Interacting with a pro-choice individual on their terms

[polytropos]

Not really. We observed a whole lot of beings, all members of the species, and we pick out those traits which we consider “essential”. We come to the conclusion that the “body” itself is not essential, since it can be replaced by artificial prostheses. What remains is the brain and its function, the mind. The definition I offered is a “functional definition”, it would incorporate every entity regardless of their “body makeup”.

It was a short-lived fun, but it was fun. Maybe someone else will be willing to explore those (admittedly) farfetched, but not impossible scenarios.

I mean that, by definition of tautology, the definition of “a person is as person does” is tautological.

If you would like the logical fallacy of your definition explicated, it is the facts that 1). the mind inside a mechanical body is still included in my definition of personhood, and 2). it is not known whether or not a being with all of its brain replaced with functionally equivalent parts is possible, and if so whether or not it would be self-evident that it deserves rights. While it is not possible to modify such a being and the conclusions of your thought experiment are uncertain, it is not a valid objection.

I am relatively sure you did not intend to make this comment as an insult, but it still is insulting. Extrapolating the current levels of technology is not “pseudo”-science, it is called “futurology”. Astrology, advocating paranormal powers would be examples of pseudoscience.

I apologize for the insult. I did not intend it as an insult, and I’m sorry that it offended you.

In any case, I hope you forgive my frustration that there have been no objections to my definition on the basis of current scientific knowledge. You have offered me nothing as speculative science that does not discredit the current functionality of my definition. You can conceive of a reality in which science advances enough to cause problems for my definition, but it is not certain that such is actually the nature of our reality. Therefore, your objections are not valid. You need to offer reasons as to why it does not work today.

 

[polytropos]

I’m getting the impression that your sense of what is or what isn’t possible in the realm of medical or scientific research is rather conservative. How does one know if one doesn’t even try?

I am not saying that people may not try. As I mentioned in my previous reply to Innoruk, though, every objection to my definition so far has appealed to speculations as to what science will one day be capable of. There are not objections to the current applicability of my definition.

Give me problems with my definition. Don’t try to posit a world, which may not exist, in which it is problematic.

This individual was referring to space travel as “pseudo-science”, so it puzzles me as to why you would so confidently dub exogenesis or further advances in preventing miscarriages – or even further efforts in that domain?-- to be pseudo-science.

To be clear, I did not dub further attempts as pseudoscience.

I also used the term pseudoscience in particular because Innoruk’s objections so far have consisted of nothing but conjectures. Exogenesis admittedly is not so clearly distant and unsubstantial as Innoruk’s thought experiment in which we gradually replace a man with a machine and retain something that acts exactly like the man. Exogenesis continues the pattern of raising objections that do not apply under current medical science.

However, the mention of exogenesis and its relation to Catholic belief is a red herring. First of all, my argument is about creating a rational, secular, and scientifically consistent definition of personhood to replace the contingent, arbitrary, and inconsistent status quo. Exogenesis is not a current issue. It does not bear on the definition of personhood or morality of abortion.

Theologically, to say “I trust that a merciful God will take care of them”, if it is not adequate for those who die outside the womb (exonerating all further efforts to prevent it), is not adequate for those who die inside the womb, either (including “natural” deaths inside the womb).

This is not a theological discussion, but I still don’t see it as problematic. Humans act to prevent the loss of life on earth when it is possible. It is just a fact that natural miscarriages are not necessarily a theological problem.

I entrust the deaths of every person, Christian or atheist, sinner or saint, born or unborn, to the mercy of God. When they are outside of the womb and there is something I can do about it, then I say, Do something about it. When they are inside the womb and there is something I can do about it, then I say, Do something about it. When there is nothing I can do about it, that is when I entrust them to God’s mercy.

This is not to say, Here is the line in the sand: we can’t do anything about natural miscarriages, so don’t try. As you and I have discussed previously, I am currently more concerned with the intentional murders that can be prevented without massive, speculative advances in science than with natural deaths that pose no clear theological problems. As I have also mentioned in previous discussions with you, research for natural miscarriages would be regarded as ridiculous while abortion and contraception are held to be morally acceptable. If anything, it is an issue whose resolution is quite, quite distant.

We are trying to create a consistent definition of personhood. We aren’t trying to define personhood in such a way that it seems like the least amount of people are dying. If the definition reveals that many people are dying naturally, then so be it; that is not a problem for the definition. It is a consequence that is not in itself contradictory.

Pro-abortionists are the ones who try to define personhood in such a way that the deaths of fetuses are not the deaths of persons, so that people don’t feel guilty about their murders.

 

[Portofino]

If I undersand your arguments, polytropos, you are making an argument for personhood as defined as any living organism with genetically human DNA. You argue that this is the most solid, most consistent criterion. The current legal definition of a person seems to be a human organism that has been born, or an unborn human organism that – with proper care – is capable of survival outside its mother’s womb. It is pragmatic and situational; I would liken it, in a different sense, to the difference between the rights of an individual born on U.S. soil, and an individual that was not (“citizenship” versus non-citizenship is pragmatic and situational, in this sense, not based on one’s “human essence”). Thus, one’s rights and privileges are different, depending on whether one was born on U.S. soil, or was not; in a different respect, one’s rights and privileges are different, depending on whether one is existing outside the womb of one’s mother, or inside of it. Indeed, just as “citizenship” is not an intrinsic human quality, so personhood is currently not conceived of as an intrinsic human quality.

Theoretically, birth is an arbitrary threshold at which to designate that an organism with human DNA becomes a “person” with legal protections; pragmatically, however, birth is not an arbitrary threshold, just as – again, in a different respect – it is not arbitrary, pragmatically speaking, to designate that something essential “happens” when one crosses the threshold from one country or one jurisdiction to another (one is physically present within that jurisdiction, whereas, before, one was not).

Maybe that is what you are fighting for – that governments cease to be so pragmatic. The U.S. government has not even stated that abortion is not immoral, or that it is not killing; it has simply stated that, before a certain threshold prior to birth (which was a compromise; the alternative would have been to designate birth itself as the threshold), abortion is legal.

Capital punishment is legal; war is legal; whether the government considers these to be “moral” or “immoral” is anyone’s guess.

