Immaterial Causation

[Anthony_A]

In his latest book on the philosophy of mind, “Physicalism, or Something Near Enough,” Jaegwon Kim devotes an entire chapter to the plausibility of Substance (Cartesian) Dualism. The chapter, “A Rejection of Immaterial Minds” offers a clear elaboration to the standard objection to substance dualism: mind-body interaction. The question is always raised: How can an immaterial substance interact with a physical body? Though the question alone is not a defeater, so Kim develops an actual argument against immaterial causation.

Now as I read this chapter nothing really bothered me because I’m not a substance dualist. Non-physical to physical (immaterial to material) causation is a problem for the Platonic/Cartesian substance dualist who wants to save some primitive notion of a soul, but Kim observes that the problem extends to a purely non-physical world. Mental to mental (read immaterial to immaterial) causation proves to be just as troubling as immaterial to material. Here Kim states why this is:

But what about mind-to-mind causation? Would this be any easier for Descartes? Consider a purely mental world, a world inhabited only by Cartesian souls; such a world must be possible, since souls are “substances,” that is, independent existents. Soul A acts in a certain way and so does soul B at the same time. This followed by certain changes in in two other souls, A* and B*. Suppose that actions of A and B are causes of the changes in A* and B*. But which caused which effect? If we want a solution that is analogous to case (2) above for the firing of guns and the deaths, what we need is a pairing relation R such that R holds, say, for A and A*, and for B and B*, but not for A and B*, or for B and A*. Since these entities are immaterial souls outside physical space, R cannot be, or include, a spatial relation, or any other kind of physical property or relation. The radical nonspatiality of mental substances rules out the possibility of invoking spatial relationships to ground cause-effect pairings.

So the crucial problem here is space-relations. If angels (I’m assuming most of us agree that angels are completely immaterial) are entirely outside of the physical world what type of spatial reference can we give to angelic interactions? Say that two angels high-five each other. If we are to give a full account of this event we have to say, or it would at least be implied, that the two angels were standing close enough to each other to slap hands and that either one or both of the angels raised their arms up and forwards and made contact with the other angel hand. But where is this other angel hand? What do mean when we say that one angel raised his hand up? These are creatures with no physical properties and existing outside of space.

As it seems to me, these are the options:

1. We posit a space-like realm in which God and angels “reside” but which is ultimately not a “physical” realm.
   This seems question begging (incoherent even) and ultimately reinforces the need for spatial-relations.
2. Say that God and angels are physical
   This is an interesting option, but I don’t know how plausible it is. In his thread on a proof of God’s existence, Fosio offered an argument based on qualia to prove that God is physical. I didn’t find the argument sound (see thread for my reply), but perhaps there is a way to prove the supposed physical nature of God and angels.

Keep in mind that if God is ultimately physical He is subject to change, and this change with presumably be natural so even God could not help the way nature is and affects Him. This of course calls to question His omnipotence and eternal nature.

1. We claim agnosticism to how immaterial causation works.
   This is an option I suppose, but not a very convincing or philosophically thorough response. Another point to keep in mind is that to say “We can’t know how immaterial causation works; it just does,” is question begging.

That’s all I’ve got at this point. I don’t have an agenda here. I’m actually puzzled. Any thoughts?

 

[geometer]

1. We claim agnosticism to how immaterial causation works.
   This is an option I suppose, but not a very convincing or philosophically thorough response. Another point to keep in mind is that to say “We can’t know how immaterial causation works; it just does,” is question begging.

That’s all I’ve got at this point. I don’t have an agenda here. I’m actually puzzled. Any thoughts?

Why is there a necessity to have any of these oppinions before the experiences which would call them into question? Why would pure mind games be useful?

Do you believe that you can know specifics about Angels? Do you know how to find out about Angels?

 

[Anthony_A]

Why is there a necessity to have any of these oppinions before the experiences which would call them into question? Why would pure mind games be useful?

Do you believe that you can know specifics about Angels? Do you know how to find out about Angels?

Really? As a “theosopher” you don’t see the worth of a thought experiment? “Pure mind games” tell us that we could never experience a square-circle. If Kim’s argument works, then not only does call in to question the possibility of us ever experiencing and angel, but also the possibility of an angel ever experiencing another angel.

 

[punkforchrist]

Hi Anthony,

I may need to take a closer look at Kim’s book, but it seems to me that he doesn’t give any reason to think that all causal relations are space-relations.

1. Space-relations are causal relations.
2. Immaterial souls do not stand in space-relations.
3. Therefore, immaterial souls do not stand in causal relations.

This argument is logically invalid, as is demonstrated by the following:

1’. Dogs are animals.
2’. Cats are not dogs.
3’. Therefore, cats are not animals.

(3’) doesn’t follow from (1’) and (2’), even though both premises are correct. The same may be said of (3) not following from (1) and (2).

