Interacting with a pro-choice individual on their terms

[Portofino]

The problem is that it’s not even a scientific argument. You can’t find dignity or rights in an unborn child using science not because the unborn child doesn’t have dignity or rights but because you couldn’t find them in an adult human either.

It is a philosophical claim that human fetuses are not human persons. Any metric for determining personhood (law, intelligence, capability to feel pain, etc.) is necessarily arbitrary and constructed. Such a metric cannot be more substantial than the claim that human fetuses are persons.QUOTE]

There are religious beliefs whereby the soul does not enter the body of a new human being until birth and the taking of the first breath. That may be an unproven belief, but it at least does not mean that the different status of a born human being and an unborn human being is arbitrary. They believe that ensoulment does not occur in utero because the human body is a vehicle for human experience, and that the human body is not “ready” to be a vehicle of that human experience until the moment of birth.

According to this same standard, meat is not murder because animals are not ensouled. A human corpse is not ensouled either, but is still accorded respect because of its connection – physical, not spiritual – with the human family. A human corpse is not a person, yet we accord it more respect and care, even dignity, than mere “road kill,” for example.

This may be neither here nor there, in arguments for abortion within the context of a secular society, but it interestingly is an illustration of how the exact nature of abortion has long been a topic of debate throughout history, in one manner or another. After all, a corpse is genetically human, but does not have the legal status of a person. A fetus, unlike a corpse, is alive, but it belies our expression “a living, breathing human being”; it has a heartbeat, but it has not yet taken its first breath. As one article on the subject puts it (neither a pro-choice nor a pro-life article), “The fetus does not actually breathe in the womb. The mother breathes for the fetus, and essential oxygen is passed to the fetus through the umbilical cord.” The mother, as it were, is the “life support” of the fetus – even though, in a medical context, it is not considered murder to take someone off life support.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ensoulment

 

[polytropos]

There are religious beliefs whereby the soul does not enter the body of a new human being until birth and the taking of the first breath. That may be an unproven belief, but it at least does not mean that the different status of a born human being and an unborn human being is arbitrary. They believe that ensoulment does not occur in utero because the human body is a vehicle for human experience, and that the human body is not “ready” to be a vehicle of that human experience until the moment of birth.

One could hold that belief. I would disagree that the human body is not a vehicle of human experience until birth - since a fetus experiences some things (like its mother’s voice) while it is in the womb. Are those valid experiences? Who knows.

I would also debate whether a human’s readiness for experience would determine when it gets a soul - if we are believing in the soul as an actual ontological entity. Fetuses do not have as many experiences as born humans. Even if the soul is only useful to humans who are having experiences, it does not follow that a human does not have a soul prior to its needing one. The fetus, as you say, does not breathe in the womb - but it does have lungs.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Just off the cuff here…

In our day and age, the theory that the soul is endowed upon the body at some point after conception is completely ad hoc. If you were to say that it gets instilled sometime before or during birth, why not say it gets instilled after birth?

I just don’t understand the motivation for such a view, unless it is simply an excuse to object to pro-life political policies.

There are religious beliefs whereby the soul does not enter the body of a new human being until birth and the taking of the first breath. That may be an unproven belief, but it at least does not mean that the different status of a born human being and an unborn human being is arbitrary.

It is the very DEFINITION of arbitrary, to say that – in the absence of any evidence – the soul is endowed at *this *time rather than that, especially if this time is after the “home” of the soul actually exists.

 

[Portofino]

It is the very DEFINITION of arbitrary, to say that – in the absence of any evidence – the soul is endowed at *this *time rather than that, especially if this time is after the “home” of the soul actually exists.

That’s a strong point, I grant – until you ask the question whether a fertilized zygote, or an embryo, already has “a soul” (think of in vitro fertilization, for example, where more embryos are created than are “needed”; a Catholic believes that the destruction of that embryo is immortal but probably would stop short of saying that the embryo possesses an “immortal soul” or even that the destruction of that embryo is murder). Ensoulment would have to occur at a precise moment in time, though it’s hard to say at what precise moment that is.

