Interacting with a pro-choice individual on their terms

[Innoruk]

It will be important to clarify, before starting, that I am not speaking of human persons before defining them, ie. my definition is not tautological in any sense. It contains the term “human person” only because that is what I am defining. “Human person” is a predicate nominative, so yes, I am equating “human person” with a “distinct, biologically alive, genetically human organism” on the other side of the predicate.

“Human person” is its own, self-contained concept, whereas my other use of the word “human” is biological. If it would make things clearer, you could respond instead to this definition:

A person is a distinct, biologically alive, genetically human organism.

It makes no difference.

Ok. Let’s use your definition as a starting point. Let’s go back to that hypothetical Joe in a previous post. Please analyze what happens during the transformation process (of replacing the biological organs with artificial counterparts). The stopping point - for the time being - is the cyborg, with the original brain and fully artificial body. What does your definition say about this entity? Is “it” a person or not?

Now if you would say that this entity is not a person any more, then I hope you will explain, why not?

However, if you would say that it is still a person, then let’s continue the thought experiment. In the second phase we shall replace one neuron at a time with a functionally equivalent artificial counterpart. Does the “personhood” of this being continue during this process, or does it cease somewhere?

After all at the end of this procedure there will be no biologically active organism left, it will have no DNA, however, it will still act a human does. It may be that you will only encounter this being through a remote procedure, and you can only form your opinion based upon a Turing-test like conversation. (I am aware that this is only a thought experiment, and it cannot be put to practice for the foreseeable future. However the process is theoretically feasible, so I hope you will not brush it off as being “impossible” or too farfetched. I hope you are not inclined to do that.)

 

[Innoruk]

a “human” as in a member of the species homo sapiens sapiens, which is (colloquially) synonymous with “human being”.

True, but I am looking for more than a colloquial usage of the word.

if a “being” is only a self-sustaining organism, then infants aren’t “beings”, and neither is any individual requiring medical aid, for example.

I disagree. Those entities are not biologically contingent upon someone else. They may require outside assistance, but that is different.

 

[Portofino]

Each distinct, biologically alive, genetically human organism is a human person.QUOTE]

As I see it there are two competing definitions of human personhood:

—your definition above (“each distinct, biologically alive, genetically human organism”

–each distinct, biologically alive, genetically human organism that has known an independent existence (viability), whereby its survival as a human organism is not dependent, but is rather independent, of any other human organism

I make no claims to the second definition being properly worded, scientifically, but I believe that is what the pro-choice definition of a human individual, per Roe v. Wade, entails.

The first definition, obviously, is much “cleaner” as a concept, yet involves ambiguities; for example:

–if a fertilized embryo is already a person, does that mean that a sperm or an egg is half a person? Presumably not – 1/2 a person = no person.

–as a side note, there is a troubling fact to human personhood beginning at conception, and that is the fact that upwards of 50 to 80% of zygotes or embryos never survive implantation. That suggests billions of human beings who do not survive the first 10 days of their fully human personhood, and it is throws a huge burden on the problem of evil, and at least raises the question as to why we are not weeping for so many terminated human lives (just because someone is not murdered, does not mean you cannot weep for them, or grieve their destruction)

–if a zygote (of a finite number of cells) is already a human person, then our definition of personhood is obviously much broader than common sense would dictate; not all human persons would even be recognizable as human and you could not, through the naked eye alone, necessarily distinguish between the embryo of a piglet (whose life is not inviolable) and the embryo of a human (whose life is presumed to be inviolable)

Regarding erring on the side of safety – why are we so confident that killing an animal is not murder? Why are we not erring on the side of caution? Are Christians comfortable because it’s always been done, and because their Scripture tells them that human life is worth more than animal life? I don’t see any rational proof in this, just presumption. It could be mere human narcissism; of course we are going to believe that we are worth more than other forms of life around us. Are we not biased?

For many passionate, morally committed individuals, all of us non-vegetarians are callous murderers of mammals with nerve endings, with enough sentience to feel anxiety and even terror. Like that proverbial pro-choice individual, we like to turn a blind eye to the similarities between us and other mammals, and exaggerate the differences.

