Immaterial Causation

[fosio]

So the crucial problem here is space-relations. If angels (I’m assuming most of us agree that angels are completely immaterial)

I wouldn’t as you know. I think all concrete objects are physical. If a concrete object is immaterial then it’s hard to see how it would be distinguished from an abstract object ontologically in its intrinsic properties.

1. Say that God and angels are physical
   This is an interesting option, but I don’t know how plausible it is. In his thread on a proof of God’s existence, Fosio offered an argument based on qualia to prove that God is physical. I didn’t find the argument sound (see thread for my reply), but perhaps there is a way to prove the supposed physical nature of God and angels.

I think you don’t find my argument sound because we simply have divergent intuitions about the nature of qualia. Here is a hypothetical quale that would not be physical in its intrinsic experience: a quale that involves the perception of an abstract object without the use of auditory or visual imagery or metaphor and without the use of language (since the symbols of language must be distinguished in some auditory, visual or other kind of physical imagery). I suppose such a quale could exist but then it wouldn’t be a perception of a concrete object. But God has perceptions of all concrete objects and so he must have qualia that give the full breadth and depth of perception on those objects (color, shape, etc.) – even if these aren’t caused by physical things, the perceptions themselves involve physicality (shape, color, etc.)

But there is another argument that proves God is physical. Something cannot come from nothing, i.e. the ontological nature of something cannot come from something that lacks that ontological nature. So physicality cannot come from something that lacks physicality. Radically new ontological constitutions don’t simply pop into existence out of nowhere; omnipotence is not an explanation for that since omnipotence itself is rationally guided and such things would not be in accordance with good reason. The way I view creation would be similar to Bonaventure in seeing creation as flowing from God as opposed to “ex nihilo.” Creation flows from God’s creative energies. There is nothing in creation that has no ontological grounding in God. There is no ontological way of being in creation that you cannot find ontologically in God; if there were, then creation would have something that God didn’t, something would be missing in God yet present in creation. Our physicality does not take away from our perfection; we are the more perfect for it. If dualism were true and we became souls we would not then increase in perfection for lacking physicality; we would decrease in perfection. So, we must eliminate the false intuition we have that physicality would diminish God’s perfection.

Keep in mind that if God is ultimately physical He is subject to change, and this change with presumably be natural so even God could not help the way nature is and affects Him.

I don’t see how this is true (the inference, not the conclusion). One can certainly imagine physical things that never change. There’s certainly a possible world where there is a particle that never changes.

But I think it’s easy to see that God changes. God did not have to create anything; yet he did. Then on the principle of sufficient reason, what would account for his deciding to create? It could not be something other than God since that would violate logical priority, obviously. It also could not be something in God since if it were, then that would be in God in every possible world if God has both intra and inter-world immutability as regards his intrinsic properties. So then either the principle of sufficient reason fails or God changes. The only way to avoid that conclusion is to say that God creates in every possible world or that creation is included in the extension of God.

This of course calls to question His omnipotence and eternal nature.

God can be everlasting and transcend the time in the space-time universe while also having temporality be a mode of his being. There are theories that postulate more than one dimension of time. As for omnipotence, I’m not sure what you are getting that from. If anything the incapacity to change would count against omnipotence. Life is more powerful than non-life precisely in its ability to change.

The way to understand omnipotence is to understand it as being in possession of all capabilities. Being able to change does not preclude being able to stay the same, so possession of this capability does not take away any other conceivable capability. Being unable to change, obviously precludes being able to change; so omnipotence entails both the capacity to change and the capacity to stay steadfast.

 

[fosio]

If immateriality were to be infused in, say, my body wouldn’t it have location? And isn’t that going against the idea of immateriality?

That’s a good point and it also goes to show that God is physical. God is present everywhere and so God stands in relation in a spatial dimensive way and is in that respect not immaterial. But perhaps God has some other relations he bears to non-spatial things that would make him immaterial in thos respects? Not possible. Consider the possible world where there are no angels or any other supposed immaterial created things and only God, man, and the universe. God then could stand only in relations to other things in a spatially dimensive way (formally you could express this in second order logic). But what about abstract objects? That cannot ontologically ground immateriality anymore than it could in us. What about God himself? That begs the question as to God’s immateriality.