By the way, one irony of these speculative arguments regarding what is or isn’t possible to science is that, based on this legal definition of viability, the granting of personhood could be extended indefinitely, through further medical breakthroughs (pushing viability down from approximately 20-23 weeks, to 18, 15, 14 weeks, etc.). And, yes, if exogensis did ever exist, then one would have the Supreme Court by the horns, as viability (helped through artificial means) would be possible from the moment of conception.

 

[polytropos]

It’s not strictly an issue of pragmatism. I opposed abortion when I was an atheist and would continue to oppose it if I, for some reason, became an atheist again. I find abortion impossible to reconcile with humanistic principles and reason, unless, perhaps, one were to concede that it were immoral though difficult to phase out. But in such a case, I believe one should hold that abortion ought to be phased out in any good society, and that the euphemistic, dishonest rhetoric about abortion as an amoral or even morally good choice should come to an end. Such a person does not “support” abortion, but permits it while trying to get rid of it. Such a person is not saying that although abortion is bad, a woman should have a right to it; he or she is saying that abortion is bad, and a woman does have a right to it but should not.

Those who argue against the practicality of banning abortion do not usually take this position, for whatever reason. In many cases I’m sure that they do not really object to banning abortion on the basis of practicality.

The fact that abortion is in some cases practical does not justify it, even in the legal sense. War is sometimes practical, but the government should be doing whatever possible to avoid war. That includes speaking about war as a tragedy, even if for the time being it is a necessary tragedy. There may be practical problems to banning abortion today, but abhorrent rhetoric about abortion as an act of love or expression of empowerment should cease, because the act of abortion is immoral regardless of whether it is legal. Laws do not correspond perfectly to morality; however, that does not justify ignoring the instances in which our laws are immoral.

Likewise, laws do not correspond perfectly to rationality, but we should constantly strive to make them rational. I do not think there has been provided a non-speculative objection nor a rational, consistently applicable alternative to my definition.

 

[Portofino]

It’s not strictly an issue of pragmatism. I opposed abortion when I was an atheist and would continue to oppose it if I, for some reason, became an atheist again. I find abortion impossible to reconcile with humanistic principles and reason, unless, perhaps, one were to concede that it were immoral though difficult to phase out. But in such a case, I believe one should hold that abortion ought to be phased out in any good society, and that the euphemistic, dishonest rhetoric about abortion as an amoral or even morally good choice should come to an end. Such a person does not “support” abortion, but permits it while trying to get rid of it. Such a person is not saying that although abortion is bad, a woman should have a right to it; he or she is saying that abortion is bad, and a woman does have a right to it but should not.

Those who argue against the practicality of banning abortion do not usually take this position, for whatever reason. In many cases I’m sure that they do not really object to banning abortion on the basis of practicalityQUOTE]

I appreciate you not only feel passionately about it, but consider anything less to be flagrantly inconsistent. It’s true that a lot of the reasons for a pro-choice position are “fuzzy” and are not even always about incontrovertble logic, but rather one’s “emotional” sense based on the sum total of various circumstantial facts, including:

–if one believes in a soul, uncertainty as to whether a fetus is ensouled (as you mentioned, one ought to err on the side of caution, but this get taken in combination with the other reasons, listed below)

–based on current scientific and medical knowledge, it appears that an 11 or 12 week old fetus (for example) is neither consciously aware, nor capable of pain (again, in isolation, this is not compelling, but – in combination with some of these other factors – the sense that “at least there is no suffering involved” carries some weight)

–the difficulty in enforcing a mandatory continuance of pregnancy, and the fact that the idea of the government legislating what goes on within a woman’s uterus does seem disturbingly invasive to them, on a visceral level

–the proportion of miscarriages within the first 12 weeks of pregnancy is naturally high, with survival of the fetus already so uncertain that many couples do not annouce their pregnancy publicly until after week 12

–the fact that no one has actually “met” an embryo, fetus, or unborn child, at least before it was born; it is difficult for human beings to think in terms of abstractions, and – for many – the concept of the unborn is comparatively more abstract to them than discussions of newborns (the pro-life camp tries to remedy this, through photos and models of a fetus at various stages of gestation, though tends not to focus on the very earliest stages of gestations, when visuals are not likely to be dramatic vis-a-vis what we would recognize as “human”)

No one of these, taken alone, is sufficient grounds for allowing abortion, and you may point out – perhaps rightly – that, even when taken together, they still are not sufficient grounds. However, for many, these considerations have a tendency to “chip away” at how strongly one feels about the issue. At the very least, they lead to the phenomen of the person who seeks to “mediate” their conflicting feelings by saying “I would never have one myself, but I wouldn’t prevent a woman from choosing.” In a very different context – not meaning to make a direct comparison – that is similar to the vegetarian who says, “I refrain from meat for ethical reasons, but I respect that others may not.” A more militant animal rights activist would perhaps rightly point out that there is no moral consistency in this position.

It may be that both your moral sense, and your ability to reason lucidly, is more highly developed in you than in the average person. Using the vegetarian comparison again, I know that I would refrain from eating meat, if my sense of human empathy were increased, say, a thousandfold (theoretical reason tells me that respect for life would be respect for all life, and that it is not moral for me to deny ethical treatment to animals simply because they lack human brain capacity and are not as “smart” or even “aware” as humans). I feel bad about it, on some level, but I find meat to be delicious – and I tell myself that life is too short to deprive myself of a pleasure that I am not 100% sure is wrong in the first place (even though I know that I risk my own health through the potential consumption of too much meat). So it’s convenient for me – and more than convenient – to rationalize it to myself. Also, in terms of moral laxity, I acknowledge to myself that it would take work to be vegetarian and to get all my nutrients elsewhere, even though I know that to say “meat-eating is necessary for my survival” is simply not true. Another rationalization – similar to the rationalization of the high proportion of miscarriages early in a pregnancy – is that animals eating other animals is part of the very order of nature, and that – even if I refrain from eating meat – I still can do nothing to prevent the suffering of animals “in nature” itself.

p.s. Regarding this issue of souls: if one is a religious non-Christian, one can claim to be certain that a fetus does not have a soul, whether through the benefit of faith or revelation. Thus, one could “consistenly” claim – based on one’s beliefs, at least – that abortion is no more murder than the consumption of meat. Of course, it’s not likely that one could rationally prove that a fetus doesn’t have a soul; but, then again, it is questionable whether one can rationally prove that any of us have souls, or rationally prove that human life is intrinsically sacred. Faith has to come in somewhere, even in a secular humanistic context.

