Improbability of Miracles

[Ziggamafu]

Hello all,

Would anyone be able to offer some advice on the following challenge to belief in miracles? Most of you have probably heard of the atheistic “mighty mouse” approach:

How many testimonies of seeing a mouse lift a battleship into the air would you have to listen to before you believed it happened?

The obvious point being that a rational person would never believe it (erroneous because that precludes the possibility of an any unknown or extraordinary phenomenon at all).

Here is the twist:
*
Suppose you substantiated the claims, or you actually witnessed the mouse lift the battleship into the air. Granting that it is therefore reasonable to accept as a historic fact that people perceived the event, isn’t it more logical to then conceive of any natural explanation that is at least hypothetically plausible before accepting that what you perceived was actually as you perceived it (supernatural)?
*

This changes things slightly. For instance the idea would apply to an atheist granting that people did in fact perceive a resurrected Christ, but maintaining that it is nevertheless unreasonable to believe that their perception matched up to actuality rather than accepting a natural explanation that is hypothetically plausible, even if unlikely. An example would be that Christ had a twin who participated in a great magic trick for the sake of selflessly promulgating a reformed vision of Judaism. You get the idea; the atheist insists that a natural explanation must always be preferred to a supernatural explanation unless every hypothetically plausible natural explanation has been ruled out.

In other words, how do we respond to the atheist that allows for the hypothetical possibility of miracles, as well as for the credibility of testimonies to perceptions of miraculous events, but points to the improbability of the supernatural explanation opposed to the natural explanation?

Thanks for any help.

 

[tonyrey]

Suppose you substantiated the claims, or you actually witnessed the mouse lift the battleship into the air. Granting that it is therefore reasonable to accept as a historic fact that people perceived the event, isn’t it more logical to then conceive of any natural explanation that is at least hypothetically plausible before accepting that what you perceived was actually as you perceived it (supernatural)?

No, not if the event had been predicted hundreds of years in advance, witnessed by persons who subsequently were tortured and executed for their testimony and resulted in the foundation of a Church which has survived for over two thousand years…

This changes things slightly. For instance the idea would apply to an atheist granting that people did in fact perceive a resurrected Christ, but maintaining that it is nevertheless unreasonable to believe that their perception matched up to actuality rather than accepting a natural explanation that is hypothetically plausible, even if unlikely.

An example would be that Christ had a twin who participated in a great magic trick for the sake of selflessly promulgating a reformed vision of Judaism. You get the idea; the atheist insists that a natural explanation must always be preferred to a supernatural explanation unless every hypothetically plausible natural explanation has been ruled out.

It is not even hypothetically plausible.

In other words, how do we respond to the atheist that allows for the hypothetical possibility of miracles, as well as for the credibility of testimonies to perceptions of miraculous events, but points to the improbability of the supernatural explanation opposed to the natural explanation?

The question assumes that atheism without miracles is a superior explanation to theism with miracles - which is certainly not the case!

 

[Prof_K]

Given that most of us have never experienced a miracle, at least on that can be proven to defy all natural laws, and have the ability to test whether or not it actually occurred, our belief in miracles relies heavily on our trust in the observations and understanding of others.

What thus continues to amaze me is that people who place their lives in the hands of the observations of others, which, aerospace engineers aside, most of us do every time we step onto an airplane, refuse to believe the testimony of others when it comes to our faith. In short, unless you have actually tested that particular airplane and have the engineering background to know it will fly, you are betting your life on the expertise of the others. Yet we rarely think twice about our level of trust. Conversely, many refuse to believe generations of Christians who claim to have experienced the reality of Christian miracles. Moreover, many of these were so certain of what they experienced, they gave their lives for it. Why according to most non-believers, is trust in the observations of others logical in one area and not in another.

