If Good and Evil Exist then God Exists

[Eleve]

Eric, I think you’re wrong to equate universal morality, in the sense of a moral standard which applies to all times and places, with an objective morality, in the sense of a moral standard which is independent of people’s opinions. Someone could think that slavery is always wrong while thinking that this is true only in virtue of personal opinion (perhaps widely shared personal opinion). Such a person would believe in a universal morality, but not an objective one.

Perhaps a comparison is in order. I think that all of the Brandenburg Concertos are beautiful, and I think that they’ll always be beautiful. In this sense, my view is universalist - all of the concertos are beautiful at all times. But I don’t think that this is an objective claim. There’s no fact about the Brandenburg Concertos that, independently of my own personal preferences, makes them beautiful. Their beauty consists entirely in the fact that I like how they sound. So my view is subjective, even though it doesn’t admit of exceptions.

Nevertheless, utilitarianism does not allow a person to make a universal judgment such as “Slaver is never acceptable.”

It allows you to make universal judgments like “Failing to maximize aggregate happiness is never acceptable.”

But, in any case, I’m not sure why Kreeft is attacking utilitarianism in this video. Kreeft says that his strategy is to show that the source of morality can’t be anything other than God. But utilitarianism isn’t a thesis about the source of morality. It’s a thesis about the content of morality: about what is right and wrong, rather than why it’s right and wrong. It seems to me that Kreeft should have just said “Whether or not utilitarians are right, they still need a supernatural lawgiver in order to explain why utilitarianism is the moral law.”

---

Anyway, I’m not really sold on Kreeft’s argument that morality can’t be a form of reasoning. Kreeft proposes two counterexamples:

The first is a mugger. Kreeft says that the mugger uses his reason to plan the mugging, while reason doesn’t tell him not to mug people. But neither of these observations are contrary to the view that moral commands are commands of reason. First of all, the fact that the mugger is using reason in planning a mugging does not mean that reason doesn’t say that mugging is wrong. A student who writes a flawed mathematical proof is probably using some reason: it’s not as if the proof is wrong at every step. But the proof can still be contrary to reason even though the student is “using her reason” in writing it. The mugger, likewise, is reasoning instrumentally: he wants money, and he reasons that armed robbery is a way to get it. So there is some reasoning going on. But that doesn’t mean that his action can’t be contrary to reason in some other way, unrelated to the instrumental usefulness of robbery for getting money.

Kreeft seems to think that if morality were a matter of reason that it would be immediately clear to everyone who can reason about anything. But this is obviously not how reason works. People who are perfectly capable of reasoning about some things may become completely irrational in certain situations.

Kreeft’s second counterexample is that of people who risked their lives to save Jews during the Holocaust. Kreeft thinks that this action was “unreasonable,” so that it can’t be reason that explains why those actions were morally good. But here I think the rationalist is just going to say that those actions were reasonable, that the good involved in saving a life gives a compelling reason for the actions of Schindler and people like him. It certainly seems very weird to me to say that Schindler was behaving unreasonably, as if he should have corrected his mistake and turned Jews over to the gas chamber.

(continued)

 

[Eleve]

(continued)

Apart from his various negative arguments - arguments that this or that thing can’t be a basis for morality - Kreeft also has a positive thesis: that the source of morality must be God. His argument looks like this:

1. 
   *]The basis for morality cannot be physical.
   *]So, the basis for morality must be supernatural.
   *]In particular, there must be a moral lawgiver.
   *]A supernatural moral lawgiver must be God.
   
   But none of the inferences in this argument look sound.
   
   In moving from (1) to (2), Kreeft assumes that everything can be divided between the physical and the supernatural. But this leaves out the possibility of a) natural but non-physical objects and b) non-natural objects which are not supernatural. In particular, this picture leaves out abstract objects such as numbers. The number three, for example, is neither physical nor supernatural. If there can be such a thing as the number three, Kreeft doesn’t show why there can’t be such a thing as an abstract moral law.
   