This may be neither here nor there, but from this I draw the conclusion that everyone is someone else’s moral monster; as passionately as pro-life individuals excoriate pro-choice individuals for their callousness, regarding the termination of fetuses that may not be conscious or feel pain, so carnivores are excoriated for their “indifference” towards the termination of the lives of fellow sentient beings who are conscious and can feel pain. That is not even a silent scream, but an audible scream – and we turn a deaf ear to it.

So sure, everyone draws the line somewhere, and there are no easy answers, I think, as to precisely where the line should be drawn.

 

[john_doran]

True, but I am looking for more than a colloquial usage of the word.

just use “human being” as a synonym for “member of the species homo sapiens sapiens”.

or are you suggesting that there are “humans” who are not also “human beings”? so that there are “humans”, “human beings”, and “human persons”?

Innoruk:

I disagree. Those entities are not biologically contingent upon someone else. They may require outside assistance, but that is different.

what’s the difference between being “self-sustaining” and “biologically contingent”?

how is an infant any less dependent/contingent on outside assistance than a fetus? an infant requires feeding and protection from the environment no less than a fetus, it’s only the method of satisfaction of those needs that varies; the need itself is the same. ditto for anyone requiring medical assistance.

 

[Innoruk]

just use “human being” as a synonym for “member of the species homo sapiens sapiens”.

The trouble here is that there is no thing as “human DNA” - which is the foundation of “home sapiens sapiens” or “home sapiens idioticus” There is an undefined range of DNA which we associate with “humans”. Human DNA is about 99% same of the DNA of the higher apes, so mere DNA is not much of definition.

or are you suggesting that there are “humans” who are not also “human beings”? so that there are “humans”, “human beings”, and “human persons”?

Even if there would be rigorously defined tolerance limits for what constitutes “human DNA”, I would still differentiate between “human tissue”, “human being” and “human person”. I would like to direct your attention to my reply to polytropos as a starting conversation about “personhood”. Let’s make a very simplified definition here: “a person is as person does” - borrowed from Forrest Gump, of course. Moreover, I would suggest that “personhood” should be defined independently from “humanity”. If we would ever encounter a “being” from another planet, it would not share our DNA, and as long as it behaved as a “person”, it should be considered to be a person. Likewise if - by some genetic mutation - dolphins would exhibit the traits of personhood, they should be considered a person. Finally, if a totally artificial being (perhaps made of silicon chips) would behave as a “person”, it should be awarded a “person” status.

what’s the difference between being “self-sustaining” and “biologically contingent”?

how is an infant any less dependent/contingent on outside assistance than a fetus? an infant requires feeding and protection from the environment no less than a fetus, it’s only the method of satisfaction of those needs that varies; the need itself is the same. ditto for anyone requiring medical assistance.

The difference is slim, but it is there. A biologically independent being can be sustained by anyone else, or even by properly designed machine. A biologically dependent entity cannot - though I accept that this is a question of technology. If technology would allow exogenesis, the problem of abortion would probably disappear; the woman could simply donate the fertilized egg to a proper facility, where the zygote could be brought to term.

 

[Portofino]

If technology would allow exogenesis, the problem of abortion would probably disappear; the woman could simply donate the fertilized egg to a proper facility, where the zygote could be brought to term.

I’ve tried to bring this up before, myself (on other threads) – maybe not pointedly enough, because it didn’t generate much interest. It would certainly make things a lot easier because there wouldn’t be the issue of a woman who is three weeks pregnant being hell-bent on terminating the pregnancy, who then feels she is being dragged “kicking and screaming” through the remaining nine months of pregnancy (including morning sickness and possible complications) followed by giving birth (which could be quite painful, even dangerous to her health, as childbirth poses natural risks to a mother’s health and well-being). The only sure-fire way to prevent her from aborting, of course, would be to put her in a detention center where she was under 24-hour surveillance, coupled with psychological counseling. It would be a lot like a suicide watch, and just as demanding.

However, I don’t think a Catholic would go for it, as a Catholic would maintain a fetus has no business gestating anywhere outside it’s mother’s womb, whether it be in an artificial environment, or in the womb of someone who is not it’s mother.

