Inviting Al Moritz to discuss the "fine tune" argument

[Linusthe2nd]

Linus, talk about possible worlds is just a standard philosophical device for dealing with counterfactuals (claims about what would follow if something were the case) and modality (claims about what is possible and what is necessary). Not everyone agrees that it’s a good device, but it’s most certainly philosophy. Nor are these topics at odds with Christianity. In fact, some way of talking about possibility and necessity is indispensable for Christianity, since Christianity traditionally includes claims like “God is a necessary being” and “When humans make decisions, they decide between different possible courses of action.”

And there I disagree. It is true that the Church says nothing about " possible " worlds but to suggest that such talk is philosophy is quite a stretch. Sounds like Sophism to me. It would be worth you while to read Al’s article. Linus2nd

 

[Al_Moritz]

I guess we have a different mindset.

Were I to throw paints at a canvas and the result was a perfect portrait of my husband, I’d think wow what a coincidence.

Because of all the possible combinations and permeations of the paint falling, one includes the paints falling in an exact likeness of my husband.

So there’s nothing extraordinary going on there.

Sarah x

Right on! Many people tend to confuse “order” and “design”. We are all “trained” to recognize patterns, since it has a huge survival value.

The name of the fallacy those people commit is called the “odometer syndrome”. When one sees an easily recognizable pattern, like “11111111111111” on an (very long) odometer, they might think what a strange number. (Of course in this case they do not think that God designed it. - hopefully! ) However if they would see something like: “23711481259128” they would see nothing “special”. Of course, if a mathematician looks at this number, for him there is a beautiful pattern there… the digits of “e” (2.7182818…) and “pi” (3.141592…) mixed into a number.

The point is that “regularity” or “pattern” is not an inherent property, it is imposed by the observer. The more sophisticated the observer is, the more likely to see a pattern - even if it is not obvious for the uninitiated.

As for the picture analogy, I have my space alien friend (called Xithoporin) sitting next to me. He sure is a strange looking fellow - looks like a bunch of “blobs”. When he looked at the picture of your husband, it was just a bunch of unrecognizable blocthes to him. However, when he looked at those “seemingly” random blobs, he exclaimed: “wow, a spittin’ image of my wife!”. Where did you see her to make such a perfect picture?

I am sure you see my point. One can only hope that the other posters will understand it, too.

I think I have in principle addressed this argument in my article, in the text re-printed below from the third paragraph onward; this also addresses the ‘brute fact’ argument (I reproduce the first two paragraphs in order to provide context):

There are those who argue: “We obviously are here, so there is nothing to be surprised about. Perhaps it is luck, but so what?” However, when it comes to ridiculously low probabilities (see also Susskind’s comment above), just ‘brute chance’ is a hard thing to ponder seriously. Indeed, all the leading atheistic or agnostic cosmologists who bring the fine-tuning issue to the public’s attention reject the idea of ‘brute chance’.

Having by chance so many things aligned (see summary above) just right within relatively narrow limits, while the total bandwidth of possibilities is very wide (e.g. for the cosmological constant, the ‘ripple constant’ Q, the ratio of the masses of neutron, proton and electron, or the ratio of electrical force to gravity) would amount to a far luckier chance than winning the lotto jackpot where you ‘only’ need to get 6 simple numbers within one order of magnitude right. Would you believe that it is ‘pure luck’ when one and the same person wins the lotto jackpot not just once, but several times? Of course you would not. You would, logically, think that the outcome was rigged. This refutes the ‘brute chance’ argument.

It does so unless one takes a particularly hardheaded stance. What if it is claimed that life is not necessarily important in the grand scheme of things? All the arguments from probability evaporate if you dispense with the necessity for life, or even chemistry, or other structures; why should they matter? If at the Big Bang the constants had sorted themselves out randomly, and we were left with a universe with no galaxies, stars or life, we would still have something, even though that something might be viewed as unsatisfactory to our senses – but we would not be here to observe it anyway. In other words: why is life, our universe with life, more significant than whatever other something might be produced from different physical constants?

Indeed, if one takes the position that life is inconsequential, the whole argument falls apart. We are just a ‘cosmic fluke’, but let us enjoy it anyway and make the best out of it. Life is something that is given us by brute chance, and we just seize the day.