If the only immaterial concrete object that we can conceive of is God or angels whom we must metaphorize in art with wings, then clearly we do not have any actual conception of concrete immateriality. At best we have a negative conception of it being something other than materiality. But the only materiality we have acquaintance with is our own and the universe’s – so that negative conception is at best a conception of “something other than this” – but that something other could just as well be a materiality that transcends our materiality.

If we come to have analogical knowledge of God by created things as Romans indicates, then to say that God is immaterial, ontologically nothing like anything in the material universe, ontologically nothing like any concrete object of our acquiantance, is to turn that passage in Romans into an absurdity and make any analogical knowledge of God impossible. But perhaps analogical knowledge of God is impossible – if so, then we hardly have grounds to say that God is immaterial since analogical knowledge is the only kind of actual knowledge we could have of God. So the belief that God is immaterial leads to an epistemic defeater for that same belief.

 

[geometer]

Would you care to explain how the strawman fallacy has been committed?

What I meant to say, is that philosophy based on logic is simply a mind game. Anyone can invent a set of axioms, and argue from them against anyone elses axioms and deductions.

There was a catholic priest who came to a theosophical lodge in Baltimore to give a lecture. He began his lecture with a few metaphysical axioms, which to him demonstrated that reincarnation was non-sense. Someone in the audience spoke up and explained that his view was naive, and explained ancient principles of reincarnation that the priest had never studied.

A friend of mine who was there at the lecture said that the priest looked like he was terrified. He quickly packed up his books and papers and left the lodge.

The priest had learned a little logical script that convinced him that reincarnation was non-sense. I am sure it was completely logical and that is why the priest was devoted to it. But he was not enough of a philosopher to know that there is no garauntee that our airtight logical scripts are actually describing our reality.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

I’m not following as to what the difference is between an account and an occurrence. I suppose there may be things we are incapable of describing, but what exactly does a mystery contribute to causation if the event is fully accounted for in physics?

Perhaps I do not understand the usage of the word “account”. There are two possible meanings of your sentence, as far as I can make out:

1. “Account” means “an oral or written description of particular events or situations; a narrative”. Thus, “In any [narrative explanation] of causation, whether implicit or explicit, a relation in terms of space (location) is necessary.”
2. “Account” means “a statement of reasons, causes, explaining some event.” Thus, “In any [statement of explanatory causes] of causation, whether implicit or explicit, a relation in terms of space (location) is necessary.”

The 2nd sentence is redundant and confusing, so I assumed you intended the first sentence. But it is obvious that an “oral or written representation” is a far cry from an “occurrence.” Is there some more technical philosophic or scientific meaning of “account”?

As for infusing, what is it for an immaterial substance to be infused with a physical substance? I’m not against the idea, but I just don’t understand what you mean by “infused”. If immateriality were to be infused in, say, my body wouldn’t it have location? And isn’t that going against the idea of immateriality?

I tend to follow Fosio, and agree with you here. What I mean is, when we talk about “immaterial”, what we really mean is “asensual”, unable to be perceived by our senses. The idea is of a fourth dimension, if you like, in which all our dimensions participate. If you’ve read the book Flatland, you should have a pretty good idea of what I’m getting at.

From a theistic standpoint, this is supported by the prayer in Ephesians “that Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith, [and] that … you may be able to comprehend with all saints what is the breadth, and length, and depth, and height [of] the love of Christ, which passeth knowledge.” There are four dimensions described there. My sense is that they are fully material dimensions, which our senses cannot comprehend. This means God has a location, although it may be (as *many *philosophers have thought) that God is everywhere.

So I guess I agree with you, Anthony, although I’m not so sure about every detail of the argument.

 

[MindOverMatter]

Well, since all events can be accounted for by physics,

You have proof that all events can be accounted for by physics?

and since all physical things are located somewhere, I think Kim is right to argue that a causal relation needs a space relation.