As for angels, they are immaterial, but they occasionally take on bodily form. God, on the other hand, is always immaterial; but, it’s not like God gives anyone a high-five or a first-bump.

 

[geometer]

Really? As a “theosopher” you don’t see the worth of a thought experiment? “Pure mind games” tell us that we could never experience a square-circle. If Kim’s argument works, then not only does call in to question the possibility of us ever experiencing and angel, but also the possibility of an angel ever experiencing another angel.

A square-circle is a joke about contradiction. It doesn’t mean any more than saying that something can not be true and false at the same time. As a mind game, perhaps a square circle is a circle constructed with a masons square. Might be a masonic riddle.

There is no value, in devaluing your faith with mind games. You can know that God does exist if you can gather the courage to ask him about that. Jesus gave the perfect solution.

Move God to move you. It is something an angel would do, because an angel knows that God can…

 

[Anthony_A]

Hi Anthony,

I may need to take a closer look at Kim’s book, but it seems to me that he doesn’t give any reason to think that all causal relations are space-relations.

1. Space-relations are causal relations.
2. Immaterial souls do not stand in space-relations.
3. Therefore, immaterial souls do not stand in causal relations.

This argument is logically invalid, as is demonstrated by the following:

1’. Dogs are animals.
2’. Cats are not dogs.
3’. Therefore, cats are not animals.

(3’) doesn’t follow from (1’) and (2’), even though both premises are correct. The same may be said of (3) not following from (1) and (2).

As for angels, they are immaterial, but they occasionally take on bodily form. God, on the other hand, is always immaterial; but, it’s not like God gives anyone a high-five or a first-bump.

Well he doesn’t say causal relations are space relation, but that causal relations require a spatial relation. His argument is more like this:

1. Causal relations require space relations
2. Immaterial souls, by definition, cannot stand in space relations
3. Therefore, immaterial souls can’t be in causal relations

I don’t think you can write this argument off as invalid as quickly as the dog/cat one. Conclusion 3’ is obviously false, but conclusion 3 isn’t. For conclusion three to be as blatantly false as 3’ we would need instances where there clearly are cases of immaterial causation without any space relation.

 

[Anthony_A]

There is no value, in devaluing your faith with mind games. You can know that God does exist if you can gather the courage to ask him about that. Jesus gave the perfect solution.

Move God to move you. It is something an angel would do, because an angel knows that God can…

How can you claim that these “mind games” are devaluing my faith? If anything I would think they are strengthening my faith. A question: With what respect do you hold people like Aquinas, Augustine, etc? They were involved in the same sort of “game” I’m playing in this thread.

 

[tonyrey]

The flaw in Kim’s reasoning is that he interprets all causation as mechanistic. Yet we know from direct personal experience that the most significant type of causation is teleological. There is no conflict between the two because mechanistic causation is not purposive or directional whereas purposive causation is directional and utilizes mechanistic causation. Purposive causation must be attributed to the activity of the mind and must be immaterial because there is no evidence that matter is conscious, rational or purposive.
.

 

[Anthony_A]

The flaw in Kim’s reasoning is that he interprets all causation as mechanistic. Yet we know from direct personal experience that the most significant type of causation is teleological. There is no conflict between the two because mechanistic causation is not purposive or directional whereas purposive causation is directional and utilizes mechanistic causation. Purposive causation must be attributed to the activity of the mind and must be immaterial because there is no evidence that matter is conscious, rational or purposive.
.

Actually, Kim does address teleological/purposive causation. He calls it an intentional relation. He thinks this still does not get away from what he calls the “pairing problem” as he argues:

Could R be some kind of intentional relation, such as thinking of, picking out, and referring to? Perhaps, soul A gazes at souls A* and B*, and single out A*, and causes a change in it. But how do we understand these relations like gazing at and picking out? What is it for A to pick out A* rather than B*? To pick out some concrete thing outside us, we must be in a certain cognitive relation to it; we must perceive it somehow and be able to single it out from other things near and around it - that is, perceptually identify it.

…Ultimately, these intentional relations must be explained on the basis of causal relations (this is not to say that they are wholly analyzable in terms of causality), and this means that we cannot explain what it is for soul A to pick out soul A* rather than B* except by positing some kind of causal relation that holds for A and A* but not for A and B*. If this is right, invoking intentional relations to do causal pairings begs the question: we need causal relations to understand intentionality.

If I understood your response correctly, the above paragraph seems to address it head on. If I didn’t, could you elaborate on what you meant by teleological causation?

Edit: to remind that when Kim says causal relation he has in mind the space-relation necessity.

 

[punkforchrist]

Well he doesn’t say causal relations are space relation, but that causal relations require a spatial relation. His argument is more like this:

1. Causal relations require space relations
2. Immaterial souls, by definition, cannot stand in space relations
3. Therefore, immaterial souls can’t be in causal relations

I don’t think you can write this argument off as invalid as quickly as the dog/cat one. Conclusion 3’ is obviously false, but conclusion 3 isn’t. For conclusion three to be as blatantly false as 3’ we would need instances where there clearly are cases of immaterial causation without any space relation.