However, given the huge improbability of life arising by chance, the apparent fine-tuning of the laws of nature is interpreted by theists as strong support for the tradition of belief that life exists because it is here on purpose, being intended by God. From that point of view life has a natural explanation. Refuting such purpose would require to show that life is ‘natural’ also without the idea of God being its originator – a natural outcome of undesigned laws of nature.

The scenario of life as a chance ‘cosmic fluke’, on the other hand, would make life a highly ‘unnatural’ outcome of nature, something that is absurdly atypical, an anomaly. It is exactly this ‘unnaturalness’ which makes the position unsatisfying and rationally unconvincing, especially compared to the theistic position that life is natural as being designed on purpose. Some other ‘natural’ explanation for life seems to be required, if one does not want to adopt the theistic position. Many prominent non-theistic cosmologists agree with that, and view the multiverse (see below) as an explanatory necessity.

 

[tonyrey]

I think I have in principle addressed this argument in my article, in the text re-printed below from the third paragraph onward; this also addresses the ‘brute fact’ argument (I reproduce the first two paragraphs in order to provide context):

There are those who argue: “We obviously are here, so there is nothing to be surprised about. Perhaps it is luck, but so what?” However, when it comes to ridiculously low probabilities (see also Susskind’s comment above), just ‘brute chance’ is a hard thing to ponder seriously. Indeed, all the leading atheistic or agnostic cosmologists who bring the fine-tuning issue to the public’s attention reject the idea of ‘brute chance’.

Having by chance so many things aligned (see summary above) just right within relatively narrow limits, while the total bandwidth of possibilities is very wide (e.g. for the cosmological constant, the ‘ripple constant’ Q, the ratio of the masses of neutron, proton and electron, or the ratio of electrical force to gravity) would amount to a far luckier chance than winning the lotto jackpot where you ‘only’ need to get 6 simple numbers within one order of magnitude right. Would you believe that it is ‘pure luck’ when one and the same person wins the lotto jackpot not just once, but several times? Of course you would not. You would, logically, think that the outcome was rigged. This refutes the ‘brute chance’ argument.

It does so unless one takes a particularly hardheaded stance. What if it is claimed that life is not necessarily important in the grand scheme of things? All the arguments from probability evaporate if you dispense with the necessity for life, or even chemistry, or other structures; why should they matter? If at the Big Bang the constants had sorted themselves out randomly, and we were left with a universe with no galaxies, stars or life, we would still have something, even though that something might be viewed as unsatisfactory to our senses – but we would not be here to observe it anyway. In other words: why is life, our universe with life, more significant than whatever other something might be produced from different physical constants?

Indeed, if one takes the position that life is inconsequential, the whole argument falls apart. We are just a ‘cosmic fluke’, but let us enjoy it anyway and make the best out of it. Life is something that is given us by brute chance, and we just seize the day.

However, given the huge improbability of life arising by chance, the apparent fine-tuning of the laws of nature is interpreted by theists as strong support for the tradition of belief that life exists because it is here on purpose, being intended by God. From that point of view life has a natural explanation. Refuting such purpose would require to show that life is ‘natural’ also without the idea of God being its originator – a natural outcome of undesigned laws of nature.

The scenario of life as a chance ‘cosmic fluke’, on the other hand, would make life a highly ‘unnatural’ outcome of nature, something that is absurdly atypical, an anomaly. It is exactly this ‘unnaturalness’ which makes the position unsatisfying and rationally unconvincing, especially compared to the theistic position that life is natural as being designed on purpose. Some other ‘natural’ explanation for life seems to be required, if one does not want to adopt the theistic position. Many prominent non-theistic cosmologists agree with that, and view the multiverse (see below) as an explanatory necessity.

It is easy to assert that life is a fluke but in practice no reasonable person lives and behaves as if life is a fluke. By their fruits you know what they really believe!

 

[Al_Moritz]

I believe that the fine tune argument can work as a metaphysical argument; just not as a probabilistic one.

I agree that the fine-tuning argument is not really a probabilistic but rather a metaphysical argument, and I should re-write some paragraphs in my article accordingly. Probabilism makes sense when you talk about chances in 1 in a million or 1 in a trillion. Then the chances of God having a hand in the design of the universe were just that number reversed (a million or a trillion against 1), and another possibility, that it is not designed, could rationally exist.

