Immaterial aspects of thought

[AndyT_81]

hatsoff,

Thanks again for the comments.

Ross seems to conflate actual mental computation with self-reflection on our own mental computation

I’m not sure what the difference is? When you add 143 and 275, you likely use some formal rules which you know to be truth preserving for any (name removed by moderator)ut. Do you mean to suggest you are not aware of the formal rules as you are applying them? Could you be mistaken that you are performing these formal rules, instead of another mutually exclusive rule? No, rather, your thoughts are determinate with respect to those formal rules.

What is “actual mental computation” apart from the mental computation that we are aware of when we perform it?

For example, he writes,

“…the ‘function’ does not consist in the array of (name removed by moderator)uts and outcomes. The function is the form by which (name removed by moderator)uts yield outputs.”

Now, if our conceptualization of computational exercises is what Ross has in mind when he talks about “the form,” then he’s begging the question by assuming that it’s not a physical process.

I’m not sure I follow you here. I think I may understand your confusion though, if I am not mistaken. When Ross uses the word “form” I don’t believe he is referring to Plato’s forms. When he says “the form” he means simply the process or structure of the thought. When you add 143 and 275 by using the formal rules mentioned previously, it is the structure of these formal rules which Ross means when he says “form”. What he is saying in the above quote is that the function is not a set of (name removed by moderator)uts and outputs, rather it is the process which we use to give outputs from (name removed by moderator)uts. Contrast this with an adding machine, we cannot be sure about the function, all we have is the (name removed by moderator)uts and outputs, which could fit an infinite number of functions.

Hope that clears things up.

However, I suspect he’s referring to some reified versions of computational concepts, which would make his argument unintelligible. This is what I meant when I said that his argument reminds me of Platonism and its variants. Either way, though, we have a serious problem.

I’m not sure why you think this, you are going to have to elaborate.

 

[hatsoff]

I’m not sure what the difference is? When you add 143 and 275, you likely use some formal rules which you know to be truth preserving for any (name removed by moderator)ut. Do you mean to suggest you are not aware of the formal rules as you are applying them?

No. I’m saying that there is a stark difference between taking two (name removed by moderator)uts and generating an output (i.e. adding two numbers) and thinking about what happens when we perform such a task. Ross may be conflating these two processes.

One potentially confusing factor is that when we human beings perform addition, we are drawing on far more than is necessary to complete the task. After all, calculators perform addition without self-reflection. But in many cases self-reflection, as well as reflection upon other mechanisms, are actually tools we humans use for the task.

There are exceptions to this, of course. It has previously been pointed out that rote memorization of tables is one tool in our human arsenal of mathematical thought. So, in many cases, performing addition amounts to recalling a memory, and this need not require self-reflection, or thinking about formal rules.

On the other hand, it could be that Ross is well-aware of this distinction, and that in fact it is the basis of his argument. I cannot be sure, since his writing leaves much to be desired, but it is possible. But if that’s the case, then his conclusion still does not follow. Pointing out the relative simplicity of man-made adding machines does not mean our minds are powered by more than physical mechanics.

When Ross uses the word “form” I don’t believe he is referring to Plato’s forms.

I don’t think so, either. I was referring to the distinction expounded above.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

No. I’m saying that there is a stark difference between taking two (name removed by moderator)uts and generating an output (i.e. adding two numbers) and thinking about what happens when we perform such a task. Ross may be conflating these two processes.

One potentially confusing factor is that when we human beings perform addition, we are drawing on far more than is necessary to complete the task. After all, calculators perform addition without self-reflection. But in many cases self-reflection, as well as reflection upon other mechanisms, are actually tools we humans use for the task.

There are exceptions to this, of course. It has previously been pointed out that rote memorization of tables is one tool in our human arsenal of mathematical thought. So, in many cases, performing addition amounts to recalling a memory, and this need not require self-reflection, or thinking about formal rules.

On the other hand, it could be that Ross is well-aware of this distinction, and that in fact it is the basis of his argument. I cannot be sure, since his writing leaves much to be desired, but it is possible. But if that’s the case, then his conclusion still does not follow. Pointing out the relative simplicity of man-made adding machines does not mean our minds are powered by more than physical mechanics.

