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AveOTheotokos
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Amen. Always strive to do good, and when in doubt, see your confessor!And ones confessor can assist…

Amen. Always strive to do good, and when in doubt, see your confessor!And ones confessor can assist…

You’re seriously comparing forced sex with an extramarital affair? Being raped is not adultery.But Kanade, in terms of culpability (which is really what we’re discussing when we say mortal or venial sin) can a person coerced into sin really be said to have consented to it? If a woman is raped at gunpoint, did she consent to an extramarital affair?
One who commits an act knowing that the act in its object is evil commits sin. Proposing the situation as a choice between “murder” or “not murder” implies knowledge of the intrinsic evil involved so you could not claim ignorance. Therefore, both the act and actor are an offense to God.If I am being held at gunpoint, and am told to murder someone or else my family and I will be shot, would I commit a mortal sin if I murdered the person?
That’s my point. “Consenting” to rape is not the same as consenting to an affair, because one is done under duress. That is, one does not consent under duress. One cannot be said to have consented to something if a gunman has a weapon trained on him.You’re seriously comparing forced sex with an extramarital affair? Being raped is not adultery.
In the OP’s example, the subject commits an evil in order to avoid an evil happening to his family. I’m not arguing that it isn’t evil or isn’t wrong. It is. But I dispute that he fully and deliberately consents to the evil and argue that, therefore, it cannot be a mortal sin.In your example, the woman would have to chose between allowing one of two evils to happen to her. In the OP’s example, the subject commits an evil against an innocent party in order to avoid something happening to him. They’re not comparable.
Apply the three elements of mortal sin.If I am being held at gunpoint, and am told to murder someone or else my family and I will be shot, would I commit a mortal sin if I murdered the person?
The problem with your rape analogy is that the woman is not the agent acting to commit the rape. Her choice is not one where she is choosing between the bad guy doing something evil or her doing something evil.That’s my point. “Consenting” to rape is not the same as consenting to an affair, because one is done under duress. That is, one does not consent under duress. One cannot be said to have consented to something if a gunman has a weapon trained on him.
In the OP’s example, the subject commits an evil in order to avoid an evil happening to his family. I’m not arguing that it isn’t evil or isn’t wrong. It is. But I dispute that he fully and deliberately consents to the evil and argue that, therefore, it cannot be a mortal sin.
The assertion that coercion necessarily removes consent is completely unjustified.Consent is absent if he’s being coerced.
False equivalence. The rape victim is not being coerced to harm some other person. She is being harmed herself. It is not a sin to endure being harmed in order to save your life.But Kanade, in terms of culpability (which is really what we’re discussing when we say mortal or venial sin) can a person coerced into sin really be said to have consented to it? If a woman is raped at gunpoint, did she consent to an extramarital affair?
By necessity, you can’t consent to rape. You can only give up fighting. It’s quite a medieval view to see the rape victim as committing a sin, so your analogy doesn’t hold.That’s my point. “Consenting” to rape is not the same as consenting to an affair, because one is done under duress. That is, one does not consent under duress. One cannot be said to have consented to something if a gunman has a weapon trained on him.
I presume you would then argue that the guards at concentration camps were not culpable as they were merely following orders to avoid being shot themselves?In the OP’s example, the subject commits an evil in order to avoid an evil happening to his family. I’m not arguing that it isn’t evil or isn’t wrong. It is. But I dispute that he fully and deliberately consents to the evil and argue that, therefore, it cannot be a mortal sin.
Ugh, I was not claiming that a rape victim commits sin. Precisely the opposite. I was trying to emphasize that it is because a rape victim does not consent that we don’t judge her for misuse of sexual faculties or whatever. I wish I hadn’t brought it up, though, because it was never meant to be an analogy for the situation OP described, even though that is how you are taking it.By necessity, you can’t consent to rape. You can only give up fighting. It’s quite a medieval view to see the rape victim as committing a sin, so your analogy doesn’t hold.
We all agree that the person in the hypothetical commits sin if he shoots the innocent person, right? I think it’s also an extreme example of moral cowardice. The OP asked if such an action would be *mortal *sin, given the the subject did not wish to murder the innocent person but was being held at gunpoint and threatened with the death of his family. Deliberate consent is necessary for a sin to be mortal. I maintain that a person choosing to sin at gunpoint is not fully consenting to the sin, just as a person held at gunpoint cannot consent to any other number of things (e.g, marriage, sexual intercourse, medical research, legal contracts, etc). Our secular laws and our Catholic Church recognize this. But God does not?I presume you would then argue that the guards at concentration camps were not culpable as they were merely following orders to avoid being shot themselves?
