If God knows what we will do but we do it freely, isn't that still Determinism?

[Pieman333272]

The reason I ask is, doesn’t that me we are certain to make a particular choice and therefore free will is an illusion?

 

[WoundedIcon]

It does mean we are certain to make that choice, but determinism requires God to force our hand. Instead, what actually happens is that our actions, and others’, and the whole world ticks like a sort of timepiece. God knew before He created us exactly how every aspect of the science of our and the universe’s being would play off itself, He knew exactly the prayers we’d pray and what we’d be like and somehow tweaks things to incorporate or collective wills into His overarching plan. It’d doesn’t necessarily mean that He approves or sets in motion any of our choices Himself as a first cause. But Satan and his legions introduced a foreseen wrench into the clockwork - setting into motion sin and corruption - which, as we see from Scripture, God has already taken into account and has already worked toward defeating Satan in the past for the future. As the awful ditty goes “God is in control.” And ultimately He maintains His fairness, because all evil is the result of choosing corruption over holiness and thus anyone who is, unfortunately, damned has chosen to damn themselves by turning their back on Father. Yet He made this chaos something blessed as well by allowing the fallen yet saved to attain to a higher level than even Adam and Eve would have obtained had they not sinned.

Now how He answers our prayer and influences us I don’t know, but even if it’s some kind of butterfly effect started from back with the primordial soup it is still His doing.

 

[mdgspencer]

God is outside of time. Time is a creation of God, created when He created the universe. So God in eternity is simultaneously present to our past, present, and future. I have heard a comparison that I found helpful. God is like a person on a high mountain that sees great stretches of land and people all at once. God is like this person who in his position can see all of time at once. We will act freely in the future, but God knows what we will freely do in the future always.

 

[danserr]

The reason I ask is, doesn’t that me we are certain to make a particular choice and therefore free will is an illusion?

The problem of freedom and God’s foreknowledge. It usually in some form goes like “if God knows I will do x tomorrow, then my choice to do x tomorrow was determined and so not free.” This is one where you have several options of how to respond.

1. If you are a compatibilist and think free will is compatible with determinism, then there is, of course, no problem. I don’t think free will and determinism are compatible, though, so I need other options.

1/1a. A simple foreknowledge view would just say that God’s knowledge does not determine our actions, rather, our actions determine God’s knowledge.

1. Open theism- God doesn’t know the future. I don’t much like this one either, but the idea is that God is omniscient. Omniscience means to know only and all truths. So because the future does not exist, then God does not know it. Asking if God could know the future on this view seems a little like asking if God could make a square circle.
2. God is outside time. I like this view, but it comes with a catch. From Boethius, Aquinas, and moderns like Brian Leftow and Eleanor Stump. God sees all moments as now, so he doesn’t see that I will do x, rather, he sees that I am doing x, and obviously to see a man do something is not to make him do it. The catch is that on this view, it is hard to explain how God can act in the world, but I like it anyway.
3. Molinism. God predicts the future using Middle Knowledge, which means that God doesn’t know the future, but he does know the present and specifically present counterfactuals. So he knows things like, “if Jon loses his job, jon will be tempted to hijack an airplane,” and so forth. God knows the present so well, and knows so many of these that his knowledge of the present lets him predict the future, but since this is not the same as knowing the future, human freedom is predicted. William Lane Craig is a big proponent of this view.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

The reason I ask is, doesn’t that me we are certain to make a particular choice and therefore free will is an illusion?

No, G-d, as the act of existing is omnipresent. Which means that He is at every point that can be said to exist, so from G-ds view point everything is “now”. There is no causal relationship between G-ds knowledge and your free will choices. There cannot be because an omniscient being cannot gain knowledge by definition.

 

[Pieman333272]

The problem of freedom and God’s foreknowledge. It usually in some form goes like “if God knows I will do x tomorrow, then my choice to do x tomorrow was determined and so not free.” This is one where you have several options of how to respond.