Yet probabilism stops becoming a rational alternative when we are talking about chances in approx. 1E200 (that is a 1 with two hundred zeros behind it *); the cosmologist Smolin calculates the chance at 1 in 1E229, but that may be too low, for reasons see my article. On the other hand, in Smolin’s calculations some parameters are not included that would lower the chances even further).

That is also how atheistic cosmologists see it (hence their proposal of the mechanism of the multiverse). For comparison, a much higher chance of 1 in 1E80 would be a chance of 1 against all the elementary particles in the entire universe combined!

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*) 1E200 would be 1E152 times a trillion times trillion times trillion times trillion. I guess you get the gist of what kind of mindboggling number that is. In comparison, the 600 trillion that Atheistgirl mentioned earlier in the thread is a ludicrously low number.

 

[tonyrey]

And there I disagree. It is true that the Church says nothing about " possible " worlds but to suggest that such talk is philosophy is quite a stretch. Sounds like Sophism to me. It would be worth you while to read Al’s article. Linus2nd

To deny that the world could be different is to subscribe to the theory of physical necessity which is incompatible with Christian belief. It implies that God had to create this world **exactly as it is **and could not have done otherwise…

 

[Tyrion]

I agree that the fine-tuning argument is not really a probabilistic but rather a metaphysical argument, and I should re-write some paragraphs in my article accordingly. Probabilism makes sense when you talk about chances in 1 in a million or 1 in a trillion. Then the chances of God having a hand in the design of the universe were just that number, and another possibility, that it is not designed, could rationally exist.

Yet probabilism stops becoming a rational alternative when we are talking about chances in approx. 1E200 (that is a 1 with two hundred zeros behind it *); the cosmologist Smolin calculates the chance at 1 in 1E229, but that may be too low, for reasons see my article. On the other hand, in Smolin’s calculations some parameters are not included that would lower the chances even further).

That is also how atheistic cosmologists see it (hence their proposal of the mechanism of the multiverse). For comparison, a much higher chance of 1 in 1E80 would be a chance of 1 against all the elementary particles in the entire universe combined!

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*) 1E200 would be 1E152 times a trillion times trillion times trillion times trillion. I guess you get the gist of what kind of mindboggling number that is. In comparison, the 600 trillion that Atheistgirl mentioned earlier in the thread is a ludicrously low number.

Maybe you overlooked the re-written summary of how I understand your epistemological stance in post forums.catholic-questions.org/showpost.php?p=10492420&postcount=34. Let me copy it here:

Ok, let’s accept this modification. But I have two remarks:

1. I am talking about events is general, and their probability. We try to forge a common ground for your article, so we need to speak in more generic terms, then the “creation” of the world. We need to establish your general and basic epistemological principle here.
2. The only difference is that you added the subjective assessment “favorable”. To rephrase what I said before:

If the probability of an event is extremely small, and we consider that event “favorable” (post facto!) and yet it happened,
then it is a rational assumption to say the event was very likely the result of a conscious design.

Before we could even contemplate the “specific” application of this method to the cosmological argument, it needs to be evaluated on its own right. Please let me know if my re-worded understanding correctly reflects your position.

 

[tonyrey]

The fine-tuning argument is like this. It does not try to argue (in the way that other cosmological arguments do) that the universe could not possibly have come out this way without God. Instead, the argument is that certain universal constants, if they were set by chance, would be possible but very unlikely to come out in the way that they did; and that this provides good evidence that they were not set by chance, but by a conscious designer. And, in support of the second claim, there is an appeal to the significance of life, the thought being that if there were a designer, this would be the sort of universe that a designer would be interested in creating.

It is highly significant that those who deny the significance of life do not live as if their lives are insignificant. Perhaps they are playing at make-believe…

 

[Al_Moritz]

I’ve read your paper - several times now It took me a few attempts to understand it and I still don’t think I do It’s a fabulous read by the way.

