Is Aquinas' First Way Falsifiable? (jd!)

[Touchstone]

TS:

Muchas gracias for being so versatile and accommodating. I guess I really want to know which definition, then, is the one you agree with? Also, to shorten these preliminaries, can you give a brief definition of ‘motion’ from physics?

I agree with both as useful definitions, and am happy to use either, or both, so long as we have a way to keep the usage clear.

For a simple (but I think useful) definition of “motion” from physics: “change in spatial position of over time”.

Just to clarify Aquinas’ definition a bit: Motion is the act of the potential precisely as potential. It is not just specific only to beings. It can refer to that which is not being yet, such as the matter of the act of coming to be, or, perhaps even of virtual particles. It can also be defined as the act of the potential qua potential.

God bless,
jd

Yes, fine. Maybe it’s not with you, but have been over this ground more than once, before. OK, so what is the next layer of preliminaries? (I’m sensing a long drawn out procession of preliminaries here, so maybe bundle them up all together?)

-TS

 

[JDaniel]

I agree with both as useful definitions, and am happy to use either, or both, so long as we have a way to keep the usage clear.

For a simple (but I think useful) definition of “motion” from physics: “change in spatial position of over time”.

Yes, fine. Maybe it’s not with you, but have been over this ground more than once, before. OK, so what is the next layer of preliminaries? (I’m sensing a long drawn out procession of preliminaries here, so maybe bundle them up all together?)

-TS

TS:

You’ll be happy to know, I hope, that the preliminaries are over. Unless the foregoing preliminary somehow finds its way back into the debate, I am happy to go on from here. It is too early in the morning here now to break apart and post what I have started. So, with your permission, I will post what I have in the AM, Eastern time. I ask one favor: please refrain from tearing it apart until I am finished with the entire argument, because I will probably answer most of your objections by the time it is completed…

Now, I guess the first thing that I must say to you is that your definition from physics, if it is in any way an accurate reflection of a definition from physics, is circular. It begs the question: “What is motion? The definition you provided simply states that motion is motion, and, somehow the object is moved from one locus to another. Why not simply say, motion is motion? It tells us nothing about motion except for the arbitrary and incidental points of relative position. The next thing I must say is, sorry for the length of this explanation. Remember, you can’t learn even the basics of physics in a simple post or two, in some thread, like this, on the internet. And, the following is especially important since you are starting out with two strikes against you: one, your predilection for the physics definition and, two, your seeming predilection for its circularity. Though, perhaps I am being too hasty.

For now, good night. I will post the first part in the AM.

God bless,
jd

 

[Touchstone]

TS:

You’ll be happy to know, I hope, that the preliminaries are over. Unless the foregoing preliminary somehow finds its way back into the debate, I am happy to go on from here. It is too early in the morning here now to break apart and post what I have started. So, with your permission, I will post what I have in the AM, Eastern time. I ask one favor: please refrain from tearing it apart until I am finished with the entire argument, because I will probably answer most of your objections by the time it is completed…

OK, well, you haven’t given me any thing for argument to look at yet, so no worries, so far.

Now, I guess the first thing that I must say to you is that your definition from physics, if it is in any way an accurate reflection of a definition from physics, is circular.

Why must you say this? I thought we agreed on using the Thomist definition of ‘motion’. Yes, I am sure we did agree to that. So why are we even talking about the physicist definition, here?

It begs the question: “What is motion? The definition you provided simply states that motion is motion, and, somehow the object is moved from one locus to another. Why not simply say, motion is motion?

This is true of all definitions. That’s the nature of tautology. By definition [sic] the right hand of the equation can always be equated to the left, and to itself. [Apple = red-skinned fruit] === [Apple = Apple].

The reason we don’t just state ‘motion=motion’ (which is valid) is because it doesn’t connect us to anything else. And the utility of definition is not to establish a=a, but to establish relationships between subjects and objects that provide meaning, understanding and connection to other concepts and knowledge. Defining “Apple=Apple” in itself doesn’t inform you that an apple is a kind of fruit, but 'apple = red-skinned fruit" does, and that’s useful, and that’s meaning; we derive meaning from associations just like that.