I don’t think so, either. I was referring to the distinction expounded above.

i must be really confused, because i dont see how this pertains to the argument.

as i understand it at this point

1. there are an infinite number of functions that may be used for addition.
2. from the (name removed by moderator)ut and out put of a machine, we could not know exactly which function a machine is using.
3. we do know which of those infinite functions that we use.
4. this means that we are capable of something that shouldnt be physicaly possible.

what am i missing here?

 

[AndyT_81]

hatsoff,

No. I’m saying that there is a stark difference between taking two (name removed by moderator)uts and generating an output (i.e. adding two numbers) and thinking about what happens when we perform such a task. Ross may be conflating these two processes.

That’s what I’m disputing though, are we not conscious of what we are doing while we perform addition? Or are we in the dark as to how we get from (name removed by moderator)ut to output? Surely we are not.

One potentially confusing factor is that when we human beings perform addition, we are drawing on far more than is necessary to complete the task. After all, calculators perform addition without self-reflection. But in many cases self-reflection, as well as reflection upon other mechanisms, are actually tools we humans use for the task.

This is begging the question here, in the context of this argument. Ross’ claim is that the calculator simulates addition, whereas addition is what we do when we add. As I’ve tried to demonstrate a few times here, a calculator could be performing quaddition, or something else. This is not the case when we add, we definitely know what we are doing.

Pointing out the relative simplicity of man-made adding machines does not mean our minds are powered by more than physical mechanics.

I really don’t know what you mean here, but I can’t see any connection between this statement and the argument Ross is making. Perhaps you may not be getting the argument completely yet (probably my fault, I am not explaining it all that well)?

warpspeed,

what am i missing here?

I think you’ve pretty much got it, at least as I understand it

 

[warpspeedpetey]

warpspeed,

I think you’ve pretty much got it, at least as I understand it

somehow, that doesnt make me feel any better

 

[hatsoff]

That’s what I’m disputing though, are we not conscious of what we are doing while we perform addition? Or are we in the dark as to how we get from (name removed by moderator)ut to output? Surely we are not.

In some ways we aren’t in the dark, because of our reflection and consciousness. However, in some ways we are in the dark—not knowing the mechanics, whether physical or non-physical, behind our thinking. But so what?

This is begging the question here, in the context of this argument. Ross’ claim is that the calculator simulates addition, whereas addition is what we do when we add. As I’ve tried to demonstrate a few times here, a calculator could be performing quaddition, or something else. This is not the case when we add, we definitely know what we are doing.

I’m sorry, but that’s just not true. We design adding machines ourselves, and for that reason we know a great deal about how they function.

I really don’t know what you mean here, but I can’t see any connection between this statement and the argument Ross is making. Perhaps you may not be getting the argument completely yet (probably my fault, I am not explaining it all that well)?

That could be. I understand “determinate” to mean that the subject is capable of reflection on his own thought processes and on the task in which he is engaged—in this case, addition of integers. If that’s not what Ross means, then some explanation is in order. It would have been nice if he was clearer about it in his paper.

 

[Betterave]

In some ways we aren’t in the dark, because of our reflection and consciousness. However, in some ways we are in the dark—not knowing the mechanics, whether physical or non-physical, behind our thinking. But so what?

…so concepts/thinking cannot be reduced to a physical mechanical process?

This is begging the question here, in the context of this argument. Ross’ claim is that the calculator simulates addition, whereas addition is what we do when we add. As I’ve tried to demonstrate a few times here, a calculator could be performing quaddition, or something else. This is not the case when we add, we definitely know what we are doing.

I’m sorry, but that’s just not true. We design adding machines ourselves, and for that reason we know a great deal about how they function.

That seems true. But then we must know the “mechanics” behind (i.e., constituting the conceptual content of) our thinking, it seems. How else could we successfully design adding machines? And since we don’t know the physical process behind our thinking, it follows that the thinking process is not a mechanical (i.e., physical) process. (QED?)