And it’s fair to say that there are women who wouldn’t want to “deal” with what you are describing, psychologically, just as there are women who do not want to “deal”, psychologically, with giving a child up for adoption (though I personally don’t think I’m in a position to judge them, just as I don’t think I’m in a position to judge a rape victim who does not want to “deal” with giving birth to the child that results; what one person calls an “inconvenience”, seeking to belittle the mother for being so petty and selfish, is, for another, hell on earth).

 

[Innoruk]

I’ve tried to bring this up before, myself (on other threads) – maybe not pointedly enough, because it didn’t generate much interest. It would certainly make things a lot easier because there wouldn’t be the issue of a woman who is three weeks pregnant being hell-bent on terminating the pregnancy, who then feels she is being dragged “kicking and screaming” through the remaining nine months of pregnancy (including morning sickness and possible complications) followed by giving birth (which could be quite painful, even dangerous to her health, as childbirth poses natural risks to a mother’s health and well-being). The only sure-fire way to prevent her from aborting, of course, would be to put her in a detention center where she was under 24-hour surveillance, coupled with psychological counseling. It would be a lot like a suicide watch, and just as demanding.

However, I don’t think a Catholic would go for it, as a Catholic would maintain a fetus has no business gestating anywhere outside it’s mother’s womb, whether it be in an artificial environment, or in the womb of someone who is not it’s mother.

And it’s fair to say that there are women who wouldn’t want to “deal” with what you are describing, psychologically, just as there are women who do not want to “deal”, psychologically, with giving a child up for adoption (though I personally don’t think I’m in a position to judge them, just as I don’t think I’m in a position to judge a rape victim who does not want to “deal” with giving birth to the child that results; what one person calls an “inconvenience”, seeking to belittle the mother for being so petty and selfish, is, for another, hell on earth).

I am sure you are right about it. Of course if there would be a God, and that God would really wish for us to have sex coupled with procreation, then a rational God would choose one of two methods:

1. to make sure that we are just like the other lower animals, who only wish to have sex in the time of estrus, or
2. to make sure that conception can only occur if both parties would endorse the outcome volitionally.

 

[Portofino]

I am sure you are right about it. Of course if there would be a God, and that God would really wish for us to have sex coupled with procreation, then a rational God would choose one of two methods:

1. to make sure that we are just like the other lower animals, who only wish to have sex in the time of estrus, or
2. to make sure that conception can only occur if both parties would endorse the outcome volitionally.

Ha – well, there’s the issue of free will, of course, this idea that humans are given responsibility and are expected to exercise it. In a safer universe, one’s bad decisions would only impact oneself, not impact others, yet I could still see the argument according to which, if you did not have the freedom to do evil towards others, you also wouldn’t have the freedom to do good towards others.

The whole origin of why sexuality is such an, at times, overwhelming temptation (rare is the individual who does not find some outlet for it, whether alone or in company) is rather paradoxical, from a theistic viewpoint. Even if one is Christian and attributes it to the Fall, it would have to make human beings creators – because, otherwise, human beings presumably would not have the power to create their own genes and hormones; in other words, we have no control over the fact that they have a sex drive, only control over how we respond to that sex drive.

If humans are not creators of nature (e.g., we did not create our DNA) then it means that, with or without the Fall, such strong concupiscence (well explainable through its value for survival) would have to have been created by *God *(again, neither human beings, nor Satan, are creators of human DNA or of human biochemistry). In other words, God would be deliberately making it difficult for us, challenging – and yes, with quite a high failure rate, resulting in quite a great deal of collateral damage. If teenagers did not have “surging hormones”, for instance, there would be a lot less “sexual misconduct” and teen pregnancies; yet only God, and no one else, could have *created *surging hormones in the first place.

As far as I understand, the Catholic view is that concupiscence was a consequence of the Fall; but, again, this doesn’t make sense to me, because human free will would have to have been capable of re-molding nature itself (as mentioned above, human DNA and biochemistry), practically making us into co-creators of nature.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

The difference is slim, but it is there. A biologically independent being can be sustained by anyone else, or even by properly designed machine. A biologically dependent entity cannot - though I accept that this is a question of technology.

