Oh, don’t worry, Sarah. I am not leaving. Whatever Al does; is his own business. If he refuses to properly clarify his prerequisites, that is his business, too.
Contrary to what he said, my summary is correct. I will repeat it, in a more exact form. The basic proposition of the theists is simple, it runs like this:
Let “E” be a complicate and
composite event.
Let “E” consist of “sub-events”: “A”, “B”, “C”… etc.
Let the a-priori probability of “E” be P(E) <= p[sub]1[/sub], where p[sub]1[/sub] is a
very small number.
Let “X” be the proposition that the event “E” is the result of a conscious agent’s deliberate action.
Let the a-priori probability of “X” be P(X) >= p[sub]2[/sub], where p[sub]2[/sub] is a number
very close to “1”.
The apologists of the fine tuning arguments propose the epistemological method of:
IF P(E) <= p[sub]1[/sub]
THEN P(X) >= p[sub]2[/sub] is a rational conclusion.
Of course there is no such epistemological principle. First, the proponents are hopelessly confused about the difference between the a-priori and the a-posteriori probabilities. They try to make an estimate of the a-priori probability of the event, while relying on the fact that “E” happened. Also they have no idea about the “surprise-factor” of an
actual outcome, as opposed to the
predicted outcome. Math is fun, and the theory of probability is very much fun.
Suppose you have a large sack filled with little balls, all of which have a number written on them. The number of the little balls is unknown (it can be millions of them), and the numbers written on those balls is also unknown (they can all be the same, or all different, or some random distribution). Suppose you reach into the sack, and randomly select one ball, and examine the number written on it. Supose that the number is 33550336. You look at the number, and see that it is a “perfect number” (
perfect numbers). Now the question: “how surprising is this outcome?”. The point is that without knowing how many balls are in that sack, and without knowing what numbers are written on those balls, one cannot make
any estimate at all.
What the proponents of the “fine tuning” arguments do is sheer hand-waving, combined with a lot of smoke. They
subjectively selected a few constants (why those and why not others? they cannot even agree on which constants to choose
), they say that those constants can have a
random value between some arbitrary limits of “a” and “b”, and then they assert that any value between those limits is equally probable. Why those limits and not others? How do they know that those limits are
physically valid? How do they know that the all values are
equally probable? How do they know that the constants can have their values “independently” from each other? It’s all hand-waving, which can - unfortunately - confuse someone who is not a mathematician.
But,** just for the sake of the discussion**, let’s grant them their prerequisites. It does not help their cause. It is child’s play to consider a real life, complex and composite event where p[sub]1[/sub] < 10[sup]-1000000[/sup] and only a fool would assert that the incredibly “unlikely”
actual outcome somehow implies a conscious “creator” (if needed, I can give quite a few of such events). Now, if someone would be able to
predict the outcome, that would be truly mind-boggling. But it is easy to look at the result of throwing a million dice and proclaim: “Yes, I knew that exactly those numbers will come up”.
However, I want to make sure that the proponents cannot start their usual “hide and seek” game, by constantly moving the goalposts.