 

[Innoruk]

any fetus that is the product of the combination of human gametes is a human being. certainly any fetus produced by human gametes in the same womb in which it is gestating is a human being.

we don’t need to analyze the DNA of human fetuses to determine their humanity, and thus the appeal to the vagueness of human DNA is inapposite in a discussion of abortion.

it would be relevant, perhaps, in a discussion as to how to determine the (non-)humanity of an organism whose genealogy is unknown and which gives us reason to think it might be human, but also reason to think that it might not.

My question is about “what is the definition of a human”? You suggest a “working definition” : if it is the result of a human sperm and a human egg in a human womb - it is a human. I have two problems. One is: why is it necessary to stipulate a human womb? And two, what if there is a huge mutation, which results in a being whose DNA is totally incompatible with “everyday, usual humans”? How much of a deviation from the “usual human DNA” is allowed before the resulting being becomes the member of a new species?

“rational animality” constitutes (human) personhood, and rational animality can be defined as something like “embodied intellect”.

Would you please clarify for me what do you mean by “animality”? I have no idea what it means.

described thusly, wholly prosthetic humans, robots, dolphins, and intelligent jovian gas-creatures can all be persons.

even more generally, rationality itself is constitutive of personhood (god and the angels are also in some important sense persons), but that is neither here nor there for this discussion.

We are getting somewhere, I think. The artificial beings (robots) are not biologically “alive”. But I agree that they can be persons, so being biologically “alive” is not a necessary prerequisite. You point out the problem by stipulating that all of these entities “CAN” be persons. So what are the deciding criteria if they are actually persons or not? What kind of physical, chemical, biological of informational properties are needed to say that any or all of these entities are “persons”?

 

[Portofino]

My question is about “what is the definition of a human”? You suggest a “working definition” : if it is the result of a human sperm and a human egg in a human womb - it is a human. I have two problems. One is: why is it necessary to stipulate a human womb?

If I may butt in, I would think it doesn’t depend on a human womb; for example, even a child conceived in a “petry dish” would still be human, and I don’t believe a zygote implants in the uterus (womb) of a woman until a few days after conception.

?
And two, what if there is a huge mutation, which results in a being whose DNA is totally incompatible with “everyday, usual humans”? How much of a deviation from the “usual human DNA” is allowed before the resulting being becomes the member of a new species??

The biggest mutuation I’m aware of is that of Downs Syndrome, which entails an extra pair of chromosomes… I suppose a safe definition, though, would be that any child conceived through the egg and sperm of human beings is a human, regardless of any genetic variations it exhibits.

We are getting somewhere, I think. The artificial beings (robots) are not biologically “alive”. But I agree that they can be persons, so being biologically “alive” is not a necessary prerequisite. You point out the problem by stipulating that all of these entities “CAN” be persons. So what are the deciding criteria if they are actually persons or not? What kind of physical, chemical, biological of informational properties are needed to say that any or all of these entities are “persons”?

Hmm… Perhaps one could say that personhood is a larger category than human DNA, even if one conservatively wants to grant that any living organism with human DNA is, by definition, a person. It is quite possible that dolphins or whales are persons, if by that we meant sentient beings with what we believed to be distinctly human attributes (the use of complex language, which is able to communicate past, present, future, and conditional tenses; the creation of art; religious beliefs; “acute self-awareness”, such as the recognition of one’s face in a mirror). With no aposable thumb, a dolphin isn’t going to sculp Michelangelo’s David, but their mental capacities would be evidenced in other ways (such as the complex manipulation of sound, or the self-awareness that is ironically necessary for a dolphin to commit suicide in captivity).

The problem I personally have is that a 10-day embryo, though genetically human and therefore a “person” according to this conservative definition, almost surely has less sentience and conscious awareness than a lamb, a goat, or a dolphin.

Yet, we are told that the 10-day old embryo has rights that the lamb or the dolphin does not. I can theoretically grant the personhood of the 10-day old embryo, but I’m just not “feeling it.” This was of material import in the whole debate over stem cell research, as well.

 

[Innoruk]

If I may butt in, I would think it doesn’t depend on a human womb; for example, even a child conceived in a “petry dish” would still be human, and I don’t believe a zygote implants in the uterus (womb) of a woman until a few days after conception.

The biggest mutuation I’m aware of is that of Downs Syndrome, which entails an extra pair of chromosomes… I suppose a safe definition, though, would be that any child conceived through the egg and sperm of human beings is a human, regardless of any genetic variations it exhibits.

I am not really interested is “safe” definition, I am interested in a correct definition. If the mutation is so large, that the resulting being would be virtually immortal, have the ability to move at will in space… etc… add all the fictional characteristics at your leisure, then to say that it is still “human” will be a stretch, to say the least.

Hmm… Perhaps one could say that personhood is a larger category than human DNA, even if one conservatively wants to grant that any living organism with human DNA is, by definition, a person.

Why should it be granted? That is simply “speciesism”. There needs to be a reason why a specific being should be considered a “person”, regardless of species “it” belongs to.

It is quite possible that dolphins or whales are persons, if by that we meant sentient beings with what we believed to be distinctly human attributes (the use of complex language, which is able to communicate past, present, future, and conditional tenses; the creation of art; religious beliefs; “acute self-awareness”, such as the recognition of one’s face in a mirror). With no aposable thumb, a dolphin isn’t going to sculp Michelangelo’s David, but their mental capacities would be evidenced in other ways (such as the complex manipulation of sound, or the self-awareness that is ironically necessary for a dolphin to commit suicide in captivity).

The list presented, I am sure, is provisional. For example there are several languages, where there is only present tense. There are simple tribes, who have no concept of past - at all. There are people who cannot conceptualize a number over two. Religious belief has no part in this list. Self-awareness is fundamental, however. Yet, many animals exhibit at least a certain amount of self-awareness. Apes have been taught to communicate with sign-language, and conduct simple conversations. The definition of “who is a person” is just part of the problem. The real problem comes in the next part of my reply.

The problem I personally have is that a 10-day embryo, though genetically human and therefore a “person” according to this conservative definition, almost surely has less sentience and conscious awareness than a lamb, a goat, or a dolphin.

Yet, we are told that the 10-day old embryo has rights that the lamb or the dolphin does not. I can theoretically grant the personhood of the 10-day old embryo, but I’m just not “feeling it.” This was of material import in the whole debate over stem cell research, as well.