You put it forward as an analogy, that’s why it’s been taken that way. Even positing that she might be judged on misusing her sexual faculties shows that you don’t understand the difference between the two scenarios - she is not the agent, she is the victim. There is not even a remote chance of sin involved here. In the OP’s scenario, there is, which is why your scenario is a false equivalence.Ugh, I was not claiming that a rape victim commits sin. Precisely the opposite. I was trying to emphasize that it is because a rape victim does not consent that we don’t judge her for misuse of sexual faculties or whatever. I wish I hadn’t brought it up, though, because it was never meant to be an analogy for the situation OP described, even though that is how you are taking it.
The subject clearly wished to murder the innocent person, as he did so in order to save himself and his family.The OP asked if such an action would be *mortal *sin, given the the subject did not wish to murder the innocent person but was being held at gunpoint and threatened with the death of his family.
Like the rape example, the actions in bold only affect the person involved, not an innocent third party (and these are not inherently sinful). You are mixing up the meanings of consent here.Deliberate consent is necessary for a sin to be mortal. I maintain that a person choosing to sin at gunpoint is not fully consenting to the sin, just as a person held at gunpoint cannot consent to any other number of things (e.g, marriage, sexual intercourse, medical research, legal contracts, etc).
Not true. English law does not recognise duress as a defence to murder - so the hypothetical person in the OP would be guilty of murder here. Previous posters have quoted the relvant sections of the CCC (post 33): “There are acts which, in and of themselves, independently of circumstances and intentions, are always gravely illicit by reason of their object; such as blasphemy and perjury, murder and adultery.”Our secular laws and our Catholic Church recognize this. But God does not?
I put it forward as an example of how consent changes the nature of an act.You put it forward as an analogy, that’s why it’s been taken that way.
Well, they could involve innocent third parties (a parent consenting to something on behalf of a their child, for example). I was using “consent” in plain vernacular English, to mean to agree to or give permission for something. If there are additional definitions you feel would add to the discussion, please explain them.Like the rape example, the actions in bold only affect the person involved, not an innocent third party (and these are not inherently sinful). You are mixing up the meanings of consent here.
I thought I had answered you. If a person has a gun trained on them and is told to stand somewhere and keep guard or they will be shot, then no, I do not think them fully culpable, even if the call themselves Nazis. Since we’re keen on analogies around here, a better one might be prisoners of the concentration camp themselves, held hostage and forced to lead other Jews into the gas chamber. Are they fully culpable?As you didn’t answer it in the last post, would you would see the concentration camp guards at not being fully culpable? Yes or no?
In American law, my understanding is that duress is not generally accepted as a defense to murder but does affect sentencing. For example, a person convicted but found to have been under extreme duress at the time of the crime may receive a minimal sentence. I think this mirrors my position, which is that a person who commits a crime while being held at gunpoint is guilty of sin, but does not receive an eternal punishment for it (as they would if it were mortally sinful).Not true. English law does not recognise duress as a defence to murder - so the hypothetical person in the OP would be guilty of murder here.
Also this:Previous posters have quoted the relvant sections of the CCC (post 33): “There are acts which, in and of themselves, independently of circumstances and intentions, are always gravely illicit by reason of their object; such as blasphemy and perjury, murder and adultery.”
There are cases of rape that involve the perpetrator demand that the victim perform oral sex to completion - a morally evil act per Catholic morality. This is an act that requires the victim to actively participate, not merely lie back and think of the loved one they are hopefully protecting.My problem with the rape analogy, as I stated before, is that the rape victim’s “choice” is not between her actions, but just her preference of victimization. The fault lies only with the aggressor.
With the OP’s scenario, the choice is between victimization (family and self being killed) or becoming a co-operator in evil and killing someone else. It is a choice to do evil to avoid harm or refusing to do evil and potentially being murdered.
The analogy is flawed because the rape victim is not choosing to act out a morally evil act to prevent an arguably worse evil act. The rape victim is a victim either way and the fault lies with the aggressor.
No, I think you are assuming that performing illicit sex acts is obviously a lesser evil than performing murder. But that the murder of one person is not obviously a lesser evil compared to murdering 4 people.In the OP’s scenario, the victim has the potential to act out a moral evil and inflict death on another person to avoid being victimized themselves. For this reason, it is flawed and the two situations are not really analogous.