 

[Touchstone]

That seems true. But then we must know the “mechanics” behind (i.e., constituting the conceptual content of) our thinking, it seems. How else could we successfully design adding machines? And since we don’t know the physical process behind our thinking, it follows that the thinking process is not a mechanical (i.e., physical) process. (QED?)

I don’t see how that follows at all. I was looking for a smiley there, or some sort of wink – maybe that’s what you meant with the “QED”?

If not, well, hmmmm…

A: if we don’t know the physical process behind some phenomenon, it is not mechanical
B: we don’t the physical process behind human thought
.: human thoughts are not mechanical

Is that really something you want to defend here? Yow.

-TS

 

[hatsoff]

I don’t see how that follows at all. I was looking for a smiley there, or some sort of wink – maybe that’s what you meant with the “QED”?

If not, well, hmmmm…

A: if we don’t know the physical process behind some phenomenon, it is not mechanical
B: we don’t the physical process behind human thought
.: human thoughts are not mechanical

Is that really something you want to defend here? Yow.

You took the words right out of my, erm, keyboard.

 

[roselily]

Among incompossible functions physically determined function among processes can be. The full generalization that all thought is determinate that way is whether simple assertion or hoping or wanting or intending.
For someone else might have thought or said or believed or felt the same in a way definite among incompressible.
thinking has is always of a definite form which may not be articulate by us, as are mathematical and logical forms. Asserting in any one of its senses cannot
be “halfway” between opposed forms; it would not be asserting.

Maybe that is true!
But I had a nightmare the night before last night, In my sleep I remembered that I had this same dream before, so in my sleep I said:No! Stop, I knew this was a dream, and it really did disappear. How pleasant it is for me to know that I can stop bad dreams in my sleep and only hold good dreams in my sleep. As I will try to use this in life also, because now before Jesus Christ come, this world is a dream compared to eternal life also.:angel1:

 

[Betterave]

I don’t see how that follows at all. I was looking for a smiley there, or some sort of wink – maybe that’s what you meant with the “QED”?

If not, well, hmmmm…

A: if we don’t know the physical process behind some phenomenon, it is not mechanical
B: we don’t the physical process behind human thought
.: human thoughts are not mechanical

Is that really something you want to defend here? Yow.

-TS

Could you explain how you got that paraphrase out of what I wrote? (hatsoff, you’re welcome to take a shot at this one too, since it’s exactly what you were also thinking):

“[We design adding machines ourselves, and for that reason we know a great deal about how they function.] But then we *must *know the “mechanics” behind (i.e., constituting the conceptual content of) our thinking, it seems. How else could we successfully design adding machines? And since we don’t know the physical process behind our thinking, it follows that the thinking process is not a mechanical (i.e., physical) process. (QED)”

(The smiley this time was just for you, TS! The original ‘?’ was to indicate that my suggestion was tentative since I haven’t necessarily thought this through very carefully - helping me with that is where you come in!)

 

[Touchstone]

Could you explain how you got that paraphrase out of what I wrote? (hatsoff, you’re welcome to take a shot at this one too, since it’s exactly what you were also thinking):

“[We design adding machines ourselves, and for that reason we know a great deal about how they function.] But then we *must *know the “mechanics” behind (i.e., constituting the conceptual content of) our thinking, it seems. How else could we successfully design adding machines? And since we don’t know the physical process behind our thinking, it follows that the thinking process is not a mechanical (i.e., physical) process. (QED)”

It doesn’t follow that it is not a mechanical process, in any case. Whether we know all, or any details of the internal processes, any ignorance we recognize on that tells us nothing about the nature of the process. That’s how ignorance works. We don’t know.

That said, we do know, from a wealth of evidence available in other areas, that natural phenomena in are amenable to natural explanations. From this we understand that while the internals of brain functions remain largely opaque, they do share the same properties of nature as innumerable other phenomena we observe and understand – they are natural, made up of physical components, operating within the law of physics. The brain requires physical energy, for example, and is a natural heat sink, and produces entropy just like every other heat-consuming process.

I think it’s quite reasonable to say that inclines the thoughtful observer to group the brain in with all the other natural phenomena we understand, provisionally, just by virtue of its composition and dynamics that we do know. But in any case, it’s patently illogical to say that such ignorance establishes the non-mechanical nature of brain functions.