1. If you are a compatibilist and think free will is compatible with determinism, then there is, of course, no problem. I don’t think free will and determinism are compatible, though, so I need other options.

1/1a. A simple foreknowledge view would just say that God’s knowledge does not determine our actions, rather, our actions determine God’s knowledge.

1. Open theism- God doesn’t know the future. I don’t much like this one either, but the idea is that God is omniscient. Omniscience means to know only and all truths. So because the future does not exist, then God does not know it. Asking if God could know the future on this view seems a little like asking if God could make a square circle.
2. God is outside time. I like this view, but it comes with a catch. From Boethius, Aquinas, and moderns like Brian Leftow and Eleanor Stump. God sees all moments as now, so he doesn’t see that I will do x, rather, he sees that I am doing x, and obviously to see a man do something is not to make him do it. The catch is that on this view, it is hard to explain how God can act in the world, but I like it anyway.
3. Molinism. God predicts the future using Middle Knowledge, which means that God doesn’t know the future, but he does know the present and specifically present counterfactuals. So he knows things like, “if Jon loses his job, jon will be tempted to hijack an airplane,” and so forth. God knows the present so well, and knows so many of these that his knowledge of the present lets him predict the future, but since this is not the same as knowing the future, human freedom is predicted. William Lane Craig is a big proponent of this view.

I used to adhere to #4 but the problem I see is that diables the authority or possibility of prophecy. I like #3 a lot, although I find it weird to see God as doing everything in his entire plan at once.

 

[Curious_Hobbit]

I tend to agree with Peter Kreeft on this one. Since God is omnipotent, he gets what he wants in the way that he wants it. God wants his plan to be fulfilled by truly free humans exercising free choice.

peterkreeft.com/topics-more/freewill-predestination.htm

Kreeft says,
“Aquinas reconciles freedom with predestination by saying that God’s love is so powerful that he not only gets what he wants but he also gets it in the way that he wants. Not only is everything done that God wills to be done, but it is also done in the way he wants it to be done. It happens without freedom in the case of natural things like falling rain and freely in the case of human choices. A power a little less then total may get what it wants without getting it in the way that it wants it. But omnipotence gets both. And the way omnipotence wants human acts done is freely.”

C.s. Lewis once said that there was never anything in his life that he felt was a more free choice than his decision to convert to Christianity and just because it was free doesn’t eliminate the possibility that God knew it would happen. Couldn’t God’s plan be fulfilled by human beings freely choosing? In other words, saying that God knows we will do x,y, and z doesn’t necessarily mean that we aren’t freely choosing x, y, and z.

That’s my understanding of the issue anyway.

 

[mdgspencer]

Your remarks, repeated below, are very acute. However, I would like to repeat the perspective that God, outside of time, sees all of time in the same eternal instant. I see, though, that I made a foolish mistake. God is everywhere, so He can’t be outside of anything. But I think it is necessary to say that God is not subject to time. Time means change. If God is perfect, then He cannot change. Any change could only be by way of imperfection.

You provide an objection to this perspective--namely, that with this perspective it becomes difficult to see God intervening in the world. I wonder if your objection is based on the idea that God intervenes in the universe in time: that there is a before He acts, then He acts, and there is a time after He acts. But God in His eternal instant acts in every way in the universe at once, at once He creates the universe, brings an end to all things, and acts in every way on men throughout time during His same eternal instant.

The problem of freedom and God’s foreknowledge. It usually in some form goes like “if God knows I will do x tomorrow, then my choice to do x tomorrow was determined and so not free.” This is one where you have several options of how to respond.

1. If you are a compatibilist and think free will is compatible with determinism, then there is, of course, no problem. I don’t think free will and determinism are compatible, though, so I need other options.

1/1a. A simple foreknowledge view would just say that God’s knowledge does not determine our actions, rather, our actions determine God’s knowledge.

