In what ways are we humans like computers?

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Computational technology requires human minds to make it work!

As dazzling as these toys are likely to become, they can no more surpass the human mind at being “mindy” than the cart can go faster than the horse pulling it.

ICXC NIKA
 
Computational technology requires human minds to make it work!

As dazzling as these toys are likely to become, they can no more surpass the human mind at being “mindy” than the cart can go faster than the horse pulling it.

ICXC NIKA
And who made the human minds? No, they did not evolve. They were intentionally created for a purpose. It is said that soon, we humans will create biological computers.

huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/29/biological-computer_n_2981753.html
 
And who made the human minds? No, they did not evolve. They were intentionally created for a purpose. It is said that soon, we humans will create biological computers.

huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/29/biological-computer_n_2981753.html
I don’t deal with the issue of evolution. It just is of no interest to me.

But before we can “create biological” anything, I’d expect a lot more to be done in augmentation and regeneration of the human body; we Are nowhere near there yet.
 
And who made the human minds? No, they did not evolve. They were intentionally created for a purpose. It is said that soon, we humans will create biological computers.

huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/29/biological-computer_n_2981753.html
It’s a pity we can’t debate this point, because on this I sharply disagree. I see a lot of evidence that the human brain, like the brains of all vertebrates, is based on a basic model, and various vertebrate lineages have modified the blueprint for various purposes; humans and other higher primates largely to increase cognitive capability.
 
It’s a pity we can’t debate this point, because on this I sharply disagree. I see a lot of evidence that the human brain, like the brains of all vertebrates, is based on a basic model, and various vertebrate lineages have modified the blueprint for various purposes; humans and other higher primates largely to increase cognitive capability.
No, by all means, let’s NOT start another evolution thread.
 
Can you define “reason” here? There are certain kinds of decision making that a computer can make that certainly resemble reasoning, if by that you mean cognition.
A computer a follow instructions. A computer make a decision based on the instructions it was given; even if it was given hundreds. But it cannot exercise common sense.

In other words, a computer can analyze a tomato and determine that it fits the criteria of a fruit. But the computer doesn’t realize it doesn’t belong in a fruit salad.
 
Computers were created to solve complex mathematical problems faster than humans. They are used in cryptography, complex data informatics involving device/vehicle testing and general performance.

Humans are far more complex. Computers have no emotions, no goals and no imagination. In many ways, they are just advanced calculating devices.

Ed
 
In other words, a computer can analyze a tomato and determine that it fits the criteria of a fruit. But the computer doesn’t realize it doesn’t belong in a fruit salad.
I almost feel that by answering the question new ambiguities have been introduced (ex: what is meant by “realize.”).

Btw: the question of whether or not one item “belongs” with another set of items is partially a problem of association (can be described and solved statistically, no human cognition needed) and is partially a matter of tastr, partially from culture (one set of people might think two foods go together, another may not).
 
Yes, that is how the function right now, although eventually, I believe they will try to mimic the human brain to create some kind of artificial intelligence.
Eventually? They have been trying to do that for over 50 years.
If computer technology keeps progressing at the current rate, at some point, it will surpass the human mind…try to imagine what computers will be like in 200 yrs, 500 yrs, 1000 yrs!!
Surpass the human mind in what way? The computer, being a physical thing, will always lack the powers of an intellect and a will, that the human soul has. It will always be a kind of puppet. A machine running processes that simulate whatever the programmer is trying to emulate. It may get better at emulating, but it will never actually be doing the real thing, having a determinate thought, that the human mind does. Since a physical thing is non-determinate by nature.

When you assemble a computer you take material parts from nature and put them together in a way that is artificial. Thus, material like a piece of metal that the computer is made up of is not naturally oriented to do anything except be a piece of metal. Likewise, the intelligence of an A.I. could only ever be artificial. Hence, the term artificial intelligence.
 
I don’t agree with everything Turing had to say on this. Nevertheless I found his comments interesting…
The computer, being a physical thing, will always lack the powers of an intellect and a will, that the human soul has.
Alan Turing:

(1) The Theological Objection
Thinking is a function of man’s immortal soul. God has given an immortal soul to every man and woman, but not to any other animal or to machines. Hence no animal or machine can think.