It simply doesn’t follow, and no entailment as you assert here can be shown, I suggest.

That means that what follows from “we don’t understand the internals adequately, yet” is “we don’t know”. If we are making inductions, then “natural explanations” wins hands down, based on the number of investigations that have yielded performative natural explanations for observed phenomena, and the conspicuous lack of performative supernatural explanations for… well, anything at all, so far.

Nevertheless, in terms of what follows, it’s “we don’t know the nature of the process. TBD.”

-TS

 

[Quid_estVeritas]

Hi all,

I would like to generate some discussion regarding a paper by Professor James Ross, entitled “Immaterial Aspects of Thought”, which I have found very interesting and can be found here:

nd.edu/~afreddos/courses/43151/ross-immateriality.pdf

The basic argument is summed up as (by aletheist at PhilosophyForums):

A. Some thoughts are incompossibly determinate.
B. No physical processes or functions of physical processes are incompossibly determinate.
C. Therefore, some thoughts are not physical processes or functions of physical processes.

What is meant by A? Well essentially, when we think things like modus ponens, when we add, square, conjoin etc. we think in a form that is incompossibly determinate amongst pure functions. Let’s consider the process of addition, which is of the form x+y=z. When we add two numbers, we certainly reason in this form and no other. For instance, we certainly know we do not perform some other process, such as Kripke’s quaddition, which can give the right output i.e. z, but is certainly not what we do when we add. In other words, when we add, we think in a form which is unique amongst incompossible functions. We may also say that, every rational judgement is truth perserving from the single case, i.e. no matter what x and y are, the single case process “x+y=z” will always be truth perserving.

What about B? Say we have an adding machine, which produces outputs, z, from two (name removed by moderator)uts, x and y, which seem to line up with our understanding of adding. Can we say that the machine is adding like we do, i.e. in a determine way amongst incompossible functions? The answer is no. By looking at the (name removed by moderator)ut and outputs, we can conceive a whole host of incompossible functions that the machine may be performing, while still simulating adding. For instance:

F1 : x+y=z, if x,y < 1e6
F2 : x+y=z, if x+y < 1e6
F3 : x+y=z, if t<10e140 years, otherwise x+y+1=z
etc.

It is clear to see that the machine is not incompossibly determinate, i.e. it’s (name removed by moderator)uts and outputs are related in such a way that suggests no uniqueness amongst incompossible functions. In other words, the machine cannot be considered to be truth preserving in all finite cases, it is indeterminate with respect to incompossible functions. This is the case for all finite physical processes or states. For instance, if we are trying to describe an experiment via a mathematical abstraction, we may have a set points on a graph. There are an argueably infinite number of functions which could intersect with these points, so long as there are a finite number of points, and all of these possible functions are incompossible.

So finally the conclusion, C. It has been established that physical processes are inherently indeterminate with respect to incompossible functions. However, if our thoughts arise from said physical processes, then they cannot be incompossibly determinate. Yet they are, so physical processes are not sufficient for certain thoughts.

I’m still working through this rather complex paper (and I may not have reproduced the main arguments accurately), but it seems pretty good to me. Any comments, positive or negative, would be appreciated.

it’s all part of “The problem consciousness poses for the old materialist paradigm”.

hey, maybe you could add some of these thoughts to my thread

 

[AndyT_81]

Touchstone,

Apologies for the brevity of the reply, but I am strapped for time at the moment.

I would suggest you try reading the paper again more carefully, as it seems you have missed the point of the argument. Physically systems are inherently indeterminate amongst incompossible functions, we can never know if an adding machine is performing addition or Kripke’s quaddition, for instance. Your comments regarding the brain as a physical process assumes that all aspects of thought arise from the brain (which is physical) and therefore begs the question.

I think it’s quite reasonable to say that inclines the thoughtful observer to group the brain in with all the other natural phenomena we understand, provisionally, just by virtue of its composition and dynamics that we do know.

The point is that we do not know what functions these dynamics follow. We know them well enough to produce formal abstractions about them which are good enough in terms of utility, but we can’t tell what formal function physical processes actually follow.