   In moving from (2) to (3), Kreeft supposes that there must be a lawgiver for every law. But why think that this is right? To continue the previous example, does there have to be a “numbergiver” in order for there to be numbers? Of course there need to be lawgivers for positive law, because those laws are by definition the laws of humans. But why think that there needs to be a lawgiver in order for there to be something like a moral reason for action. (Kreeft thinks it’s unreasonable to risk your life for the sake of another. Does he think it takes a supernatural “reasongiver” to make this unreasonable?)
   
   Finally, in moving from (3) to (4), Kreeft posits a supernatural moral commander and says “that sounds pretty much like what we know as God.” But does that really get everything that we expect from a god? Consider the following possibilities:
   
   • 
     *]The moral law is given by a supernatural being with limited power.
     *]The moral law is given by a supernatural being with limited knowledge.
     *]The moral law is given by a supernatural being who sometimes falls short of his own demands. (Much like our human legislatures.)
     
     In any of these situations, there is a supernatural lawgiver. But in none of these situations is the lawgiver God. The lawgiver in each one fails to have an essential divine attribute: omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence. If there is some reason to think that a supernatural lawgiver must also have these attributes, it’s a reason that Kreeft fails to give.

 

[PRmerger]

Eric, I think you’re wrong to equate universal morality, in the sense of a moral standard which applies to all times and places, with an objective morality, in the sense of a moral standard which is independent of people’s opinions. Someone could think that slavery is always wrong while thinking that this is true only in virtue of personal opinion (perhaps widely shared personal opinion). Such a person would believe in a universal morality, but not an objective one.

I think what is meant by an “objective morality” is that anyone who considers a particular situation, if he is using an objective evaluation, will come to the same conclusion.

Thus, we can say with racial slavery that anyone who considers whether it is moral or immoral will come to the same conclusion: racial slavery is immoral.

(That is, if he has a properly formed conscience.)

 

[Eleve]

I think what is meant by an “objective morality” is that anyone who considers a particular situation, if he is using an objective evaluation, will come to the same conclusion.

As opposed to what? Surely if two people are using the same standard, they’ll come to the same conclusion. Suppose the standard is something like taste. Well, if two people have the same taste, they will come to the same conclusions.

But in that case, what is added by the word “objective” that doesn’t already follow from the word “standard”? I’m not sure I understand what you’re saying?

 

[PRmerger]

As opposed to what? Surely if two people are using the same standard, they’ll come to the same conclusion. Suppose the standard is something like taste. Well, if two people have the same taste, they will come to the same conclusions.

But in that case, what is added by the word “objective” that doesn’t already follow from the word “standard”? I’m not sure I understand what you’re saying?

Well, taste is a very good example. 2 people will taste the same thing and may come to completely different conclusions. That’s subjective.

But if we take, say, racial slavery. 2 people ought to evaluate the same situation and come to the same conclusion. That’s objective.

 

[Eleve]

But if everyone had the same taste, we would not say that taste is objective.

Conversely, if people were to disagree about slavery, we would not say that the wrongness of slavery is subjective. Indeed, people have in the past disagreed strongly about the permissibility of slavery. But we don’t think that slaveowners had different subjective preferences. We think that they were wrong.

The other distinction you make is that you say two people ought to have the same view about slavery, while they don’t need to have the same tastes. If that’s the difference you mean to point out, I agree, only I don’t see how it’s any different from what I said before. Somebody (David Hume, say) could find slavery vicious without thinking that anyone else has an obligation to think the same way. So objectivity turns out to be a different stance from universality.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

As opposed to what? Surely if two people are using the same standard, they’ll come to the same conclusion. Suppose the standard is something like taste. Well, if two people have the same taste, they will come to the same conclusions.

But in that case, what is added by the word “objective” that doesn’t already follow from the word “standard”? I’m not sure I understand what you’re saying?