In any case, I found this interesting article on the subject (catholiceducation.org), of which the following is an excerpt:

"This declaration expressly leaves aside the question of the moment when the spiritual soul is infused. There is not a unanimous tradition on this point and authors are as yet in disagreement. For some it dates from the first instant; for others it could not at least precede nidation [implantation in the uterus]. It is not within the competence of science to decide between these views, because the existence of an immortal soul is not a question in its field. It is a philosophical problem from which our moral affirmation remains independent.

That being said, the moral teaching of the Church is that the human embryo must be treated as if it were already ensouled, even if it might not yet be so. It must be treated as if it were a person from the moment of conception, even if there exists the theoretical possibility that it might not yet be so. Why this rather subtle, nuanced position, instead of simply declaring outright that zygotes are ensouled, and therefore are persons? First, because there has never been a unanimous tradition on this point; and second, because the precise timing of ensoulment/personhood of the human embryo is irrelevant to the question of whether or not we may ever destroy such embryos for research or other purposes.

Interestingly, ensoulment has been discussed for centuries, and so-called delayed ensoulment was probably the norm for most of Christian history, with immediate ensoulment gaining some serious momentum of its own beginning in the 1600s (and representing the position most widely held today). Augustine seemed to shift his opinion back and forth during his lifetime between immediate and delayed ensoulment. In the 1200s, Thomas Aquinas held that human ensoulment occurred not right at the first instant, but at a time-point removed from the beginning. This, he argued, would enable the matter of the embryo to undergo development and become “apt” for the reception of an immortal soul from God (by passing through simpler initial stages involving “vegetative” and “animative” souls). Even today in various quarters, the discussions continue, with new embryological details like twinning and chimerization impinging upon the debate, and new conceptual questions arising from the intricate biology surrounding totipotency and pluripotency.

Any destructive action against them as they move along the continuum of their development disrupts the entire future time line of that person. In other words, the embryo exists as a whole, living member of the human species, and when destroyed, that particular individual has perished. Every human embryo, thus, is unique and sacrosanct, and should not be cannibalized for stem cell extraction.

We must recognize that it is God’s business as to precisely when He ensouls embryos. We do not need an answer to this fascinating and speculative theological question, like counting angels on the head of a pin, in order to grasp the fundamental truth that human embryos are inviolable and deserving of unconditional respect at every stage of their existence."

catholiceducation.org/articles/medical_ethics/me0116.htm

 

[Prodigal_Son]

A bit of background for that debate about ensoulment: until the last 200 years or so, scientists believed that a baby developed from the sperm alone – no egg at all. Thus, it would have been arbitrary to say that it received a soul at the moment it came into the womb. But to say that it is ensouled the moment a sperm and an egg combine is not arbitrary, for this is the very moment when – uncontroversially – something exists that did not exist before: an organism.

Aquinas didn’t know about this moment. Insofar as the concept of ensoulment continues to be controversial among Catholics, I suspect this is because some Catholics feel uncomfortable having to be so obstinately pro-life. Maybe I’m too cynical. I hope so.

 

[polytropos]

Insofar as the concept of ensoulment continues to be controversial among Catholics, I suspect this is because some Catholics feel uncomfortable having to be so obstinately pro-life. Maybe I’m too cynical. I hope so.

Not only that, but so long as it is not certain, other Catholic moral principles oblige us to take the safer route (which is the conclusion of the article posted by Portofino).

There is also the matter that even if ensoulment were delayed, abortion would be morally wrong for the same reasons that contraception is, although it would be more difficult to converse with someone who is pro choice on that topic.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Not only that, but so long as it is not certain, other Catholic moral principles oblige us to take the safer route (which is the conclusion of the article posted by Portofino).

Yup, when there’s uncertainty, err on the safe side. Which is what I try to say about climate change too, but that’s another story…

 

[Least]

Repeated in other threads: “If you are from a “blue state” you are part of the problem. If you have a (D) after your name, the problem is part of you.”

