Continued from previous post.
- Second, I also want to make a distinction between a thing’s essence, its distinctive properties, and its accidents. The essence of a thing is what makes it the precise kind of being that it is. The property of a thing is a feature that necessarily belongs to the thing, but without being a part of its essence. An accident is a feature that belongs to a thing contingently rather than necessarily. Let me illustrate all these by one example.
The common sense definition of a circle is that it is a perfectly round figure. If you want a mathematical definition, we could say that a circle is a figure all of whose points are equidistant from the same point, called the center. Based on the common sense definition, roundness is the essence of the circle. One might even say that it is a defining feature of a circle because if roundness is missing in a figure, then the figure circle would not be there. So, the essence of the circle is being perfectly round.
A
property is a feature that necessarily belongs to a thing, without being a part of its essence, or without being a part of its real definition. For example, a circle can be intersected by a straight line in at most two points. The fact that a straight line cannot intersect a circle in more than two points is a characteristic property of a circle, but it is not what makes a circle a circle. It is a characteristic that
necessarily belongs to the essence of a circle, but it is not a defining feature of a circle. It is a feature that necessarily flows from the essence of the circle, without being a part of that essence; thus, it is a property of the circle.
An
accident is an inherent feature that belongs to a thing or essence, but not necessarily. For example, every circle has a radius (the distance from the center to any point in the circle). That this particular circle has a 10" radius belongs to this circle, but it is not a necessary feature of a circle. A circle could have a 15" radius and would still be a circle. Accidents exist in things, but they do not form a necessary part of their natures (or essences).
Strictly speaking, the essences of material things are hidden from us, which is why it is so difficult to define them. Mathematical entities and concepts are relatively easier to define than material objects, like a monkey or a cow. Frequently, we define material objects by listing their distinctive properties, or properties that make them distinct from other objects in the same class. For example, nobody can see what the actual essence of water is. But we know that water boils at 100 degrees Celsius at sea level; that its molecule consists of two atoms of Hydrogen and one atom of Oxygen; etc. etc. Because the essence of a material object is hidden from the scientist, a list of observable, distinctive characteristics, features, or properties take the place of essence for him.
The same is true when we consider the essence of man. We cannot see man’s essence, but if you are a biology student, you probably could make a taxonomy-based definition that leads to the species
homo sapiens. This is nothing but a list of distinctive properties that constitute what a man is for the scientist. Philosophers simply call man’s essence “humanity,” but while everybody understands it, it is still not a very clear concept. Aristotle attempted to give a real definition of man as a rational animal, and while it is not perfect, it is good enough for our purposes. The fact that a man is a rational being distinguishes him sufficiently from the rest of the Animal Kingdom.
Why did I go through the trouble of making these distinctions? Because what we call *natural human rights *are properties that belong to the nature (or essence) of man
as man. They are not what define a human being; but they necessarily belong to man to the extent that he or she is human.
Now, not all human rights are natural. Some are arbitrarily given by law, such as the rights of citizenship - the right to vote, etc. These rights are not natural rights. But the right to life is one of the natural human rights. It is an axiomatic principle that every human being has a natural right to life, a property that belongs to every human being, without it being a part of the human essence. It is not what makes us human; it is not a part of what we call “humanity.” But it is one of those features that necessarily belong to man by virtue of the fact that he or she is human.
Natural human rights are
inalienable rights. They cannot be removed or taken away from any man. The law can impede a human being from exercising an inalienable right, but it cannot take away his or her natural human right.
What about the unborn? It is also an axiomatic physical principle (rejected or denied by many) that the zygote, the embryo, or the fetus resulting from the conjugal action of two human parents, is a human being. Therefore, it has natural and inalienable human rights that may not justly be taken away from it, one of which is its natural right to live. The fact that the zygote is still so tiny is a temporary accident of man’s nature. Its size does not define it as non-human. It is a human being that possesses the distinctive faculties intellect and will, though it is still unable to exercise those powers.
What about the insane, or the disabled? They are all human. They have natural human rights, and they have human powers or faculties. They might not be able to exercise all their rights and powers, but that doesn’t make them any less human.
I hope all these definitions and distinctions that I took the trouble to write help to clarify the many issues wherein we all find ourselves entangled.