Intrinsically Evil Acts

[RosaryFan]

given that:
A is an intrinsically evil act
B is a moral act

1. Is it ever moral to do A?
2. Can good intention or dire circumstances ever make it moral to do A?
3. Can intention or circumstance ever change the essential moral nature of A, so that A becomes a different kind of act, one that is now moral?
4. If A is done before, during, or after B, can A ever become moral or become a different kind of act, one that is now moral?
5. When the second font of morality is bad, is the act necessarily intrinsically evil?

I was under the impression that intrinsically evil acts were always immoral, such as abortion.

 

[ForwardProgress]

So how is masturbation before/during/after a completed act of coitus considered moral?

It is because if it is right before/during/after a sexual session it is not defined as ‘masturbation’?

 

[Ron_Conte]

Direct abortion is intrinsically evil and therefore always immoral.
Nothing can make an intrinsically evil act moral.

As for sexual sin, all unnatural sexual acts are intrinsically evil
whether completed in sexual climax or not,
because the moral object of the act is the same.
The moral object is the inherent moral meaning of the act.
Unnatural sexual acts are inherently contrary to the moral law.

Such acts do not become moral by being accompanied by a
good act of natural marital relations, because each and every
knowingly chosen act must be good under all three fonts of morality.
And an act never takes its morality from the fonts of a different act.

So the moral object of an unnatural sexual act is that of the unnatural act,
even if not completed. One knowingly chosen act cannot be justified
by the moral object of a different act.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

I’d just like to add a note of clarification:

Ron is right that the circumstances considered as a font of morality cannot reform an evil act into a good one, however circumstances which themselves are an element of the moral object of an act do determine whether the moral object of an act is good or bad. Thus those circumstances can make an act good or bad.

Example: taking = morally neutral; theft = morally bad. Part of the moral object of “theft” includes certain circumstances.

Example: intercourse outside of marriage = fornication, morally bad; intercourse within marriage = morally good. Again, circumstances considered not as a font but as a constituent of the moral object can be important in determining the moral object of an act itself.

VC

 

[Ron_Conte]

I’d just like to add a note of clarification:

Ron is right that the circumstances considered as a font of morality cannot reform an evil act into a good one, however circumstances which themselves are an element of the moral object of an act do determine whether the moral object of an act is good or bad. Thus those circumstances can make an act good or bad.

Example: taking = morally neutral; theft = morally bad. Part of the moral object of “theft” includes certain circumstances.

Example: intercourse outside of marriage = fornication, morally bad; intercourse within marriage = morally good. Again, circumstances considered not as a font but as a constituent of the moral object can be important in determining the moral object of an act itself.

VC

Your ‘clarification’ is based on your own misunderstanding of the meaning of the word ‘circumstances’ as it is used in moral theology. This is not the dictionary definition of ‘circumstances’, but a specialized use of the term.

By definition, circumstances in moral theology is everything that pertains to the morality of an act, other than the intention and the act itself with its moral object. Any factor which is essential to the moral nature of the act itself is not a circumstance, but a part of the definition of the act.

Also, all knowingly chosen acts are under the moral law and are either good (morally licit) or bad (morally illicit). There are no morally neutral knowingly chosen act. So, in order to determine the morality of ‘taking’ one needs more information to discover the moral object (the inherent moral meaning of the act); that additional information is part of the second font. By definition, only the third font is called circumstances.

VC’s post above has no support in Catholic moral teaching. The term circumstances refers solely to the third font. See Veritatis Splendor.

 

[RosaryFan]

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Your ‘clarification’ is based on your own misunderstanding of the meaning of the word ‘circumstances’ as it is used in moral theology. This is not the dictionary definition of ‘circumstances’, but a specialized use of the term.

Ron,

I know what the term circumstances mean in moral theology.
Ron Conte:

VC’s post above has no support in Catholic moral teaching. The term circumstances refers solely to the third font. See Veritatis Splendor.

St. Thomas Aquinas seems to disagree with you Ron.
The Angelic Doctor:

whenever a circumstance has a special relation to reason, either for or against, it must needs specify the moral action whether good or bad. (II-I, 18, 10)

And in Latin : quandocumque aliqua circumstantia respicit specialem ordinem rationis vel pro vel contra, oportet quod circumstantia det speciem actui morali vel bono vel malo.