Eleve and all. The point Peter is making is that all peoples throughout history acknowledged a Moral Law - do good and avoid evil. This then stands as the most fundamental Principle of the Moral Law. Following upon this Fundamental Principle, a self evident given found in our human nature, came certain Secondary Moral Principles, which were so widely recognized as to be nearly self evident - honor your Mother and Father, care for your children, do not steal, do not slay the innocent, worship God, etc. ( i.e. what we identify roughly as the ten commandments.).

Peter doesn’t detail all this because the piece is too short. The point is a Moral Law was recognized even if it was variously interpreted at various times. Now, a Law requires a Law Giver and for a Law to be obligated for all people at all times, the Law Giver must be one that has existed at all times and who had the authority to demand the Law be obeyed, and this could only be one who existed above and outside the human race - God.

Again, Peter explains this in different language. But it is clear that such a Law does not have its source in any of the systems of ethics he speaks of. His explanation is a little deceptive however because we do use the reasoning powers of our human natures to discover the full application of this Moral Law we recognize.

And, the reminders of Conscience do alert us to our conformity or non conformity to this Law in specific acts about to be performed, being performed, or have been performed. It works on the positive side of such acts as well.

Now this may not be a convincing proof for God’s existence to an atheist or agnostic but Christians and Jews, at least, recognize its validity. So it acts as a reinforcement and encouragement to their faith. And it has indeed provided a valid proof to at least some non-believers.

P.S.
The Moral Law is an Objective Standard. In that sense it is universally obligatory. It is universally recognized only in its self-evident First Principles and in some of its Secondary Principles. Hume was wrong.

 

[PRmerger]

But if everyone had the same taste, we would not say that taste is objective.

I try never to present an impossibility as an example.

But for the sake of the discussion I will consider: if everyone “had the same taste”…

let’s see…what if we all we would try, say, bittermelon and each and every person who tried it said, “It’s not bitter. It’s actually sweet!”…

what would we conclude?

That it’s objectively sweet.

Right?

So I’m not sure what your point is here in proffering that example.

Conversely, if people were to disagree about slavery, we would not say that the wrongness of slavery is subjective. Indeed, people have in the past disagreed strongly about the permissibility of slavery. But we don’t think that slaveowners had different subjective preferences. We think that they were wrong.

Exactly!!

And the fact that you can say they were wrong is because of…

wait for it…

wait for it…

Objective morality.

The other distinction you make is that you say two people ought to have the same view about slavery, while they don’t need to have the same tastes. If that’s the difference you mean to point out, I agree, only I don’t see how it’s any different from what I said before. Somebody (David Hume, say) could find slavery vicious without thinking that anyone else has an obligation to think the same way. So objectivity turns out to be a different stance from universality.

Really? You’re perfectly fine with another individual declaring that racial slavery is moral?

 

[EricFilmer]

Well, that was 140 words which could have been edited down. I think you must have an army of elves doing your typing.

Everyone’s posts in this thread “could have been edited down”, including yours. That’s hardly the basis for accusing me of committing the fallacy of verbosity.

We must bring this to a conclusion, we’re repeating ourselves and obviously won’t reach agreement. I’ll therefore confine my comments to explanation and let you have the last word on everything else.

In addition to repeating ourselves, I think it is important to point out that I responded to every point you raised, while you dodged several of mine. This, then, is the reason why we obviously won’t reach an agreement.

The standard definitions of each fallacy are in the links I provided.

I was referring to your comment: “supposing that contemporary mass opinion is more objective than past opinion”.

You refuse in this post to accept that Kreeft has committed any errors whatsoever, which means you must believe he has made the first ever perfect argument for the existence of God. If this is so, your churches will overflow with converts convinced by Kreeft’s perfect argument, but I’d caution don’t hold your breath.

In other words, you’re unable to defend your accusations of fallacy against my rebuttals of them.

