Let’s start with an average grown-up human, called Joe. Joe is a person. Let’s remove each of his organs and substitute them with artificial prosthesis. His personhood is unaffected as long as his mind is in good working order. Now let’s see what happens when Joe’s body stays intact, but his higher brain functions are gone, and he enters into a persistent vegetative state. Is he still a “person”? What happens when a simple snip of a scalpel removes the connection between the frontal lobe and the rest of the brain - lobotomy? Is the lobotomized human still a “person” without any traits of “personality”?
The bolded statement presupposes your conclusion. Your definition holds only if you smuggle the definition into your proof. It is not self-evident that “His personhood is unaffected as long as his mind is in good working order.”
It’s also fine to say that a working mind is the criteria for personhood, but given that mental development and (later in life) degradation are gradual processes, it is not very applicable. A “persistent vegetative state” also may be appealed to in theoretical contexts, but does not account so clearly for practical cases, like a coma. At what point do we decide that the vegetative state is “peristent”? Are we then allowed to violate the rights that the “person” allegedely no longer has?
I would consider lobotomites and those in vegetative states to be persons, because they satisfy my (below) definition for personhood.
If you disagree, then present your definitions, so we can discuss it.
My definition is simple and bears the least risk of killing anyone who ought not to be violated:
Each distinct, biologically alive, genetically human organism is a
human person.
Note that, to avoid ambiguity, each term in this definition is consistent with the specialized science of biology. By
alive, I am of course referring to the biological definition of life, not some nebulous alternate term for personhood. The organism must be a member of the human species. It would follow, naturally, from this definition that personhood begins at conception.
You will note that this definition is coherent and functional. It also makes a lot of sense that my personhood would begin when I become a discrete, unique entity, rather than at an arbitrary point determined by an inconsistent and poorly defined metric like intelligence, mind, etc.
Not true. There are no “natural rights”, that is true. Rights are granted by someone who is in the position to enforce those granted rights. Before you ask, the definition of a “right” is: “a permission to do (or not to do) something without the fear of repercussions”. It is always granted by the “strong” to the “weak” - currently by the governments to the governed.
What I said (that you have no rational basis for rights) is true. You are not appealing to reason here. You are appealing to rights through power, which allows for them to be arbitrary and unreasonable.
As for your definition of rights, it seems a little lacking. “To do (or not to do)” would seem to only to apply to, let’s say, “active rights,” the rights in which you are either entitled to taking some action or not taking some action. It does not account for “passive rights.” For instance, the right to bodily autonomy is not always active; in the case of rape, it is passive. You have a right
not to be raped, which has nothing to do with permission granted for you to take action or not.
In any case, the position that there are no natural rights is fine to hold philosophically, but the American legal system operates as though there were natural rights. It is not codified in the least that rights are dictated simply by those who have power. It’s not clear what this would mean for any sort of activism. Should activists all just stop because they are opposing the present “rights”?
Correct me, if I am mistaken, but last time I heard the defining characteristic of “humanness” is the existence of an “immortal soul”. Before it is “instilled” (whatever that means) you cannot speak of a “human” being - according to the church. So it is absolutely mandatory to p(name removed by moderator)oint the “ensoulment”.
No, you are correct, the defining characteristic of humanness is the existence of an immortal soul. I hope I did not give the impression that it is not. My point is that the specific moment does not actually have to be specified. Why? Say we are not sure whether the fetus is a person; let’s say, for the sake of example, that we are split between ensoulment at conception and ensoulment at implantation. We are still morally obligated to
act as though ensoulment occurs at conception, because if it does and we act as though it occurs later, then we are committing murder. Ignorance obliges us to choose the safer option.
All according to the Catholic Church, of course. Not to mention the fact that abortion, even if the fetus were not ensouled, would be at least as immoral as contraception since it subjectifies the creative importance of the sexual act. But all this theological stuff need not be discussed here. It’s not secular and I don’t expect you to accept it.
And yes, I also think that this discussion has run its course. Thank you for your (name removed by moderator)ut.
I apologize for continuing. At the top, you asked me to provide my definition of personhood, so I did, and responded to the rest. I swear I wasn’t trying to get the last word. Maybe a little. Feel free to ignore this post if you’re done with this discussion. I enjoyed debating with you and would be glad to continue elsewhere.
And what is the moment of pregnancy? At the point of the fusion of the sperm and the egg? Or is it the point of the zygote imbedding in the uterus? So many loosely defined terms!
Your predictive powers are insufficient.