But in any case, it’s patently illogical to say that such ignorance establishes the non-mechanical nature of brain functions.

The point of the argument is not to say that brain functions are “non-mechanical”, the point is that aspects of thought are non-physical. To assume thought are entirely brain processes is to beg the question.

Remember, thoughts themselves must somehow be physical processes via physicalism. But the problem is, physical processes are indeterminate amongst incompossible functions. You give me a set of data points and a function which connects those points, and I can give you an infinite number of other functions which connect the same points. Yet, our thoughts regarding formal processes such as addition are not like this, we know exactly what function we are performing. We know we are performing addition instead of quaddition, we don’t “observe” (name removed by moderator)uts turning to outputs without a clue as to how that happens in such thought processes. How do such determinate thoughts arise from inherently indeterminate processes? This is the question.

 

[Betterave]

Touchstone,

I would suggest you try reading the paper again more carefully, as it seems you have missed the point of the argument.

I think that’s a sound suggestion.

 

[Touchstone]

Touchstone,

Apologies for the brevity of the reply, but I am strapped for time at the moment.

I would suggest you try reading the paper again more carefully, as it seems you have missed the point of the argument. Physically systems are inherently indeterminate amongst incompossible functions, we can never know if an adding machine is performing addition or Kripke’s quaddition, for instance. Your comments regarding the brain as a physical process assumes that all aspects of thought arise from the brain (which is physical) and therefore begs the question.

I understand this now, and understood this then. I think you’re reliance on “begging the question” is misplaced here. Begging the question, or affirming the consequent is a logical problem, but I’m suggesting this is a matter of inquiry and discovery, a research program. In that case, “begging the question” is just the provisional adoption of one hypothesis or another so that it can be tested.

I’ve been told a number of times, for example, that accepting relativity is bogus because the only way people come to accept is by first assuming it’s true! Like it’s a scandal, and begging the question. Well, that’s precisely how knowledge works – it “begs the question” in a provisional ways, and tests the premise to see how it holds up.

That means that if we say “OK, assume Einstein is right for the moment, how does all that bear out”, or “OK, assume the mind is just activity of the physical brain, how does that all bear out”, you are begging the question, but you are doing it on purpose, as part of the method of discovery. It’s provisional, and contingent on the testing.

In both of those cases, the provisional idea bears up quite well under scrutiny and testing, thankyewverymuch. And it renders complains about “begging the question” an exercise in missing the point of the question itself, and how questions actually get answered, I think.

The point is that we do not know what functions these dynamics follow. We know them well enough to produce formal abstractions about them which are good enough in terms of utility, but we can’t tell what formal function physical processes actually follow.

Right, and who cares? It’s a non-problem, and really, an empty question. Think of what could possibly satisfy that question in the terms you demand. Nothing could, except for possibly fantasies and imaginations that are not subject to any real scrutiny! We might as well ask “what energy is made of”? What is energy made of? ZOMG, all this talk about energy and we *do not know *what energy is really made of!!!

The only formalisms we can have are descriptive, and necessarily incomplete. The notion of “knowing these dynamics” as you intend here is a divide by zero. Undefined. An incoherent proposition.

I agree it’s frustrating to understand that we are constrained by these epistemic limitations, but that’s a bit like cursing gravity for what a drag it is on us. Reality is what it is.

The point of the argument is not to say that brain functions are “non-mechanical”, the point is that aspects of thought are non-physical. To assume thought are entirely brain processes is to beg the question.

Well, see above, that’s major goof epistemologically, thinking that the question is answered as a function of warrant or logic or justification only. That’s totally bassackwards in approach to the problem. We must beg the question, but we do so provisionally, and we test it objectively to see how it works out. This is how knowledge is obtained. And if we accept the “brain is physical, and the mind is a supervenient upon in it a physical sense” hypothesis, it performs very well, and frankly embarrasses the other hypotheses we might also accept, provisionally, and test. We can “beg the question” for a “supernatural” hypothesis, too. But we get nowhere when we do. It’s a non-starter.

Epic fail.