:ehh:

So you say that an infant could be sustained by a properly designed machine, and admit that a fetus could also be sustained by a properly designed machine. And yet babies are beings and fetuses are not?

No comprende.

 

[polytropos]

Ok. Let’s use your definition as a starting point. Let’s go back to that hypothetical Joe in a previous post. Please analyze what happens during the transformation process (of replacing the biological organs with artificial counterparts). The stopping point - for the time being - is the cyborg, with the original brain and fully artificial body. What does your definition say about this entity? Is “it” a person or not?

Now if you would say that this entity is not a person any more, then I hope you will explain, why not?

I would, most likely, regard this “cyborg” as a person. The brain is still genetically human and is the only remaining, living component of an organism that was a human. It’s still Joe.

We will neglect the fact that there has never been an example of your hypothetical cyborg, person or not. My definition’s clarity is impacted less by this hypothetical entity than yours is by the fact that a “working mind” is a completely arbitrary basis.

However, if you would say that it is still a person, then let’s continue the thought experiment. In the second phase we shall replace one neuron at a time with a functionally equivalent artificial counterpart. Does the “personhood” of this being continue during this process, or does it cease somewhere?

There is absolutely no evidence that this will ever be possible. Neurobiology is nowhere near developed enough to be able to 1). identify the function of a specific neuron and 2). replace that neuron. It does not even begin to discount my definition of personhood.

After all at the end of this procedure there will be no biologically active organism left, it will have no DNA, however, it will still act a human does. It may be that you will only encounter this being through a remote procedure, and you can only form your opinion based upon a Turing-test like conversation. (I am aware that this is only a thought experiment, and it cannot be put to practice for the foreseeable future. However the process is theoretically feasible, so I hope you will not brush it off as being “impossible” or too farfetched. I hope you are not inclined to do that.)

I do not know what would happen if your hypothetical modifications were possible. Maybe we will find out in a few hundred or thousand years. For now, let’s create a definition that derives its certainty, applicability, and unambiguity from its scientific basis. If your pseudoscience ever comes into being, we can then think about how it influences my definition.

Your thought experiment is not “theoretically feasible.” The assumption that one could replace the brain with a non-biological machine and still have a being that “acts as a human does” is completely unsubstantiated and unwarranted.

I know you don’t want me to brush your objection off as impossible or farfetched, but really, it is pure conjecture, assumption after assumption. There are real problems in applicability in defining personhood by mind, whereas there are currently no problems in applicability in defining personhood as I have. Even if everything you have posited will ever be medically possible, it would be hundreds of years off and has no bearing on what we’re discussing now.

 

[polytropos]

–each distinct, biologically alive, genetically human organism that has known an independent existence (viability), whereby its survival as a human organism is not dependent, but is rather independent, of any other human organism

I make no claims to the second definition being properly worded, scientifically, but I believe that is what the pro-choice definition of a human individual, per Roe v. Wade, entails.

I don’t mean to nitpick too much, since as you admit, it’s not perfectly stated. But this does raise other obvious questions about personhood by viability. A late-term fetus is “viable” in the sense that medical professionals can work hard to make it survive outside of the womb. But it is much, much later before a human organism is actually independent of other human organisms… one could argue that many adults living in society are not quite independent of others.

Certainly toddlers and other young children are still greatly dependent on their parents or caretakers, but there is not much dispute as to whether they are humans (just by certain abhorrent bioethicists).

–if a fertilized embryo is already a person, does that mean that a sperm or an egg is half a person? Presumably not – 1/2 a person = no person.

Of course not. Guided by the definition, we will note that neither an egg nor a sperm cell have all of the DNA necessary for human existence; they are not quite genetically human and are not, on their own, included in the human species. The other reason is that we will be sensible and consult biology; sperm and eggs are created by individual organisms in order to produce more individual organisms.