I am unable to accept any part of this,…]

However, this is mere speculation. I am not very impressed with theological arguments whatever they may be used to support. Such arguments have often been found unsatisfactory in the past. In the time of Galileo it was argued that the texts, “And the sun stood still . . . and hasted not to go down about a whole day” (Joshua x. 13) and “He laid the foundations of the earth, that it should not move at any time” (Psalm cv. 5) were an adequate refutation of the Copernican theory. With our present knowledge such an argument appears futile. When that knowledge was not available it made a quite different
impression.
It will always be a kind of puppet. A machine running processes that simulate whatever the programmer is trying to emulate. It may get better at emulating, but it will never actually be doing the real thing, having a determinate thought, that the human mind does.
Alan Turing:

The Argument from Consciousness
This argument is very, well expressed in Professor Jefferson’s Lister Oration for 1949, from which I quote. “Not until a machine can write a sonnet or compose a concerto because of thoughts and emotions felt, and not by the chance fall of symbols, could we agree that machine equals brain-that is, not only write it but know that it had written it. No mechanism could feel (and not merely artificially signal, an easy contrivance) pleasure at its successes, grief when its valves fuse, be warmed by flattery, be made miserable by its mistakes, be charmed by sex, be angry or depressed when it cannot get
what it wants.”

This argument appears to be a denial of the validity of our test. According to the most extreme form of this view the only way by which one could be sure that machine thinks is to be the machine and to feel oneself thinking. One could then describe these feelings to the world, but of course no one would be justified in taking any notice. Likewise according to this view the only way to know that a man thinks is to be that particular
man. It is in fact the solipsist point of view. It may be the most logical view to hold but it makes communication of ideas difficult. A is liable to believe “A thinks but B does not” whilst B believes “B thinks but A does not.” instead of arguing continually over this point it is usual to have the polite convention that everyone thinks.

I am sure that Professor Jefferson does not wish to adopt the extreme and solipsist point of view. Probably he would be quite willing to accept the imitation game as a test. The game (with the player B omitted) is frequently used in practice under the name of viva voce to discover whether some one really understands something or has “learnt it parrot
fashion.”
 
I don’t agree with everything Turing had to say on this. Nevertheless I found his comments interesting…

Alan Turing:

(1) The Theological Objection
Thinking is a function of man’s immortal soul. God has given an immortal soul to every man and woman, but not to any other animal or to machines. Hence no animal or machine can think.

I am unable to accept any part of this,…]

However, this is mere speculation. I am not very impressed with theological arguments whatever they may be used to support. Such arguments have often been found unsatisfactory in the past. In the time of Galileo it was argued that the texts, “And the sun stood still . . . and hasted not to go down about a whole day” (Joshua x. 13) and “He laid the foundations of the earth, that it should not move at any time” (Psalm cv. 5) were an adequate refutation of the Copernican theory. With our present knowledge such an argument appears futile. When that knowledge was not available it made a quite different
impression.
I don’t see how this has any bearing on anything. I don’t see how Alan’s opinion on theology has any bearing to what I wrote. Since the soul is philosophically understood.
Alan Turing:
The Argument from Consciousness
This argument is very, well expressed in Professor Jefferson’s Lister Oration for 1949, from which I quote. “Not until a machine can write a sonnet or compose a concerto because of thoughts and emotions felt, and not by the chance fall of symbols, could we agree that machine equals brain-that is, not only write it but know that it had written it. No mechanism could feel (and not merely artificially signal, an easy contrivance) pleasure at its successes, grief when its valves fuse, be warmed by flattery, be made miserable by its mistakes, be charmed by sex, be angry or depressed when it cannot get
what it wants.”
This argument appears to be a denial of the validity of our test. According to the most extreme form of this view the only way by which one could be sure that machine thinks is to be the machine and to feel oneself thinking. One could then describe these feelings to the world, but of course no one would be justified in taking any notice. Likewise according to this view the only way to know that a man thinks is to be that particular
man. It is in fact the solipsist point of view. It may be the most logical view to hold but it makes communication of ideas difficult. A is liable to believe “A thinks but B does not” whilst B believes “B thinks but A does not.” instead of arguing continually over this point it is usual to have the polite convention that everyone thinks.
I am sure that Professor Jefferson does not wish to adopt the extreme and solipsist point of view. Probably he would be quite willing to accept the imitation game as a test. The game (with the player B omitted) is frequently used in practice under the name of viva voce to discover whether some one really understands something or has “learnt it parrot
fashion.”
This does not have any bearing over the philosophical argument that physical processes are non-determinate. See below. And therefore can not engage in fornal thinking. Besides, the turing test is not full proof see here. There was a debate I watched on YouTube. Both were materialists. There was the mathematician/A.I. guy vs a philosopher. I can’t find the video now though. But, the philosopher had some arguments that show the turing test does not really tell us if the machine is actually thinking or if it is just emulating.
What Ross, Kripke, et al. are saying when they say that the physical is indeterminate is that no collection of physical facts, and indeed not even the entirety of physical facts, entails any particular meaning rather than another. That would include all the facts about deterministic causation, if causal determinism turned out to be true. For example, even if it so happened that every single time anyone saw Δ or T-R-I-A-N-G-L-E he were rigidly causally determined to utter “That definitely represents triangles, and not a slice of pizza, or a UFO, or some oddball acid jazz music!” there would be nothing about the physical properties of that sequence of sounds, or of its causal relations to any other collection of sounds, brain states, bodily motions, etc., that would by itself entail that the meaning it has is the one we would naturally tend to associate it with.
edwardfeser.blogspot.ca/2013/10/oerter-and-indeterminacy-of-physical.html?m=1
 
