphous standard of good, and therefore subject to some higher law (it is because God is goodness itself, He is own standard of good).

Now, you say there is no possiblity of God creating another world. My answer to this is, it was necessary by a necessitas congruentiae, or necessity of congruence, to create this world and not another. A necessity of congruence is not an absolute necessity (and therefore, not a necessity in the strictest sense), but very highly appropriate considering His supreme moral perfection. He could have created another world that was good, but not as good, or not have created the world at all, and He would not have done contrary to either His justice or His goodness, and so He was also free in His creation of the world.

Anyway, I hope this was helpful, and thank you for the insightful questions,
Benedicat Deus,
Latinitas

 

[Latinitas]

(Emphasis added)

In which case this universe is not contingent but necessary. So this particular argument for god fails.

No it doesn’t. The universe is not necessary absolutely - God was perfectly free in creating the universe. Had He not created, He would do no wrong either to His justice, charity, or goodness in that. The same is true had He created another universe other than this one. But on account of His supreme moral perfection, He was, by a necessity of congruence (see my last post), compelled to create the Universe. The universe, is, therefore, contingent upon God’s existence and creation, and yet, God is still pure act.

The point about pure act above and its meaning is also spot on.

Benedicat Deus,
Latinitas

 

[Shike]

Now, you say there is no possiblity of God creating another world.

You might be confusing me with someone else as I did not say that.

But your first paragraph is great and I agree whole-heartedly.

He could have created another world that was good, but not as good, or not have created the world at all, and He would not have done contrary to either His justice or His goodness, and so He was also free in His creation of the world.

Okay, but what I am wondering is why cannot He create a better world than this one given His omnipotence. You say God cannot create a logical contradiction, and I agree. I just do not see the logical contradiction in creating a world that is more good than this one (say with one more person). In fact, given omnipotence, I see reason to say that He could do so.

To say that this world is already the best possible… is it to beg the question?

Take care.

• Michael

 

[Shike]

I have a question if you’re still around . You said that if one had a complete understanding of God your knowing what universe He creates is not a matter of deducing but of seeing. Does that mean that God’s divine action is the same for any world, but the effects are different, because a different world was created?

Hmm… like I said I do not really know. Sorry.

I think what JapaneseKappa is getting at if I am understanding him/her correctly is that if God creates a different world, then there is some difference in His action that you could look at and say “oh, well given that feature He is going to create this world.” But that would be to ask the question what causes God’s uncaused action to create the universe, which is to ask nonsense. Would it be the case that God actually “looks the same” in all possible worlds? He would certainly have a reason for creating the world He actually creates on account of the goodness of that world, but His creating it would be uncaused. So we could see why He created it but not be able to predict it from the essence of God because it is uncaused.

I think instead of “…what causes God’s uncaused action to create the universe…” would be better stated as “…what is the reason for God’s uncaused action to create the universe…”. But interesting. I guess all in all, I do not see why there is all this talk of God’s motive or reason for creating this world rather than that. The arguments seem to lead us to the point of acknowledging God as Creator of this world and that it was/is a free creation. But a reason or motive does not necessitate so… I guess I am lost as to the overall point.
I do not think you could deduce which world from God’s essence merely because creation involves a choice of the will. But since God is timeless and since His power is “tied” up in this creation, it would seem to me if you could comprehend the essence of God (though in principle impossible), to predict this world would be more akin to seeing rather than deducing. However, since it is in principle impossible to comprehend the essence of God, are we not wasting our time?

And kudos to you for following Dr. Feser’s blog. There is some really great stuff there.

 

[Latinitas]

You might be confusing me with someone else as I did not say that.

But your first paragraph is great and I agree whole-heartedly.

Okay, but what I am wondering is why cannot He create a better world than this one given His omnipotence. You say God cannot create a logical contradiction, and I agree. I just do not see the logical contradiction in creating a world that is more good than this one (say with one more person). In fact, given omnipotence, I see reason to say that He could do so.

To say that this world is already the best possible… is it to beg the question?

Take care.

• Michael

Sorry about the confusion.

This is the best world possible, relatively speaking, in that it is the one which God brings out the greatest good. As to why this one is the best, I can only answer, that
God has judged so. Other than that, it’s a mystery (cf. Rom. 11:33).

Anyway, I hope this helped.

Benedicat Deus,
Latinitas

 

[Shike]

Sorry about the confusion.

This is the best world possible, relatively speaking, in that it is the one which God brings out the greatest good. As to why this one is the best, I can only answer, that
God has judged so. Other than that, it’s a mystery (cf. Rom. 11:33).

Anyway, I hope this helped.

Benedicat Deus,
Latinitas

Well, I guess I would ask then why is this one the one which God brings out the greatest good? Why cannot it be possible that He creates another world with even more goodness?

You said that God has judged this world to be the best possible–how do you know that?

If you do not have a philosophical argument, I would be interested in one from Scripture or the authority of the Church.

 

[Latinitas]

Well, I guess I would ask then why is this one the one which God brings out the greatest good? Why cannot it be possible that He creates another world with even more goodness?

Well, like I said, it’s mysterious as to the true reason why God did judge this one better than all others - we can’t the depths of God’s mind in these matters.

You said that God has judged this world to be the best possible–how do you know that?