For ‘motion’, my definition implicated far more than your reduction, even if ‘motion=motion’ is quite valid lexical calculus. From ‘motion=motion’ we do not have grounds for understanding that my definition is related to spatial geometry, distance or time. These are the building blocks of meaning that convey concepts and semantic payloads to you.

It tells us nothing about motion except for the arbitrary and incidental points of relative position.

And that sounds just fine. That’s a semantically rich payload right there. If I were to agree, arguendo, that that’s all there was to it, you would still have discredited your claim above that “motion=motion” is the same. You can’t get what you got (“arbitrary and incidental points of relative position”) out of “motion=motion”. So you’ve shown that you did receive exactly what you just claimed you did not!

Nevertheless, it’s an interest little tidbit to throw out (to be torn apart as it begs to be!), but why are we focusing on the physics defintion at all? What’s the point of preliminaries if you are going to chuck all that and get on about movement through space over time?

I’m scratching my head here. But no harm, no foul, I guess. Onward!

The next thing I must say is, sorry for the length of this explanation. Remember, you can’t learn even the basics of physics in a simple post or two, in some thread, like this, on the internet. And, the following is especially important since you are starting out with two strikes against you: one, your predilection for the physics definition and, two, your seeming predilection for its circularity. Though, perhaps I am being too hasty.

For now, good night. I will post the first part in the AM.

God bless,
jd

All definitions are ultimately circular. The error of a “circular definition” refers to tight circularity. See this paragraph from “Circular definition” at Wikipedia, it lays this out pretty well:

Definitions can be broadly or narrowly circular. Narrowly circular definitions simply define one word in terms of another. A broadly circular definition has a larger circle of words. For example, the definition of the primary word is defined using two other words, which are defined with two other words, etc., creating a definitional chain. This can continue until the primary word is used to define one of the words used in the chain, closing the wide circle of terms. If all definitions rely on the definitions of other words in a very large, but finite chain, then all text-based definitions are ultimately circular. Extension (semantics) to the actual things that referring terms like nouns stand for, provided that agreement on reference is accomplished, is one method of breaking this circularity, but this is outside the capacity of a text-based definition.

So, you’re right, my motion definition from physics is circular in a final sense, just like any definition, including any you might offer. That’s how language works. But it wasn’t tightly circular, and I think you will find it’s boringly consonant with short definitions for “motion” in the physics context in wide use across many different sources.

Can we talk about the falsifiability of the First Way, now, using your definition of the word “motion”?

-TS

 

[JDaniel]

OK, well, you haven’t given me any thing for argument to look at yet, so no worries, so far.

All definitions are ultimately circular. The error of a “circular definition” refers to tight circularity. See this paragraph from “Circular definition” at Wikipedia, it lays this out pretty well:

So, you’re right, my motion definition from physics is circular in a final sense, just like any definition, including any you might offer. That’s how language works. But it wasn’t tightly circular, and I think you will find it’s boringly consonant with short definitions for “motion” in the physics context in wide use across many different sources.

Can we talk about the falsifiability of the First Way, now, using your definition of the word “motion”?

-TS

TS:

Please! Wikipedia? Circularity means:
2 Logic (of an argument) already containing an assumption of what is to be proved, and therefore fallacious. - Oxford Dictionary (bolding mine).
Actually, I thought your rebuttal was well done. You must have had fun writing it. I’m happy that we can enjoy this. But, to the first part of my argument:

Unlike the circular definition from physics, what Saint Thomas does is “define” motion, in my opinion and, I think, my opinion parallels the opinion of most thinkers. (I notoriously consider myself a thinker - ) He says, it is the act of the potential precisely as potential. Now, there are three parts to this definition: first, that it is an “act” inasmuch as it is an actualization; second, that it is potential, that is, it is still potency to something further; and, third, and most importantly, it is potential qua potential. In other words, capacity qua capacity or, capability qua capability. That is, it is the actualization of the “potential,” as opposed to the actualization of the object, or subject, in question. For example, a baseball is in potency to be in the catcher’s mitt while it is still in the hand of the pitcher. Then it is in “perfect” act when it is in the catcher’s mitt. While it is in flight, it is at every place along the trajectory, in act (of the potential), but it is in an imperfect act, because it is still in potency to be in the catcher’s mitt.