Moreover, I never said that I thought Kreeft made a perfect argument. I told you the *exact opposite *in Post #113 where I stated, “I neither claim nor believe that Kreeft’s argument is perfect and flawless. I have my own issues with the video.” Also, several days ago in Post #119, I made the following comment to zro x: “I do not believe that this video is flawless. One of the limitations is that a viewer who supports a subjective-only system of morality can conclude (in a rational manner) that there is no universal dimension to morality, and is content to embrace the ramifications of such a belief. For example, he may commit to refraining from proposing objective moral standards, such as saying that slavery and Nazi war crimes are never morally acceptable. The video does not actually make a case against such a conclusion, but instead addresses those who would reject it in favor of the belief that such things as slavery and Nazi war crimes are to be universally condemned.”

So it’s not that I am unwilling to accept that Kreeft “has committed any errors whatsoever”, but what I am unwilling to admit is that he committed a fallacy unless it has first been clearly demonstrated.

I think you meant pre- not post-civil war.

Yes, you are correct.

If you want to start a thread, the article I linked in post #72 might be good for the OP. Perhaps there’s a wider issue - as the article says, “with less than 5 percent of the world population, the U.S. imprisons more than 25 percent of all people imprisoned in the world”.

But this is first and foremost a question for Americans to debate and I’m not in America so I don’t generally take part in such threads.

You seemed perfectly content to debate it in this thread, so why not in another thread?

Yes, progressive revelation of God, but I’ve still never heard of your idea of progressive revelation of morality.

Why not? It’s clearly biblical. For example, God had a covenant with Adam, then Noah and then Abraham, but it was not until the covenant with Moses that he gave the Ten Commandments. Also, the 5th chapter of Matthew has a string of examples where Jesus proclaims, “You have heard that it was said…, but I say to you…” Each of these deals with development in moral law.

In any case I can’t see how you imagine that has anything at all to do with God ordering ethnic cleansing and slavery.

I gave you a linked explanation, but rather than actually address the material therein, you chose to simply respond with…

Good grief 2.

The Spirit.

I’m afraid this really didn’t do much to answer my question. It doesn’t seem like the Holy Spirit would have a changing, subjective teaching regarding slavery, but people do, even when they pray to the Holy Spirit for guidance.

 

[EricFilmer]

You’ve misunderstood what I said, and I can’t think of a way to make it clearer.

Where in this thread did you even make a sincere attempt “to make it clearer”? In Post #45 you stated that some atheists, “don’t necessarily view good and evil as anything more than words. So the premise relies on a fabrication. Christians who believe that fabrication may nod adoringly at Kreeft, as choirs are supposed to, but the rest of us are underwhelmed.” Since then I have repeatedly tried to gain a clear understanding of the distinction between what atheists believe and what Christians believe regarding these terms. Your responses either indicated that there was not an actual distinction, or you dodged my questions.

:banghead: The argument was not invented by atheists. The problem of evil is an age old theological problem of trying to reconcile a loving God with the presence of evil in the world. Those who can’t reconcile the two tend to become atheists. See en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_evil

I never said that the argument was* invented* by atheists, I said that atheists use this argument. So the question is, what do atheists mean by the term “evil” when they speak about the “problem of evil?” That is a perfectly legitimate question, and I initially raised it two weeks ago in Post #57. Your first response (Post #74) was to simply say, “It’s not an atheist argument, the problem of evil is a theological problem as old as theology…”, as if that somehow makes a difference. So I provided a link (Post #113) to an atheist not only using the argument, but even including it under the category of “atheism 101.” I once more asked you what atheists mean by the term “evil” in this context. In Post #118 you didn’t specifically address it, but instead made general statements about “good” and “evil” being abstract concepts (whatever that’s supposed to mean) and that Kreeft is resorting to reification. But the idea was for you to give me a proper understanding what atheists mean by the terms, not a description of what you think Kreeft means by them.