What do you mean by physical things? You mean mass or energy, correct? That these “things” are all located in space, does nothing to show that all causal relationships need a space relation. It just shows that mass and energy are located in space, nothing more. In other words its a circular arguement, for the simple fact that he assumes that the first premise is true with out proving it. He assumes naturalism from the outset.You must prove that the only causal relationships that exist are physical relationships, otherwise you are committing the fallacy of composition

Remember, he doesn’t say that casual relations are space relations.

Space isn’t something thats just their, its apart of physics, and you must account for that to.

Second point, I’m not sure how immaterial causation adds anything but a mystery to any event.

Theres a difference between mystery and a logical problem. An immaterial cause accounts for the logical problem concerning the existence of physics while remaining largely a mystery in itself. I do not see why or how this undermines the logical necessity of a transcendent cause. In respect of its necessity in order to explain physics, the inference is logically valid.

When events can be physically accounted for, immaterial explanations are excess.

Well; when you can show that all physical events can in principle be accounted for, then you might have a point. You are the one that is saying that all reality is physical reality. Since i have ideas that cannot be found in the brain, i would have to say that your statements contradict my experiences.

Third, I think you’re mistaken about the mind. I think physicalism can give a reductive explanation of how the mind works via functional analysis (computational theory).

Well…you can think or believe in what ever you want to believe or think; but making mere statements about physical relationships is never going to make logical sense of mind and free-will. A Group of atoms arranged in a particular pattern says nothing about why i am a person rather then just an object which is what atoms are. At the most, physics reveals a relationship between physical patterns in nature and the actuality of mind. This is not to be confused with making mind and physical objects or patterns synonymous. It only reveals a relationship between two different qualities of being. There is an infinite difference between experiencing an atom and being an atom. That an atom is located in a particular space in time has no descriptive value in terms of explaining why there is such a thing as how some thing “feels like”. Experience in itself is a different order of being despite its relationship to physical events; and anybody that is serious about mind/body philosophy has largely abandoned reductionism. Christians have always known that physical reality has a apart to play in our being human-beings, but there is an obvious qualitative difference between the experience of mind and the relationships of atoms.

 

[Anthony_A]

You have proof that all events can be accounted for by physics?

No, I suppose I don’t have a proof (though I don’t know what kind of proof you are looking for). I guess I understand “causal closure” to mean that when there is a physical event, physics can give an explanation of it.

Suppose I play this childish game and press you for proof that all events cannot be accounted for by physics. What would your proof look like?

What do you mean by physical things? You mean mass or energy, correct? That these “things” are all located in space, does nothing to show that all causal relationships need a space relation. It just shows that mass and energy are located in space, nothing more.

In what case would two things located in space and participating in an event not have a spatial relationship? That goes against the very idea of being located in space. If I am located in space, and you are too, then when we communicate via bulletin board there is a relationship that can be given in terms of location in space. I am here (in texas) at coordinates x,y and you are elsewhere at x’,y’. That seems pretty untouchable.

Space isn’t something thats just their, its apart of physics, and you must account for that to.

Now I’m not a physicist, but I think that when physicists account for space they don’t say “well space can be explained by immateriality - a substance that has no size, weight, extension, charge, location, etc…”. I’m fairly certain they explain it through, you guessed it, physical explanation.

Theres a difference between mystery and a logical problem. An immaterial cause accounts for the logical problem concerning the existence of physics while remaining largely a mystery in itself. I do not see why or how this undermines the logical necessity of a transcendent cause. In respect of its necessity in order to explain physics, the inference is logically valid.

In the case of me lifting my arm and an explanation given in terms of biology, physiology, neurology, physics, and cognitive science, what would I be leaving out? What “room” would there be for a “transcendent” cause?

Well; when you can show that all physical events can in principle be accounted for, then you might have a point. You are the one that is saying that all reality is physical reality. Since i have ideas that cannot be found in the brain, i would have to say that your statements contradict my experiences.

I don’t see how a materialist is commited to saying that ideas can be “found in the brain”. Suppose I say that ideas are not found in the brain, but realized and experienced by the system (the entire human organism) as a whole.

