Intrinsic Goods and its relation to instrinsic evils

[fakename]

Can intrinsic good be, at least accidentally, intrinsic evil?

If good is like being, perhaps not because intrinsic good might be likened to substance and substance cannot be an accident.

But then again, we see in life how things that are good by definition can be accidentally connected with things bad by definition. For instance, food might lead, accidentally, to death.

So what is the answer?

 

[bzkoss236]

Can intrinsic good be, at least accidentally, intrinsic evil?

If good is like being, perhaps not because intrinsic good might be likened to substance and substance cannot be an accident.

But then again, we see in life how things that are good by definition can be accidentally connected with things bad by definition. For instance, food might lead, accidentally, to death.

So what is the answer?

I don’t think you could say that things are good or bad in and of themselves, but it is how they are used that can be intrinsically good or evil. So, for food, it isn’t good or bad itself, but if one eats to excess to the point of death, that is not the food’s fault. It was merely designed to be consumed as food. The fault lies with the person who ate all the food.

I will say that things that are designed by God are said to be good, because God Himself called them good. And I will also say that good things can be misused, but that still doesn’t make the thing evil, only that the person who misused the good things did evil.

Does that make sense?

 

[fakename]

I don’t think you could say that things are good or bad in and of themselves, but it is how they are used that can be intrinsically good or evil. So, for food, it isn’t good or bad itself, but if one eats to excess to the point of death, that is not the food’s fault. It was merely designed to be consumed as food. The fault lies with the person who ate all the food.

I will say that things that are designed by God are said to be good, because God Himself called them good. And I will also say that good things can be misused, but that still doesn’t make the thing evil, only that the person who misused the good things did evil.

Does that make sense?

Then what is extrinsically bad, if everything that is good per simpliciter only because of how it is used and context, etc.?

Or perhaps, intrinsically good things are not “things” but "how things are used " or “how the person using them sees them”?

But food, defined per se, as “that which nourishes an organism” is intrinsically or “by definition” good. Perhaps there is an equivocation when people say “food”. Perhaps they mean on one hand “that which nourishes” (intrinsically good) and on another “that which is ingestible” which is extrinsically good? There appear to be moral complications which arise depending on whether one wants to define things materially or formally. But since a definition proper is always formal (though sometimes including matter) I would say that we should, for the remainder of the thread, use the formal definitions of things.

Your opinions?

 

[bzkoss236]

Then what is extrinsically bad, if everything that is good per simpliciter only because of how it is used and context, etc.?

Or perhaps, intrinsically good things are not “things” but "how things are used " or “how the person using them sees them”?

But food, defined per se, as “that which nourishes an organism” is intrinsically or “by definition” good. Perhaps there is an equivocation when people say “food”. Perhaps they mean on one hand “that which nourishes” (intrinsically good) and on another “that which is ingestible” which is extrinsically good? There appear to be moral complications which arise depending on whether one wants to define things materially or formally. But since a definition proper is always formal (though sometimes including matter) I would say that we should, for the remainder of the thread, use the formal definitions of things.

Your opinions?

Either way, what is considered intrinsically evil is usually a how something is used. “Things” that are considered intrinsically evil (such as contraception) are only considered such because of their associated use. This can be seen in the fact that the Church allows the use of birth control pills for medicinal purposes.

 

[fakename]

Either way, what is considered intrinsically evil is usually a how something is used. “Things” that are considered intrinsically evil (such as contraception) are only considered such because of their associated use. This can be seen in the fact that the Church allows the use of birth control pills for medicinal purposes.

But the Church is not saying “use birth ctrl because in this case, it has much greater utility than normal and so is no longer intrinsically evil” but it does say “only if something is not intrinsically evil, then it may be used according to utilitarian calculations” as per the law of double effect which justifies birth control. Birth control pills are not intrinsically evil but to prevent the possibility and impede pregnancy is, so that shows that it is not the case that use is what determines definitive good or bad.