The real problem is here. What part of the “genetically human tissue/being” is the one which makes those abilities possible? If that part missing, then the resulting “being” is still composed of human tissue, but does not deserve the title “person” any more. Carl Sagan proposed a simple way: “when the brain’s electrical functioning starts”. Without a functioning brain there can be no person. Up until that point there can be no rational definition of personhood. I can already foresee the objection that someone may lose part of the functionality of the brain through an illness or an accident. Those people could be “grandfathered” into categorizing them as “honorary persons” (or they can be granted “squatting rights”) - for the sake of emotional sentimentality.

 

[Portofino]

Why should it be granted? That is simply “speciesism”. There needs to be a reason why a specific being should be considered a “person”, regardless of species “it” belongs to.

Yes, I believe humans and chimpanzees share between approximately 96% and 99% of their genetic code. If we privilege human genes over chimpanzee genes, it is obviously because we have recourse to what those human genes* become* – and there, we have recourse to all of the qualities in a human being that qualify them as persons in a more behavioral sense. In a certain sense, we are working backwards – it is the* future* personhood of a genetically human embryo, that privileges its protection over the protection of a genetically non-human embryo. But I’ve been reading a little bit about how this is far from an uncontroversial notion, this idea that the “future personhood” would entitle an embryo to protection immediately, before that personhood is actualized versus in the process of being actualized.

list presented, I am sure, is provisional. For example there are several languages, where there is only present tense. There are simple tribes, who have no concept of past - at all. There are people who cannot conceptualize a number over two. Religious belief has no part in this list. Self-awareness is fundamental, however. Yet, many animals exhibit at least a certain amount of self-awareness. Apes have been taught to communicate with sign-language, and conduct simple conversations. The definition of “who is a person” is just part of the problem. The real problem comes in the next part of my reply

That’s right – plus, a child can be born so brain damaged that it could fail many of the criteria of personhood that one would care to come up with, even vis-a-vis certain animals. Yet perhaps it’s the exception that proves the rule, in terms of the defining characteristics of personhood. Then again, an infant itself would fail many of those criteria – it cannot use language immediately; nor is it immediately self-aware, or even endowed with long-term memory (“infant amnesia”, the fact that we do not remember our births, is seemingly universal).

But the alternative is speciesism, as you mentioned – the privileging of human genetic material, and human beings (despite their “situation”) because they are human. This can be more plausibly grounded if it is based on faith or revelation (“God said we’re special” ) but, obviously, cannot be demonstrated through reason alone (just as, arguably, moral values themselves cannot be demonstrated through reason alone). If I refuse to talk about the characteristics of human DNA, and simply say, “human DNA, in any form, is worth more than animal DNA” then I am saying that no reasons, no justification vis-a-vis other animals, is necessary. I’m just taking it as self-evident, that what is genetically human is worth more than what is not genetically human, and am even refusing to talk about any special qualities that the genetically human have, behaviorally speaking.

I frankly don’t see any easy answers, nor have read of any, which is not to say that there are not philosophers on both sides of the issue who have reasoned brilliantly and cogently on the topic.

What I agree with you on, wholeheartedly, is that it would presumptuous of me to discover an alien civilization (for example) that built pyramids; had a writing system; fell in love; appreciated beauty; grappled with moral questions; speculated about the origins of the universe and conclude that, because those beings are not genetically human, they are not “entitled” to be treated as persons. A more “behavioral” – not merely genetic – notion of personhood seems inevitable, and I believe it is this which gives the privileging of human genes its meaning in the first place.

Here’s a link to a cartoon that is relevant to this discussion;* I* found it to be making a wry point about the paradoxes of personhood (ultimately in support of the pro-choice position, or at least of stem cell research), whereas I was surprised to find it featured on a pro-life site.

As I see it, arguing that a zygote or embryo is “already a human person” is untenable, which does not mean that one cannot argue for privileging a zygote or embryo as a future human person that is already in the process of developing (even though I’m still not convinced that it’s a slam dunk).

prolifeblogs.com/articles/archives/2009/03/embryonic_stem_14.php

 

[polytropos]

My definition admittedly does not explain why the human species in particular should have rights. I have a couple responses to this, since it seems to be misleading to some.

First of all, my definition does not grant personhood to humans exclusively. The original definition was: “Each distinct, biologically alive, genetically human organism is a human person.” Innoruk objected to the dual use of the word “human” (even though, in context, it was being used in two distinct ways), so I modified the definition, but it should be clear that we are still talking about human persons. Naturally, though, this does not exclude the possibility of other, nonhuman persons. It merely means that such things require their own definitions. For instance, if it were agreed that rights should be extended to dolphins, then one might come up with the definition: “Each distinct, biologically alive, genetically dolphin organism is a dolphin person.” In the case of extraterrestrial life (or even non-mammal life, or non-life, in the biological sense), the definition might have to be tuned to account for inevitably different methods of heredity. My point is that if personhood needs to be extended to nonhumans, then we will do so when the need arises; for now, the fact that it is conceivable that it might be necessary is not a valid objection to my definition of human personhood.

Second of all, the focus of my definition is legal applicability and function. As I mentioned, it does not give a reason for defining persons in such a way. Part of the difficulty arises, I think, from the fact that it is self-evident that humans (we will consider adult humans for now) deserve the legal distinction of personhood, which grants them rights and protections, but the reasons for the particular distinction of humans are not self-evident. So when people try to decide why humans deserve rights, they produce inconsistent justifications that do not apply to all circumstances, even though it seems like they should. For instance, we feel that humans are pretty special in their intelligence, but defining personhood by intelligence leads us to define infants and the mentally disabled as nonpersons, even though most consider these to be persons.

Defining personhood by viability has been proposed, although in this case, viability does not mean independence or self-sufficiency; it just means that it is medically possible to make a child live. So by viability, personhood has been changing for as long as medical science has been developing, and what once would not have been considered a person, now is. An infant does not have to be “incubated” in the womb, but relies on its mother for sustenance and food. Before formula was developed, when breastfeeding was necessary, were infants nonpersons? If a mother does not have access to formula and would have to suffer the burden of breastfeeding in order for her child to live, is she justified in killing her child because it is a nonperson?