 

[Muze]

Yup, when there’s uncertainty, err on the safe side. Which is what I try to say about climate change too, but that’s another story…

The safe side of climate change is not killing thousands of people by driving up energy prices because of a baseless hypothesis.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

The safe side of climate change is not killing thousands of people by driving up energy prices because of a baseless hypothesis.

Driving up energy prices kills thousands of people. Really? Which people? And how exactly is the death of thousands of people proportional with the potential annihilation of the habitat of all human beings?

(I really didn’t mean to get sidetracked onto this subject. Sorry, everyone!)

 

[Innoruk]

When a woman engage in coitus with a man and willingly allows him to release sperm into her reproductive system, she consents to to use of her body to gestate a fetus to term. And thus, even if a woman has a right to her own body, the consent given means she has an obligation to fulfill.

It doesn’t matter what means she took to prevent pregnancy, it is universally known that sex produces offspring. And, as such, when offspring are produced, the woman contented to it forming there and consented to the use of her body until birth.

And thus the argument about a woman’s right to her body falls apart on the issue of her consent to give up that right for a period of time.

Let’s see another example of the same “principle”. If a person gets into a car, she is aware that during the drive she MAY be involved in an accident. She MAY be driving defensively, she MAY use her seat belt, her car MAY be equipped with air-bags… but it is still possible that she MAY be involved in an accident (is it not amazing how close this parallel is?). Does that mean that she “consented” to have an accident? Does it mean that she “consented” to the consequences of that accident? Obviously not! She may be aware that an accident MAY happen, but to tell her, that she CONSENTED to the accident is ridiculous.

In case of an accident, would she be obliged to forego medical treatment to get rid of the unwanted consequences of that accident? Should she wait “patiently” as her wounds will heal on their own? Why should she? About 95% of all the sexual encounters is NOT about achieving a conception. For those people conception is an accident, an unwanted outcome.

To be aware of a possible outcome, to try to minimize the possibility of that outcome does not mean “consent” to that outcome. So you should reconsider your argument, since it simply does not work in its current form.

 

[polytropos]

Let’s see another example of the same “principle”. If a person gets into a car, she is aware that during the drive she MAY be involved in an accident. She MAY be driving defensively, she MAY use her seat belt, her car MAY be equipped with air-bags… but it is still possible that she MAY be involved in an accident (is it not amazing how close this parallel is?). Does that mean that she “consented” to have an accident? Does it mean that she “consented” to the consequences of that accident? Obviously not! She may be aware that an accident MAY happen, but to tell her, that she CONSENTED to the accident is ridiculous.

Fair analogy so far.

In case of an accident, would she be obliged to forego medical treatment to get rid of the unwanted consequences of that accident? Should she wait “patiently” as her wounds will heal on their own? Why should she? About 95% of all the sexual encounters is NOT about achieving a conception. For those people conception is an accident, an unwanted outcome.

And this is where it falls apart. A pregnancy, even an unwanted pregnancy, is not analogous to “her wounds.”

The larger problem with your analogy is that the woman is the only person in it. There is no justification for the burden that your analogy places on the woman. By contrast, there is another biological being involved in an abortion scenario. So the situation is more like this:

A woman is in a car crash. There are two victims, the woman and another person. Her right to bodily autonomy, guaranteed by our great nation, entitles her to a choice: heal in 9 months, or heal immediately by killing the other person.

Muze’s argument is not wholly successful because it is an argument against a woman’s right to do whatever she wants with her body, but on its own it is not a positive argument against abortion. ie. someone may not have a right to watch TV, but that doesn’t mean they can’t watch TV. Muze at best demonstrates that women are not entitled to abortions, not that they morally cannot have one.

 

[Portofino]

Don’t get me wrong, I’m anti-abortion, and I think the unborn ought to be afforded fundamental rights including life.

However, since the actual scientific argument about when life begins becomes a mire, I came up with another tack for dealing with the pro-choice argument on their terms.

Effectively, they say that abortion is a woman’s right because it’s her body and she has the right to do what she wishes with it.

