P
Peter_Plato
Guest
To say we choose what appears to be good does not deny that it is a good, but that it is the inappropriate or inopportune good relative to the choice currently being faced. It is more like a focal problem than a chimera. It may be a good that is chosen but not the good that ought to have been. The freedom is in freedom from constraint in choosing to set the priority of goods correctly.Since we are required to choose only what appears to us as good, and we cannot choose what appears to us as bad, then I don;t see how we can have free will.
Freedom comes into it because freedom entails freedom from compulsion or constraint to choose one good over another. We can only be free to choose a higher good over a lower if we are free from any compulsion to choose the lesser good and free to choose the greater based purely on its objective standing as a higher good rather than by its desirability.
That does not, by the way, mean we cannot desire the good in addition to choosing it but it does mean that the reason we choose it is because it is the appropriate good rather than solely determined by an impulse or desire for it.