 

[bzkoss236]

But the Church is not saying “use birth ctrl because in this case, it has much greater utility than normal and so is no longer intrinsically evil” but it does say “only if something is not intrinsically evil, then it may be used according to utilitarian calculations” as per the law of double effect which justifies birth control. Birth control pills are not intrinsically evil but to prevent the possibility and impede pregnancy is, so that shows that it is not the case that use is what determines definitive good or bad.

I never said the Church endorses the use of birth control as medication. She just says that it is okay to use as medication.

In regard to the second part, how is impeding pregnancy (or more accurately, conception, hence contraception) not a use?

The main function of birth control is contraception (which is a use), and because of that, when sitting by itself, it is considered intrinsically evil. However, something that is normally evil, can be used for good. If the same pill were advertised as a medication, rather than contraception, I do not think this would not be the case.

 

[fakename]

I never said the Church endorses the use of birth control as medication. She just says that it is okay to use as medication.

In regard to the second part, how is impeding pregnancy (or more accurately, conception, hence contraception) not a use?

The main function of birth control is contraception (which is a use), and because of that, when sitting by itself, it is considered intrinsically evil. However, something that is normally evil, can be used for good. If the same pill were advertised as a medication, rather than contraception, I do not think this would not be the case.

An interesting response.

I answer that contraception is a use and so it is true that the uses of a thing therefore factors into intrinsic good/evil. However, I would ask “why is the use of something for contraception evil? Is it because the use of it is not beneficial from a utilitarian standpoint? No, for the Church recognizes the contradiction in utilitarianism. Is it because contraception is just a bad use? Well that is circular reasoning, defining the use of a thing by the definition of that thing’s use. So then what is the reason?” I answer that question by pointing to the fact that the rational use of sex organs is to produce children and so on and so forth. So it is from this fact, that we derive that contraception is a bad use, and not that contraception is a bad use by the use of contraception.

Again, going back to a previous post, the material definition focuses on the use of the thing, while the formal definition unveils the true reason.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Can intrinsic good be, at least accidentally, intrinsic evil?

If good is like being, perhaps not because intrinsic good might be likened to substance and substance cannot be an accident.

But then again, we see in life how things that are good by definition can be accidentally connected with things bad by definition. For instance, food might lead, accidentally, to death.

So what is the answer?

Nothing is intrinsically bad or evil. Speaking of human acts only, evil acts are those which fail to conform to God’s will, they are lacking in moral goodness. Evil is not something which exists, it is the lack of goodness to some degree. Human language adds the adjective " intrinsically " to emphasize how much good is lacking.

The same could be said of natural " evils. " Fires, earth quakes are bad in so far as they depart from the desireable norm or if they cause damage to men. Linus2nde

 

[fakename]

Nothing is intrinsically bad or evil. Speaking of human acts only, evil acts are those which fail to conform to God’s will, they are lacking in moral goodness. Evil is not something which exists, it is the lack of goodness to some degree. Human language adds the adjective " intrinsically " to emphasize how much good is lacking.

The same could be said of natural " evils. " Fires, earth quakes are bad in so far as they depart from the desireable norm or if they cause damage to men. Linus2nde

So then all bads are extrinsic? But still, if that is true then why are there things which are by definition bad like for instance “to not conform with God’s will” -the very relation of the words makes the thing bad quite beside any extrinsic considerations?

 

[fakename]

Then what is extrinsically bad, if everything that is good per simpliciter only because of how it is used and context, etc.?

Or perhaps, intrinsically good things are not “things” but "how things are used " or “how the person using them sees them”?

But food, defined per se, as “that which nourishes an organism” is intrinsically or “by definition” good. Perhaps there is an equivocation when people say “food”. Perhaps they mean on one hand “that which nourishes” (intrinsically good) and on another “that which is ingestible” which is extrinsically good? There appear to be moral complications which arise depending on whether one wants to define things materially or formally. But since a definition proper is always formal (though sometimes including matter) I would say that we should, for the remainder of the thread, use the formal definitions of things.

Your opinions?

However way I define food, though it would still be the case that something by definition good “pleasure of food” since the definition of pleasing is “a good feeling”) would lead to something bad by definition “death”.

 

[fakename]

However way I define food, though it would still be the case that something by definition good “pleasure of food” since the definition of pleasing is “a good feeling”) would lead to something bad by definition “death”.