Because this is the world that actually exists, and so God, who, compelled (not absolutely, but morally) by His supreme moral perfection, created the best world to exist. There’s more on this in The Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma by Dr. Ludwig Ott (a great book by the way) that I’d recommend.

Here’s another way of looking at it - take an animal for instance. It is true that every human is a greater good than animal, and yet there are animals in the world. Why? Because God has judged it good for the men He has created to have animals. Analogously with worlds. It is true that any one thing might be improved in worlds, but for some inscrutable reason, God has judged this to be the best one, or the one which accords to His plan the most.

The definition of “best” should also be defined. “Best” here, means, the one which accords most with the Divine plan. God could have created a world with no suffering and no evil, but, for some inscrutable reason, God seems to have created the world, and allowed beings to suffer and commit moral evils (sins), since this best accords to His plan.

To be simple, this is a profound mystery, but I’m trying the best I can to think of examples to explain. New Advent, under “Optimism”, has a pretty good article on this, as well.

If you do not have a philosophical argument, I would be interested in one from Scripture or the authority of the Church.

New Advent will quote St. Thomas, who you can then look up on their copy of the Summa.

I do hope this was helpful,
Benedicat Deus,
Latinitas

 

[oldcelt]

It could all stray a bit toward Deism, couldn’t it? God is a creator…the particulars take care of themselves. Just a thought after a quick read of the thread.

John

 

[Shike]

Because this is the world that actually exists, and so God, who, compelled (not absolutely, but morally) by His supreme moral perfection, created the best world to exist. There’s more on this in The Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma by Dr. Ludwig Ott (a great book by the way) that I’d recommend.

Thanks for your post. If I have time I will have to come back and look up the resources you propose.

I guess I do not see why God must make a world that best conforms to His plans…

 

[Shike]

Because this is the world that actually exists, and so God, who, compelled (not absolutely, but morally) by His supreme moral perfection, created the best world to exist. There’s more on this in The Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma by Dr. Ludwig Ott (a great book by the way) that I’d recommend.

…

The definition of “best” should also be defined. “Best” here, means, the one which accords most with the Divine plan. God could have created a world with no suffering and no evil, but, for some inscrutable reason, God seems to have created the world, and allowed beings to suffer and commit moral evils (sins), since this best accords to His plan.

To be simple, this is a profound mystery, but I’m trying the best I can to think of examples to explain. New Advent, under “Optimism”, has a pretty good article on this, as well.

The New Advent Optimism article was interesting and I think I learned something.

Against the extreme optimism of Leibniz, one might say that God is not necessitated to choose the best of all possible worlds, because this is in itself an impossibility. Whatever exists besides God, is finite. Between the finite and the infinite there is always a field of indefinite extent. And since the finite cannot become infinite, simply because the created can never be uncreated, it therefore follows that whatever exists, besides God, is, and always will be, limited. If so, no matter what may exist, something better could be conceived and brought into being by God. An absolutely best possible world would, therefore, seem to be a contradiction in terms and impossible even by the Omnipotence of God, who can bring into being all and only that which is intrinsically possible. If, then, one should take the words “doing the best possible” as meaning creating something than which nothing better is possible, no world could be the best possible. But there is another sense in which the words may be taken. Though one is not making the best thing that can be made, he still may be doing what he does in the best possible manner. In this sense, according to St. Thomas, God has made this world relatively the best possible. “When it is said that God can do anything better than He does it, this is true if the words ‘anything better’ stand for a noun. No matter what you may point out, God can make something that is better. . . . If, however, the words are used adverbially, and designate the mode of operation, God cannot do better than He does, for He cannot work with greater wisdom and goodness” (I, Q. xxv, a. 5, ad 1um). It is just this distinction which Leibniz failed to make, and was thereby led to his extreme position. According to St. Thomas, God was free to make a less or more perfect world. He made the world that would best fit the purposes of creation, and wrought it in the best possible manner.

I was really trying to push the truth that ontologically a best possible world is a contradiction. But if you define “best” differently (and it seems it is legitimate to do so), you can come to a different conclusion. So I think I see where you are coming from.

Now, moving on slightly. From the very end of the quote from the article:

He made the world that would best fit the purposes of creation, and wrought it in the best possible manner.

I think I see why the second part is correct, that ‘He wrought it in the best possible manner’. But I guess what makes me wonder is if ‘He made the world that would best fit the purposes of creation’. Could it not be that an ontoligically better world would better fit the purposes of creation? And if that is possible, then I don’t think we can say the first part of the quote is true.

I mean, we would need some necessary reasons to make that claim, and all I see is possibilities or a big ‘I don’t know’.

Thoughts?

And much thanks.

 

[Bahman]

Wouldn’t a complete lack of potentiality in God, as it is maintained in Catholic theology, entail that he can’t make decisions? How can God conceive of a divine plan and a world to create (as opposed to some other) if he is on pure act with absolutely no potentiality at all?

In the state where God has yet to create the universe, the universe still must exist potentially in it’s cause (which would be God), but since it is said there is no potentiality in God, then it couldn’t possibly exist, unless, of course it is maintained that the universe is co-eternal with God (and Aquinas seems to allow this possibility).

The problems you raised has a deep root in omniscience and omnipotence. The creation is necessary if the concept of it is in mind of God otherwise it is not creation concept. Add to this the fact that God is eternal then you can easily deduce that creation is eternal as well which is problematic since eternity means that there is no beginning.