Intention as a font of morality

[Ron_Conte]

There are three fonts (sources) of morality:

[1] the intention, or end, or purpose, or motive, of the person
[2] the moral object, or object, or species, or nature, of the act itself
[3] the circumstances, or consequences, of the intentionally chosen act

Every knowingly chosen act has all three fonts: an intended end (or purpose or motive) for which the act is chosen; the chosen act itself, which is inherently directed at its moral object; the consequences of the chosen act. All three fonts must be good for an act to be moral.

In order for the first font of intention to be good, all that is intended must be good. A bad intention makes any act immoral. However, if the other two fonts are good, and only the bad intention is causing the act to be immoral, then change your intention.

An immoral intended end makes the intention and the overall act immoral. However, if a person intends a good end, but by means of an intrinsically evil act, then the intended means is immoral. Such an intention cannot be said to be moral.

Example: A physician intends the good end of relieving the suffering of his patient. But he intends to use the gravely immoral means of euthanasia to that end. Not only is the act immoral due to an evil moral object (the killing of an innocent person), but the first font of intention is also immoral. No one can claim that their intention is good, if they intend to use an evil means to a good end. The end does not justify the means. And so an evil intended means is not justified by a good intended end.

 

[katrntogo]

… No one can claim that their intention is good, if they intend to use an evil means to a good end. The end does not justify the means. And so an evil intended means is not justified by a good intended end.

Perhaps I am not looking at this correctly, but I believe it would depend on what the “means” is, I think it would be up to God to decide in each individual case. To use an example that has been used before:

the intent: good - to protect hidden Jews
the means: bad - lying when asked if one has any in their house & they do
the end: good - the Jews are safe

 

[Ron_Conte]

Perhaps I am not looking at this correctly, but I believe it would depend on what the “means” is, I think it would be up to God to decide in each individual case. To use an example that has been used before:

the intent: good - to protect hidden Jews
the means: bad - lying when asked if one has any in their house & they do
the end: good - the Jews are safe

Three Fonts:

1. The intended end, to protect innocent persons, is good. But the intended means is immoral, and so the intention is also immoral. It is never moral to intended to commit an intrinsically evil act.
2. Lying has an evil moral object, the deprivation of truth from an assertion. Therefore, lying is intrinsically evil and always immoral.
3. The end result that the innocent persons are safe is a consequence, in the third font.

The first and second fonts are bad, so the act is immoral.
It is our responsability to judge whether or not an act is moral, so that we can avoid sin.

 

[thistle]

Three Fonts:

1. The intended end, to protect innocent persons, is good. But the intended means is immoral, and so the intention is also immoral. It is never moral to intended to commit an intrinsically evil act.
2. Lying has an evil moral object, the deprivation of truth from an assertion. Therefore, lying is intrinsically evil and always immoral.
3. The end result that the innocent persons are safe is a consequence, in the third font.

The first and second fonts are bad, so the act is immoral.
It is our responsability to judge whether or not an act is moral, so that we can avoid sin.

Although lying is immoral, the example given by the other poster would not have meant the person lying had committed a mortal sin.

 

[chrysostim83]

A small point. There seems to be a frank contradiction here:

The intended end, to protect innocent persons, is good. But the intended means is immoral, and so the intention is also immoral.

Either the intention is good or it is immoral. Which is it? The option I would take is to say that the means are no part of the intention, so that even though the agent selects a bad means, this does not reflect poorly on his intention.

Now to a more important point. The case of lying to save someone’s life from unjust and unappeasable aggressors is similar to one Plato considers: suppose X lends his weapon to Y and then later demand it back while he’s in a most agitated and murderous state. Plato says Y is bound not to return the weapon, even though Y’s action could be construed as theft. A good reason for agreeing with Plato would be that to return the weapon would make Y an accomplice in any murder X might be about to commit.

Likewise, in the situation where Anne Frank’s hidden away in the house and Nazis are knocking at the door, you are pretty much bound to lie to the Nazis on pain of becoming an accomplice to genocide.