 

[Ziggamafu]

No, not if the event had been predicted hundreds of years in advance, witnessed by persons who subsequently were tortured and executed for their testimony and resulted in the foundation of a Church which has survived for over two thousand years…

The prediction part could be argued to be circumstantial or “reading into things” like a rorschach test; the martyrdom of the Apostles (and any other martyrs who actually witnessed the resurrected Christ) could be argued to be sincere deaths. Again, the idea is that these people really were (obviously) convinced that they saw the resurrected Christ. They even touched him, etc. The point of the argument that was raised to me was the question of whether or not it is more reasonable to conceive of ANY explanation that resorts to natural causes before taking recourse to a supernatural explanation. For instance, let’s say people die rather than lie about seeing a mouse lift a battleship into the air. Obviously they saw what appeared to be a mouse lift a battleship into the air. Is it reasonable to prefer a supernatural “miracle-mouse” to any other hypothetical explanation from nature? Or should a miracle explanation only be opted for when there is no other conceivable natural explanation left to turn to? Another example: say primitive tribesmen come back to their tribe from a journey and claim to have seen a giant metal bird fly through the sky. Would the tribe be more reasonable to pursue a natural, science-based explanation for the airplane or would the tribe be more reasonable to prefer a supernatural or magic-based explanation?

It is not even hypothetically plausible.

Is this or any other nature-based scenario less plausible than a supernatural resurrection? Actually, that’s a distraction from the real issue; since God exists (I have little difficulty in arguing for God’s existence or the historicity of Christ) it is of course plausible that He could work a miracle anytime He wants. The real issue is in probability and reliability in regards to testimony of miracles and critical thought. Which is more likely, that a mouse should lift a battleship or that a person should be deceived? Which is more likely, that a street performer really worked magic or that his trick was a clever illusion? Which is more likely? That angels “move the spheres” (literally, “push the planets”) or that scientific theories on these natural processes are correct?

When it comes to credibility / plausibility / reliability, do we first prefer any natural explanation, or do we allow for supernatural explanations while science-based explanations are still at least a hypothetical option?

The question assumes that atheism without miracles is a superior explanation to theism with miracles - which is certainly not the case!

I don’t know if it is strictly an atheism vs theism situation. I suppose even theists of opposing faiths could find the issue relevant. Theist A says a miracle was worked that directly challenges the faith of Theist B. Theist B comes up with an unlikely - though not impossible - natural explanation. Should the natural argument be preferred to a supernatural explanation?

I am reminded of the claim of Mormons about a miracle of seagulls (something like that…I forget the details, but I was recently told by a friend that it is one of their favorite apologetic stories). I’m sure other examples of miraculous claims could be thought up. Anyway, I think the question assumes that a natural explanation for what at first seems supernatural is superior to a supernatural explanation that is preferred to one or more remaining natural explanations that, even if unlikely, are not as unlikely as a supernatural violation of God’s own created laws of nature.

 

[Ziggamafu]

Given that most of us have never experienced a miracle, at least on that can be proven to defy all natural laws, and have the ability to test whether or not it actually occurred, our belief in miracles relies heavily on our trust in the observations and understanding of others.

What thus continues to amaze me is that people who place their lives in the hands of the observations of others, which, aerospace engineers aside, most of us do every time we step onto an airplane, refuse to believe the testimony of others when it comes to our faith. In short, unless you have actually tested that particular airplane and have the engineering background to know it will fly, you are betting your life on the expertise of the others. Yet we rarely think twice about our level of trust. Conversely, many refuse to believe generations of Christians who claim to have experienced the reality of Christian miracles. Moreover, many of these were so certain of what they experienced, they gave their lives for it. Why according to most non-believers, is trust in the observations of others logical in one area and not in another.

I think more is needed, but my own gut-instinct tells me that your answers is a start in the right direction. I think the CCC says something about the testimony of the Church itself being the greatest apologetic for our faith. Something like that.

 

[DysonSphere]

It is difficult for me to understand how probabilities are assigned to miracles in the first place.