Another thing to note - I don’t experience the earth revolving, yet I know it does. The fact that it revolves directly contradicts my experience of the world, alas the physical theory is true. I also don’t experience the atoms qua atoms that compose my arm - yet my arms are surely composed of atoms and subatomic particles.

Suppose though that you are right (I don’t think you will have trouble doing this), why is it the case that an immaterial mind can think? What makes it coherent that something which is radically unlike any physical structure we have ever seen has the ability to think?

Well…you can think or believe in what ever you want to believe or think; but making mere statements about physical relationships is never going to make logical sense of mind and free-will.

Well when you beg the question like that, how am I ever going to convince you?

A Group of atoms arranged in a particular pattern says nothing about why i am a person rather then just an object which is what atoms are.

A dog is nothing but atoms, yet we don’t interact with them as though they were mere objects. And exactly how is that immateriality explains why you are a person?

At the most, physics reveals a relationship between physical patterns in nature and the actuality of mind. This is not to be confused with making mind and physical objects or patterns synonymous. It only reveals a relationship between two different qualities of being

How do those two qualities of being interact?

Experience in itself is a different order of being despite its relationship to physical events; and anybody that is serious about mind/body philosophy has largely abandoned reductionism.

I suppose a question begging statement like that would work against some one who is not well read in the philosophy of mind. Unfortunately for you, I am not that person. I guess Daniel Dennett, Douglas Hofstadter, Paul and Patricia Churchland, Frank Jackson, Hilary Putnam, Jerry Fodor, John Searle, and countless others are simply “not serious about mind/body philosophy”

 

[MindOverMatter]

I guess Daniel Dennett, Douglas Hofstadter, Paul and Patricia Churchland, Frank Jackson, Hilary Putnam, Jerry Fodor, John Searle, and countless others are simply “not serious about mind/body philosophy”

You got that straight. The people you are talking about here are only interested in finding a natural explanation. They are naturalists by principle and belief. They are not lead to their conclusions by the observable evidence.
As for the rest of your post, you are not conceptually mature enough to debate with me. When you say things like Science has explained the existence of physics or can account for physical reality, i realize that you lack a fundamental understanding about the limits of scientific explanation and inquiry, and that if i want you to understand it will mean that i will have to re-educate you. When i ask you for proof of your claims, and you cannot even give me a straight answer, but instead decide to ask me another question, i know that you don’t really have a clue about what you’re are talking about. I have not the patience, and your attitude tells me that you already think, like your naturalist heroes, that you’re right. Personally i don’t understand why you think it to be logically possible for you to be convinced by somebody like Daniel Dennet when you claim that all things are caused by physical events. If all my thoughts can be reduced to a blind physical cause, then what sense does it make to call them my thoughts or to speak of my mind? I guess i can’t blame you if the only reason you thought to debate me was because of some natural chemical reaction in your brain. Of coarse, how can i challenge you for disagreeing? It is not you thinking or disagreeing with me; i am just talking to blind random/deterministic chemical reactions. That you think that you have a mind or freewill under naturalism or that you think that you can have a rational debate while denying the existence of the two, only leads me to think that you take allot of things for granted. you are not a serious thinker. Of course i could be just bluffing you here to make you think that I know better then you. But thats for you to find out i suppose.

Lets agree to disagree.

Ps. let me know when you find an objective physical idea of an idea of you sitting in a room saying that ideas are physical objects.

Peace.

 

[Anthony_A]

You got that straight. The people you are talking about here are only interested in finding a natural explanation. They are naturalists by principle and belief. They are not lead to their conclusions by the observable evidence.

I’m fairly sure naturalism is committed to conclusions by the observable evidence.

As for the rest of your post, you are not conceptually mature enough to debate with me. When you say things like Science has explained the existence of physics or can account for physical reality, i realize that you lack a fundamental understanding about the limits of scientific explanation and inquiry, and that if i want you to understand it will mean that i will have to re-educate you.

I’m not certain how mature it is for some one to claim conceptual superiority over another without due explanation. I guess that’s up to other readers to decide. My opinion of the matter should be fairly obvious.