Perhaps we could say the true object of lying involves the right of the person deceived to know the truth; because of their intentions, the Nazis had no such right. So when you “lie” to them, your action is really less like procuring the conviction of an innocent person, and more like the sensible precaution of keep Fraulein Frank out of plain sight.

 

[Ron_Conte]

Although lying is immoral, the example given by the other poster would not have meant the person lying had committed a mortal sin.

Yes, that’s right. Lying is always immoral, but not always gravely immoral.

 

[Ron_Conte]

A small point. There seems to be a frank contradiction here:

Either the intention is good or it is immoral. Which is it? The option I would take is to say that the means are no part of the intention, so that even though the agent selects a bad means, this does not reflect poorly on his intention.

St. Thomas teaches that one intention includes the intended means as well as the intended end.
Summa, I-II, Q. 12. A. 1-4, esp. A. 3.
newadvent.org/summa/2012.htm

Now to a more important point. The case of lying to save someone’s life from unjust and unappeasable aggressors is similar to one Plato considers: suppose X lends his weapon to Y and then later demand it back while he’s in a most agitated and murderous state. Plato says Y is bound not to return the weapon, even though Y’s action could be construed as theft. A good reason for agreeing with Plato would be that to return the weapon would make Y an accomplice in any murder X might be about to commit.

Likewise, in the situation where Anne Frank’s hidden away in the house and Nazis are knocking at the door, you are pretty much bound to lie to the Nazis on pain of becoming an accomplice to genocide.

Perhaps we could say the true object of lying involves the right of the person deceived to know the truth; because of their intentions, the Nazis had no such right. So when you “lie” to them, your action is really less like procuring the conviction of an innocent person, and more like the sensible precaution of keep Fraulein Frank out of plain sight.

You are contradicting the teaching of the Church that intrinsically evil acts are always immoral, regardless of intention or circumstances. Lying is intrinsically evil and always immoral (but not always gravely immoral).

Like so very many posts in this discussion group, you are answering questions on matters of faith and morals from your own thoughts alone, with no regard for the writings of the Saints and Doctors of the Church, for Sacred Scripture, or for the teachings of the Magisterium.

[Sirach]
{7:13} Do not love a lie against your brother, nor should you act the same toward your friend.
{7:14} Do not be willing to devise a lie of any kind. For the practice of lying is not good.

[John]
{14:6} Jesus said to him: “I am the Way, and the Truth, and the Life. No one comes to the Father, except through me.”

St. Thomas Aquinas: “An action that is naturally evil in respect of its genus can by no means be good and lawful, since in order for an action to be good it must be right in every respect: because good results from a complete cause, while evil results from any single defect, as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now a lie is evil in respect of its genus, since it is an action bearing on undue matter…… A lie is sinful not only because it injures one’s neighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness…. Therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger whatever.”

Pope John Paul II: “The negative precepts of the natural law are universally valid. They oblige each and every individual, always and in every circumstance. It is a matter of prohibitions which forbid a given action semper et pro semper, without exception, because the choice of this kind of behaviour is in no case compatible with the goodness of the will of the acting person, with his vocation to life with God and to communion with his neighbour. It is prohibited — to everyone and in every case — to violate these precepts. They oblige everyone, regardless of the cost, never to offend in anyone, beginning with oneself, the personal dignity common to all.”
Veritatis Splendor, n. 52

Lying is intrinsically evil, and therefore always immoral.

 

[chrysostim83]

You are absolutely right. I looked up Thomas Aquinas after my post (as well as ye olde Catholic encyclopedia, Romanus Cessario’s introduction to moral theology, and—just to see what the opposition says—Charles Curran). All except Curran agree with the Catechism that a lie is simply false speech or action intended to lead another into error.