But, there is a second definition explicated by Saint Thomas. This second definition has to do with that which is “in motion,” as we say when we speak. This takes us to the question of that in which motion resides: the mobile being or the agent (mover). (Remember, we are not speaking of composite beings here, but only simple, non-composite whole beings, such as almost everything that is not alive, or some kind of built machinery. Our search to answer this question will bring us to a perfect demonstration:

The act of the potential precisely as potential is the act of the mobile precisely as mobile.
But motion is the act of the potential precisely as potential.
Therefore, motion is the act of the mobile precisely as mobile.

This syllogism contains another definition of motion, a so-called material definition. It states that motion is in the mobile. More precisely, it states that motion is in the thing capable of being moved. This contrasts the subject of motion from its mover. Despite this contrast, it appears that motion goes on in both the moved and the mover (agent). For one thing, every natural mover is in a state of potency to be a mover, and in this respect, it must be moved to perform as an agent by another agent outside itself. This represents a problem for us: if we can’t show that motion is in the mobile and not in its mover, it’s absurd to try to show that motion resides in the mobile: our first ‘falsification’ of Saint Thomas’ definition.

Let’s take a simple example: a saw will cut wood only when it is in the hands of a carpenter. And, there is no doubt in our minds that natural motion occurs by contact between the mover and thing moved: further, we see that the saw blade is dulled by its action against the wood. It would, therefore, look as though motion is not only in what receives the motion, i.e., in the wood, but also in what communicates the motion, i.e., in the saw. (Our first falsification of Saint Thomas’ definition!) It can be argued, however, that to the extent that a mover, the saw, is moved by something else, the hands of the carpenter, the mover is not precisely a mover but a being that is moved; therefore it can still be true then that as a mover the saw is not properly said to be moved.

continued . . .

 

[JDaniel]

continuation from above . . .

Now as to our second falsification, that the thing acted upon reacts upon the agent, it can be proposed that precisely as acted upon rather than as acting, the agent," e.g., the saw (that is dulled), is not truly an agent but a “receiver." The two falsifications, then, do not destroy the truth of the conclusion: that motion is the act not of the mover but of the mobile, i.e., the thing capable of being moved.

The truth of this follows immediately from the truth of the premises in our demonstration. Since the minor has already been established in connection with the first definition of motion, it remains now only to establish the truth of the major proposition, i.e., the act of the potential as potential is the act of the mobile as mobile. The proof of the major is that such an act, i.e., the act of the potential as potential, cannot be the act of the mover for the reason that the causing of motion must be the act of something actual, not the act of something potential. The potential, per se, cannot operate; a potential storm can never cause any damage or even do any good. It simply cannot operate as a cause. Only what is actual can cause. As actual, then, the agent does not undergo the act of the potential as potential although as moved by some other cause, as a receiver rather than an agent, the “agent" may be potential. The only other possible subject of motion is the mobile. As the act of what exists in potency, motion takes place only in the mobile; motion is in mobile being and what goes on in the producer of the motion cannot properly be said to be motion.