Does he argue that causal relations require space relations? It seems like he was talking about causal relations, but then jumped to space relations without providing a sufficient reason that causation requires space. Like I said before, though, I’ll have to take a closer look at the bulk of Kim’s writing.

 

[Anthony_A]

Does he argue that causal relations require space relations? It seems like he was talking about causal relations, but then jumped to space relations without providing a sufficient reason that causation requires space. Like I said before, though, I’ll have to take a closer look at the bulk of Kim’s writing.

He does. If you read the quote and then my dumbed down version of the problem in the first post you will see that in any account of causation, whether implicit or explicit, a relation in terms of space (location) is necessary.

 

[punkforchrist]

After reading the paragraph several times, I still can’t see what the argument is, but that’s probably my own fault.

 

[MindOverMatter]

First one must prove that all causal relations are space relations.

Secondly i have never understood why people seem to think that immaterial causes are unproductive?

Thirdly there are insurmountable problems concerning physical thoughts. The idea that inertness can be intentional or have ideas about inertness makes no sense whatsoever. The only leg a naturalist has to stand on is the threat that science might one day have the answer; which is no kind of arguement at all. The name of the book said it all. Physicalism or something near enough, is not good enough. Physicalism cannot account for mind.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Well he doesn’t say causal relations are space relation, but that causal relations require a spatial relation. His argument is more like this:

1. Causal relations require space relations
2. Immaterial souls, by definition, cannot stand in space relations
3. Therefore, immaterial souls can’t be in causal relations

I don’t think you can write this argument off as invalid as quickly as the dog/cat one. Conclusion 3’ is obviously false, but conclusion 3 isn’t. For conclusion three to be as blatantly false as 3’ we would need instances where there clearly are cases of immaterial causation without any space relation.

Why should we accept the first premise? What knowledge do we have that this is true? Call me David Hume, if you must, but the fact that every cause-effect pair we’ve observed has corresponded to space relations does not prove anything.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

He does. If you read the quote and then my dumbed down version of the problem in the first post you will see that in any account of causation, whether implicit or explicit, a relation in terms of space (location) is necessary.

This may be true in any *account *of causation, but not necessarily in any *occurence * of causation. There may be things which we are incapable of describing.

Side note: It is unhelpful to think of the “immaterial world”. If there are spiritual realities, they *infuse *physical realities. My suspicion is that nearly every event is saturated with “immaterial” causation, if we had eyes to see.

 

[geometer]

This may be true in any *account *of causation, but not necessarily in any *occurence * of causation. There may be things which we are incapable of describing.

Side note: It is unhelpful to think of the “immaterial world”. If there are spiritual realities, they *infuse *physical realities. My suspicion is that nearly every event is saturated with “immaterial” causation, if we had eyes to see.

You said it all, the endless strawman arguments from philosophers. What an embarassment to common sense…

 

[Anthony_A]

This may be true in any *account *of causation, but not necessarily in any *occurence * of causation. There may be things which we are incapable of describing.

Side note: It is unhelpful to think of the “immaterial world”. If there are spiritual realities, they *infuse *physical realities. My suspicion is that nearly every event is saturated with “immaterial” causation, if we had eyes to see.

I’m not following as to what the difference is between an account and an occurrence. I suppose there may be things we are incapable of describing, but what exactly does a mystery contribute to causation if the event is fully accounted for in physics?

As for infusing, what is it for an immaterial substance to be infused with a physical substance? I’m not against the idea, but I just don’t understand what you mean by “infused”. If immateriality were to be infused in, say, my body wouldn’t it have location? And isn’t that going against the idea of immateriality?

 

[Anthony_A]

You said it all, the endless strawman arguments from philosophers. What an embarassment to common sense…

Would you care to explain how the strawman fallacy has been committed?

 

[Anthony_A]

Why should we accept the first premise? What knowledge do we have that this is true? Call me David Hume, if you must, but the fact that every cause-effect pair we’ve observed has corresponded to space relations does not prove anything.

Of course you don’t have to accept the first premise, you may object and present a clear case where immaterial causation gives an account or a better account of an event.

 

[Anthony_A]

First one must prove that all causal relations are space relations.

Secondly i have never understood why people seem to think that immaterial causes are unproductive?

Thirdly there are insurmountable problems concerning physical thoughts… Physicalism cannot account for mind.

Well, since all events can be accounted for by physics, and since all physical things are located somewhere, I think Kim is right to argue that a causal relation needs a space relation. Remember, he doesn’t say that casual relations are space relations.

Second point, I’m not sure how immaterial causation adds anything but a mystery to any event. When events can be physically accounted for, immaterial explanations are excess.

Third, I think you’re mistaken about the mind. I think physicalism can give a reductive explanation of how the mind works via functional analysis (computational theory).