Anyway, I’ve been meaning to give up this bad habit of looking at these forums. Perhaps your shrill, uncharitable, and unsatisfactory reply was the shove I needed to carry out this intention. (A satisfactory reply would have begun: "The right of the other to know the truth is not part of the moral object of lying because . . . ")

 

[chrysostim83]

After pointing out the unsatisfactory nature of Ron’s answer, I had rather hoped he would attempt to give a satisfactory one. Here is a sample of the kind of response I had in mind:

To the small point, there was no need to cite St. Thomas Aquinas, since it is obvious that I was inadvertently confusing “intended end” with “intention.”

To the large point: One may cite authorities such as the Magisterium, the Doctors and Fathers of the Church and so on, in order to establish what the correct answer is, but it is necessary (at least for me) to go on and answer the argument I gave in order to show why that answer is correct.

Now my argument was essentially this: Just as Plato’s example forces us to recognize that the object of stealing includes more than the taking of another’s property, so also the Nazi example should force us to recognize that the object of lying includes more than the telling of an untruth in order to deceive. So the question is, what’s fishy about this bit of reasoning?

The most plausible answer attacks the assumptions behind the “just as. . . , so also . . .” construction in the argument by pointing to a clear difference between the values of property and truth. Specifically, Plato’s example does indeed do what the argument says it does, but this is only possible because the value of property is relative to the value of life. In fact, as reason suggests, and nearly any political philosopher confirms, the whole institution of property exists merely to serve human life. In contrast, the Anne Frank example does not show that the object of lying needs to be reconsidered, because the value of truth is not relative to the value of life. The reason why this is so is a bit metaphysical, but St. Thomas Aquinas, for example, has shown that truth is a transcendental value, and from there it follows that truth cannot be relative to anything at all. A fortiori, the value of truth is not relative to the value of life, and it is evil deliberately to tell a falsehood even in order to save someone’s life.

So ultimately, the answer to my post is: “The moral object of lying does not include the right of the person deceived to know the truth, because of the special sort of value that belongs to truth.”

That’s just about it. All I have now is curiosity why Ron didn’t give me an answer along these lines, rather than merely hitting me over the head with a bunch of quotes. Moral theologians generally receive instruction in philosophical ethics, and I would expect one who was writing a textbook to be familiar with the argument I posed. The only possible answer seems to be that Ron wanted to conceal from me the ways in which reason recommends the Church’s moral teaching. I beg pardon for whatever I’ve done to deserve such a vote of no confidence, and I hope that Ron will be kinder to the readers of his forthcoming book, most of whom would no doubt benefit from the occasional argument drawn from reason.

 

[thistle]

After pointing out the unsatisfactory nature of Ron’s answer, I had rather hoped he would attempt to give a satisfactory one. Here is a sample of the kind of response I had in mind:

To the small point, there was no need to cite St. Thomas Aquinas, since it is obvious that I was inadvertently confusing “intended end” with “intention.”

To the large point: One may cite authorities such as the Magisterium, the Doctors and Fathers of the Church and so on, in order to establish what the correct answer is, but it is necessary (at least for me) to go on and answer the argument I gave in order to show why that answer is correct.

Now my argument was essentially this: Just as Plato’s example forces us to recognize that the object of stealing includes more than the taking of another’s property, so also the Nazi example should force us to recognize that the object of lying includes more than the telling of an untruth in order to deceive. So the question is, what’s fishy about this bit of reasoning?

The most plausible answer attacks the assumptions behind the “just as. . . , so also . . .” construction in the argument by pointing to a clear difference between the values of property and truth. Specifically, Plato’s example does indeed do what the argument says it does, but this is only possible because the value of property is relative to the value of life. In fact, as reason suggests, and nearly any political philosopher confirms, the whole institution of property exists merely to serve human life. In contrast, the Anne Frank example does not show that the object of lying needs to be reconsidered, because the value of truth is not relative to the value of life. The reason why this is so is a bit metaphysical, but St. Thomas Aquinas, for example, has shown that truth is a transcendental value, and from there it follows that truth cannot be relative to anything at all. A fortiori, the value of truth is not relative to the value of life, and it is evil deliberately to tell a falsehood even in order to save someone’s life.