So that is the issue with all “easy” definitions of personhood that appeal to a particular trait of humans: they are not only arbitrary, but they lead to contradictions. One begins with the human adult, who is self-evidently a person, and then can consider the extenuating cases, since the growth into a human adult is conceivably continuous with any other state of the human organism, including the fetus. One therefore needs a good reason to justify discriminating between the human adult and any other human organism. And there are no such good reasons: they are all based on arbitrary, incomplete generalizations about what we find valuable in the human race.

So this is why my definition is “speciesistic,” as Innoruk claims. Humans adults are self-evidently valuable and there is no good reason to remove the rights of any other human. Perhaps my argument could be summarized with this syllogism: If a human adult is a person, then there is no compelling reason for any other human organism not to be a person.

This is, of course, a secular case. The Catholic Faith fully enlightens the value of all human life.

 

[polytropos]

To address some specific objections:

I am not really interested is “safe” definition, I am interested in a correct definition.

Personhood is a legal construct that protects ontologically nonexistent (under metaphysical naturalism) rights. The word “correct” does not apply to it.

If the mutation is so large, that the resulting being would be virtually immortal, have the ability to move at will in space… etc… add all the fictional characteristics at your leisure, then to say that it is still “human” will be a stretch, to say the least.

Eh, more conjecture here. Genetic mutation of this scale, it is fair to say, does not happen. Is it conceivable that any genetic mutation could occur in a single generation? Yes, but the probability is so infinitesimally small that it’s not a realistic consideration. Anyway, if such a large mutation did occur, the zygote would probably just not survive.

The facts: Speciation never occurs in a single generation. It is a gradual process. The offspring of two humans is always human. The human species is not undergoing speciation right now. A genetic mutation of the size necessary to make an offspring not genetically human would kill the offspring.

The real problem is here. What part of the “genetically human tissue/being” is the one which makes those abilities possible? If that part missing, then the resulting “being” is still composed of human tissue, but does not deserve the title “person” any more. Carl Sagan proposed a simple way: “when the brain’s electrical functioning starts”. Without a functioning brain there can be no person. Up until that point there can be no rational definition of personhood.

The last two sentences here are bald assertion. You anticipate the obvious objection:

I can already foresee the objection that someone may lose part of the functionality of the brain through an illness or an accident. Those people could be “grandfathered” into categorizing them as “honorary persons” (or they can be granted “squatting rights”) - for the sake of emotional sentimentality.

Your personhood is “piecewise defined.” The purpose of defining personhood in such a way is to justify abortion; in the places where it is inconsistent, you can just say the definition doesn’t apply and we’ll grant them rights anyway. This is based on emotion rather than reason.

I have an emotional reaction against killing fetuses. Can they be honorary persons for the sake of emotional sentimentality? No, because you don’t want them to be.

An objection may be that fetuses would not be grandfathered in - but there is no clear reason as to why giving rights to grandfathered persons is more justified than giving rights to potential persons. The other objection may be that not everyone supports granting rights to fetuses, whereas granting rights to those who have lost the functionality of their brain is more universally agreed upon. But that rights should hardly be dispensed according to the desires of those who benefit from not dispensing them; the civil rights movement would have been pretty different if that were sound.

But the alternative is speciesism, as you mentioned – the privileging of human genetic material, and human beings (despite their “situation”) because they are human. This can be more plausibly grounded if it is based on faith or revelation (“God said we’re special” ) but, obviously, cannot be demonstrated through reason alone (just as, arguably, moral values themselves cannot be demonstrated through reason alone). If I refuse to talk about the characteristics of human DNA, and simply say, “human DNA, in any form, is worth more than animal DNA” then I am saying that no reasons, no justification vis-a-vis other animals, is necessary. I’m just taking it as self-evident, that what is genetically human is worth more than what is not genetically human, and am even refusing to talk about any special qualities that the genetically human have, behaviorally speaking.

Hopefully the above syllogism clears this up. I am not arguing that human DNA is more valuable than animal DNA. I am arguing that if a developed human is a human person, there is no good reason for a fetus not to be a human person.

What I agree with you on, wholeheartedly, is that it would presumptuous of me to discover an alien civilization (for example) that built pyramids; had a writing system; fell in love; appreciated beauty; grappled with moral questions; speculated about the origins of the universe and conclude that, because those beings are not genetically human, they are not “entitled” to be treated as persons. A more “behavioral” – not merely genetic – notion of personhood seems inevitable, and I believe it is this which gives the privileging of human genes its meaning in the first place.

Also to be clear, my definition is not excluding the possibility that rights would be extended to an alien race. They would be extraterrestrial persons, and we would figure out some way to make sure that we legally do not violate any of their rights. We would just have to see them first.

Personhood by civilization is not a complete metric, since we don’t justify killing those who do not contribute to civilization (whether they are members of less developed tribes or unemployed citizens on welfare). Now, we could extend personhood on the basis of the potential to be civilized, but that would include fetuses.

 

[ccmnxc]

I always liked this thought experiment, and I’d like pro-choicers to weigh in on it:
Imagine some point in the not so distant future when surgeons are capable of operating on the developing embryo in such a way that it never develops things people generally associate with personhood, namely desires, emotion, any sense of personality, et al. Now, say these embryos grow, are born, and continue growing. Then, when they reach a desired age, they are killed and their organs are harvested. Is this a moral wrong?

If so, how would this be different from justifying abortion on grounds of personhood?

 

[Portofino]

Perhaps my argument could be summarized with this syllogism: If a human adult is a person, then there is no compelling reason for any other human organism not to be a person.

I think that, at some point, reason alone may prove itself incapable of getting the job done, as differences in perspective may be irreducible.

For example, here is someone arguing for why there is a compelling reason why an embryo does not yet have the same rights as a human being in a later state of development:

"The fertilized egg has no beating heart, no brain, and no consciousness. It is not aware, it cannot think, and it cannot sense anything, including pleasure or pain. It is just two cells, the egg and sperm that have joined into one.