No matter what the victim does or “chooses”, they are being victimized. They are not acting out evil that is causing someone else to be a victim, but are just enduring the victimization, suffering, and torture of their aggressor. Resistance does not necessarily even prevent the act from happening.There are cases of rape that involve the perpetrator demand that the victim perform oral sex to completion - a morally evil act per Catholic morality. This is an act that requires the victim to actively participate, not merely lie back and think of the loved one they are hopefully protecting.
To compromise your morals for financial security of the future would be wrong. There is not an immediate threat of death or immediate duress. Many people around the world live jobless, homeless, and are forced to beg. While not an easy, enjoyable, or ideal lifestyle, it is still life. We must always remember the temporal nature of this world. We should never place the priority of building up earthly treasures above building up our spiritual treasures.Or what about the classic “quid pro quo” scenario, where a boss demands a woman perform sex acts on him, otherwise he will get her fired? The boss does not have a gun to the woman’s head, he’s not even threatening to hurt anyone. Merely get her fired. Would you find the woman to be sinning if she submits, even if getting fired would leave her destitute?
This shows that you are the one who is assuming. I never stated any of the above and you have simply assumed that is my train of thought.No, I think you are assuming that performing illicit sex acts is obviously a lesser evil than performing murder. But that the murder of one person is not obviously a lesser evil compared to murdering 4 people.
But AFAIK, the Catholic definition of “evil” goes far beyond “causing someone else to be a victim”. If that was the definition, then consensual sex acts, drug abuse, etc., wouldn’t even be an issue, since they do not cause “someone else to be a victim”. (And St. Maria Goretti would be an idiot, not a saint.)No matter what the victim does or “chooses”, they are being victimized. They are not acting out evil that is causing someone else to be a victim, but are just enduring the victimization, suffering, and torture of their aggressor. Resistance does not necessarily even prevent the act from happening.
I agree, but if this was the case all prostitutes would be guilty of mortal sin, and the only exception would be those who are literally kidnapped into sexual slavery. But AFAIK the Church does NOT reach that.To compromise your morals for financial security of the future would be wrong. There is not an immediate threat of death or immediate duress. Many people around the world live jobless, homeless, and are forced to beg. While not an easy, enjoyable, or ideal lifestyle, it is still life. We must always remember the temporal nature of this world. We should never place the priority of building up earthly treasures above building up our spiritual treasures.
Again, what about the scenario of a rapist threatening to harm his victim’s child? If the victim hadn’t capitulated, but, say, had fought back, only to be overpowered, or had run away and called the police, and the rapist had followed through on his threat. Would she be at all responsible for his sick actions?The rape victim is not being given a choice to choose between the morality of performing sex acts or performing murder. Their choice is be raped or be murdered. They are the victim, not the aggressor. Rape victims are not choosing anything, and the illusion of choice in the scenario is only just a further twisted and sick part of the aggressors already disordered actions.
My response to this scenario would be similar to my response in posts #33 and #34.PS: I can also think of a case that involved a man kidnapping a woman and raping her. The victim was interviewed for a “true crime” documentary show, and stated that she was indeed raped the first day of the ordeal. But she also stated that later on, hoping to get the man to trust her, and give her more of a chance to escape, that “I consented” to having sex with him.
Now, I don’t remember if the man actually wound up being tried for rape, or just for kidnapping. But anyway, would you say that this woman sinned when she consented to sex with her kidnapper? I think many would think that if (1) it doesn’t matter if she thinks she consented, she really didn’t or that (2) even she did sin, it was only venial, but it seems that again, using some of the benchmarks mentioned here, that some would state it was a mortal sin to engage in illicit sex to merely throw the kidnapper off his guard.
We can never know the exact circumstance, the consequences, real or perceived, nor can we ever know the exact interior condition of the victims heart, so we cannot definitively declare the level/state of sinfulness of the victim.1754 The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral act. They contribute to increasing or diminishing the moral goodness or evil of human acts (for example, the amount of a theft). They can also diminish or increase the agent’s responsibility (such as acting out of a fear of death). Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; they can make neither good nor right an action that is in itself evil.
I completely agree with that, BUT I would also apply this to the victim in the original scenario.We can never know the exact circumstance, the consequences, real or perceived, nor can we ever know the exact interior condition of the victims heart, so we cannot definitively declare the level/state of sinfulness of the victim.