Posited natural events have probabilities associated with them. Because no one can create a deterministic model for God (at least as far as I am aware), there is no probability that can be assigned for a miracle having taken place. The best that can be done, for the believer, is to note that every proposed natural explanation is very unlikely, meaning that by scientific methodology no good answer has yet been determined, and then to assert, likely based on other reasons also, that a miracle occurred.

Take the Miracle at Fatima, for example. No rational person would have thought the event a miracle, however unlikely a natural explanation would have been, if there had not been a prediction of its occurrence.

Nevertheless, science is very limited. It can only say that posited miracles, like those of Fatima and Lourdes, have no good natural explanation, not that they are in fact miracles.

I think the investigators at Lourdes have said as much.

 

[redhen]

How many testimonies of seeing a mouse lift a battleship into the air would you have to listen to before you believed it happened?

The obvious point being that a rational person would never believe it (erroneous because that precludes the possibility of an any unknown or extraordinary phenomenon at all).

I don’t think it’s dependent on being a rational person. Is the claim a live option for that person? Is the possibility of the Greek deity Athena a live option for you?

Suppose you substantiated the claims, or you actually witnessed the mouse lift the battleship into the air. Granting that it is therefore reasonable to accept as a historic fact that people perceived the event, isn’t it more logical to then conceive of any natural explanation that is at least hypothetically plausible before accepting that what you perceived was actually as you perceived it (supernatural)?

I think Hume would say that a miracle has occurred only if all the other explanations are more unbelievable than divine intervention.

This changes things slightly…> snip …the atheist insists that a natural explanation must always be preferred to a supernatural explanation unless every hypothetically plausible natural explanation has been ruled out.

oops, should have read the whole post first.

In other words, how do we respond to the atheist that allows for the hypothetical possibility of miracles, as well as for the credibility of testimonies to perceptions of miraculous events, but points to the improbability of the supernatural explanation opposed to the natural explanation?

Thanks for any help.

Belief is subjective, except for self evident realities. As a bank CEO said once about all the people who lately accepted seemingly favourable credit card offers without bothering to read the fine print; “people believe what they want to believe”.

 

[edwest2]

Here is my current favorite miracle:

catholicnewsagency.com/news/documentary_on_miracle_of_pacocha_submarine_debuts_in_peru/

God bless,
Ed

 

[RobNY]

*Suppose you substantiated the claims, or you actually witnessed the mouse lift the battleship into the air. Granting that it is therefore reasonable to accept as a historic fact that people perceived *the event, isn’t it more logical to then conceive of any natural explanation that is at least hypothetically plausible before accepting that what you perceived was actually as you perceived it (supernatural)?

This changes things slightly. For instance the idea would apply to an atheist granting that people did in fact perceive a resurrected Christ, but maintaining that it is nevertheless unreasonable to believe that their perception matched up to actuality rather than accepting a natural explanation that is hypothetically plausible, even if unlikely. An example would be that Christ had a twin who participated in a great magic trick for the sake of selflessly promulgating a reformed vision of Judaism. You get the idea; the atheist insists that a natural explanation must always be preferred to a supernatural explanation unless every hypothetically plausible natural explanation has been ruled out.

In other words, how do we respond to the atheist that allows for the hypothetical possibility of miracles, as well as for the credibility of testimonies to perceptions of miraculous events, but points to the improbability of the supernatural explanation opposed to the natural explanation?

Thanks for any help.

The Humean trades on an equivocation in the term probability. He fallaciously claims that because an event is (statistically) improbable that we ought to doubt its (intrinsic) probability.

To give you a sense of the difference in terms, statistic probability is a mathematical thing, compiled from many instances. It is a totally different thing than the ‘weight’ or probability of an event based on our perception of it by our reliable sources (e.g., sense perception). Quite clearly, this sort of probability is actually philosophically prior to that of the statistical sort. No statistical probability could ever be constructed without first evaluating individual events as to their ‘weight’ or intrinsic probability, based on their appearance to our reliable sources of knowledge.

The very fact that we are referring to an unique instance and not to many instances should be the dead giveaway that we are not speaking of statistical probability. But the Humean seems utterly ignorant of such a distinction. Statistical probability does not exist with only one instance.