1. Open theism- God doesn’t know the future. I don’t much like this one either, but the idea is that God is omniscient. Omniscience means to know only and all truths. So because the future does not exist, then God does not know it. Asking if God could know the future on this view seems a little like asking if God could make a square circle.
2. God is outside time. I like this view, but it comes with a catch. From Boethius, Aquinas, and moderns like Brian Leftow and Eleanor Stump. God sees all moments as now, so he doesn’t see that I will do x, rather, he sees that I am doing x, and obviously to see a man do something is not to make him do it. The catch is that on this view, it is hard to explain how God can act in the world, but I like it anyway.
3. Molinism. God predicts the future using Middle Knowledge, which means that God doesn’t know the future, but he does know the present and specifically present counterfactuals. So he knows things like, “if Jon loses his job, jon will be tempted to hijack an airplane,” and so forth. God knows the present so well, and knows so many of these that his knowledge of the present lets him predict the future, but since this is not the same as knowing the future, human freedom is predicted. William Lane Craig is a big proponent of this view.

 

[danserr]

I used to adhere to #4 but the problem I see is that diables the authority or possibility of prophecy. I like #3 a lot, although I find it weird to see God as doing everything in his entire plan at once.

Yeah, I really like 3, but I agree, there is that element of weirdness that it is hard to understand from our own point of view.

4 (molinism) would probably be my second choice if 3 doesn’t work, though the only one I really don’t like is Open Theism. I don’t quite get why you think it disables prophecy though. Couldn’t I just say that God uses his Middle Knowledge to predict the future, and it is this that inspires and allows prophecy?

 

[Pieman333272]

One of the attributes of God seems to contradict Molinism:

God also knows the conditioned future free actions with infallible certainty (Scientia futuribilium). (Sent. communis.)

 

[belorg]

The problem of freedom and God’s foreknowledge. It usually in some form goes like “if God knows I will do x tomorrow, then my choice to do x tomorrow was determined and so not free.” This is one where you have several options of how to respond.

1. If you are a compatibilist and think free will is compatible with determinism, then there is, of course, no problem. I don’t think free will and determinism are compatible, though, so I need other options.

1/1a. A simple foreknowledge view would just say that God’s knowledge does not determine our actions, rather, our actions determine God’s knowledge.

The problem with this is, for God to see something in the future, there must ve a future to see and not several different futures. IOW ‘simple foreknowledge’ entails determinism. Maybe it’s not God that determines everything, but if things are not determined, God cannot see the future, He could only see a future.

1. Open theism- God doesn’t know the future. I don’t much like this one either, but the idea is that God is omniscient. Omniscience means to know only and all truths. So because the future does not exist, then God does not know it. Asking if God could know the future on this view seems a little like asking if God could make a square circle.

THat is an option, but would render God fallible.

1. God is outside time. I like this view, but it comes with a catch. From Boethius, Aquinas, and moderns like Brian Leftow and Eleanor Stump. God sees all moments as now, so he doesn’t see that I will do x, rather, he sees that I am doing x, and obviously to see a man do something is not to make him do it. The catch is that on this view, it is hard to explain how God can act in the world, but I like it anyway.

That’s one of the catches. the other one is that, for God to see everything as an terenal present, the futire must be fixed, just as in 1. Again, maybe not by God, but if there is no determinism, there is not one future to observe, neither by being outside time or by simple foreknowledge.

1. Molinism. God predicts the future using Middle Knowledge, which means that God doesn’t know the future, but he does know the present and specifically present counterfactuals. So he knows things like, “if Jon loses his job, jon will be tempted to hijack an airplane,” and so forth. God knows the present so well, and knows so many of these that his knowledge of the present lets him predict the future, but since this is not the same as knowing the future, human freedom is predicted. William Lane Craig is a big proponent of this view.

For WL Criag, middle knowledge comes on top of simple foreknowledge. God, in Craig’s view, knows with certainty, not only what I will do, but also what I would do in every other possible situation. The problem with this is that Molinism , even though Molinists will deny this, does entail determinism because if God knows that under circumstance C, I would freely do A, that means that in every possible world in which C obtains, I will do A. Which means that the choice to do A is determined by the circumstances.