I don’t think you are likely to convince any pro-choicers with that argument; they will simply say, “a woman has a right to do with her body as she pleases, both before *and *after she becomes pregnant.” You are saying that, by having consensual intercourse, she has already consented to carrying the child for nine months, and giving birth. That is going even farther than saying that, by having consensual intercourse, she has already consented to getting pregnant.

Obviously, one can consent to something – assuming that’s what it is – and then change one’s mind. You presumably do not believe that one should have the choice to revise one’s opinion, at any time; obviously, a pro-choice individual does believe that a woman has the choice, even if she said “yes” to the pregnancy during week one and subsequently said “no” to the pregnancy during week two.

But this is the whole difference of opinion, anyway – that it should not be a choice. Your argument that “the choice has already been made; there is no choice thereafter” is not likely to convince anyone who is pro-choice, who could simply say, “one chooses, and then one chooses again; one has the right to change one’s mind.”

 

[Prodigal_Son]

I don’t think you are likely to convince any pro-choicers with that argument; they will simply say, “a woman has a right to do with her body as she pleases, both before *and *after she becomes pregnant.” You are saying that, by having consensual intercourse, she has already consented to carrying the child for nine months, and giving birth. That is going even farther than saying that, by having consensual intercourse, she has already consented to getting pregnant.

Obviously, one can consent to something – assuming that’s what it is – and then change one’s mind. You presumably do not believe that one should have the choice to revise one’s opinion, at any time; obviously, a pro-choice individual does believe that a woman has the choice, even if she said “yes” to the pregnancy during week one and subsequently said “no” to the pregnancy during week two.

But this is the whole difference of opinion, anyway – that it should not be a choice. Your argument that “the choice has already been made; there is no choice thereafter” is not likely to convince anyone who is pro-choice, who could simply say, “one chooses, and then one chooses again; one has the right to change one’s mind.”

This is why the consent argument needs a second prong, which involves the moral status of the infant in the womb. But, with this second prong, we see that the infant is not the sort of thing you can change your mind about. As I said before, if I pick up my niece to bring her home from school, so long as the niece is with me, she is my responsibility – I cannot withdraw consent.

 

[polytropos]

This is why the consent argument needs a second prong, which involves the moral status of the infant in the womb. But, with this second prong, we see that the infant is not the sort of thing you can change your mind about. As I said before, if I pick up my niece to bring her home from school, so long as the niece is with me, she is my responsibility – I cannot withdraw consent.

Indeed. One is allowed to make reparations for an unintended consequence if the reparations are morally neutral. One is not allowed to make reparations when the reparations are morally wrong. So the argument still hinges on the moral status of the infant.

 

[Innoruk]

Fair analogy so far.

I am glad that we have some agreement. The point was that there is no CONSENT involved by embanking on a course of events which can have unintended consequences. This makes the OP’s stance already incorrect.

And this is where it falls apart. A pregnancy, even an unwanted pregnancy, is not analogous to “her wounds.”

The larger problem with your analogy is that the woman is the only person in it. There is no justification for the burden that your analogy places on the woman. By contrast, there is another biological being involved in an abortion scenario. So the situation is more like this:

A woman is in a car crash. There are two victims, the woman and another person. Her right to bodily autonomy, guaranteed by our great nation, entitles her to a choice: heal in 9 months, or heal immediately by killing the other person.

Ok. No analogy is ever perfect, so let me give a more precise one. The word “killing” already has emotional overtones, so I am not going to use it. I will say that she declines the access to her own bodily resources. A morning-after pill simply prevents the implantation of the zygote in the uterus wall, it does not “kill” the zygote.

So, let’s consider that there is another real, true-blue human being involved (not just a few cells or a zygote). There was an accident, and there is no one to fault. The other person will die if the driver (the woman) does not consent to give up some of her bodily resources. Is she under obligation to provide those bodily resources? For example, to give up one of her kidneys? (We know that one can survive with one kidney.) As far as I know there is no legal or moral imperative which would demand that she should give up a kidney.

Let’s consider a blood transfusion, which is less intrusive than giving up one kidney. She could save the life of the other person, is she consented to a blood transfusion (blood is a renewable bodily resource, unlike a kidney). Is there a legal or moral imperative that she should do so? Not as far as I know of.