At the other end of life, when a person is old, sick and dying, we do have some established rules concerning when death has occurred, or when it is acceptable to “pull the plug”. Perhaps the same rules that apply to the end of life should be applied to the beginning. If the analysis of brain activity shows no conscious thought then life is considered over. This suggests that life begins with the formation of a brain and the initiation of conscious thought." eveloce.scienceblog.com/13/is-the-killing-abortion-of-human-embryos-always-murder/

If one says that this argument is irrelevant, or non-compelling, I’m not sure that the reasons for the difference in opinion are not ultimately subjective in nature. And even if one accepts this argument, but argues that it is future personhood of a living human organism that entitles it to the same right to life as any human person, I don’t see how the factor of a subjective viewpoint – a “certain way of looking at it” – can ever be eliminated entirely. So yes, if left uninterrupted, there is a reasonable expectation that an embryo will develop into a fully-formed human being. The subjectivity comes in, I think, over arguments over whether it is obviously not only immoral, but illegal, to interfere with the process (some, obviously, believe that it is immoral to interfere with the process even at the moment of intercourse, via contraception).

Then there is the question: is it murder to take, for example, a “morning after pill”; is it a felony; is it a misdemeanor, etc. (e.g., animal cruelty is a misdemeanor in some states, a felony in others, thus illegal, but in none of them is it considered first-degree murder if the animal dies as a result of human cruelty). Any arguments, for or against, would have an irreducible element of being an attempt to persuade, which involves an appeal to emotion. So, you consider different ways of looking at the issue and, at the end, make a subjective call, based on what seems “persuasive” or “compelling” or “fair-minded.”

Maybe some would agree, and say “that’s why we need religion” and “you can’t have objective morality without religion!” But even that wouldn’t solve the problem, as some religious believers confidently declare that ensoulment occurs at the moment of birth (and others, of course, confidently declare that killing adult persons who are guilty of theological crimes is not murder!)

The emotions cannot be eliminated entirely, either, because it is sometimes the emotions that clarify one’s reasoning. For instance, if there is no respect for life, no reverence for life, then I don’t think any rational arguments will be deemed persuasive. Indeed, values cannot be subtracted entirely from the equation.

 

[Portofino]

I always liked this thought experiment, and I’d like pro-choicers to weigh in on it:
Imagine some point in the not so distant future when surgeons are capable of operating on the developing embryo in such a way that it never develops things people generally associate with personhood, namely desires, emotion, any sense of personality, et al. Now, say these embryos grow, are born, and continue growing. Then, when they reach a desired age, they are killed and their organs are harvested. Is this a moral wrong?

If so, how would this be different from justifying abortion on grounds of personhood?

I haven’t given it any thought before, but I am not to going to take the route of saying that, currently, this possibility is a mere fantasy

As an initial reaction, I could imagine a few arguments that pro-choicers would make, as to why this should be strictly forbidden:

–it depends on what kind of “results” one procures, but it would be doubtful that an argument for the personhood of these actually born – albeit modified – humans could not still be mounted, based such things as: viability outside the womb (after the 23rd week, any fetus is presumed a person and is given full legal protection, no matter how malformed or “abnormal”); conscious awareness; any ability to experience pain (unless you would anesthetize their nerve endings completely, which would take a practically God-like control over human development). Viability outside the womb, including by artificial means, which is currently the yardstick for prohibiting most late-term abortions, would theoretically be the “fail-safe” to objecting to your thought experiment

–aside from questions of viability, there likely would be arguments mounted from the perspective of “cruel and unusual punishment”, whether physical or psychological; these same arguments could be used against the practice of castrating pre-teen boys so that they retain a “lovely singing voice.” I realize that laws against “cruel and unusual punishment” are already paradoxical, as is – thus, you can kill an inmate in Texas – that is no cruel and unusual punishment, nor is the psychological torture of anticipating the hour of one’s execution – but you need to kill in a way that is judged by the state to be “sufficiently humane” (including the presumed “psychological comfort” offered by the last meal, which admittedly does not preclude the consumption of ice cream! )

–these already born children would be treated as property, which would violate the prohibition against enslavement/human trafficking

If such children were born and kept in holding pens – being raised like veal, in order to harvest their organs – it would not only be unlikely that the parents and extended family would have something to say about it but that, if all else fails (let’s say the parents are either unethical or really in need of money) they would still resemble “normal children” too strongly for people not to be repulsed by the whole thing. In fairness, most pro-choicers who wish to keep first- or early second-trimester abortions legal under most circumstances are still revolted by the process of a late-term abortion, where a woman’s belly is so distended that it’s clear that she is “closer to the end than to the beginning.”

But, again, the courts take a comparatively conservative stance on personhood, automatically considering that any fetus that has reached at least 23 weeks of development (a conservative estimate of its ability to survive outside its mother’s womb, including with artificial aid) is already a human person. It doesn’t say “unless the brain is sufficiently malformed for it to be disqualified as a person”… Not sure we would want to roll back our standards on that, for the sake of consistency!

 

[polytropos]

"The fertilized egg has no beating heart, no brain, and no consciousness. It is not aware, it cannot think, and it cannot sense anything, including pleasure or pain. It is just two cells, the egg and sperm that have joined into one.

At the other end of life, when a person is old, sick and dying, we do have some established rules concerning when death has occurred, or when it is acceptable to “pull the plug”. Perhaps the same rules that apply to the end of life should be applied to the beginning. If the analysis of brain activity shows no conscious thought then life is considered over. This suggests that life begins with the formation of a brain and the initiation of conscious thought." eveloce.scienceblog.com/13/is-the-killing-abortion-of-human-embryos-always-murder/

There are certainly various definitions of life. I think a point of difference between the two cases would be that our criteria for death of someone who is sick is based on knowing that the person “isn’t coming back.” Once there is not a conscious thought, it is very unlikely that the person will return to a state of consciousness. The distinction is more medical than legal. Likewise, life is defined biologically, so the person who has been “pronounced dead” recently still has some “living” cells, but because the brain is no longer functioning, those cells are in the process of dying, whereas all of the fetus’s cells are living (excepting, of course, those that will undergo apoptosis per the normal process of fetal development) and are in the process of differentiating into a being that will have conscious thought. It seems we will have to borrow from definitions sensibly. In a medical context, it makes sense to use one definition; carrying that over to “the other end of life” may not be proper.

There is also the issue that, even though the person is considered medically dead, he or she has certain rights (ie. organ donation). Conscious thought is necessary to be considered alive medically, but the absence of conscious thought is not the absence of rights.

I know that this is kind of your point: one can read into just about any situation according to their position on the matter:

Any arguments, for or against, would have an irreducible element of being an attempt to persuade, which involves an appeal to emotion. So, you consider different ways of looking at the issue and, at the end, make a subjective call, based on what seems “persuasive” or “compelling” or “fair-minded.”