An event may have intrinsic probability but lack ‘statistical’ probability, and even vice versa.

The Humean is simply guilty of a formally invalid argument by reason of his equivocation.

-Rob

 

[DysonSphere]

I don’t understand this at all.

What is the difference between statistic probability and intrinsic probability, giving an example (that has nothing to do with miracles)?

I’m not trained at all in philosophy.

The Humean trades on an equivocation in the term probability. He fallaciously claims that because an event is (statistically) improbable that we ought to doubt its (intrinsic) probability.

To give you a sense of the difference in terms, statistic probability is a mathematical thing, compiled from many instances. It is a totally different thing than the ‘weight’ or probability of an event based on our perception of it by our reliable sources (e.g., sense perception). Quite clearly, this sort of probability is actually philosophically prior to that of the statistical sort. No statistical probability could ever be constructed without first evaluating individual events as to their ‘weight’ or intrinsic probability, based on their appearance to our reliable sources of knowledge.

The very fact that we are referring to an unique instance and not to many instances should be the dead giveaway that we are not speaking of statistical probability. But the Humean seems utterly ignorant of such a distinction. Statistical probability does not exist with only one instance.

An event may have intrinsic probability but lack ‘statistical’ probability, and even vice versa.

The Humean is simply guilty of a formally invalid argument by reason of his equivocation.

-Rob

 

[StevieD]

If you are determined not to believe in miracles, nothing will persuade you. Most self claimed sceptics are not sceptics, they are people who would not believe if God came down and set about them with a chunk of four by two like Emile Zola. He was a very famous and distinguished French writer and ‘freethinker’. Zola travelled to Lourdes by train in 1892 accompanied by several journalists and amid something of a fanfare. Here was one of the most prominent men in France who was going to confront and explain to the world how the miraculous cures claimed there were nothing of the kind. Zola told the press that, if he “saw only a cut finger healed”, in Lourdes then he would believe.

On the train was a young woman called Marie Lemarcheand who shared Zola’s carriage for part of the journey. Marie suffered from lupus of the mouth and nose both of which were almost eaten away and oozed pus, her right arm and leg were also partially paralysed. After several days in Lourdes a doctor working for the Lourdes Medical Commission sought Zola out and told him that a wonderful healing had occurred and asked him to meet the lady involved. It was Marie Lemarcheand who was totally healed, her face having miraculously been reformed and her arms and legs totally healed. And what was Zola’s reaction?

He said “She isn’t very pretty” and walked away! He later said that he would not believe if every sick person in Lourdes were to be healed!

 

[DysonSphere]

If you are determined not to believe in miracles, nothing will persuade you.

There is a certain sense in which this is true. In terms of my own research and experience, I would accept any natural answer, no matter how unlikely, before I would accept that a miracle occurred.

However, if there were a consensus among philosophers that supernatural explanations are valid, I’d likely accept that consensus, because I am not an expert in philosophy and it seems like a good source of truth.

Since philosophers are not even close to consensus on this issue, I will continue with the conclusions I have reached in science: miracles are more unlikely than any natural explanation.

 

[tonyrey]

No, not if the event had been predicted hundreds of years in advance, witnessed by persons who subsequently were tortured and executed for their testimony and resulted in a Church which has survived over two thousand years…

There is not just one factor but a conjunction of factors which increases the probability of a miracle: the prophecies, the eye-witnesses and the subsequent events over a period of two thousand years. You dismiss all that out of hand on the basis of one assumption - that supernatural events are unlikely to happen. How can you prove that?

The point of the argument that was raised to me was the question of whether or not it is more reasonable to conceive of ANY explanation that resorts to natural causes before taking recourse to a supernatural explanation. For instance, let’s say people die rather than lie about seeing a mouse lift a battleship into the air. Is it reasonable to prefer a supernatural “miracle-mouse” to any other hypothetical explanation from nature?