Let’s go one step further. Suppose the driver dies in the accident, but her body is available for organs to be harvested. Even in this case it would be unacceptable to cut her up to save the lives of several other persons - unless she gave that permission beforehand. (Personally, I do not agree with this. I would say that the needs of living human beings should supersede the “rights” of a cadaver. But that is just me.) The point is that our bodily integrity even survives our death.

So the woman is under no obligation to provide bodily resources for the zygote or the fetus, just like she cannot be forced to provide those resources to an accident victim - EVEN IF she would be responsible for the accident.

 

[Portofino]

I am glad that we have some agreement. The point was that there is no CONSENT involved by embanking on a course of events which can have unintended consequences. This makes the OP’s stance already incorrect.

Ok. No analogy is ever perfect, so let me give a more precise one. The word “killing” already has emotional overtones, so I am not going to use it. I will say that she declines the access to her own bodily resources. A morning-after pill simply prevents the implantation of the zygote in the uterus wall, it does not “kill” the zygote.

So, let’s consider that there is another real, true-blue human being involved (not just a few cells or a zygote). There was an accident, and there is no one to fault. The other person will die if the driver (the woman) does not consent to give up some of her bodily resources. Is she under obligation to provide those bodily resources? For example, to give up one of her kidneys? (We know that one can survive with one kidney.) As far as I know there is no legal or moral imperative which would demand that she should give up a kidney.

Let’s consider a blood transfusion, which is less intrusive than giving up one kidney. She could save the life of the other person, is she consented to a blood transfusion (blood is a renewable bodily resource, unlike a kidney). Is there a legal or moral imperative that she should do so? Not as far as I know of.

Let’s go one step further. Suppose the driver dies in the accident, but her body is available for organs to be harvested. Even in this case it would be unacceptable to cut her up to save the lives of several other persons - unless she gave that permission beforehand. (Personally, I do not agree with this. I would say that the needs of living human beings should supersede the “rights” of a cadaver. But that is just me.) The point is that our bodily integrity even survives our death.

So the woman is under no obligation to provide bodily resources for the zygote or the fetus, just like she cannot be forced to provide those resources to an accident victim - EVEN IF she would be responsible for the accident.

Yes; it occurred to me that pro-life arguments do not simply necessitate saying, “the unborn have the same privileges as the born.” Rather, it is necessary to maintain that the unborn have special privileges that the born do not.

In other words, it would not be permissible to open up the belly of a woman who is twelve weeks pregnant, detach the umbilical cord, and say “if the baby does not survive, it is through no fault of the mother, who has no longer offered her consent to act as its life support.”

In the world that we live in, no one is obligated to give blood or to donate organs (though some states have legislated Good Samaritan laws, whereby one is obliged to help those in distress). It is arguably the right, the moral thing to do, but no one will be forced to do so; at worst, forcing someone to do so is comparable to forced servitude, or to “appropriating” what they consider their private property (their blood, their organs).

Just the whole crux of the problem is right there, as I think you’ve pointed out – the fetus’ survival before approximately 23 weeks depends on the consent of the mother to continue to be a host, a form of life support; if she no longer consents, can you force her? For nine months, are her “habitual” civil rights forfeited?

Even if the fetus has civil rights, it is not yet viable on its own; thus, the mother would have to forfeit her own civil rights, assuming she does not consent to remain pregnant.

By that logic, why not force folks to give blood, or to donate organs? Why should the organ donor card be optional? Why not make it as compulsory as jury duty? So I think you bring up real issues.

For that matter, why not mandate that you house the homeless? Without the warmth that your shelter could provide, that person could freeze to death (during times of war, there is the “quartering” of soldiers).

 

[polytropos]

The word “killing” already has emotional overtones, so I am not going to use it. I will say that she declines the access to her own bodily resources. A morning-after pill simply prevents the implantation of the zygote in the uterus wall, it does not “kill” the zygote.

Killing is a pretty standard term for the ending of something’s life, and a zygote/fetus is a living thing. One may argue that it does not have legal or moral rights, but one cannot soundly argue that it is not alive.