Thanks for the compliment. Yes, it’s a bit technical, I admit.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

To deny that the world could be different is to subscribe to the theory of physical necessity which is incompatible with Christian belief. It implies that God had to create this world **exactly as it is **and could not have done otherwise…

No, I don’t think your conclusion follows. But my main point simply is that it is useless to talk about " possible " or " probable " worlds because that is pure speculation. There is no " there " there. It just moves the goal posts further down the road. It is just evading the question of accounting for the real world. Linus2nd

 

[tonyrey]

*To deny that the world could be different is to subscribe to the theory of physical necessity which is incompatible with Christian belief. It implies that God had to create this world **exactly as it is ***

Pascal made the famous remark:

''Had Cleopatra’s nose been shorter, the face of the world would have changed."

If history could have been different it follows that the universe could have been completely different - and is not the only possible universe.

But my main point simply is that it is useless to talk about " possible " or " probable " worlds because that is pure speculation. There is no " there " there. It just moves the goal posts further down the road. It is just evading the question of accounting for the real world.

I agree that the world is not self-sufficient or self-explanatory but thought experiments in both science and philosophy have led to insights and discoveries because they put things in perspective. The fine-tuning theory is based on the fact this is not the only possible universe and the argument from contingency implies that God was not compelled to create this particular universe…

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Pascal made the famous remark:

''Had Cleopatra’s nose been shorter, the face of the world would have changed."

If history could have been different it follows that the universe could have been completely different - and is not the only possible universe.

I agree that the world is not self-sufficient or self-explanatory but thought experiments in both science and philosophy have led to insights and discoveries because they put things in perspective. The fine-tuning theory is based on the fact this is not the only possible universe and the argument from contingency implies that God was not compelled to create this particular universe…

I don’t think the origin of the fine-tuning theory is based on the " possible " universe argument. I think it started long before the " possible " universe pipe dream. Linus2nd

 

[tonyrey]

I don’t think the origin of the fine-tuning theory is based on the " possible " universe argument. I think it started long before the " possible " universe pipe dream. Linus2nd

The fine-tuning theory is based on the principle that the laws of nature could be different. If they couldn’t be different there is no reason to believe they are evidence of Design because the argument from improbability collapses! There would be nothing significant about the existence of life in an otherwise hostile universe.

 

[aux1]

First off, good paper.

I don’t think this is correct. This is an over-simplification.

I’d rather say:
a) if the creation (or generation if you will) of a universe as a one-time event could randomly happen in any configuration,
b) the particular configuration with a favorable outcome (e.g. one that allows for life) is unlikely just as any other particular one, to such an extent that any probability of it is entirely negligible (e.g. substantially less than one single person winning the jackpot four times in a row),
and
c) the one-time event still happens in that particular configuration,

then design or intent is highly likely.

You argument hinges on the fact that universe creation is a one-off event, not a repeatable event. But, there is no evidence either way. (Well, there cannot be, since such evidence is outside the universe and thus by definition unobservable!)

Assuming universes can be created repeatably, and assuming that this-what-creates-universes is not intelligent, then the logical conclusion is that this-what-creates-universes would have to generate all possible universes. However, since only habitable universes will eventually produce an observer, and the observer can only observe its own universe, then the observer wil be naturally biased into seeing design where there is none.

Another thing worth noting is that, in several billion years, all galaxies outside the Local Group will disappear from our view due to expansion. Future inhabitants of the Local Group will be confronted with an island universe, and they will probably never discover that the universe at large is expanding – and they will end up constructing a faulty cosmology.
By the same vein, we must entertain the notion that our cosmology is faulty, because some other important feature of the universe has already become unobservable…

 

[Alberti_Devoveo]

First off, good paper.

You argument hinges on the fact that universe creation is a one-off event, not a repeatable event. But, there is no evidence either way. (Well, there cannot be, since such evidence is outside the universe and thus by definition unobservable!)

And your argument hinges on the unreasonable assumption that the universe’s creation was not a one-off event…

Assuming universes can be created repeatably, and assuming that this-what-creates-universes is not intelligent, then the logical conclusion is that this-what-creates-universes would have to generate all possible universes. However, since only habitable universes will eventually produce an observer, and the observer can only observe its own universe, then the observer wil be naturally biased into seeing design where there is none.

Why would (or really “how could”) you assume that the creator of a universe is not intelligent?

Another thing worth noting is that, in several billion years, all galaxies outside the Local Group will disappear from our view due to expansion. Future inhabitants of the Local Group will be confronted with an island universe, and they will probably never discover that the universe at large is expanding – and they will end up constructing a faulty cosmology.