Well, I would say that the arguments for abortion are not compelling because 1). all pro-abortion analogies are fallacious and not truly equivalent, and 2). all definitions of “generalized personhood” (to borrow Innoruk’s term) are arbitrary, though the personhood of normal adults is self-evident. Since the development of an adult is continuous with the development of a fetus, there would have to be a non-arbitrary reason to designate a point where the fetus becomes a person. Conception is the moment where the fetus becomes an individual; the first conscious thought is the moment where the fetus exhibits a single characteristic that we associate with adult persons.

The subjectivity comes in, I think, over arguments over whether it is obviously not only immoral, but illegal, to interfere with the process.

Well, it is currently legal; the argument is as to whether it should be illegal. I don’t even think the word “obviously” applies; this discussion would suggest otherwise.

Then there is the question: is it murder to take, for example, a “morning after pill”; is it a felony; is it a misdemeanor, etc. (e.g., animal cruelty is a misdemeanor in some states, a felony in others, thus illegal, but in none of them is it considered first-degree murder if the animal dies as a result of human cruelty).

Well, I think the important debate right now is the question of immorality rather than illegality. I consider murder to be “intentional, unjustified killing,” so taking a morning-after pill is murder. The law ought to conform to what is moral; there may be issues of conforming the law to morality, and conforming law to morality may be far off, but society’s goal should always be to make laws more moral.

Abortion is like gun control to me. There are millions of guns in America, and they cannot be removed immediately. Those guns are, however, often used to kill people, much like abortions which are always performed to kill people. That does not mean that we should not attempt gun control or hold it as a goal. Part of the current effort must be to convince people that in the end it will be better if we can’t shoot each other, even if we feel like the inability to own firearms is an encroachment on our rights.

 

[polytropos]

The emotions cannot be eliminated entirely, either, because it is sometimes the emotions that clarify one’s reasoning. For instance, if there is no respect for life, no reverence for life, then I don’t think any rational arguments will be deemed persuasive. Indeed, values cannot be subtracted entirely from the equation.

Certainly. We have a legal system to promote justice, which is rooted viscerally in our impulses and desires for fairness. Furthermore, every time we draw an analogy regarding abortion, we are appealing to the emotionally guided clarity of the purportedly analogous situation, which is supposed to make the abortion scenario clear.

But since definitions of personhood are arbitrary, we need to figure out how to give people the rights they deserve. Personhood is not just intelligence, it is not just viability, and it is not just civilization, since all of those produce viscerally and legally inconsistent results. Right now, all that we have definitively associated personhood with is humanity.

Is this conceivably problematic? Maybe - if we discover some other nonhuman entity that seems deserving of personhood. But right now, we haven’t.

 

[CompSciGuy]

This is a bit of a straw man, but OK.

Actually it is the most common defense made by pro-choicers. I am living in Austin and at the capitol on the HB2 legislation days nearly all of the signs say something to the degree of “my body, my choice.”

 

[ccmnxc]

Hi Portofino.

–it depends on what kind of “results” one procures, but it would be doubtful that an argument for the personhood of these actually born – albeit modified – humans could not still be mounted, based such things as: viability outside the womb (after the 23rd week, any fetus is presumed a person and is given full legal protection, no matter how malformed or “abnormal”); conscious awareness; any ability to experience pain (unless you would anesthetize their nerve endings completely, which would take a practically God-like control over human development). Viability outside the womb, including by artificial means, which is currently the yardstick for prohibiting most late-term abortions, would theoretically be the “fail-safe” to objecting to your thought experiment

When it comes to viability, I would say that personhood is a misnomer. Personhood is generally associated with mental faculties. Furthermore, viability would then make personhood arbitrary and contingent upon medical technology of the time, which is continually advancing. This would mean that a fetus today has a greater right to life than one living in the 18th century simply due to advances in medical technology. As to conscious awareness and ability to feel pain, I think this would basically make the vast majority of animals (or at least mammals) persons, which leads to quite a lot of problems.

–aside from questions of viability, there likely would be arguments mounted from the perspective of “cruel and unusual punishment”, whether physical or psychological; these same arguments could be used against the practice of castrating pre-teen boys so that they retain a “lovely singing voice.” I realize that laws against “cruel and unusual punishment” are already paradoxical, as is – thus, you can kill an inmate in Texas – that is no cruel and unusual punishment, nor is the psychological torture of anticipating the hour of one’s execution – but you need to kill in a way that is judged by the state to be “sufficiently humane” (including the presumed “psychological comfort” offered by the last meal, which admittedly does not preclude the consumption of ice cream! )

One of the main arguments for personhood (and one which I mentioned in the thought experiment) would be desires. If one has no desires, then it seems the thought of being killed wouldn’t be all that psychologically detrimental to that being. They cannot desire to live, after all. They also cannot desire not to feel pain. However, it seems that laws against cruel and unusual punishment only apply to people who are already considered persons (correct me if I am wrong on this). If that is the case, then it seems one is already assuming that those in my thought experiment are persons, which is fine, but then, it invalidates the characteristics listed as viable reasons to believe a fetus is not a person.

–these already born children would be treated as property, which would violate the prohibition against enslavement/human trafficking

I believe this also assumes the personhood of the being in question. After all, we can own dogs and gerbils w/o repercussions specifically because they are not persons.

If such children were born and kept in holding pens – being raised like veal, in order to harvest their organs – it would not only be unlikely that the parents and extended family would have something to say about it but that, if all else fails (let’s say the parents are either unethical or really in need of money) they would still resemble “normal children” too strongly for people not to be repulsed by the whole thing. In fairness, most pro-choicers who wish to keep first- or early second-trimester abortions legal under most circumstances are still revolted by the process of a late-term abortion, where a woman’s belly is so distended that it’s clear that she is “closer to the end than to the beginning.”

I think this highlights exactly what I am attempting to get across. Most reasonable people (save guys like Michael Tooley and Peter Singer) would find such actions abominable. However, for the sake of consistency, it doesn’t make sense to use the same characteristics to justify abortion. I hope for the love of God this never becomes a reality, but I think it does help to outline what most people really think of personhood.

But, again, the courts take a comparatively conservative stance on personhood, automatically considering that any fetus that has reached at least 23 weeks of development (a conservative estimate of its ability to survive outside its mother’s womb, including with artificial aid) is already a human person. It doesn’t say “unless the brain is sufficiently malformed for it to be disqualified as a person”… Not sure we would want to roll back our standards on that, for the sake of consistency!