A mere accidental circumstance doesn’t specify a moral object, but circumstances, context, etc. can be a component of a moral object (i.e a component of the second font).

If anyone else is having a bit of trouble following, or I’m not sufficiently making myself clear, pipe up and we can discuss it more.

VC

p.s. Like I said in my prior post, Ron is right insofar as circumstances such as “she is my girlfriend!” don’t change the moral object of fornication. But the circumstance “I am married!” does specify the moral object of adultery. If we aren’t clear that some things called circumstances do factor into the moral object of an act, it leads to all kinds of misunderstandings and error.

 

[Ron_Conte]

Terminology in moral theology has developed since St. Thomas wrote the Summa. The term ‘circumstances’ now refers solely to the third font. All that determines the second font is called the moral object (or moral species), and nothing that determines the moral object is called a circumstance.

See Pope John Paul II in Veritatis Splendor, where he uses circumstance solely to refer to the third font. This point is essential to his doctrinal teaching that intrinsically evil acts are always gravely immoral regardless of intention or circumstance. If circumstance also refered to the second font, so that a circumstance changed the moral object from evil to good, then intrinsically evil acts would not be independent of circumstance, as Pope John Paul II teaches.

"The foreseeable consequences are part of those circumstances of the act, which, while capable of lessening the gravity of an evil act, nonetheless cannot alter its moral species."
Veritatis Splendor, n. 77

The Pope is here teaching that circumstances cannot alter the moral species (i.e. the moral object, or moral nature) of the act. In another document, he also teaches that the moral object is independent of circumstances.

"That is, there exist acts which, per se and in themselves, independently of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason of their object."
Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, n. 17

It is a required belief of the Catholic faith that intrinsically evil acts are always gravely immoral regardless of intention or circumstance.

The misuse of terminology such that the second font is also said to be a result of ‘circumstance’ makes this required belief much more difficult to understand. So while terminology is not doctrine, misuse of terminology can obscure a doctrine and make it difficult to understand.

 

[JG77]

given that:
A is an intrinsically evil act
B is a moral act

A and B are opposites. A is something that is always unethical since it is always or intrinsically evil no matter what the situation. B is something that is always going to be an ethical act (or we could say as act of charity), something that is moral; otherwise it would not be called such. So … A and B are like oil and water; they can’t be mixed together because they oppose each other.

So let’s look at the questions our OP puts before us.

1. Is it ever moral to do A?
That’s like asking if it is it ever ethical to do anything unethical and in the case of A, A is always intrinsically evil. Intrinsic means that the very center and nature of the thing is evil. Therefore making #1 and the following impossible.
**
2. Can good intention or dire circumstances ever make it moral to do A?** It is impossible to have any good intention or dire circumstance to commit something that is evil to the core.
Because it is intrinsic, the evilness of the act is never going to be lessened because of ill formed or misguided intent. The only other element is that depending on the acquired habit or addiction to something that the moral culpability of the person is lessened. However, even while there is that element the gravity of the action/s itself is completely retained. Which pretty much answers 3 which is also …
**
3. Can intention or circumstance ever change the essential moral nature of A, so that A becomes a different kind of act, one that is now moral?** … no
**
4. If A is done before, during, or after B, can A ever become moral or become a different kind of act, one that is now moral?** Being a repeat of 3, the answer is still no. There is no justification for committing an intrinsically evil act becasue the very nature of that act is evil and cannot change.
**
5. When the second font of morality is bad, is the act necessarily intrinsically evil? **Intrinsically evil acts are always intrinsically evil. If they were not, why would we call them that? Wouldn’t we just call them potentially evil acts if that’s all they are?

Is there a particular A & B that our OP is wondering about? It would help if it were asked so us responders could offer clearer advise.

 

[JG77]

p.s. Like I said in my prior post, Ron is right insofar as circumstances such as “she is my girlfriend!” don’t change the moral object of fornication. But the circumstance “I am married!” does specify the moral object of adultery. If we aren’t clear that some things called circumstances do factor into the moral object of an act, it leads to all kinds of misunderstandings and error.