While this does assume that dark energy continues its current trend, it would take trillions of years for this to occur and it would be the local supercluster that is still visible, not just the local group (though the local supercluster does include the local group). Since the supercluster will be visible then, it is probable that the cosmology will still be correct.

Note also that our galaxy is expected to be partially destroyed by the Sagittarius dwarf galaxy in about 100 million years.

By the same vein, we must entertain the notion that our cosmology is faulty, because some other important feature of the universe has already become unobservable…

A curious notion.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

The fine-tuning theory is based on the principle that the laws of nature could be different. If they couldn’t be different there is no reason to believe they are evidence of Design because the argument from improbability collapses! There would be nothing significant about the existence of life in an otherwise hostile universe.

Well, I’m no authority of " fine tuning, " I thought it meant that the universe was so finely tuned that just a minute change in the beginning or later on would have made life impossible anywhere in the universe.

Also, going back to a prior post. I didn’t know how to interpret this comment of yours:

"
To deny that the world could be different is to subscribe to the theory of physical necessity which is incompatible with Christian belief. It implies that God had to create this world exactly as it is and could not have done otherwise "

What do you mean by " physical necessity ? " Certainly God could have created a different world ( universe ). But in fact He created this one. The fact that He created this one would imply no necessity on the part of God. So teaches St. Thomas. This is not incompatible with Christian belief. Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

First off, good paper.

You argument hinges on the fact that universe creation is a one-off event, not a repeatable event. But, there is no evidence either way. (Well, there cannot be, since such evidence is outside the universe and thus by definition unobservable!)

Assuming universes can be created repeatably, and assuming that this-what-creates-universes is not intelligent, then the logical conclusion is that this-what-creates-universes would have to generate all possible universes. However, since only habitable universes will eventually produce an observer, and the observer can only observe its own universe, then the observer wil be naturally biased into seeing design where there is none.

Another thing worth noting is that, in several billion years, all galaxies outside the Local Group will disappear from our view due to expansion. Future inhabitants of the Local Group will be confronted with an island universe, and they will probably never discover that the universe at large is expanding – and they will end up constructing a faulty cosmology.
By the same vein, we must entertain the notion that our cosmology is faulty, because some other important feature of the universe has already become unobservable…

Yes, it was an excellent paper. But it really is useless to discuss all these " possible " universes, no matter how you want to envision their " coming to be. " We happen to live in this world. Philosophically we do not know whether it had an absolute beginning in time or whether it is eternal. In either case Thomas Aquinas has shown that it was caused to exist and continues to exist by the creative act of an Unmoved and Unmoveable First Cause Who was outside the universe created and Who was Pure Act, having no potentiality to be more or less than He was. And Who futhermore was inifinitely Intelligent, infinitely Powerful, Good,etc; in other words a Living Being Who possessed all possible Perfection in Himself eternally.

By definition then, there could be only one such Being.

If there are indeed other universes or if other universes were to arise, such are such or could only be such by His creative act.

Therefore all this speculation is utterly useless, since we would still arrive at the same First Uncaused Cause.

Now I don’t understand why people balk at accepting this fact. To refuse to accept it because of some fear of the Almighty doesn’t make sense, because refusal will not alter the fact, the " Brute Fact " of His existence. All the Sophistry and Rationalization in the world will not change that fact.

If one hates that conclusion and then hates God as a result, I can understand that, so does God. But to deny it will not change anything. We will still be held accountable for all we do in this life. That is why Blaze Pascal’s wager makes so much sense. Linus2nd

 

[Peter_Plato]

You argument hinges on the fact that universe creation is a one-off event, not a repeatable event. But, there is no evidence either way. (Well, there cannot be, since such evidence is outside the universe and thus by definition unobservable!)

Assuming universes can be created repeatably, and assuming that this-what-creates-universes is not intelligent, then the logical conclusion is that this-what-creates-universes would have to generate all possible universes. However, since only habitable universes will eventually produce an observer, and the observer can only observe its own universe, then the observer wil be naturally biased into seeing design where there is none.

That is a whole lot of assuming goin’ on!