–as a side note, there is a troubling fact to human personhood beginning at conception, and that is the fact that upwards of 50 to 80% of zygotes or embryos never survive implantation. That suggests billions of human beings who do not survive the first 10 days of their fully human personhood, and it is throws a huge burden on the problem of evil, and at least raises the question as to why we are not weeping for so many terminated human lives (just because someone is not murdered, does not mean you cannot weep for them, or grieve their destruction)

Well, I don’t see this as an issue in this discussion because my definition is fully secular and has no bearing on the problem of evil.

Biologically speaking, it is fairly common for organisms to produce a lot of offspring that do not survive. I don’t think we necessarily must be distraught over such brute facts of life; people die. If it were plausible to do anything about those zygotes and embryos, our approach might be different. Personhood does not necessarily entail that a being’s death must cause other persons grief. It is a legal criteria for dispensing rights.

Theologically speaking, I don’t it as necessarily problematic. I trust that God is merciful and just. This is natural evil in the truest sense; there is nothing we can do about it (unlike the deaths of infants, for instance, because of poor sanitation of lack or resources).

–if a zygote (of a finite number of cells) is already a human person, then our definition of personhood is obviously much broader than common sense would dictate; not all human persons would even be recognizable as human and you could not, through the naked eye alone, necessarily distinguish between the embryo of a piglet (whose life is not inviolable) and the embryo of a human (whose life is presumed to be inviolable)

It depends what you mean by “recognizable as human.” In the case of abortion, the fetus is in a human womb, so we might presume that it is human (whereas a pig fetus would not be in a human womb). The only case I could see this being problematic is if human IVF treatments were being done in the same facility as research involving pig embryos, and somehow a bumbling intern mixed up all the samples, which happened not to be labeled. Were you thinking of something else?

If you’d like to propose “recognizable to the naked eye as human” as a criteria for personhood, then hash out a definition and we’ll discuss whether it is viable.

 

[polytropos]

Regarding erring on the side of safety – why are we so confident that killing an animal is not murder? Why are we not erring on the side of caution? Are Christians comfortable because it’s always been done, and because their Scripture tells them that human life is worth more than animal life? I don’t see any rational proof in this, just presumption. It could be mere human narcissism; of course we are going to believe that we are worth more than other forms of life around us. Are we not biased?

For many passionate, morally committed individuals, all of us non-vegetarians are callous murderers of mammals with nerve endings, with enough sentience to feel anxiety and even terror. Like that proverbial pro-choice individual, we like to turn a blind eye to the similarities between us and other mammals, and exaggerate the differences.

This may be neither here nor there, but from this I draw the conclusion that everyone is someone else’s moral monster; as passionately as pro-life individuals excoriate pro-choice individuals for their callousness, regarding the termination of fetuses that may not be conscious or feel pain, so carnivores are excoriated for their “indifference” towards the termination of the lives of fellow sentient beings who are conscious and can feel pain. That is not even a silent scream, but an audible scream – and we turn a deaf ear to it.

So sure, everyone draws the line somewhere, and there are no easy answers, I think, as to precisely where the line should be drawn.

Okay… but I don’t find this to be a compelling reason to not question the status quo for determining personhood, which is arbitrary. The rights of an entity are currently defined not by what the entity is but by what others might want to do to it. This is certainly inconsistent and demands reconsideration.

The fact that we might all be murderers of animals doesn’t justify our being murderers of fetuses. That is a quite separate argument. The abortion debate might influence it, in the respect that one might say, Let’s extend rights even further, but it does not influence the abortion debate.

 

[polytropos]

The trouble here is that there is no thing as “human DNA” - which is the foundation of “home sapiens sapiens” or “home sapiens idioticus” There is an undefined range of DNA which we associate with “humans”. Human DNA is about 99% same of the DNA of the higher apes, so mere DNA is not much of definition.

This is why metaphysical naturalism, when followed to its logical conclusion, is inapplicable in a legal setting. This is just not as ambiguous as you are claiming. Just about every mammal shares a huge amount of DNA, but every human shares more DNA with every other human than with any other mammal. In any case, species is biologically defined without much ambiguity or recourse to whatever percentage of DNA is shared with other members.

In any case, for all practical purposes, the offspring of two humans is going to be human. The fetus gestating in the womb of a human is going to be human.