But then it doesn’t seem to make much sense to use any standard of personhood other than viability (disregarding my issues with it). Things like desires, emotions, etc would then be made irrelevant in being replaced solely by the viability argument.

 

[Portofino]

Hi Portofino.

Hi there.

it comes to viability, I would say that personhood is a misnomer. Personhood is generally associated with mental faculties. Furthermore, viability would then make personhood arbitrary and contingent upon medical technology of the time, which is continually advancing.

You’re right; I think the courts (in the Roe v. Wade decision) were making a compromise between the pro-life and the pro-choice argument, in privileging viability over questions of personhood (pro-life proponents would place personhood much earlier, pro-choice proponents conceivably later). I understand that a pro-life proponent believes it was a lousy compromise.

of the main arguments for personhood (and one which I mentioned in the thought experiment) would be desires. If one has no desires, then it seems the thought of being killed wouldn’t be all that psychologically detrimental to that being. They cannot desire to live, after all. They also cannot desire not to feel pain. However, it seems that laws against cruel and unusual punishment only apply to people who are already considered persons (correct me if I am wrong on this). If that is the case, then it seems one is already assuming that those in my thought experiment are persons, which is fine, but then, it invalidates the characteristics listed as viable reasons to believe a fetus is not a person.

It gets thorny. A zygote or an embryo has no desire to live, yet reasonably would have a desire to live if it had the wherewithal to be conscious of its fate. You’re right; I think I am assuming, in my response, that the law indeed does “err on the side of caution” as regards the personhood of late-term fetuses, let alone newborns, and that this would carry over to your thought experiment. Questions of personhood are off limits there, or are irrelevant.

In a comparatively more innocuous way, I’m also thinking of the way that our laws “draw the line” in terms of who gets the right to vote; who gets to drive; who gets to drink. It would be ludicrous to give a two-year-old the right to vote (though I can’t say they wouldn’t make any less informed decision, than a lot of other vote-wielding citizens ).

So there’s the sense of, “a two-year-old is obviously not a candidate to have the right to vote” (in the same way that, for some pro-choicers, a 10-day old embryo is “obviously” not yet a person). Then you start sliding the scale further and further over, until you get into a rather large “gray zone.” For example, are there not mature and intelligent 16-year-olds who probably deserve the right to vote? Are there not 18-year-olds who probably are not yet ready, and should wait until at least age 21? Are there not 30-somethings and 40-somethings that probably shouldn’t have the right to vote at all? Should there be a particular IQ threshold for exercising the right to vote; for example, if someone is mentally disabled, should that right be revoked?

It’s irreducibly arbitrary, isn’t it? Someone who is 17 and 364 days is not legally authorized to vote, whereas someone who is 18 and 0 days is. Did he magically become a “mature adult”, overnight? Can one p(name removed by moderator)oint the exact moment at which he merits being called an adult?

I think the courts realized that it is impossible to identify the moment that personhood begins, even though science can tell us the moment that life begins. Their fatal mistake, I suppose a pro-lifer would say, is that they made an arbitrary distinction between a living organism that is genetically human, a living human organism, proper, and a living human person. The viability argument was a way to evade deciding on this question of the moment at which one becomes “a human person” even though viability itself is a gray area (sure, a 2-day old embryo is not viable outside the mother’s body, but a 7 month old fetus may be).

then it doesn’t seem to make much sense to use any standard of personhood other than viability (disregarding my issues with it). Things like desires, emotions, etc would then be made irrelevant in being replaced solely by the viability argument.

It’s also true that viability is something which, strategically speaking, pro-life advocates are willing to run with. In a way, it is a boon to the movement that the moment of viability can be increased with further advances in medicine. It may be a technicality, but it could prove useful as medical technology continues to improve.

The issue of pain is also used strategically; if pain can be demonstrated, then one has a comparatively stronger case, against the skeptics, that a fetus is already “sufficiently” a human person. Of course, it’s no guarantee; I’ve heard arguments that, if fetuses are demonstrated to be capable of feeling pain during the first trimester, then fetal anesthetic will be mandated before an abortion is performed!

But if were demonstrably shown that even a first trimester fetus can experience fear, anxiety, terror, or agony, all but the hard-core pro-choicers would probably swing over to the other side.

It’s also fair to point out that governments, frankly, are not shining bastions of respect for life! Surely, innocent people have been unjustly imprisoned, and executed. The government errs on the side of caution in terms of someone needing to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt (which falls short of a standard of 100% certainty) ; then, there is a potentially lengthy appeals process, to which the condemned person is entitled. But governments are not as conscientious guardians of life as any deeply religious individual would be; during military operations, “erring on the side of caution” is also pretty loosely applied, in the sense that collateral damage is considered a legitimate casualty of war.

 

[lynnvinc]

I think it is very difficult to argue with pro-choice people who are zonked into Enlightenment, esp American, thinking of autonomous, monadic individualism and freedom and pursuit of material gluttony.

For one thing we are not individuals, but interdependents (we were all fetuses at one time, and we need one another…for both material and emotional sustenance). And who’s “free”? People are tied up in their cultures and social mesh; they are not free. They mainly parrot whatever their sociocultural millieu has taught them to parrot.

The Catholic way of thinking is that with what freedom we do have, which is God-given, we are to give that back to God and follow His will, not ours, and that is true freedom.

Following God’s will means accepting one’s circumstances and making the best of often difficult situations, including difficult pregnancies. We are not to have personal goals apart from God’s will for us. It should be all for God, with inconveniences and hardships as presents from God to help us develop our strength of character and serve Him better. That is true peace and happiness.

I have an easier time convincing non-Catholics of the pro-choice persuasion, but dedicated to saving the world for future generations – environmentalists – that it makes no sense to kill children in order to save the earth for the children. I pray I would have saved a few children that way.

In other words, only if people are into (or open to) non-selfish pursuits of doing good for others, even if they be non-Catholic or atheist, only then does one have a chance to get through to them about the wrongness of abortion.

Also, here is a great vid, if you haven’t seen it on EWTN re “it’s my body, my choice” juxtaposed with “this is my body given up for you that you might live eternally” – youtube.com/watch?v=DCmLmZDpB4I