Given that if it were a one-off event the existence of the universe would, most certainly, had to have been designed. Given, also, that absolutely no evidence exists to justify all your assuming, it is clear that it is being engaged in by you solely for the reason that design is an unpalatable option as far as you are concerned.

You are also forgetting that an observer is not an objective entity with observable properties but a unique personal subjective state which creates an entire set of explanatory problems of its own which cannot simply be ignored or explained away as a necessary aspect of a habitable universe.

 

[Al_Moritz]

Ok, let’s accept this modification. But I have two remarks:

1. I am talking about events is general, and their probability. We try to forge a common ground for your article, so we need to speak in more generic terms, then the “creation” of the world. We need to establish your general and basic epistemological principle here.
2. The only difference is that you added the subjective assessment “favorable”. To rephrase what I said before:

If the probability of an event is extremely small, and we consider that event “favorable” (post facto!) and yet it happened,
then it is a rational assumption to say the event was very likely the result of a conscious design.

Is this now correct?

No, it is not. You omitted my nuance of “one-time event”, as well as other ones. I am afraid that when you consistently ignore any nuances that I bring to the issue, this does not bode well for a discussion. Your first formulation was also an over-simplification, as i had pointed out. I further take issue with your "we consider that event “favorable” (post facto!) " as compared to my “the particular configuration with a favorable outcome”, but I won’t spend energy right now getting into this.

You want a general and basic epistemological principle. It’s not that easy, since the universe situation is unique, as the following comparison shows.

What is the difference between an asteroid impact with favorable outcome and the creation of the universe with favorable outcome?

Let’s take the asteroid impact 65 million years ago that wiped out the dinosaurs, or at least greatly facilitated their demise. The outcome was favorable to the emergence of our species, but I don’t necessarily think it was 'designed", as opposed to our universe, even though the event would fall under your definition. I will tell you why.

1. In comparison to the fine-tuning of the universe, the asteroid impact is infinitely more likely on a statistical basis:

We can statistically expect a similar asteroid impact like the one 65 million years ago once every few hundred million years. That is several times over the life cycle of the Earth.

1. The asteroid impact was not a one-time event, it occurs many times elsewhere in the universe:

We can observe large asteroid or comet impacts elsewhere. Just in 1994 comet Schoemacher-Levi crashed into Jupiter, with fragments being of similar size as the asteroid on our Earth 65 million years ago.

1. There was a mechanism for the asteroid event, explained by the laws of nature:

it is clear that we have as a source the asteroid belt at the outer edges of our solar system or other sources outside our solar system, and it is clear that the gravitational attraction of the Earth or Jupiter (where those impacts occur more often given its much larger gravitational attraction) cause those objects to ‘find their target’. The mechanism for the asteroid impacts is given by the laws of nature in our universe and thus does not itself need an explanation, and these laws ensure that asteroid impacts are no singular events but occur repeatedly and according to statistically predictable patterns, hence there is nothing to be surprised about them.

In contrast, we have no evidence that there is a mechanism for the creation of the universe. If a one-off event without mechanism occurs, then we have to explain why it occurred in a way that gives a favorable outcome (in our case, life) which is, out of an incredible number of random ways how it could have been different, statistically virtually impossible.

The multiverse, if it would exist, of course would be a way out in providing a mechanism (and it would do away with the universe being a one-time event). Yet then the question arises, as cosmologist George Ellis puts it: “All the same anthropic issues arise as for a single universe: Why this multiverse, and not another one?” Or to put it another way: “why this mechanism and not any other?”

But what if the atheist would claim, in order to avoid the multiverse fine-tuning problem, that there exist perhaps trillions of multiverses, and one of them happens just by chance to be fine-tuned enough to, again just by chance, produce our particular universe? Now that would definitely violate Occam’s razor big time! Just like the scenario of, in terms of origin, completely disconnected universes.

Another way to provide a mechanism would be that any generation of a universe necessarily results in a universe like ours. Yet also such a mechanism could not exist by physical necessity and thus would be in need of an explanation itself, as I point out in section 1.3.2. of my article.

