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Betterave
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Why is Averroes’ position absurd?
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JohnDamian
Guest
Averroes formulation that the intellective part of man to be a sort of seperate substance united to man through the medium of sense images is absurd because Man formally and properly understands, therein the intellective soul is the proper form of man.
Man knows by an act of knowlege that is not of an organic nature; he knows or understands in the proper sense of the term; The consequence is evident for this reason given, that since intellection properly speaking is a knowlege which transends all sense knowlege; and as all sensation knowlege is organic then organic sense knowlege is not the composer of the intellective part of the soul; which is proper to man. That said; the medium of sense knowlege is not the producer or director of the intellect; because this intellection is essentially a composite of the rational soul.
Man knows by an act of knowlege that is not of an organic nature; he knows or understands in the proper sense of the term; The consequence is evident for this reason given, that since intellection properly speaking is a knowlege which transends all sense knowlege; and as all sensation knowlege is organic then organic sense knowlege is not the composer of the intellective part of the soul; which is proper to man. That said; the medium of sense knowlege is not the producer or director of the intellect; because this intellection is essentially a composite of the rational soul.
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Betterave
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“…because Man formally and properly understands.” Right, I agree, but isn’t that just begging the question against Averroes?Averroes formulation that the intellective part of man to be a sort of seperate substance united to man through the medium of sense images is absurd because Man formally and properly understands, therein the intellective soul is the proper form of man.
Man knows by an act of knowlege that is not of an organic nature; he knows or understands in the proper sense of the term; The consequence is evident for this reason given, that since intellection properly speaking is a knowlege which transends all sense knowlege; and as all sensation knowlege is organic then organic sense knowlege is not the composer of the intellective part of the soul; which is proper to man. That said; the medium of sense knowlege is not the producer or director of the intellect; because this intellection is essentially a composite of the rational soul.
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Hubriss
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Because philosophy, or more specifically theology, is absurd.
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Betterave
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Well chosen name, but isn’t it spelled hubris?
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Hubriss
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Single “s” was already taken. It’s a snake!!! SSSssSSsssssss. Heh.
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JohnDamian
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Well I didn’t feel like posting the full hundred or so pages of the argument - but I shall give a distillation;
a) A general bodily ressurection must be based upon something that is proper to man and not belonging to other perishibles
b) Neither is it to be, if it is proof - a form that is destroyable
c) In this capacity, even excellence of a brute would not be adequate; hence the proof must reside in some form that is specific to man or upon some operation by which man enjoys reason of this form.
d) The proposed conclusions are;
i) The intellective soul is the specific form of man,
ii) The intellective soul is incorruptible,
iii) The specific form of man will remain forever outside the composite.
Then;
- Taking Aristotles Definition of the soul as* an act of the natural organised body (de anima)* he speaks of the differentiae of intellection within this species. (which is a distinctio intentionalis); that of this composite the intellective capacity is considered a subject or part.
- Meaning, by Rational - that the intellective soul is an essential part of man.
a) The antecedent is proven thus; that it seems to be clear enough according to Aristoles De anima & Nicomachean Ethics since to understand is the proper operation of man. Now an operation, in contradistinction to an act of fashioning something or to an action, is formally in the one who perfoms the operation and is not produced by the agent in something else. Similarily, Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics makes mans happiness consist in understanding. Now it is clear that this felicity is formally in man. Consequentlt the operation in which this felicity consist must also be in man formally.
b) Nevertheless, the antecedent sould be further proven with logic, lest some contentious individual deny it. I take “to know” or “to understand” in it’s proper sense of the term as an act of knowlege which is trancendental to sense knowlege.
b1) This is proven by thus; Man knows by an act of knowlege which is not organiuc, hence he knows or understands properly. The consequence is evident for the reason already given - for the intellection properly speaking is a knowlege which transcends sense knowlege. All sensation however is organic knowlege, as Aristotle shows in De anima - There the antecedenct of this enthymeme is proved from the fact that every organ is determined to a certain kind of sensible, and this because it consists in a balance between two extremes. But we do experience in ourselves some knowlege which we do not have in virtue of some organ, for if it were organic; this knowlege would be limited precisely to the sensibles of some determined kind - which is the very opposite of what we experience. For by such an act we know precisely how one kind of sensible differs froma nother, and by consequence we know both extremes.