Now, the forgoing is clear, since in our language we actually have two words that describe the states of motion by an agent. The first we call “action,” while the second we call “passion.” What do these two states mean as far as our definitions are concerned? Well, an analysis of experience will show that it is the same motion which in different ways characterizes both the agent and the receiver. Take, for example, the impressing of a seal upon wax. The seal is impressing something into the wax to the same extent that the wax is receiving the impression. Thus, there is only one motion here, rather than two. It is by the seal, but in or on the wax. Likewise, from our previous example, it is by the saw, but on the wood. And, it is by the storm, but on the earth surface affected. Thus, it is by the ‘agent’, the storm, but, in or on the affected earth surface, the “patient,” or material cause. Latin has two excellent phrases that adequately define action and passion: terminus a quo, or that principle from which the motion originates, i.e., the agent which produces the ‘action’, and, terminus ex quo, or that principle out of which motion comes, or the patient which receives.

For a moment, let us consider efficient causality. There is the notion of emergence or evolution whenever something new comes to be in this world. And that is so despite that its structural explanation is that it is merely a rearrangement of existing matter, which we are happy to postulate. One thing comes out of something else rather than is put into something else. From this we understand that motion really comes out of the patient as nothing goes into the patient. Nothing goes out of the agent and into the patient. Therefore, motion is really out of’ the patient and by the agent. Thus, the agent, i.e., efficient cause, remains extrinsic to the motion of the moved, but, is nevertheless the cause of the motion while simultaneously itself being characterized by motion in some way.

More later as I must leave for work! But, I’m not finished yet.

God bless,
jd

 

[Touchstone]

continuation from above . . .

Now as to our second falsification, that the thing acted upon reacts upon the agent, it can be proposed that precisely as acted upon rather than as acting, the agent," e.g., the saw (that is dulled), is not truly an agent but a “receiver." The two falsifications, then, do not destroy the truth of the conclusion: that motion is the act not of the mover but of the mobile, i.e., the thing capable of being moved.

The truth of this follows immediately from the truth of the premises in our demonstration. Since the minor has already been established in connection with the first definition of motion, it remains now only to establish the truth of the major proposition, i.e., the act of the potential as potential is the act of the mobile as mobile. The proof of the major is that such an act, i.e., the act of the potential as potential, cannot be the act of the mover for the reason that the causing of motion must be the act of something actual, not the act of something potential. The potential, per se, cannot operate; a potential storm can never cause any damage or even do any good. It simply cannot operate as a cause. Only what is actual can cause. As actual, then, the agent does not undergo the act of the potential as potential although as moved by some other cause, as a receiver rather than an agent, the “agent" may be potential. The only other possible subject of motion is the mobile. As the act of what exists in potency, motion takes place only in the mobile; motion is in mobile being and what goes on in the producer of the motion cannot properly be said to be motion.

Now, the forgoing is clear, since in our language we actually have two words that describe the states of motion by an agent. The first we call “action,” while the second we call “passion.” What do these two states mean as far as our definitions are concerned? Well, an analysis of experience will show that it is the same motion which in different ways characterizes both the agent and the receiver. Take, for example, the impressing of a seal upon wax. The seal is impressing something into the wax to the same extent that the wax is receiving the impression. Thus, there is only one motion here, rather than two. It is by the seal, but in or on the wax. Likewise, from our previous example, it is by the saw, but on the wood. And, it is by the storm, but on the earth surface affected. Thus, it is by the ‘agent’, the storm, but, in or on the affected earth surface, the “patient,” or material cause. Latin has two excellent phrases that adequately define action and passion: terminus a quo, or that principle from which the motion originates, i.e., the agent which produces the ‘action’, and, terminus ex quo, or that principle out of which motion comes, or the patient which receives.

For a moment, let us consider efficient causality. There is the notion of emergence or evolution whenever something new comes to be in this world. And that is so despite that its structural explanation is that it is merely a rearrangement of existing matter, which we are happy to postulate. One thing comes out of something else rather than is put into something else. From this we understand that motion really comes out of the patient as nothing goes into the patient. Nothing goes out of the agent and into the patient. Therefore, motion is really out of’ the patient and by the agent. Thus, the agent, i.e., efficient cause, remains extrinsic to the motion of the moved, but, is nevertheless the cause of the motion while simultaneously itself being characterized by motion in some way.

More later as I must leave for work! But, I’m not finished yet.