So, really, the only option seems to be compatibilism.

 

[danserr]

1. Open theism- God doesn’t know the future. I don’t much like this one either, but the idea is that God is omniscient. Omniscience means to know only and all truths. So because the future does not exist, then God does not know it. Asking if God could know the future on this view seems a little like asking if God could make a square circle.

THat is an option, but would render God fallible.

No, because God remains omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect. Omniscence is to know only and all truths. God would still know all truths and so still be omniscient (the future just wouldn’t be one of them, since it wouldn’t exist), so he would still be a greatest conceivable being.

for God to see everything as an terenal present, the futire must be fixed,

I concede the objection I stated as a problem, (though it may have solutions), but not this one. the idea is that if God sees what we “will” do, how are we free to do it? But on the God is atemporal/transcends time view, God does not see what we “will do,” he sees what we “are doing.” And obviously to see a man do something is not to cause him to do it.

For WL Criag, middle knowledge comes on top of simple foreknowledge. God, in Craig’s view, knows with certainty, not only what I will do, but also what I would do in every other possible situation. The problem with this is that Molinism , even though Molinists will deny this, does entail determinism because if God knows that under circumstance C, I would freely do A, that means that in every possible world in which C obtains, I will do A. Which means that the choice to do A is determined by the circumstances.

So, really, the only option seems to be compatibilism.

I disagree with your argument that Molinism is essentially the same as simple foreknowledge.
The future is not determined on this view, but God’s knowledge of present counterfactuals is so good that he can predict the future with perfect accuracy.

By way of example, I myself know present counterfactuals about many things that allow me to make some vague predictions of the future. That hardly seems to prevent human freedom, so I don;t see that it would be different just because God would know even more present counterfactuals.

Also, I don’t think your example with possible worlds works, because it is human choice that determines which possible world will be actualized. Since the actualization of that world is up to human choice, free will is protected.
Secondly, and here I think may be the key point, there are possible worlds where the same circumstance leads to a different conclusion. Possible worlds just entail all broadly logically possible claims. So one possible world could consist of circumstances A, B, C, D, … B’, C’… etc., and event E, whereas another possible world could consist of the same circumstances and event E’, that is to say, a totally different event! so there are possible worlds where the same circumstances lead to different events. But if this is the case, you can’t say the outcome is determined. finally, what determines which possible world is actualized? Obviously, not God’s foreknowledge, or the future, because neither exist. So we are free to say that human choice determines which possible world is actualized, and so it doesn’t really make sense to call molinism determinist.

 

[danserr]

One of the attributes of God seems to contradict Molinism:

God also knows the conditioned future free actions with infallible certainty (Scientia futuribilium). (Sent. communis.)

Ahh, I see. Could we interpret this to be compatible with molinism, though, in the sense that God’s middle knowledge is so good that he can predict the future with certainty?

 

[Pieman333272]

Ahh, I see. Could we interpret this to be compatible with molinism, though, in the sense that God’s middle knowledge is so good that he can predict the future with certainty?

But that seems to resurrect the problem.

 

[MikeDunphy]

How about a model of God as a film editor and our world as the film? At moments of His choosing, He could interact with the persons in the film, and then let them continue forward with their own free choices. If He didn’t like the way the film turned out, he could rewind it, fine-tune His interventions in the world, and then let it proceed forward again.

(I doubt that God in heaven ever really says “I didn’t see that coming”, and has to rewind the film to fix an error on His part. Perhaps He can play multiple possible histories of the world out in His mind before giving one reality. That is, if it means anything for God to play out a history without making it a reality).

I find it weird to see God as doing everything in his entire plan at once.

Me too. It seems very busy, very frantic, with all that must have to be done. Why doesn’t God take it easy and pace Himself?

But that is the thinking of a limited creature who acts in time. The less time we have, the less we can get done, so that if we were limited to a single moment, we could accomplish nothing.