In terms of parsimony, economy, performance against the evidence, prediction and falisifiability, the materialist hypothesis just dominates the alternatives. By comparison, supernatural competitors are embarrassing in their perfomance. They only commend themselves, so far as I can see, because they pander to your superstitious inclinations. If you dispute this, I invite you to lay out how the supernaturalist hypothesis performs under a testing regime when we accept it provisionally.

-TS

 

[Touchstone]

Remember, thoughts themselves must somehow be physical processes via physicalism.

I think I know what you mean, but as stated, this needs some revision. “physicalism” isn’t a “via” for how thoughts, or anything else happens. Nature is what it is. Physicalism is just a description, a label for a model of how nature works – it’s the map, not the territory. Nevertheless, I understand you to mean that in the physicalist model, all real processes are physical processes, including thoughts.

But the problem is, physical processes are indeterminate amongst incompossible functions.

You are confusing potentialities with actualities here. For any given phenomenon, there may be an infinite number of potential descriptions for it, but these are descriptions in potentia, not the actual phenomenon. How man walking routes are there between the Empire State Building and Gramercy Park? Too many to count, and all plausible. You could take a route over the Golden Gate bridge, for one. And as actualities, each of them is incompossible with respect to all the others for any given pedestrian at any given time. You cannot (we believe) take a route down Broadway, and simultaneously take the “long way” west through San Francisco before coming east to New York again.

Moreover, even for the very same stroll from the ESB to Gramercy Park, we have multiple ways to describe the same actuality. One observer might report it thus:

A: Subject went south on 6th Ave. and took a left and went west for several blocks on 19th St.

Another might report:

B: Subject walked at a heading of 205 degrees for 1.2 miles, then changed course to a bearing of 115 degrees, and continued for another 0.7 miles.

Neither of these descriptions is “correct” or “better” in any final sense; they are different descriptions that may have utility in different contexts, but they remain just descriptions. The pedestrian and his walk to Gramercy Park are what they are, regardless of any multitude of descriptions we might supply.

The phenomenon itself is a unity. The descriptions are manifold, and potentially infinite.

You give me a set of data points and a function which connects those points, and I can give you an infinite number of other functions which connect the same points. Yet, our thoughts regarding formal processes such as addition are not like this, we know exactly what function we are performing.

Yes, but again, you are dealing in potentialities, not actualities. So what?

We know we are performing addition instead of quaddition, we don’t “observe” (name removed by moderator)uts turning to outputs without a clue as to how that happens in such thought processes. How do such determinate thoughts arise from inherently indeterminate processes? This is the question.

It’s been a while since I’ve read Ross’ paper, but yeah, we know because we are observing actualities, not potentialities. You’ve got them mixed up, I’m afraid. Thoughts, as actualities are not “inherently indeterminate” and there’s perfectly no reason to even suppose they are, let alone conclude that. The map is not the territority, and you’re worried because we can create maps all sorts of different ways – all of which (or maybe just some of which) have strong isomorphisms to different aspects of the territory (i.e. a “road map” relates different information about the territory than a “topological map” does), but WHICH ARE NOT THE TERRITORY themselves.

This seems obvious in reading it, often times, but it is an exceedingly subtle distinction in practice.

As for what the adding machine is “really” doing, that’s a non-problem, or more precisely, a non-question, and for the reasons you pointed out yourself (perhaps unwittingly) – it’s undefined what “really” means in that context. It’s not a coherent question. That does NOT mean that the machine – the physical phenomonon – is now in some metaphysical trouble because of that. It isn’t. Reality is what it is, and can’t be bothered by the pathetic intellectual difficulties of us humans. What is “indeterminate” is really more usefully understood as simply “undefined” – we don’t have a “cosmic authority” that defines what “really happening” means.

Happily, that’s not a problem, in practice. The models we adopt based on our disposition toward empirical models are useful for our ends.

-TS

 

[Betterave]

It doesn’t follow that it is not a mechanical process, in any case. Whether we know all, or any details of the internal processes, any ignorance we recognize on that tells us nothing about the nature of the process. That’s how ignorance works. We don’t know. …

Okay… but why not try paraphrasing my argument accurately like I asked you to? I think that might be a fun exercise and I also really think this might help you to see what you’re perhaps still missing in the conceptual structure of the argument.