In Post #135 I pointed out that you still haven’t told me what atheists mean by the term “evil” when they bring up the argument of the problem of evil. So, after all is said and done, in Post #138 you replied with, “The argument was not invented by atheists. The problem of evil is an age old theological problem…” So we’re right back to square one. I gave you a legitimate question and repeatedly brought it up, but (for whatever reason) you refused to give me a straight answer. And yet you say things like, “I can’t think of a way to make it clearer.”

Eric, I think you’re now wandering down garden paths of your own making.

Well, that’s pretty much my conclusion regarding this claim some people make that “good” and “evil” are “meaningless fabrications.” Such a stance is obviously a “garden path of their own making” (and therefore lacking any real merit) and you were not able to prove otherwise.

Let’s stop there. In summary some folk think the video is neat and others don’t. Good to talk to you.

And had you simply said in Post #18 that you did not think the video was neat, and that you did not think it would be effective in converting anyone then I wouldn’t have even responded. But instead you chose to state that Kreeft was “inane”, “infantile” and that he had committed “every fallacy in the book.” People who feel so inclined can read our posts and determine for themselves how well you backed up such statements.

In any event, good talking with you too.

 

[Eleve]

A happy New Year to all!

let’s see…what if we all we would try, say, bittermelon and each and every person who tried it said, “It’s not bitter. It’s actually sweet!”…

what would we conclude?

That it’s objectively sweet.

Right?

No, I don’t think we would conclude that. Usually, to say that a property is objective is to say that whether an object has the property is independent of any property of an observer. But taste isn’t like that. Sweetness isn’t in an apple. It’s in the fact that we perceive certain chemicals in the apple in a certain way.

Surely you wouldn’t think that slavery would be objectively good if everyone approved of it, or abortion if everyone approved of abortion.

Really? You’re perfectly fine with another individual declaring that racial slavery is moral?

No, I’m not fine with it. I don’t see how you got that from my post. All I’m saying there is that someone could think that slavery is wrong (and that support for slavery is wrong) without thinking that there is an objective reason to oppose slavery. Hume’s is a good example of this view, since Hume thinks that there is no such thing as a reasonable action or moral judgment.

Is Hume wrong? Yes, I think so. But the fact that he can even hold the opinion that he does shows that making a universal moral claim is not the same thing as thinking that moral claims hold objectively.

 

[PRmerger]

A happy New Year to all!

Right back at 'cha, Eleve!

No, I don’t think we would conclude that. Usually, to say that a property is objective is to say that whether an object has the property is independent of any property of an observer. But taste isn’t like that.

'zactly. That’s why I found it curious that you would cite it as an example.

Sweetness isn’t in an apple.

Actually, sweetness isin an apple. That’s what fructose is.

If you want to be technical though we could say that sweetness is the perception, but the “sweet” is in the apple.

It’s in the fact that we perceive certain chemicals in the apple in a certain way.

Indeed. And if everyone came to the conclusion that a particular type of apple had the same amount of sweet, then it would be objectively true that “this apple is sweet”, right?

Surely you wouldn’t think that slavery would be objectively good if everyone approved of it, or abortion if everyone approved of abortion.

If there were a universe where this occurred, then by the definition of objective, yes, I would conclude that slavery was objectively good. In that universe.

That’s what we mean by objective.

No, I’m not fine with it. I don’t see how you got that from my post. All I’m saying there is that someone could think that slavery is wrong (and that support for slavery is wrong) without thinking that there is an objective reason to oppose slavery.

And what I am saying is that even if they don’t acknowledge that they are giving tacit submission to objective morality, they are, indeed, using objective morality to conclude that racial slavery is always bad, in all situations, at all times.

Hume’s is a good example of this view, since Hume thinks that there is no such thing as a reasonable action or moral judgment.

I have never read Hume so I will decline that riposte.