This should read:

However way I define food though, it would still be the case that something by definition good like “The pleasure of food” (since the definition of pleasing is “an innately good feeling”) would lead to something bad by definition “death”.

Again can anyone answer why something by definition good can lead to something by definition bad, for if it did, would not to choose that first thing be itself an intrinsic evil? And yet would not choosing it under different circumstances make the same choice intrinsically good?

Perhaps, as has been suggested, the evils that exist are not real evils and so to choose something inherently good is possible in both cases while the intrinsically evil is mere accident of good. Yet, how do we explain this: it is wrong to choose something which is merely accidental good but mortal evil. If mortal evil were always a mere accident of good though, then how could there be accidental good? Mortal evil would have to be in someway, substantial.

Again though, perhaps the choices are only apparently the same. In scenario one, I am choosing both an intrinsic good and evil,and therefore I am choosing an evil and ought not to do so. In scenario two, I am only choosing good so the contradiction above does not occur.

Perhaps also, what is essentially good and bad are accidentally connected? But taking the metaphor of substance again, how can one substance be the accident of another? Yet, is that what “accidentally connected” means? Instead perhaps two substances can be connected accidentally as opposed to one substance being an accident. This is the difference between a black colored human and the connection between chickens and humans since both can be featherless bipeds.

 

[davidv]

From a moral perspective good and bad apply to actions not objects.

From the CCC:

II. GOOD ACTS AND EVIL ACTS

1755 A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances together. An evil end corrupts the action, even if the object is good in itself (such as praying and fasting “in order to be seen by men”).
The object of the choice can by itself vitiate an act in its entirety. There are some concrete acts - such as fornication - that it is always wrong to choose, because choosing them entails a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil.
1756 It is therefore an error to judge the morality of human acts by considering only the intention that inspires them or the circumstances (environment, social pressure, duress or emergency, etc.) which supply their context. There are acts which, in and of themselves, independently of circumstances and intentions, are always gravely illicit by reason of their object; such as blasphemy and perjury, murder and adultery. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.

fakename:

Again can anyone answer why something by definition good can lead to something by definition bad, for if it did, would not to choose that first thing be itself an intrinsic evil?

I don’t think I can answer why, but the prime example is Jesus’ death on the cross. From this great evil came the great good of salvation from sin of all mankind.

And yet would not choosing it under different circumstances make the same choice intrinsically good?

Circumstances cannot alter the intrisic nature of the act. If the act is intrinsically evil, no good intention nor good circumstance can change it. See the CCC quote above.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

So then all bads are extrinsic? But still, if that is true then why are there things which are by definition bad like for instance “to not conform with God’s will” -the very relation of the words makes the thing bad quite beside any extrinsic considerations?

Evil has no ontological reality, it is a mental construct used to describe the absence of a good which should be present. A two legged dog is not " evil , " it is good in that it is a dog and in that it has two legs. It is less good than it should be.

Murder is a mental construct describing the unjust depriving a good which should be present. It is the failure to preserve and protect a positive good in a given situation. " Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. "

Therefore, " bads " are not " extrinsic. " Neither are they intrinsic. Evil is always the absence of good.

Linus2nd

 

[fakename]

Evil has no ontological reality, it is a mental construct used to describe the absence of a good which should be present. A two legged dog is not " evil , " it is good in that it is a dog and in that it has two legs. It is less good than it should be.

Murder is a mental construct describing the unjust depriving a good which should be present. It is the failure to preserve and protect a positive good in a given situation. " Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. "

Therefore, " bads " are not " extrinsic. " Neither are they intrinsic. Evil is always the absence of good.

Linus2nd

Then why would the Church teach that there are intrinsic bads?

In any case, I’m not wedded to a Manichean view of evil, but intrinsic evils might exist (in our minds) anyways if we simply called them “definitions which have “bad” in them” (for instance “dying” or “murder” etc.). So we don’t have to say that evil exists in any substantial fashion in order to say that privations exist objectively and that things which have the word “privation” in their very definitions must be essentially evil.