So ultimately, the answer to my post is: “The moral object of lying does not include the right of the person deceived to know the truth, because of the special sort of value that belongs to truth.”

That’s just about it. All I have now is curiosity why Ron didn’t give me an answer along these lines, rather than merely hitting me over the head with a bunch of quotes. Moral theologians generally receive instruction in philosophical ethics, and I would expect one who was writing a textbook to be familiar with the argument I posed. The only possible answer seems to be that Ron wanted to conceal from me the ways in which reason recommends the Church’s moral teaching. I beg pardon for whatever I’ve done to deserve such a vote of no confidence, and **I hope that Ron will be kinder to the readers of his forthcoming book, **most of whom would no doubt benefit from the occasional argument drawn from reason.

I wouldn’t bet on it. I for one will not be a reader anyway. The more people read HIS books and HIS translation of the Bible will simply feed his lust for self importance and glorification. We are only supposed to believe what he tells us and he is contemptuous of anyone who dares say that we should eagerly read and refer to the Catechism of the Catholic Church to find out what the Church teaches. In other threads he calls this idolatry and a mortal sin. Does he need help or what??

 

[Blink]

Discussions like these ignore some realities of the situation. For instance, in Italy during WWII, a person who was found harboring Jews (or Allied soldiers) would be killed, while the Jews and soldiers would merely be captured. So, harboring Jews was a brave thing to do.

If the Nazi’s come knocking at your door, b/c some Jews or soldiers were reported in your building, but they don’t have time to search every home, and they are pointing guns at you, what should you do? Not lie and give up the Jews? Aren’t you then cooperating with the evil of the Nazi’s? Is that really lying?

The Roman Catholic Church was discretely cooperating with civil authorities to issue fake birth certificates, change names, change passports, and do other types of forgery to protect and conceal Jews, and permit them to travel elsewhere, if possible. Did this violate the 8th Commandment?

These are realities. You cannot cast them aside as hypotheticals. This really happened. Ron, was the Church wrong to cooperate with civil authorities to engage in fraud to protect the Jews from evil? Is an individual wrong to lie to the Nazi’s at the door? Must we cooperate with evil?

 

[Ron_Conte]

These are realities. You cannot cast them aside as hypotheticals. This really happened. Ron, was the Church wrong to cooperate with civil authorities to engage in fraud to protect the Jews from evil? Is an individual wrong to lie to the Nazi’s at the door? Must we cooperate with evil?

Decisions of the temporal authority of the Church are not teachings. Also, cooperation with the sin of another person may or may not be moral, depending on whether the cooperation is explicit or implicit, formal or material, immediate or mediate.

The Church definitively teaches that every intrinsically evil act is always immoral, regardless of intention or circumstances. It is always a sin, at least a venial sin, to tell a lie because God is truth.

Since God is Truth, all lying offends God, regardless of intention or circumstances. God is Truth, therefore all lying is immoral.

St. Thomas Aquinas: “An action that is naturally evil in respect of its genus can by no means be good and lawful, since in order for an action to be good it must be right in every respect: because good results from a complete cause, while evil results from any single defect, as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now a lie is evil in respect of its genus, since it is an action bearing on undue matter…… A lie is sinful not only because it injures one’s neighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness…. Therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger whatever.”
(Summa, II-II, Q. 110, A. 3.)

Suppose that a man tells a venial lie in order to keep several innocent persons from being unjustly put to death. The lie remains a venial sin, despite the good intentions and the good consequences. The good intention remains good; the good consequences remain good; the moral object remains immoral. A thousand good acts do not justify the smallest bad act, nor do a thousand bad acts corrupt the smallest good act. Nothing is more essential or more fundamental to the eternal moral law than the distinction and separation between good and evil. Good acts do not justify bad acts, and bad acts do not corrupt good acts. Whatever is good remains good; whatever is bad remains bad.