Even if there would be rigorously defined tolerance limits for what constitutes “human DNA”, I would still differentiate between “human tissue”, “human being” and “human person”. I would like to direct your attention to my reply to polytropos as a starting conversation about “personhood”. Let’s make a very simplified definition here: “a person is as person does” - borrowed from Forrest Gump, of course. Moreover, I would suggest that “personhood” should be defined independently from “humanity”. If we would ever encounter a “being” from another planet, it would not share our DNA, and as long as it behaved as a “person”, it should be considered to be a person. Likewise if - by some genetic mutation - dolphins would exhibit the traits of personhood, they should be considered a person. Finally, if a totally artificial being (perhaps made of silicon chips) would behave as a “person”, it should be awarded a “person” status.

Once again, your objection is 100% conjecture. If we found something else like a person… Well, if we ever do, then we will revisit our definition.

It does not seem that we need to work very hard, though. In such a case, we would not have to redefine what human personhood is; we merely create another legal distinction, like dolphin personhood or extraterrestrial personhood, and afford those persons the same rights as human persons.

Regarding “a person is as person does”: this definition is tautological. Under my definition, “a person is as person does” because a fetus, as a person, does what all other fetuses do: it develops in the womb, is born, and then goes about its child and adult life. I realize this isn’t your appoint, but it might highlight the obvious problem with defining personhood as what persons are commonly understood to do… it’s arbitrary and is not, in itself, not a definition. At best, phrased “right,” it would be an appeal to self-evidence, but that will surely do us no good in handling sensitively such a disputed topic…

 

[polytropos]

However, I don’t think a Catholic would go for it, as a Catholic would maintain a fetus has no business gestating anywhere outside it’s mother’s womb, whether it be in an artificial environment, or in the womb of someone who is not it’s mother.

As a Catholic, I don’t think a fetus should be gestated out of the womb.

As someone advancing a secular argument, I see no need to address exogenesis since it’s pseudoscience.

 

[Innoruk]

There is absolutely no evidence that this will ever be possible. Neurobiology is nowhere near developed enough to be able to 1). identify the function of a specific neuron and 2). replace that neuron. It does not even begin to discount my definition of personhood.

So what? Thought experiments are still a valid form of exploring a subject, unless their starting parameters are shown to be logically inconsistent, or they contradict the current level of knowledge.

Your thought experiment is not “theoretically feasible.”

And you “know” this… how? (Rhetorical question, does not require an answer)

I know you don’t want me to brush your objection off as impossible or farfetched, but really, it is pure conjecture, assumption after assumption.

These thought experiments show that the “speciesism” is just as arbitrary.

There are real problems in applicability in defining personhood by mind…

Are there? For example? (Rhetorical question, does not require an answer)

… whereas there are currently no problems in applicability in defining personhood as I have.

I was presenting problems via those thought experiments, but you shrugged them off. Nevertheless you did it quite early in the conversation, so I did not waste a lot of time. And for that I am grateful.

This is why metaphysical naturalism, when followed to its logical conclusion, is inapplicable in a legal setting.

Maybe you never thought about it, but all legal systems are arbitrary. And so is the biological definition of a “species”.

In any case, for all practical purposes, the offspring of two humans is going to be human. The fetus gestating in the womb of a human is going to be human.

Unless, of course its genetic material falls outside of those “unspecified tolerance limits” we associate with the “human” DNA. And since your definition hinges upon the genetic makeup, those fetuses will NOT be human, according to your definition.

Once again, your objection is 100% conjecture. If we found something else like a person… Well, if we ever do, then we will revisit our definition.

It does not seem that we need to work very hard, though. In such a case, we would not have to redefine what human personhood is; we merely create another legal distinction, like dolphin personhood or extraterrestrial personhood, and afford those persons the same rights as human persons.

Ah, but here we have a problem. If there is such a thing as a “human person”, a “dolphin person”, an “extraterrestrial person” then there is a “generalized personhood”, independent from the genetic material, and that is what I wanted to explore before you shut down the conversation. In other words, what makes an organism composed of human DNA based biologically active material to become a “person”, and what part of that material can be replaced with functionally equivalent non-biological counterparts before the entity loses its “personhood” - if it would lose it.

