Your statement above is much too broad. We all reach hundreds of conclusions every day based on common-sense beliefs about how the world works; e.g. that guy in the right lane is going to try and cut in front of me, so I better speed up (or slow down, depending on how you drive).
Right. We operate on models, models that are continually being refined and honed by experience and consequences of the performance of our previous models.
Or take this statement; “Scientific conclusions should be based on valid scientific evidence.” That itself is not an empirical conclusion, but rather a logical philosophical belief.
Actually, that
is an empirical conclusion. It’s what Popper would call “meta-induction” - the analysis of the formation, testing and results of all sorts of scientific endeavors over a long period of time now. The results are strongly coalesced around the idea that adherence to scientific evidence, objective testing and liability to falsification tend to produce superior results in terms of knowledge and its performance over the lack or negation of any of those three. Science as a science experiment, science judged on its own criteria, is a resounding success.
When I say “…as a neuroscientist I do not accept…”, I am implying that my conclusion comes from my professional-level knowledge of the field of neuroscience. When I say “…as a Catholic I do not believe…”, I am talking about a religious belief that I hold that is consistent with my understanding of the body of Catholic teaching.
I do not think that my neuroscientific beliefs and my religious beliefs are contradictory, but that is a whole other discussion.
I can see that it’s fair to say “My Catholic beliefs do not contradict my knowledge as a neuroscientist”. I think’s to be expected – there is a kind of “NOMA” here in a local sense, where the Catholic notions of mind and dualist intellect are just beyond natural science’s scope, and perfectly unfalsifiable.
But the impression that “as a neuroscientist I do not accept” gives (me, at least) is that somehow current neuroscience militates against a materialist view. I’m not a neuroscientists, but in talking to experts who
are, the more we learn – and there’s been a renaissance of sorts in this field in the last decade, as you know – the more robust and complete physical descriptions become. Again, that doesn’t negate dualism (in the non-monist sense), but nothing can.
That reduces, though to physical models that get better and better, but “do not falsify that which I believe in an unfalsifiable way”. Fair enough, but I think it’s misleading as you’ve offered it, as it sounds like neuroscience offers some succor for dualism which I suggest it does not.
-TS