 

[Eleve]

I don’t see how you can say that I’m “exactly” right when I say that “to say that a property is objective is to say that whether an object has the property is independent of any property of an observer,” but then turn around and say that on the one hand slavery is objectively wrong, while on the other hand whether slavery is good depends on whether everyone agrees on whether it’s good. My statement and your statement are in direct opposition to each other.

If slavery is objectively bad, then it’s bad whether everyone agrees that it’s bad or everyone agrees that it’s good or nobody can come to any agreement. That’s just what the word “objective” normally means in philosophy.

If you’re using the word “objective” in some other way, I can’t stop you. But I think it’s awfully nonstandard and confusing.

Apart from that, and even leaving aside the word “objective,” I think any Catholic moral theologian would disagree when you say that slavery would be good in a world where everyone thinks that it’s good.

 

[PRmerger]

I don’t see how you can say that I’m “exactly” right when I say that “to say that a property is objective is to say that whether an object has the property is independent of any property of an observer,” but then turn around and say that on the one hand slavery is objectively wrong**, while on the other hand whether slavery is good depends on whether everyone agrees on whether it’s good.** My statement and your statement are in direct opposition to each other.

That’s not a correct distillation of my argument, Eleve. :nope:

If slavery is objectively bad, then it’s bad whether everyone agrees that it’s bad or everyone agrees that it’s good or nobody can come to any agreement. That’s just what the word “objective” normally means in philosophy.

Indeed.

But we were talking about a universe in which everyone, after independent evaluation, came to the same conclusion.

And by that, if everyone in this universe comes to the same conclusion, what is it except an objective reality?

But, remember, I prefaced this discussion by saying that I tried never to present impossibilities as examples.

Apart from that, and even leaving aside the word “objective,” I think any Catholic moral theologian would disagree when you say that slavery would be good in a world where everyone thinks that it’s good.

Why do you think that Catholic moral theologians say this, Eleve?

 

[Eleve]

That’s not a correct distillation of my argument, Eleve. :nope:

I’m afraid I can’t tell what your argument is. You deny here that “whether slavery is good depends on whether everyone agrees on whether it’s good,” and you agree with me when I say that “If slavery is objectively bad, then it’s bad whether everyone agrees that it’s bad or everyone agrees that it’s good or nobody can come to any agreement.”

But then the very next thing that you say is that slavery would be good if everyone were to agree that it’s good.

How on earth do you reconcile that?

 

[Regular_Atheist]

How so?

If a culture as a whole determines that something is good or bad, and those teachings are passed down through the generations, how on Earth does that warrant the existence of a higher power? What kind of bizarre assertion is that? Why is it impossible that we are, in fact, the ones setting the “minimum standard”?

 

[PRmerger]

I’m afraid I can’t tell what your argument is. You deny here that “whether slavery is good depends on whether everyone agrees on whether it’s good,” and you agree with me when I say that “If slavery is objectively bad, then it’s bad whether everyone agrees that it’s bad or everyone agrees that it’s good or nobody can come to any agreement.”

But then the very next thing that you say is that slavery would be good if everyone were to agree that it’s good.

How on earth do you reconcile that?

Because we are talking about impossible scenarios here, which you have presented.

Perhaps it would help advance the discussion if you could proffer why you think Catholic moral theologians would say that racial slavery would be immoral despite a world declaring that it is good.

Apart from that, and even leaving aside the word “objective,” I think any Catholic moral theologian would disagree when you say that slavery would be good in a world where everyone thinks that it’s good.

 

[Eleve]

I don’t see why you think it’s “impossible.” Certainly very unlikely that everyone would come to that conclusion, but it’s not impossible in the way that a square circle or a married bachelor is impossible. Often things that are very widely believed turn out to be false. So why could a false claim like “Slavery is morally permissible” not also be universally, or almost universally, believed?