Regarding “a person is as person does”: this definition is tautological.

Not really. We observed a whole lot of beings, all members of the species, and we pick out those traits which we consider “essential”. We come to the conclusion that the “body” itself is not essential, since it can be replaced by artificial prostheses. What remains is the brain and its function, the mind. The definition I offered is a “functional definition”, it would incorporate every entity regardless of their “body makeup”.

It was a short-lived fun, but it was fun. Maybe someone else will be willing to explore those (admittedly) farfetched, but not impossible scenarios.

 

[Innoruk]

As someone advancing a secular argument, I see no need to address exogenesis since it’s pseudoscience.

I am relatively sure you did not intend to make this comment as an insult, but it still is insulting. Extrapolating the current levels of technology is not “pseudo”-science, it is called “futurology”. Astrology, advocating paranormal powers would be examples of pseudoscience.

 

[ThinkingSapien]

Not to be confused for an argument, but in reading the discussion on whether or not some entity is a person I wonder how it would be applied to an anencephalic fetus (one with no brain) or in those cases where a zygote grows to form something that is more similar to a teratoma. Both of these meet the criteria on being genetically distinct from the parents, yet I wouldn’t classify them as human beings (admittedly I’m not using any formal criteria there).

(note: I would suggest not looking these up if you’ve never heard of them since the search result pictures may be graphic).

 

[john_doran]

Unless, of course its genetic material falls outside of those “unspecified tolerance limits” we associate with the “human” DNA. And since your definition hinges upon the genetic makeup, those fetuses will NOT be human, according to your definition.

any fetus that is the product of the combination of human gametes is a human being. certainly any fetus produced by human gametes in the same womb in which it is gestating is a human being.

we don’t need to analyze the DNA of human fetuses to determine their humanity, and thus the appeal to the vagueness of human DNA is inapposite in a discussion of abortion.

it would be relevant, perhaps, in a discussion as to how to determine the (non-)humanity of an organism whose genealogy is unknown and which gives us reason to think it might be human, but also reason to think that it might not.

Innoruk:

Ah, but here we have a problem. If there is such a thing as a “human person”, a “dolphin person”, an “extraterrestrial person” then there is a “generalized personhood”, independent from the genetic material, and that is what I wanted to explore before you shut down the conversation. In other words, what makes an organism composed of human DNA based biologically active material to become a “person”, and what part of that material can be replaced with functionally equivalent non-biological counterparts before the entity loses its “personhood” - if it would lose it.

“rational animality” constitutes (human) personhood, and rational animality can be defined as something like “embodied intellect”.

described thusly, wholly prosthetic humans, robots, dolphins, and intelligent jovian gas-creatures can all be persons.

even more generally, rationality itself is constitutive of personhood (god and the angels are also in some important sense persons), but that is neither here nor there for this discussion.

 

[Portofino]

If it were plausible to do anything about those zygotes and embryos, our approach might be different. …This is natural evil in the truest sense; there is nothing we can do about it (unlike the deaths of infants, for instance, because of poor sanitation of lack or resources)…

I’m getting the impression that your sense of what is or what isn’t possible in the realm of medical or scientific research is rather conservative. How does one know if one doesn’t even try?

“To place a man in a multi-stage rocket and project him into the controlling gravitational field of the moon where the passengers can make scientific observations, perhaps land alive, and then return to earth—all that constitutes a wild dream worthy of Jules Verne. I am bold enough to say that such a man-made voyage will never occur regardless of all future advances.”–Lee De Forest, American radio pioneer and inventor of the vacuum tube, in 1957 De Forest Says Space Travel Is Impossible

This individual was referring to space travel as “pseudo-science”, so it puzzles me as to why you would so confidently dub exogenesis or further advances in preventing miscarriages – or even further efforts in that domain?-- to be pseudo-science.

Theologically, to say “I trust that a merciful God will take care of them”, if it is not adequate for those who die outside the womb (exonerating all further efforts to prevent it), is not adequate for those who die inside the womb, either (including “natural” deaths inside the womb).