b2) But to this some object, firstoff that organic knowlege is that which is present in some determinate part of the body wheras the aforesaid knowlege by which we distinguish sensibles from things that cannot be perceived by the senses is present in hte body aas a whole and for this reason is not had in vitrue of some organ in the proper sense of the word. For an attribute of the whole is as material as something which exists in one of its parts. Nevertheless this knowlege does not transcend in perfection the whole species of sense knowlege since it is just as material in character as the knowlege in only a part of the whole. Secondly, they deny the assumption that this act of knowlege is not present in virtue of some organ because it is there by reason of the organ of the imagination. Proof fro this is found that when this organ is damaged, such knowlege is no longer possible. Neither is the proof from the limitation of the organ to a certain sensible conclusive, because the inagination extends to all sensibles.
2) The second proof of the antecedent is that no sense knowlege can be immaterial etc.
And so on.
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Betterave
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ah, I see. lol
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Betterave
Guest
Well I didn’t feel like posting the full hundred or so pages of the argument - but I shall give a distillation;
a) A general bodily ressurection must be based upon something that is proper to man and not belonging to other perishibles
b) Neither is it to be, if it is proof - a form that is destroyable
c) In this capacity, even excellence of a brute would not be adequate; hence the proof must reside in some form that is specific to man or upon some operation by which man enjoys reason of this form.
d) The proposed conclusions are;
i) The intellective soul is the specific form of man,
ii) The intellective soul is incorruptible,
iii) The specific form of man will remain forever outside the composite.
Then;
This is because Man formally and properly understands, therefore the intellective soul is the proper form of man.
- Taking Aristotles Definition of the soul as* an act of the natural organised body (de anima)* he speaks of the differentiae of intellection within this species. (which is a distinctio intentionalis); that of this composite the intellective capacity is considered a subject or part.
- Meaning, by Rational - that the intellective soul is an essential part of man.
a) The antecedent is proven thus; that it seems to be clear enough according to Aristoles De anima & Nicomachean Ethics since to understand is the proper operation of man. Now an operation, in contradistinction to an act of fashioning something or to an action, is formally in the one who perfoms the operation and is not produced by the agent in something else. Similarily, Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics makes mans happiness consist in understanding. Now it is clear that this felicity is formally in man. Consequentlt the operation in which this felicity consist must also be in man formally.
b) Nevertheless, the antecedent sould be further proven with logic, lest some contentious individual deny it. I take “to know” or “to understand” in it’s proper sense of the term as an act of knowlege which is trancendental to sense knowlege.
b1) This is proven by thus; Man knows by an act of knowlege which is not organiuc, hence he knows or understands properly. The consequence is evident for the reason already given - for the intellection properly speaking is a knowlege which transcends sense knowlege. All sensation however is organic knowlege, as Aristotle shows in De anima - There the antecedenct of this enthymeme is proved from the fact that every organ is determined to a certain kind of sensible, and this because it consists in a balance between two extremes. But we do experience in ourselves some knowlege which we do not have in virtue of some organ, for if it were organic; this knowlege would be limited precisely to the sensibles of some determined kind - which is the very opposite of what we experience. For by such an act we know precisely how one kind of sensible differs froma nother, and by consequence we know both extremes.
b2) But to this some object, firstoff that organic knowlege is that which is present in some determinate part of the body wheras the aforesaid knowlege by which we distinguish sensibles from things that cannot be perceived by the senses is present in hte body aas a whole and for this reason is not had in vitrue of some organ in the proper sense of the word. For an attribute of the whole is as material as something which exists in one of its parts. Nevertheless this knowlege does not transcend in perfection the whole species of sense knowlege since it is just as material in character as the knowlege in only a part of the whole. Secondly, they deny the assumption that this act of knowlege is not present in virtue of some organ because it is there by reason of the organ of the imagination. Proof fro this is found that when this organ is damaged, such knowlege is no longer possible. Neither is the proof from the limitation of the organ to a certain sensible conclusive, because the inagination extends to all sensibles.
2) The second proof of the antecedent is that no sense knowlege can be immaterial etc.
And so on.
- lol - that’s distilled? Could you dilute it then (without it being 100 pages of dense scholastic verbiage)? What’s the key point, in your mind?