But God is not limited to a single moment in time. He is eternal. Eternity encompasses and exceeds all moments. So God is not rushed. If eternity is infinite, then He can devote an eternity to the contemplation of every smallest act of every creature and an eternity again to considering what His response should be.

The model I suggested has God doing things in sequential order, as if He were in His own stream of time separate from ours, but that is limited, temporal creature thinking again. I don’t think that the Creator is caught in any stream of time. He is the Creator and Master of all time in all worlds.

 

[belorg]

No, because God remains omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect. Omniscence is to know only and all truths. God would still know all truths and so still be omniscient (the future just wouldn’t be one of them, since it wouldn’t exist), so he would still be a greatest conceivable being.

If He doesn’t know the outcome of His creation, it is possible for Him to make mistakes.

I concede the objection I stated as a problem, (though it may have solutions), but not this one. the idea is that if God sees what we “will” do, how are we free to do it? But on the God is atemporal/transcends time view, God does not see what we “will do,” he sees what we “are doing.” And obviously to see a man do something is not to cause him to do it.

I have never claimed that God causes someone to do something. His foreknowledge as such does not entail causation of anybody’s actions. But if God sees what we ‘are doing’ then that means that from the moment of creation we are diong one thing and not another, which means that we don’t have counterfactual free will, because our past, present and future acts are facts and cannot be altererd.

I disagree with your argument that Molinism is essentially the same as simple foreknowledge.
The future is not determined on this view, but God’s knowledge of present counterfactuals is so good that he can predict the future with perfect accuracy

.

Wghich is only possible if person P under situation S will, in every possible world do exactly the same.

By way of example, I myself know present counterfactuals about many things that allow me to make some vague predictions of the future. That hardly seems to prevent human freedom, so I don;t see that it would be different just because God would know even more present counterfactuals.

Because in order for God to know that I would do A under situation S, it must be true that, whenver situation S occurs, I will do A.
If under S I will sometimes do A and sometimes B, then God cannot know what I would do in situation S.

Also, I don’t think your example with possible worlds works, because it is human choice that determines which possible world will be actualized. Since the actualization of that world is up to human choice, free will is protected.

Under situation S I will, in every possible wolrd, choose A, so it does not matter which world is actualized.

Secondly, and here I think may be the key point, there are possible worlds where the same circumstance leads to a different conclusion. Possible worlds just entail all broadly logically possible claims. So one possible world could consist of circumstances A, B, C, D, … B’, C’… etc., and event E, whereas another possible world could consist of the same circumstances and event E’, that is to say, a totally different event! so there are possible worlds where the same circumstances lead to different events.

If that is true, Molinism is logically impossible. Because “P would do A in situation S” is true in some, and false in other possible worlds.

 

[danserr]

If He doesn’t know the outcome of His creation, it is possible for Him to make mistakes.

How? Remember, he is still omniscient, omnipotent, morally perfect, and metaphysically necessary.

we don’t have counterfactual free will, because our past, present and future acts are facts and cannot be altererd.

As long as those actions were the result of our free choice and were solely determined by our own choices, then I have no objection. The fact that we did chose to do one thing doesn’t mean that we had to choose that thing.

Your comments on molinism, I find pretty interesting, but even though it’s hard for me to say exactly how, it seems like you are somehow misusing possible worlds semantics. Because if what your say is true about each possible world being determined being the same as compatibilism, then this would not apply only to God’s foreknowledge, but the future, period. So if your argument is true, then determinism is true. Since I am inclined (though not absolutely committed at this point) to see an determinism as incompatible with free will, then this seems to be a problem, because if there is no free will, and our beliefs are determined, then my belief that there is no free will is determined and so unwarranted. So I should not believe that determinism is true.

Possible worlds just refer to all non contradictory possible states of affairs (feel free to suggest a better definition). The reason I think you must somehow be mistaken is that I have pointed out that I myself use counterfactuals to predict the future, this doesn’t mean that the future is determined, and I don’t see that it would become determined just because God knew even more counterfactuals.