You can shift the situation to the use of a morning-after pill which does not kill directly, but that is a different scenario. You cease to argue about abortion and begin arguing about contraception (which is immoral for other reasons). If you are arguing only about scenarios in which killing does not directly occur, then you have retracted your analogy so that it does not apply to most abortions (or to abortifacients).

So, let’s consider that there is another real, true-blue human being involved (not just a few cells or a zygote).

Naturally, I disagree with your terminology.

There was an accident, and there is no one to fault. The other person will die if the driver (the woman) does not consent to give up some of her bodily resources. Is she under obligation to provide those bodily resources? For example, to give up one of her kidneys? (We know that one can survive with one kidney.) As far as I know there is no legal or moral imperative which would demand that she should give up a kidney.

Let’s consider a blood transfusion, which is less intrusive than giving up one kidney. She could save the life of the other person, is she consented to a blood transfusion (blood is a renewable bodily resource, unlike a kidney). Is there a legal or moral imperative that she should do so? Not as far as I know of.

Let’s go one step further. Suppose the driver dies in the accident, but her body is available for organs to be harvested. Even in this case it would be unacceptable to cut her up to save the lives of several other persons - unless she gave that permission beforehand. (Personally, I do not agree with this. I would say that the needs of living human beings should supersede the “rights” of a cadaver. But that is just me.) The point is that our bodily integrity even survives our death.

So the woman is under no obligation to provide bodily resources for the zygote or the fetus, just like she cannot be forced to provide those resources to an accident victim - EVEN IF she would be responsible for the accident.

You are essentially drawing the famous violinist analogy, ie. even if a fetus is a person, the woman’s right to bodily autonomy entitles her to kill it.

A few comments:

• This still is not a proper analogy. In the case of organ donation, the woman is not obligated to act to save the other victim; she does not have to give up even any of her extra organs. But the parallel of inaction in the abortion case is not to have an abortion.
• Again, the woman is not obligated to take action. What she cannot do is take positive action to kill the other person; her action cannot cause the other victim’s death. In the case of most abortions, they do. So you must substantially retract the case for abortion in order for this analogy to hold.
• She has already “consented to give up some of her bodily resources” if she is pregnant. Now, if it were possible for the woman to revoke that consent morally, then that would be another case, but if revoking of that case consists in actively killing the fetus/other victim, then she is not morally justified in doing so.
• The right to bodily autonomy is not absolute anyway, although arguments over abortion often act as though it is. People are not entitled to do whatever they want with everything they own - including their bodies. Suicide, the ban on soft drinks in New York, self-mutilation, etc. are all examples (of varying level of extremity and controversy) of things that we are not considered entitled to do.

 

[polytropos]

In the world that we live in, no one is obligated to give blood or to donate organs (though some states have legislated Good Samaritan laws, whereby one is obliged to help those in distress). It is arguably the right, the moral thing to do, but no one will be forced to do so; at worst, forcing someone to do so is comparable to forced servitude, or to “appropriating” what they consider their private property (their blood, their organs).

Just the whole crux of the problem is right there, as I think you’ve pointed out – the fetus’ survival before approximately 23 weeks depends on the consent of the mother to continue to be a host, a form of life support; if she no longer consents, can you force her? For nine months, are her “habitual” civil rights forfeited?

The thing is, no external thing is forcing her to act as a host. Her body takes the biologically normal route and consents for her. This is why revoking consent of pregnancy is not analogous to unplugging from the theoretical violinist - because there is no way to “unplug.” In the violinist analogy - in any medical analogy where the woman’s right to her body conflicts with another agent’s right to life - you can unplug or elect not to give away your kidney, but you can’t slash the violinist’s neck. So as long as abortion involves the active killing of another person, it is not analogous to situations in which the woman is not obligated to donate her organs etc.

 

[polytropos]

No one is proposing that a doctor has the right to take a woman’s kidney, against her will, and give it to someone else, even if that person needs it.

What is proposed is that, if a woman gives her kidney away, she is not allowed to kill in order to get it back.