Nor do I see how that makes any sense of your simultaneous claims that “If slavery is objectively bad, then it’s bad whether everyone agrees that it’s bad or everyone agrees that it’s good or nobody can come to any agreement” and “And by that, if everyone in this universe comes to the same conclusion, what is it except an objective reality?”

That’s a contradiction whether or not it’s actually possible for everyone to approve of slavery.

PRmerger:

Perhaps it would help advance the discussion if you could proffer why you think Catholic moral theologians would say that racial slavery would be immoral despite a world declaring that it is good.

Well, because the Catholic Church teaches that there is an objective moral law as I’ve described above. For example, here’s Libertas praestantissimum:

The natural law is written and engraved in the soul of each and every man, because it is human reason ordaining him to do good and forbidding him to sin . . . But this command of human reason would not have the force of law if it were not the voice and interpreter of a higher reason to which our spirit and our freedom must be submitted.

As Leo XIII says, the content of the moral law is beyond human power. So how could we change it just by changing our opinions on slavery?

 

[PRmerger]

I don’t see why you think it’s “impossible.” Certainly very unlikely that everyone would come to that conclusion, but it’s not impossible in the way that a square circle or a married bachelor is impossible.

Logical contradictions are one subset of things that fall under “impossible”.

Other things, however, can also be part of “impossible.”

For example: it is impossible for a man to be pregnant. That is not because it’s a logical contradiction. It’s impossible for *other *reasons, mostly having to do with anatomy (but other factors contribute to its impossibility as well).

Often things that are very widely believed turn out to be false. So why could a false claim like “Slavery is morally permissible” not also be universally, or almost universally, believed?

If you could cite a world where this existed, that would be helpful.

Now, of course, there were societies in which slavery was permitted, but for you to prove your point you’d have to say that everyone believed this to be moral, after examining the evidence, and pondered the moral laws written in their hearts, and came to the same conclusion.

Can you do that?

Nor do I see how that makes any sense of your simultaneous claims that “If slavery is objectively bad, then it’s bad whether everyone agrees that it’s bad or everyone agrees that it’s good or nobody can come to any agreement” and “And by that, if everyone in this universe comes to the same conclusion, what is it except an objective reality?”

That’s a contradiction whether or not it’s actually possible for everyone to approve of slavery.

It’s no more of a contradiction than for me to say, “Men can’t get pregnant”

and, if there were a universe where men had a uterus, (there’s an ee cummings poem in there somewhere!) then, of course, “Men could get pregnant.”

Well, because the Catholic Church teaches that there is an objective moral law as I’ve described above. For example, here’s Libertas praestantissimum:

As Leo XIII says, the content of the moral law is beyond human power. So how could we change it just by changing our opinions on slavery?

'zactly.

Point is: anyone who ponders, independent of any outside influence, racial slavery, he will come to this conclusion: slavery is wrong.

That’s an objective conclusion. Not a universal conclusion.

 

[Eleve]

Look. I am not claiming that there has ever, will ever, or can ever exist a world in which everyone thinks that slavery is permissible.

All I am claiming is that if such a world were to exist - and you agree that it would be logically possible - that slavery would still be wrong in that world.

You have agreed with this claim, because you’ve agreed with me when I said:

If slavery is objectively bad, then it’s bad whether everyone agrees that it’s bad or everyone agrees that it’s good or nobody can come to any agreement

You’ve also disagreed with the claim, because you’ve said:

And by that, if everyone in this universe comes to the same conclusion [that slavery is good], what is it except an objective reality?

All I’m trying to figure out is which one of these things you actually believe. I am not trying to make an argument. I am just trying to understand the definition of objectivity which you’ve given. But I can’t do that if you make claims about objectivity which are the exact opposite of each other.

So, could you please explain which claim it is that you are trying to make?

Or, if you don’t think that these quoted claims are contradictory, can you at least see why I think they are? And in that case explain why, in spite of how it looks to me, they are not at odds with each other?