God bless,
jd

OK, as I understand it you want me to refrain from responding until you have gotten more out here than this, so I’ve read this, and will wait until you say “Finished, over to you”.

-TS

 

[Nooj]

I can think of 2 ways, but I may be oversimplifying:

1. Prove an infinite casual or motion chain is possible
2. Prove something can put itself in motion

If you define “first mover” as God specifically, then any natural explanation would work as well.

I’m not deep into Thomistic Philosophy, so like I said, I could be wrong or over-simplifying, but from what I’ve read of the first way these seem to work.

Or dispute that motion exists. I don’t understand what it means for something to be in potentiality nor am I certain that it is an accurate description of the world.

 

[Touchstone]

In a scientific context, no it isn’t falsifiable. But something doesn’t have to be falsifiable in order to be understood as true.

Yes, that’s right, but it renders that truth a trival truth. If I say “all bachelors are unmarried”, I’ve given a definitional truth. It’s true, but in a trivial sense, true by definition. It is perfectly unfalsifiable, and can be understood as “true”, but only in a trivial sense; it doesn’'t reveal anything about the actual state of the extramental world. If I say “gravitational fields dissipate at the rate of 1/distance from the mass”, I have a different kind of proposition, one that is falsifiable, and in this case is falsified, as gravitational pull dissipates at 1/x^2 (inverse square law).

That would not be a trivial truth, because it makes a claim about the actual state of affairs of the world, and is subject to falsification.

I can think of 2 ways, but I may be oversimplifying:

1. Prove an infinite casual or motion chain is possible
2. Prove something can put itself in motion

If you define “first mover” as God specifically, then any natural explanation would work as well.

I’m not deep into Thomistic Philosophy, so like I said, I could be wrong or over-simplifying, but from what I’ve read of the first way these seem to work.

In the case of 1.) it can’t be proven one way or another, even in principle. By definition, you can’t complete the job of demonstrating an actual infinite, even if such obtain. It would take an infinite amount of time to do the inventory, so it’s not possible, even in principle. This puts Aquinas’ notions securely out of reach of falsifiability on 1).

On 2), you have the same problem. For any circumstance where one sees “spontaneous motion”, Aquinas (and other theists here) would simply say that something MUST have been the “mover”, we just can’t see or observe it. Why, well of course because it’s an *a priori *rule that nothing can move without a mover!

And that can’t be falsified. There’s no POSSIBLE way to show that an unseen, unknown, intangible, perfectly hidden force or agent isn’t the “mover” behind any action we may suppose is spontaneous. Again, the Aquinas has set himself up, he’s perfectly impervious to any and all evidence. Can’t possibly be falsified.

Or dispute that motion exists. I don’t understand what it means for something to be in potentiality nor am I certain that it is an accurate description of the world.

It can be disputed, and has been, along several different lines, particular in light of Aquinas choice of ways to define “motion”. But dispute is not falsification. There is no test that Aquinas’ ideas of motion could be subjected to that would put those ideas at risk of falsification. Aquinas’ ideas are a priori, and just tautological in that sense. No matter what evidence might possible be presented, Aquinas-style motion is inferred, BY DEFINITION. Not established by models, as in science, it’s just a generic definition that can be trivially applied to any and all evidence.

-TS

 

[MindOverMatter2]

It is perfectly unfalsifiable, and can be understood as “true”, but only in a trivial sense; it doesn’'t reveal anything about the actual state of the extramental world.

-TS

Yes it does reveal something about the extra-mental world. It reveals to us that there can never be a married bachelor in the real world, once one properly and fully understands the nature of the two words “married” and “bachelor”. Just like there cannot be a square triangle. Just like I cannot be and not be at the same time.

 

[Touchstone]

Yes it does reveal something about the extra-mental world. It reveals to us that there can never be a married bachelor in the real world, once one properly and fully understands the nature of the two words “married” and “bachelor”. Just like there cannot be a square triangle. Just like I cannot be and not be at the same time.