In this instance the supernatural “miracle-mouse” is highly improbable for the simple reason that it has precisely no significance whatsoever!

Another example: say primitive tribesmen come back to their tribe from a journey and claim to have seen a giant metal bird fly through the sky. Would the tribe be more reasonable to pursue a natural, science-based explanation for the airplane or would the tribe be more reasonable to prefer a supernatural or magic-based explanation?

Again there is no reason to resort to a supernatural explanation in our case because we are not primitive tribesmen…

Is this or any other nature-based scenario less plausible than a supernatural resurrection?

Yes! The Resurrection occurred in the specific context of the life and death of the greatest moral Teacher the world has known.

Actually, that’s a distraction from the real issue; since God exists (I have little difficulty in arguing for God’s existence or the historicity of Christ) it is of course plausible that He could work a miracle anytime He wants.

Not necessarily. If it is a situation in which there is no obvious reason to work a miracle it becomes highly implausible - as in the case of the hands of a clock moving backwards.

The real issue is in probability and reliability in regards to testimony of miracles and critical thought. Which is more likely, that a mouse should lift a battleship or that a person should be deceived?

The latter because there is no reason why it should.

Which is more likely, that a street performer really worked magic or that his trick was a clever illusion? Which is more likely? That angels “move the spheres” (literally,“push the planets”) or that scientific theories on these natural processes are correct?

The latter because there is no reason to invoke the supernatural.

When it comes to credibility / plausibility / reliability, do we first prefer any natural explanation, or do we allow for supernatural explanations while science-based explanations are still at least a hypothetical option?

As I have pointed out, it depends on the context. Where miracles have occurred, as in Lourdes, if a cure is instantaneous the onus is on the scientist to explain how it was effected.

The question assumes that atheism without miracles is a superior explanation to theism with miracles - which is certainly not the case!

I don’t know if it is strictly an atheism vs theism situation.

There is no doubt about it because the atheist rejects miracles on principle whereas the theist is open-minded.

I suppose even theists of opposing faiths could find the issue relevant. Theist A says a miracle was worked that directly challenges the faith of Theist B. Theist B comes up with an unlikely - though not impossible - natural explanation. Should the natural argument be preferred to a supernatural explanation?

Once more it depends on the precise context. Why should miracles be confined to members of a particular faith? God is not constrained by human notions of precedence.

I am reminded of the claim of Mormons about a miracle of seagulls (something like that…I forget the details, but I was recently told by a friend that it is one of their favorite apologetic stories). I’m sure other examples of miraculous claims could be thought up. Anyway, I think the question assumes that a natural explanation for what at first seems supernatural is superior to a supernatural explanation that is preferred to one or more remaining natural explanations that, even if unlikely, are not as unlikely as a supernatural violation of God’s own created laws of nature.

It is impossible to assess the value of this claim without more information. The belief that
natural explanations are necessarily more likely than supernatural ones is not even justified on statistical grounds because we have no means of knowing how many unknown miracles occur. In fact God’s created laws of nature have a miraculous origin because they do not have a natural explanation! Our power of reason which can grasp the concept of the entire universe and our power of self-control which enables us to choose to die for absolute strangers are miraculous. We are by no means typical of natural phenomena. To restrict ourselves to so-called “natural” explanations is to be blind to the wonder and beauty of nature itself…

 

[Ridgerunner]

Kind of hard to put myself into an atheist’s frame of mind. The following is difficult to put to words, besides.

I think part of the non-acceptance of particular miracles by atheists might be that many do not have a “context” in which to put them. People of faith, or who are at least open to it, put them into a mental “context” consisting of many things. Faith already there, inklings of God or the supernatural, personal experiences, experiences of those they deem credible or perhaps even an overwhelming sense of wonder at the natural world.

But it would seem to me a committed atheist’s “context” would likely be one of established and quite firm rejection. The story or perhaps even the experience of one miracle might simply “bounce off” the rejecting “context” already established, and there is therefore no “cumulative effect” which, I think, leads or holds many to belief.