Maybe the issue is that it does not make sense to speak of possible worlds as being determined or indetermined, since they are simply conjunctions of p’s and q’s, (p&r&t…) and (p’&~r&t…). They are only descriptions of broadly logically possible states of affairs. Yet, in spite of this, I can still use my knowledge of present counterfactuals to predict the future on a low-level basis. It makes sense to me that God, knowing even more counterfactuals, even better, could predict the future even better.

 

[danserr]

But that seems to resurrect the problem.

Originally Posted by danserr View Post
Ahh, I see. Could we interpret this to be compatible with molinism, though, in the sense that God’s middle knowledge is so good that he can predict the future with certainty?

But that seems to resurrect the problem.

Well, in this case maybe not. Because the issue is often seen as, for God to know the future, then the future has to already exist/be set. Molinism offers a way that God can predict the future without the future yet existing or being set.

 

[AnthonyCL]

Hello, this is my first post ever on these forums! I am glad to be speaking with other people about our faith. I’m not a theologian or a philosopher, but I have attended a lot of church theology socials and I can tell you that I’ve thought about this myself quite extensively.

The question that has been asked assumes that God is finite (and we know that is not true.) In sociology and psychology, social scientists have trouble defining what exactly time is, yet we somehow know what it is. Emotions are in the same vein – you can experience emotions, but if you asked me to describe what exactly an emotion is, it would be impossible without using anything related to the emotion, and even then you would still have trouble. In other words, I could tell you what behaviors come out of anger and I could define it by using other emotions, but to define an emotion itself is impossible. You just know when you’re angry, or sad, or happy.

Time is not easily defined either because time is an experience. You can experience the passing of time, but I cannot tell you exactly what time is using words – you would just have to experience it yourself, using your own perception of reality. Time is a concept of limitation and a finite existance, because for us, the beginning of our time is our birth, and the end of our time is our death.

For God, he is the Alpha and the Omega, the Beginning and the End. He has always existed; begotten and not created, as it says in the Nicene’s Creed. If we were to attempt to measure God with time, we would find it impossible to conceptualize. Yet we know that He exists. We can’t explain why, we can’t define it, or maybe even be as precisely logical as we want to about what we know about him, but we perceive that He exists.

Determinism assumes two things. First, it assumes that there is time, which is finite by its very nature. Second, it assumes that we do not have the ability to choose. Thirdly, it may suggest to some (such as the pilgrims that settled here after Columbus) that we have no way of changing whether or not we are going to heaven or hell. God, as we understand him however, is not one for predestination, and he is not restricted to constructs which are finite to us. Since God is eternal, he is in the present, the past, the future. And since God allows for evil in the world, he does in fact create the necessity of choice not just for Himself (See Jesus being tempted by the devil when he fasted for forty days) but for all of us. If you think about it, this is quite paradoxical because God still has to choose between a good decision and a bad decision, and yet God always makes the good decision. It is paradoxical for us because we make bad choices from our own free will, so being that this is our experience, we cannot remotely conceive something that always makes the right choice but at the same time is still making a choice, just as we cannot apply time (a finite concept of our experience) to God (an eternal concept which we have no way of knowing what God experiences), and just as we cannot explain what emotions are. But God does indeed make choices – one of the tenants of the Catholic faith, or any Christian faith that I am aware of, is that God created us out of goodness and love, and that was a choice. So God is both deterministic and has the ability to choose. Perhaps that is why some people say “God helps those who help themselves,” and others say, “God has a plan for you.” One assumes that God knows what you are going to do, and the other assumes that you are making an uninfluenced choice. While this does not make any logical sense, neither does abandoning ninety-nine sheep to find one lost sheep, allowing one’s self to die on a cross, punishing a sinful soul’s finite, short life for an eternity, or to be three divine and distinct personalities and beings, yet be one being. Simply put, you can’t put the ocean into a thimble, and these are things we may never come to understand.