I agree with you. But the OP made it specific that there were only A’s and B’s or moral and intrinsically evil acts. So this whole thing about circumstances, while it makes sense, goes beyond what he was asking becasue we can assume in his question that adultery, fornication, rape, abortion and so on are in under the category of A. Like I said, I think you are right, but just by way he worded his questions we are only dealing with the specific act and whether or not its gravity can be changed. Like, fornication is never going to be right and so on.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Terminology in moral theology has developed since St. Thomas wrote the Summa. The term ‘circumstances’ now refers solely to the third font. All that determines the second font is called the moral object (or moral species), and nothing that determines the moral object is called a circumstance.

Yes, please read my post again. I specifically mentioned that circumstances considered not as a font but as a constituent of the moral object can be important in determining the moral object of an act itself. “Circumstances” referring to the third font of course do not do so.

Perhaps we don’t have a good word for the circumstances which are an intelligible component of the moral species or object. “Specifying circumstances” has been suggested. Regardless of the term, however, the concept is of crucial importance. Whatever we might want to call them, there are certain specifying -]circumstances/-] qualities which are so intrinsically and logically related to the object that they merge with or become indistinguishable from the object, i.e. they are an element of the specification of the moral object. The three fonts of morality, preserved in traditional moral theology, are outlined by Aquinas in the same question that I referenced. . . along with the concept of (for lack of a better term) “circumstances which collapse into the moral object”.
"Ron Conte:

See Pope John Paul II in Veritatis Splendor, where he uses circumstance solely to refer to the third font. This point is essential to his doctrinal teaching that intrinsically evil acts are always gravely immoral regardless of intention or circumstance. If circumstance also refered to the second font, so that a circumstance changed the moral object from evil to good, then intrinsically evil acts would not be independent of circumstance, as Pope John Paul II teaches.

"The foreseeable consequences are part of those circumstances of the act, which, while capable of lessening the gravity of an evil act, nonetheless cannot alter its moral species."
Veritatis Splendor, n. 77

The Pope is here teaching that circumstances cannot alter the moral species (i.e. the moral object, or moral nature) of the act. In another document, he also teaches that the moral object is independent of circumstances.

"That is, there exist acts which, per se and in themselves, independently of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason of their object."
Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, n. 17

It is a required belief of the Catholic faith that intrinsically evil acts are always gravely immoral regardless of intention or circumstance.

The misuse of terminology such that the second font is also said to be a result of ‘circumstance’ makes this required belief much more difficult to understand. So while terminology is not doctrine, misuse of terminology can obscure a doctrine and make it difficult to understand.

Excellent points here Ron, to which I agree. I attempted to take care explaining that circumstances (font) are not “circumstances which collapse into the moral object”.

Because I interpreted your thread as an explanatory one, I wished to add what I believe to be an important point: that we must carefully asses the elements of the moral object or else may miss the mark. For instance, if one were to say that theft is wrong and that it remains wrong even though the owner gives you permission to take because “having permission” is a circumstance (font) which can’t reform the bad moral object of theft. . . well, that is an obvious blunder. The truth is, of course, that not having permission to take is an element of theft, and is a “type” of circumstance which collapses into and specifies the moral object of a physical act (taking). That’s an obvious example, but there may examples less obvious and care taken in assessing the moral object of an act.

VC’s post above has no support in Catholic moral teaching.

seems a far cry from

Terminology in moral theology has developed since St. Thomas wrote the Summa.

In as much as I attempted to reiterate Aquinas’ point in the Summa Theologiae (and also found in *de Malo, *Q. II, Art. 6) I thought my post had sufficient support in Catholic moral teaching.

Didn’t intend to sidetrack you.
VC

 

[Verbum_Caro]

I agree with you. But the OP made it specific that there were only A’s and B’s or moral and intrinsically evil acts. So this whole thing about circumstances, while it makes sense, goes beyond what he was asking becasue we can assume in his question that adultery, fornication, rape, abortion and so on are in under the category of A. Like I said, I think you are right, but just by way he worded his questions we are only dealing with the specific act and whether or not its gravity can be changed. Like, fornication is never going to be right and so on.

JG,

Good point, thanks. See my post above as to why I thought it somewhat related. I was taking the approach that an analysis of intrinsically evil acts must carefully define the moral object (because it is the most important font, *especially *in the case of intrinsically evil acts).