When i ask you for proof of your claims, and you cannot even give me a straight answer, but instead decide to ask me another question, i know that you don’t really have a clue about what you’re are talking about. I have not the patience, and your attitude tells me that you already think, like your naturalist heroes, that you’re right.

Actually I did provide answers to your questions. They are as follows:

1. No
   2)Location in space logically entails spatial relations
   3)Physics explains space via physical explanation
   4)The sciences I listed give an exhaustive account of an action
   5)Materialism is not committed to “finding” an idea in the brain
   6)Materialists have a functional “system as whole” response available to them
   7)You are clearly begging the question that a physical account will not answer questions of mind and free will
   8)Being composed of atoms (i use a dog in my example) does not count as being reduced to a mere object
   9)I presented a non-exhaustive list of leading philosophers of mind who are committed to reductionism.

I did present a series of questions to press what I think are insurmountable obstacles to the dualist:

1. What would said proof look like assuming immaterialism?
2. When the sciences account for all the nuances in the action of raising my arm, what room is there for a immaterial explanation?
3. What is it about the nature of immateriality that enables it to think?
4. How is it that immateriality entails personhood?
5. How do immaterial and matter substances interact?

So I presented 9 answers and 5 questions for you to answer. I don’t see how this is unfair or conceptually immature.

Also, I’m not committed to naturalism. The purpose of this thread was to generate ideas for solving the problem posed by Kim. I, like most other people on this board, believe in God and angels. I also believe they interact with each other. But, I also believe Kim posed a philosophically sophisticated objection to their interactions. The problem posed by Kim never claimed to show that God and angels don’t exist, just that assuming their interactions is problematic.

Those philosophers who I listed are not my heros, but I read them because I am interested in the entire field of the philosophy of mind - not just those who agree with me. In fact I disagree with Dennett, Churchlands, and Searle for a number of reasons. I just wanted to prove that there are plenty of reductive materialists who are really “serious”.

Personally i don’t understand why you think it to be logically possible for you to be convinced by somebody like Daniel Dennet when you claim that all things are caused by physical events. If all my thoughts can be reduced to a blind physical cause, then what sense does it make to call them my thoughts or to speak of my mind?

Because you are the organism thinking them, not me. Your example is some what like asking “What’s the use of calling this object a baseball? It’s just a bunch of atoms.” You seem to have a problem with objects, and even animals, being ontologically material because it rids them of worth. I just don’t see how worth is absent in these cases.

I guess i can’t blame you if the only reason you thought to debate me was because of some natural chemical reaction in your brain. Of coarse, how can i challenge you for disagreeing? It is not you thinking or disagreeing with me; i am just talking to blind random/deterministic chemical reactions. That you think that you have a mind or freewill under naturalism or that you think that you can have a rational debate while denying the existence of the two, only leads me to think that you take allot of things for granted.

Again, materialists don’t have to be committed to the sort of nihilism you are accusing me of. That you are talking to an organism composed of molecules and atoms does not logically entail that you are talking to something without the capacity for the functions we call “mind” and “free will”. You are doing a lot of asserting without much argument.

you are not a serious thinker. Of course i could be just bluffing you here to make you think that I know better then you. But thats for you to find out i suppose.

Well I appreciate your (quasi?) honesty.

Lets agree to disagree.

I prefer debate, but if you are throwing in the towel so be it.

Ps. let me know when you find an objective physical idea of an idea of you sitting in a room saying that ideas are physical objects.

Again, materialists are not committed to an idea being a physical object - a bit of data. An idea could be a holistic function of the brain communicating within itself, or interacting with the outside world.

 

[Anthony_A]

I think this is relevant to our debate, MindoverMatter:

Although they are not the “norm”, there are a number of philosophical materialists who are also theists:
Peter van Inwagen (Christian)
Hilary Putnam (Jewish)
Richard Taylor (Theist)
Yujin Nagaswa (Theist)
Kevin Corcoran (Christian)
Wes Morriston (Theist)
Lynn Rudder Baker (Christian)
Hud Hudson (Christian)
Nancy Murphy (Christian)

This is of course not an exhaustive list. These are just some of the more popular names I could think of off the top of my head.