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Given all these considerations, your simple generalization,

If the probability of an event is extremely small, and we consider that event “favorable” and yet it happened, then it is a rational assumption to say the event was very likely the result of a conscious design,

clearly doesn’t fly.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Has everyone gone bonkers!!! Linus2bd

 

[Tyrion]

No, it is not. You omitted my nuance of “one-time event”, as well as other ones. I am afraid that when you consistently ignore any nuances that I bring to the issue, this does not bode well for a discussion. Your first formulation was also an over-simplification, as i had pointed out. I further take issue with your "we consider that event “favorable” (post facto!) " as compared to my “the particular configuration with a favorable outcome”, but I won’t spend energy right now getting into this.

You want a general and basic epistemological principle. It’s not that easy, since the universe situation is unique, as the following comparison shows.

What is the difference between an asteroid impact with favorable outcome and the creation of the universe with favorable outcome?

Let’s take the asteroid impact 65 million years ago that wiped out the dinosaurs, or at least greatly facilitated their demise. The outcome was favorable to the emergence of our species, but I don’t necessarily think it was 'designed", as opposed to our universe, even though the event would fall under your definition. I will tell you why.

1. In comparison to the fine-tuning of the universe, the asteroid impact is infinitely more likely on a statistical basis:

We can statistically expect a similar asteroid impact like the one 65 million years ago once every few hundred million years. That is several times over the life cycle of the Earth.

1. The asteroid impact was not a one-time event, it occurs many times elsewhere in the universe:

We can observe large asteroid or comet impacts elsewhere. Just in 1994 comet Schoemacher-Levi crashed into Jupiter, with fragments being of similar size as the asteroid on our Earth 65 million years ago.

1. There was a mechanism for the asteroid event, explained by the laws of nature:

it is clear that we have as a source the asteroid belt at the outer edges of our solar system or other sources outside our solar system, and it is clear that the gravitational attraction of the Earth or Jupiter (where those impacts occur more often given its much larger gravitational attraction) cause those objects to ‘find their target’. The mechanism for the asteroid impacts is given by the laws of nature in our universe and thus does not itself need an explanation, and these laws ensure that asteroid impacts are no singular events but occur repeatedly and according to statistically predictable patterns, hence there is nothing to be surprised about them.

In contrast, we have no evidence that there is a mechanism for the creation of the universe. If a one-off event without mechanism occurs, then we have to explain why it occurred in a way that gives a favorable outcome (in our case, life) which is, out of an incredible number of random ways how it could have been different, statistically virtually impossible.

The multiverse, if it would exist, of course would be a way out in providing a mechanism (and it would do away with the universe being a one-time event). Yet then the question arises, as cosmologist George Ellis puts it: “All the same anthropic issues arise as for a single universe: Why this multiverse, and not another one?” Or to put it another way: “why this mechanism and not any other?”

But what if the atheist would claim, in order to avoid the multiverse fine-tuning problem, that there exist perhaps trillions of multiverses, and one of them happens just by chance to be fine-tuned enough to, again just by chance, produce our particular universe? Now that would definitely violate Occam’s razor big time! Just like the scenario of, in terms of origin, completely disconnected universes.

Another way to provide a mechanism would be that any generation of a universe necessarily results in a universe like ours. Yet also such a mechanism could not exist by physical necessity and thus would be in need of an explanation itself, as I point out in section 1.3.2. of my article.

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Given all these considerations, your simple generalization,

If the probability of an event is extremely small, and we consider that event “favorable” and yet it happened, then it is a rational assumption to say the event was very likely the result of a conscious design,

clearly doesn’t fly.

Very well. That is the reason that I did not want to start the actual discussion before we clear away some of the possible misuderstanding.

Based upon your post, I will amend the epistemological rule again.

IF the probability of an event is extremely small,
AND that event is a unique (one time, never to be repeated event),
AND the outcome of that event is “favorable” (we consider that event “favorable”)
AND yet it happened,
THEN it is a rational assumption to say the event was very likely the result of a conscious design.

You said: "I further take issue with your “we consider that event “favorable” (post facto!) " as compared to my “the particular configuration with a favorable outcome”, but I won’t spend energy right now getting into this.”

I am glad you did not, because there is no difference, it is just a semantic quibbling. The “favorable outcome” is contingent upon someone, WHO considers it “favorable”.

So, is this new, improved amendment correct now? Yes, I insist on a proper, generic formulation of your principle, for very good reason, to be elaborated upon your confirmation.