D
DL82
Guest
I wonder if anyone here is familiar with intuitivism, the ‘affective turn’ in philosophical ethics, for example in the ideas of Daniel Kahneman, Jonathan Haidt or Jesse Prinz, or in earlier ethical work such as Philippa Foot or even David Hume, who argue that there is a gap between intellectual ethical understanding and intuition, or the gut motivation to act.
To (over)simplify, a rationalist approach to ethics says:
What I am trying to work out is what is the relationship between this affective approach to practical ethics and Catholic teaching about the well informed conscience?
Firstly, it seems to have a bearing on what we think of as ‘full knowledge’ (i.e. one of the 3 criteria of mortal sin), because, while we can memorize the whole Catechism in our rational brain, or at least know where to look things up, if our moral decisions are part of the intuitive brain, then it may only be able to hold a very few core principles. The intuition of a holy person may instinctively do what the Catechism teaches, but it doesn’t do so just because that person knows their Catechism inside out. To ‘know’ with the affective, intuitive, fast-thinking part of the brain would mean something quite different from simply knowing which encyclical to look up to find the answer.
Consequently, this seems to lend itself toward something that looks more like classical Aristotelian virtue ethics, where what matters is, yes, that we fill our rational brains with Church teaching, but also that, through long training, recourse to the Sacraments, meditation on the Gospel stories or the mysteries of the Rosary, we train the intuition to have right desires. This is close to the Eastern fathers’ understanding of ‘mystagogy’, gradual learning from the mysteries, with the importance the East places on the ‘prayer of the heart’, learning in our affective part, instead/as well as the intellectual part.
I just wonder whether it is appropriate to draw a similarity between this idea of ‘intuition’ and the Catholic understanding of conscience. Like conscience, intuition, as it is used by Haidt, Kahneman, et al, seems to have a directive force which is not the same as either the reason or the will. On the other hand, many spiritual writers have stressed the importance of slowing down to listen to the ‘still small voice’ of conscience (such as in Ignatian spirituality), whereas Kahneman associates intuition with ‘fast thinking’, gut reactions and snap judgments. Speculatively, could it even be argued that we have two consciences, a fast one and a slow one?
To (over)simplify, a rationalist approach to ethics says:
- We see an ethical situation
- We reason as to the right thing to do, using the intellect (we recall something from the Summa, perhaps, and consider the dilemma in the form of a deductive syllogism)
- We make an act of will, based on our reason, and act on it.
- We see an ethical situation
- We have an immediate intuitive/affective reaction (e.g. ‘eww, that’s bad’!)
- We use our intellect to find a way of rationalizing our intuition (we ask our brain to find out why we just wen’t ‘eww’)
- If we can find a reason for our intuition, then we act on it. (Maybe we even act on it if we can’t find a reason, or maybe we act first, and engage brain later).
What I am trying to work out is what is the relationship between this affective approach to practical ethics and Catholic teaching about the well informed conscience?
Firstly, it seems to have a bearing on what we think of as ‘full knowledge’ (i.e. one of the 3 criteria of mortal sin), because, while we can memorize the whole Catechism in our rational brain, or at least know where to look things up, if our moral decisions are part of the intuitive brain, then it may only be able to hold a very few core principles. The intuition of a holy person may instinctively do what the Catechism teaches, but it doesn’t do so just because that person knows their Catechism inside out. To ‘know’ with the affective, intuitive, fast-thinking part of the brain would mean something quite different from simply knowing which encyclical to look up to find the answer.
Consequently, this seems to lend itself toward something that looks more like classical Aristotelian virtue ethics, where what matters is, yes, that we fill our rational brains with Church teaching, but also that, through long training, recourse to the Sacraments, meditation on the Gospel stories or the mysteries of the Rosary, we train the intuition to have right desires. This is close to the Eastern fathers’ understanding of ‘mystagogy’, gradual learning from the mysteries, with the importance the East places on the ‘prayer of the heart’, learning in our affective part, instead/as well as the intellectual part.
I just wonder whether it is appropriate to draw a similarity between this idea of ‘intuition’ and the Catholic understanding of conscience. Like conscience, intuition, as it is used by Haidt, Kahneman, et al, seems to have a directive force which is not the same as either the reason or the will. On the other hand, many spiritual writers have stressed the importance of slowing down to listen to the ‘still small voice’ of conscience (such as in Ignatian spirituality), whereas Kahneman associates intuition with ‘fast thinking’, gut reactions and snap judgments. Speculatively, could it even be argued that we have two consciences, a fast one and a slow one?