Saint Catherine of Siena: “The light of discretion (which proceeds from love, as I have told thee) gives to the neighbor a conditioned love, one that, being ordered aright, does not cause the injury of sin to self in order to be useful to others, for, if one single sin were committed to save the whole world from Hell, or to obtain one great virtue, the motive would not be a rightly ordered or discreet love, but rather indiscreet, for it is not lawful to perform even one act of great virtue and profit to others, by means of the guilt of sin.”
(Dialogue of Saint Catherine of Siena, n. 42)

 

[Soler]

There seems to be a fair amount of unwarranted vitriol being thrown in Ron Conte’s face. I saw nothing objectionable in his posts on this thread.

Perhaps some of the confusion may arise from the fact that, as far as I know, an earlier edition of the CCC specified that telling a falsehood with the intention of deceiving was not a lie if the person hearing it did not have “a right to the truth”. This clause is absent from the current editio typica.

 

[Blink]

Decisions of the temporal authority of the Church are not teachings. Also, cooperation with the sin of another person may or may not be moral, depending on whether the cooperation is explicit or implicit, formal or material, immediate or mediate.

Decisions are never teachings. Decisions are acts. If the acts are guided by a proper understanding of Catholic teachings, then the acts will be properly ordered and moral. This is not just an ivory tower discussion. The question is what acts are morally proper.

So, the questions are:

(1) Was the Church wrong (did their acts fail to comport with Catholic teaching) when it cooperated with civil authorities to engage in fraud to protect the Jews from evil? These appear (to me) to be the type of lying that would normally constitute mortal sins.

(2) Is an individual wrong to lie to the Nazi’s at the door?

(3) Must we cooperate with evil by telling the Nazi’s where the Jews or Allied soldiers are hiding?

I appreciate your understanding of the faith. You started this thread. Can you give concrete answers to the above questions?

For anyone interested in a historical perspective, there is a movie called “A Debt to Honor” which specifically discusses the Church’s cooperation with civil authorities to forge documents, birth certificates, and passports, to smuggle and save the lives of Jews. Also, “The Scarlet and the Black” with Gregory Peck is based on this.

Remember, those Italians (in Rome, under Nazi occupation) who hid Jews would be executed if they were caught.

 

[Ron_Conte]

(1) Was the Church wrong (did their acts fail to comport with Catholic teaching) when it cooperated with civil authorities to engage in fraud to protect the Jews from evil? These appear (to me) to be the type of lying that would normally constitute mortal sins.

I don’t know the specifics of this situation, as to which acts were done by which individual persons. It is not correct to attribute the decision of a few Church leaders to the Church as a whole.

(2) Is an individual wrong to lie to the Nazi’s at the door?

Lying is intrinsically evil and always immoral. See the quotes and citations I presented above.

(3) Must we cooperate with evil by telling the Nazi’s where the Jews or Allied soldiers are hiding?

Morally, you have the options of remaining silent, using mental reservations, or even of using force to protect the innocent. Lying in this situation is a venial sin.

This is not an open question; it is settled doctrine that intrinsically evil acts are always immoral.

 

[Blink]

You answered (2) and (3).

If you have not seen “A Debt to Honor,” about the Nazi occupation of Rome, let me make question (1) more precise.

Is it, or was, it permissible for Catholic priests to consort with civil authorities to make fraudulent baptismal certificates, birth certificates, passports, etc. so as to hide the identity of Jews or to assist in transporting them out of Rome?

 

[Ron_Conte]

Is it, or was, it permissible for Catholic priests to consort with civil authorities to make fraudulent baptismal certificates, birth certificates, passports, etc. so as to hide the identity of Jews or to assist in transporting them out of Rome?

In my opinion, those persons who created fraudulent documents were committing a venial sin by lying, and those persons who created fraudulent baptismal certificates were committing a more serious sin (but perhaps still venial) because the lie pertains to a Sacrament.