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JohnDamian
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Sure!
ille maledictus Averroes
Seriously however;
Not all knowlege is sense knowlege; thus the intellect cannot solley be united to man through sense images.
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Betterave
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Much better, thanks! Now what exactly is Averroes’ position and how does he justifiy it?Sure!
ille maledictus Averroes
Seriously however;
Not all knowlege is sense knowlege; thus the intellect cannot solley be united to man through sense images.
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JohnDamian
Guest
Averroes believes that the intellect of man is seperate from man; but united to man through sense images. This is in his commentaries on De Anima (Aristotle).
However, we know this to be false, because we can see that the intellect is united to man in ways other than, as well as - sense images; and so Averroes position on this matter is false. The reason it is particularily annoying is the fact that neither Averroes, nor his followers have ever been able to explain this unity; a frustration shared with Scotus “Neither he, nor his followers to the present day have been able to explain this union”.
Which is why I found the quote so funny, because it is a human reaction to a frustrating claim about the unity of intellect through sense images. Perhaps I just have a sad sense of humor.
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Betterave
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Right, so Averroes believes that the intellect of man is separate from man (or perhaps more precisely: that the intellect is a separate substance); but it is united to man through sense images. Now we may know this to be false, but before calling it absurd we should want to know: why does Averroes hold that it is true? Surely he offers some kind of reason?
As for your reasoning against Averroes, why should we hold that one way the intellect is united to man is through sense images? And how do we know that the intellect is united to man in ways *other *than sense images?
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JohnDamian
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That’s what the posts were about!
“for the intellection properly speaking is a knowlege which transcends sense knowlege.”
Thus, if we are only united by senses we would have no union with this knowlege. Thus; either we cannot know - or we can know in more ways than sense knowlege.
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Betterave
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Hmmm. . . not really satisfying. You didn’t really answer my questions. Maybe I should go one at a time. What does it mean to say that the intellect possesses sense knowledge?
(This would seem absurd to some, I would imagine: the intellect’s proper object is universals; the sensitive faculty’s proper object is sense objects (particulars) - I imagine some such concern motivates Averroes’ position. In any case, let’s be honest: medieval theories of abstraction and intellection tend to be much more complicated that your terse arguments would suggest.)
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JohnDamian
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You are absolutely right, the object of the intellect is universals; and thus if the unity of man and his intellective part is through the medium of sense images then such objects could not be known. Which is obviously untrue; hence Averroes claim that the unitive medium is sense knowlege is false, and unintelligible. For even if we follow a rejection of si est and quid est distinctions; the conception of an essence only insofar as it exists we can see that even our conception of such a contingent essence is not united through sense images alone.
Consequently, Averroes claim is absurd.
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Betterave
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Averroes’ account seems rather complicated and I’m trying to understand it. He believes that there is a process of “intellectation” by which man’s rational faculty moves from potentiality to actuality. This happens by the “material intellect" (whatever that is), which is “a single incorporeal eternal substance,” which, in the process of intellectation, becomes “attached to the imaginative faculties of individual humans” (my emphasis). So his claim doesn’t seem to be simply that sense knowledge is the unitive medium (full stop). Instead he seems to be using some kind of neo-Platonic notion of participation. (He seems to be trying to make sense of the claim nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu.)
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JohnDamian
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nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu is not a sensible claim.
Perhaps there is a fundemental difference in our philosophys?
Perhaps there is a fundemental difference in our philosophys?
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Betterave
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I tend to agree with you, but setting aside ille maledictus Averroes, I’m hesitant to dismiss the Angelic Doctor’s position as absurd. You? Maybe there are some Thomists around who would like to weigh in on this.nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu is not a sensible claim.
Perhaps there is a fundemental difference in our philosophys?
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JohnDamian
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I like the Angelic Doctors work, But I prefer the Subtle Doctor’sI tend to agree with you, but setting aside ille maledictus Averroes, I’m hesitant to dismiss the angelic doctor’s position as absurd. You? Maybe there are some Thomists around who would like to weigh in on this.
I think the difference between them was best summed up as; Aquinas was a philosopher, Duns a critic. The latter has been said to stand to the former in the relation of Kant to Leibnitz. In the matter of Universals, Duns was more of a realist and less of an eclectic than Aquinas.
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