 

[polytropos]

So what? Thought experiments are still a valid form of exploring a subject, unless their starting parameters are shown to be logically inconsistent, or they contradict the current level of knowledge.

Thought experiments are valid. However, every single thought experiment offered as an objection to my definition so far is not currently scientifically possible. There has been no reason given as the why my definition does not suffice today. If your only objections have to do with massive advances in neurobiology, then they do not compellingly suggest that my definition is inadequate.

Maybe if current science actually made my definition vague or unusable, you would have a case. But the fact that you can imagine a scenario that would make it problematic is not a valid objection.

These thought experiments show that the “speciesism” is just as arbitrary.

Not “just as.” The thing is that the specialized science of biology can consistently categorize organisms by what it has defined as species. This provides us a consistent measure for determining personhood, whereas mind is inconsistent because mind is poorly defined and not agreed upon. The only “advantage” to using mind as a criteria for personhood is that it is a vague enough notion that it allows us to withhold rights from those we would like to oppress.

Are there? For example? (Rhetorical question, does not require an answer)

See above objection. Mind is not as clearly defined as species. Personhood by mind is just a proxy for permitting the deaths of those who we don’t want to save.

I was presenting problems via those thought experiments, but you shrugged them off. Nevertheless you did it quite early in the conversation, so I did not waste a lot of time. And for that I am grateful.

I shrugged off your first thought experiment (progressively replacing human body parts to construct a functionally human robot) because at the very least, it will not be applicable for hundreds of years. You, probably conscious of the ridiculousness of your thought experiment, anticipated my objection and tried to imply that objecting to the possibility of your thought experiment was not valid. That doesn’t really matter. The fact is that in 2013 it’s not a valid objection. We don’t know what would happen if we replaced every body part with a mechanical counterpart; that requires us to know the function of every neuron and to be capable of replacing them, keeping memories, emotions, etc. intact. Since it’s not certain that this is even possible, you will need a better objection.

Maybe you never thought about it, but all legal systems are arbitrary. And so is the biological definition of a “species”.

The advantage of the biological definition of species is that it is consistently applicable. Legal systems are arbitrary and imperfect, but that doesn’t mean we should forgo any attempt to make them rational.

Unless, of course its genetic material falls outside of those “unspecified tolerance limits” we associate with the “human” DNA. And since your definition hinges upon the genetic makeup, those fetuses will NOT be human, according to your definition.

As we have established, my definition does not quite hinge on genetic makeup, although it does hinge on biological species. You need a good reason to think that the offspring of two humans, gestating in a human womb, is not human. While humans may be evolving very, very slowly, they are not observably undergoing the process of speciation (and such effects would certainly not be visible in a single generation).

Ah, but here we have a problem. If there is such a thing as a “human person”, a “dolphin person”, an “extraterrestrial person” then there is a “generalized personhood”, independent from the genetic material, and that is what I wanted to explore before you shut down the conversation. In other words, what makes an organism composed of human DNA based biologically active material to become a “person”, and what part of that material can be replaced with functionally equivalent non-biological counterparts before the entity loses its “personhood” - if it would lose it.

I did not shut down the conversation. You have made no objections that do not consist of unverified conjectures about what developments may occur in science in the next few hundred years.

As for generalized personhood, there are a lot of biological and psychological factors that move us to define personhood. Societies tend to agree that rights should be extended to people. Species tend to favor their own kind. Humans cooperate and extend rights to each other because humans are uniquely capable of creating society. I imagine if we met another species with such capabilities, we would extend rights to them as well.

However, the ability to contribute to society is not what determines whether something is a person. A homeless man is a person even if he is not contributing to culture or society. A bedridden grandmother is a person even if she cannot help out other humans anymore.

Right now, since no other species rivals our rationality, it makes sense to extend rights to all of our species. If another species were to rival our rationality, we would have to think about what that means for our dispensation of rights. Until then, you have not objected to the actual applicability of my definition.

This objection is similar to Portofino’s musings on the rights of animals. Humans may not be the only things deserving of rights; it does not follow that, therefore, not all humans are deserving of rights.