Nevertheless, your point is well taken and I appreciate the admonition.

VC

 

[Dtmccameron]

Good fruit can not come from a rotten tree. If A is an evil act then nothing good can result from A. You also mention good intentions, the road to hell is paved with good intentions.

• Charlie

Mmmmm…no, but, the rotten fruit can, possibly, fertilize the soil.

Meaning to say that all things “work for the good” of those who serve Him. So, evil things, such as murder, rape, genocide, and the like, while having no good result in and of themselves, might lead, in the fullness of time, to a good conclusion.

Then again, this might simply have everything to do with all things being possible in God.

 

[elts1956]

Ron,

I know what the term circumstances mean in moral theology.

St. Thomas Aquinas seems to disagree with you Ron.

And in Latin : quandocumque aliqua circumstantia respicit specialem ordinem rationis vel pro vel contra, oportet quod circumstantia det speciem actui morali vel bono vel malo.

A mere accidental circumstance doesn’t specify a moral object, but circumstances, context, etc. can be a component of a moral object (i.e a component of the second font).

If anyone else is having a bit of trouble following, or I’m not sufficiently making myself clear, pipe up and we can discuss it more.

VC

p.s. Like I said in my prior post, Ron is right insofar as circumstances such as “she is my girlfriend!” don’t change the moral object of fornication. But the circumstance “I am married!” does specify the moral object of adultery. If we aren’t clear that some things called circumstances do factor into the moral object of an act, it leads to all kinds of misunderstandings and error.

I’m piping up. I am having a hard time following you. I do know that Pope Paul II in I “think” Evangelium Vitae said for instance in the case of a woman having an abortion, circumstances can mitigate the individual’s culpability. BUT abortion itself as an act is always, always wrong. So although culpability would/could be judged differently in each case, the guilt is still there. ie. However, we cannot, as humans, say for certain a woman is going to Hell because she had an abortion. That decision is God’s as only He knows the whole circumstance. Does that make sense? Am I on the right track? Thanks.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Hi elts,

abortion itself as an act is always, always wrong.

Yes, that is exactly right. Abortion is an intrinsically evil act.

Returning to Ron’s outline of the fonts of morality, the moral object of the act of abortion is evil. The circumstances that surround an abortion or the intention one has in procuring an abortion can never change the moral object form evil to good. And if the moral object is evil (in fact, if any font is evil) the whole act is evil.

For instance see *Evangelium Vitae *58:

procured abortion is the deliberate and direct killing, by whatever means it is carried out, of a human being in the initial phase of his or her existence, extending from conception to birth.

The Holy Father here gives the elements of the moral object “procured abortion”.

Once you satisfy all the elements of the moral object, and if it is intrinsically evil, no circumstances (the font) or good intention can change the object or reform the evil of the act. Thus the circumstance “we don’t have enough money” cannot make abortion good. Or the intent “to save the life of the mother” cannot make abortion good.

This is exactly what Holy Father later says (pointing out that the other fonts cannot redeem an intrinsically evil act):

It is true that the decision to have an abortion is often tragic and painful for the mother, insofar as the decision to rid herself of the fruit of conception is not made for purely selfish reasons or out of convenience, but out of a desire to protect certain important values such as her own health or a decent standard of living for the other members of the family. Sometimes it is feared that the child to be born would live in such conditions that it would be better if the birth did not take place. Nevertheless, these reasons and others like them, however serious and tragic, can never justify the deliberate killing of an innocent human being.

VC

 

[The_Rock]

Verbum Caro

I can not thank you enough! I have struggled with the moral legitimacy of such acts for a long time. (I read this thread first… forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?t=320818&page=2)

Would you agree with this quote from the above linked thread?

The important part is “immediately before or after coition”, aka in the context of a larger, life-giving sexual act. It is NOT masturbation when contained in the context of the act; then it’s more like foreplay/afterglow. -IF- the man was stimulating the woman without them having any intention of completing the life-giving part of the act at that time, THEN it would be masturbation.

My understanding of the morality of these acts within marriage was incomplete until I read your posts. You have done a great service here. My spiritual director pointed me to the same conclusions your analysis points to, but I never understood intellectually before reading your posts. Thank you!