So, what does all this have to do with us and fate? Are we all destined to a specific fate? Is everything in life just like code in a programming language where programs follow instructions and then end when they are finished with their function? If we believe we were created in God’s image, we will have many of the same abilities that God has – the ability to create, the ability to love, the ability to feel joy, the ability to suffer, the ability to experience life. Though, it should be noted that we are just an image and not anywhere near a replica of Him – we are infinitely more limited than God is. We were born with original sin, which means that we can choose between what is right and wrong. Thus we are making a choice, but we do not experience ourselves as a paradox like God is – the choice we make is always ours alone, just as it was God’s choice to create us. Perhaps this is why evil exists in the world. If evil did not exist, how would we ever be able to choose between what is good and what is evil?

God recognizes our ability to choose, in fact so much so that he rarely intervenes with our lives unless it is to bring about goodness and to help fulfill His plan. This is why I chuckle to myself when people who haven’t been to church in a long time are afraid to go into one because they fear they are so sinful that they will burst into flames. But because God is not subject to the same rules of time and does not experience the problem of our choices in the same way that we do, God already knows what you are going to choose, and yet God has a plan in motion that will correct or guide you toward what is good, particularly if you are invested in his plan. Your future will always be uncertain, but just as it says in scripture, your Father already knows what you need before you ask Him.

 

[belorg]

How? Remember, he is still omniscient, omnipotent, morally perfect, and metaphysically necessary.

If, as Opne Theists seem to believe, God does not know the outcome of His own actions, He can make mistakes. the only way for ‘omniscience’ to include ‘no possible mistakes’ is if the knwoledge includes the future.

As long as those actions were the result of our free choice and were solely determined by our own choices, then I have no objection. The fact that we did chose to do one thing doesn’t mean that we had to choose that thing.

That is exactly what a compatibilist would say, danserr.

Your comments on molinism, I find pretty interesting, but even though it’s hard for me to say exactly how, it seems like you are somehow misusing possible worlds semantics. Because if what your say is true about each possible world being determined being the same as compatibilism, then this would not apply only to God’s foreknowledge, but the future, period.

Of course.Foreknowledge does not make the future determiined, but foreknowledge and middle knowledge are only possible under determinism.

So if your argument is true, then determinism is true. Since I am inclined (though not absolutely committed at this point) to see an determinism as incompatible with free will, then this seems to be a problem, because if there is no free will, and our beliefs are determined, then my belief that there is no free will is determined and so unwarranted. So I should not believe that determinism is true.

A determined belief is not necessarily unwarranted.

Possible worlds just refer to all non contradictory possible states of affairs (feel free to suggest a better definition).

This definition works just fine.

The reason I think you must somehow be mistaken is that I have pointed out that I myself use counterfactuals to predict the future, this doesn’t mean that the future is determined, and I don’t see that it would become determined just because God knew even more counterfactuals.

The reason is that, if we suppose omniscience, there are no counterfactuals about the future.

Maybe the issue is that it does not make sense to speak of possible worlds as being determined or indetermined, since they are simply conjunctions of p’s and q’s, (p&r&t…) and (p’&~r&t…). They are only descriptions of broadly logically possible states of affairs.

Yes, but they are broadly logical states of affairs under a certain assumption. If you assume molinism, then that has logical consequences, which means that, under molinism, there are states of affairs that are illogical even though they would perhaps be logical under another view of omniscience

Yet, in spite of this, I can still use my knowledge of present counterfactuals to predict the future on a low-level basis. It makes sense to me that God, knowing even more counterfactuals, even better, could predict the future even better.

That is because if knowing all possible counterfactuals can predict the future with 100% certainty, there in fact are no counterfactuals, because in an undetermined world, each counteractual leads to at least two possible outcomes, which means that, if we suppose 1000 counterfactuals, there is an enormous number of possible outcomes. Yet, in order for God to predict the future with 100% accurancy, there can only be one future.