 

[TheWhim]

Okay, I think I’ve seen what the debate ultimately is all about.

The flaw in Kim’s reasoning is that he interprets all causation as mechanistic.

This also was my first idea when reading Kim’s thoughts.

However, as Anthony reminded us, he also takes into consideration ‘intentional causation’(or, like tonyrey calls it, ‘teleological causation’); and thus dismisses it:

Ultimately, these intentional relations must be explained on the basis of causal relations (this is not to say that they are wholly analyzable in terms of causality), and this means that we cannot explain what it is for soul A to pick out soul A* rather than B* except by positing some kind of causal relation that holds for A and A* but not for A and B*.

Well, I always have a strong notion that despite the unaccountable variety of philosophical systems and theories on all different kinds of subjects that can be found, there are really just a few basic concepts, a handful, and a handful of very substantial debates that somehow include, foreshadow, predesign all the finer, more subtle, more artful reflections that fill philosophical or theological textbooks. And such is the case in this instance.

To assume that even intentionality has to be backed up by causality is to give compatibilism the preference above free-agent causation. I myself believe in the latter and have argued for it in this thread: forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?t=326553

Glowingmembers is a true compatibilist and argues his position very forcefully. Everyone will easily perveice that I happen to be rather on the weak side in the intercourse, however, in retrospect I deem that post #35 has some strength to it.

Is free-agent causation possible? - That’s the great question underlying these sublime musings on the angelic behavioural patterns. And, of course, free-agent causation is finally linked to the great, raging debate whether there exists such a thing as human freedom of choice.

I just thought it might be helpful to try and put matters into perspective.

 

[tonyrey]

Actually, Kim does address teleological/purposive causation. He calls it an intentional relation.

Sorry not to have replied sooner. I become involved in too many threads.

I think Kim’s analysis of teleological causation is too restricted. He even admits that teleological causation is not wholly analyzable in terms of causality, i.e. physical causality. The significant feature of teleological causation is that it implies a global view of a process which may include mechanical or mechanistic causation. It need not effect change in an individual object or person, let alone a pair, nor a change in a collection of objects or persons. It can simply direct them towards a future situation or event, such as controlling the course of evolution. On the other hand, it can focus on one individual and effect a change in that individual alone. It can select one mutation out of many, for example, in order to influence the development of a species.

The most significant feature of purposeful activity is that it begins with the end! That is to say, first of all there is the concept of the goal to be attained. Secondly, there is the concept of the means by which this goal can be attained. Thirdly, there is the realization of the means. Fourthly, there is the realization of the end. Not all purposes as clearly defined as this, of course, but it reveals the holistic nature of purpose. Physical causality, on the other hand, is atomistic and limited to the present. This is not surprising because physical causality is created by God for a specific purpose whereas like rationality teleological causality is implicit in God’s creativity.

 

[Anthony_A]

What I meant to say, is that philosophy based on logic is simply a mind game. Anyone can invent a set of axioms, and argue from them against anyone elses axioms and deductions.

There was a catholic priest who came to a theosophical lodge in Baltimore to give a lecture. He began his lecture with a few metaphysical axioms, which to him demonstrated that reincarnation was non-sense. Someone in the audience spoke up and explained that his view was naive, and explained ancient principles of reincarnation that the priest had never studied.

A friend of mine who was there at the lecture said that the priest looked like he was terrified. He quickly packed up his books and papers and left the lodge.

The priest had learned a little logical script that convinced him that reincarnation was non-sense. I am sure it was completely logical and that is why the priest was devoted to it. But he was not enough of a philosopher to know that there is no garauntee that our airtight logical scripts are actually describing our reality.

I think this is a fair concern to raise. The problem, for me at least, is that I don’t see the problem with the axiom he begins with. That’s why I posted this argument. When I read it in the book I was impressed that Kim went beyond the simple question “Well how do immaterial and material things interact?” yet troubled because I didn’t see anything obviously wrong with his argument. I suspect the way to object to Kim will be very nuanced, but I have yet to come up with anything sufficient.