So of those who proclaim reductionist arguments against the possibility of (future) computers thinking, is anyone on here willing to say that the human brain does not indeed think or reason, since it is merely a physical thing? Wouldn’t this be the only consistent position if you believe that physical things can not possibly reason?
 
So of those who proclaim reductionist arguments against the possibility of (future) computers thinking, is anyone on here willing to say that the human brain does not indeed think or reason, since it is merely a physical thing? Wouldn’t this be the only consistent position if you believe that physical things can not possibly reason?
I think the ones who are reductionists are the ones who reduce the mind to being merely material. They would reduce the mind to the physical brain. Now there are some atheist philosophers who do that, that conclude that we don’t actually think about anything and our thoughts are an illusion, because they see the weight of arguments about how a physical thing can not actually think about something else. However, that would be imho a crazy position to take. It does not correspond to our experience.

There are though other atheist philosophers who are less reductionistsic that conclude there must be some kind of immaterial mind to account for our ability to think immaterial thoughts.

Hope that answers your question.
 
I think the ones who are reductionists are the ones who reduce the mind to being merely material./QUOTE]

I would argue that perhaps only the non-material aspect of the mind could actually recognize a thought as a thought. But that doesn’t mean that some man-made copy of the brain couldn’t “think”.

Our religion tells us that animals have no immaterial part, and yet they do indeed seem to think and feel. That tells me that these are physical processes. Therefore, I believe that a thinking machine is a real possibility.

That does not mean that these machines would have all human abilities, since they would not possess an immaterial soul as we do. They may functionally be able to do what human beings do and beyond, but have no soul to understand it.
 
fisherman carl;13813775:
I think the ones who are reductionists are the ones who reduce the mind to being merely material./QUOTE]

I would argue that perhaps only the non-material aspect of the mind could actually recognize a thought as a thought. But that doesn’t mean that some man-made copy of the brain couldn’t “think”.

Our religion tells us that animals have no immaterial part, and yet they do indeed seem to think and feel. That tells me that these are physical processes. Therefore, I believe that a thinking machine is a real possibility.

That does not mean that these machines would have all human abilities, since they would not possess an immaterial soul as we do. They may functionally be able to do what human beings do and beyond, but have no soul to understand it.
You are talking about Aristotelean philosophy. If so then it teaches that animals have a soul which includes the vegetative soul powers as well as the powers of the sensitive soul like the ability to move and respond to the environment. The human animal though also has the powers of intellect and will, which the animals do not. Thus, only humans have the power to reason with an intellect. Therefore animals don’t actually think like we do. They can only respond intuitively to sensory (name removed by moderator)uts. Though they are not like machines. Because a machine is not alive. What makes something alive under Thomism is that it has the ability to make immanent causes for its own benefit. Whereas a machine is composed of foreign objects that are not intrinsically ordered to its benefit, but have been artificially constructed. The objects it is composed of may be in fact intrinsically ordered to some other end. For example if it is composed of wood, we know that wood is intrinsically ordered to be a tree, not a machine.

The immaterial nature of abstract thoughts means that it could never be done by a purely physical machine. Something that processes physical data can be done. But, it will never have a mind of its own.
 
SecretCatholic;13966533:
You are talking about Aristotelean philosophy. If so then it teaches that animals have a soul which includes the vegetative soul powers as well as the powers of the sensitive soul like the ability to move and respond to the environment. The human animal though also has the powers of intellect and will, which the animals do not. Thus, only humans have the power to reason with an intellect. Therefore animals don’t actually think like we do. They can only respond intuitively to sensory (name removed by moderator)uts. Though they are not like machines. Because a machine is not alive. What makes something alive under Thomism is that it has the ability to make immanent causes for its own benefit. Whereas a machine is composed of foreign objects that are not intrinsically ordered to its benefit, but have been artificially constructed. The objects it is composed of may be in fact intrinsically ordered to some other end. For example if it is composed of wood, we know that wood is intrinsically ordered to be a tree, not a machine.

The immaterial nature of abstract thoughts means that it could never be done by a purely physical machine. Something that processes physical data can be done. But, it will never have a mind of its own.
I meant animals respond instinctively, not intuitively.
 
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