No. We could just as easily say “All bachelors are married” and it’s just as true, because it is a definition, a declarative. If we looked at the real world and found someone who was unmarried and said “here’s a bachelor”, the reaction would have to be “no he’s not, by our definition”.

Definitions are just associations, tautologies. One definition may map closely to terms and concepts we can apply in the real world, another may not connect at all. The correspondence to the real world is secondary to the definition itself, which, as I said, is just a conceptual association we create for some purpose or other.

-TS

 

[MindOverMatter2]

No. We could just as easily say “All bachelors are married”
-TS

Only if we ignore the essential distinction by which we understand bachelors to be un-married. Otherwise, in fully understanding what a bachelor is, we cannot say that this being is “married”. Thus we know that a married bachelor cannot exist, so long as we remain honest to what a bachelor is and what a married person is. Changing the meaning of words, does not change this fact.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

If we looked at the real world and found someone who was unmarried and said “here’s a bachelor”, the reaction would have to be “no he’s not, by our definition”.
-TS

But this still doesn’t change the fact that the person is not married which you clearly understand or you wouldn’t have been able to contradict it with your arbitrary assertion.

 

[Touchstone]

But this still doesn’t change the fact that the person is not married which you clearly understand or you wouldn’t have been able to contradict it with your arbitrary assertion.

Well, this was your objection:

Yes it does reveal something about the extra-mental world.

It doesn’t reveal anything as a definition. It can’t. “bachelor=a married female” is just as much a definition as “bachelor=unmarried male”. A definition is an association and can be completely contrary or unconcerned with the actual state of affairs in the world, or it can hew tightly to it, or anywhere in between.

I think you are confusing the meaning of a definition – the semantic associations established – with the truth-as-correspondence value of those associations. Even here in this thread, we have to very different definitions of ‘motion’. Neither is “true” or “false” as a definition; to suppose such is to confuse meaning with truth-as-correspondence. We’re going to use Aquinas’ definition per jd’s preference and that’s fine, as I understand the meaning and that’s all we need to communicate and move forward. Aquinas’ definition isn’t probitive of the real world any more than the physics definitions is; they are just definitions. How we take those definitions and apply them to the real world is where we start to build arguments and possibly make headway towards knowledge of the real world through correspondence analysis, predictive models and falsification, etc.

-TS

 

[MindOverMatter2]

Well, this was your objection:

It doesn’t reveal anything as a definition. It can’t. “bachelor=a married female” is just as much a definition as “bachelor=unmarried male”. A definition is an association and can be completely contrary or unconcerned with the actual state of affairs in the world, or it can hew tightly to it, or anywhere in between.

When a person speaks of a bachelor, the word is intended to be a symbol of a real state or action and is, i.e, that a person is not married. Marriage is an agreement of personal life long commitment. So long as we agree that this is what is intended by the word marriage, we cannot fail to be speaking about that which is real. Bachelor, so long as we agree that this word stands for a persons relationship status as not married, we cannot fail to speaking about a real state of affairs. What you refuse to admit is that the symbols we are using are inspired by and are describing a real or possible state of affairs, i.e either a marriage between two persons or the single status of an individual. The use of symbols is arbitrary and interchangeable, but the meaning of the events described is not.

Its irrelevant what we call it, you can call it pingu for all I care. This doesn’t change the fact that we are referring to specific things that can occur or have occurred.

So long as I understand what a bachelor is, I know what it is not, and it is not a married person. Thus I can also know that a married person cannot be a bachelor in the real world; and that will remain true unless we change the meaning of what a bachelor is. So long as the meaning remains the same, I know that any fact to the contrary cannot exist, i.e a married bachelor.

This is true of essential distinctions in general. I cannot be and not be at the same time. I do not require falsification in-order to know this with absolute certainty as true of the real world, because I already know with certainty what it means to be in opposition to what it means to not be. From the general basis of being as an act and its essential distinctions, I am justified in making inferences to what is possible and what is not, so long as I make general statements about being and not scientific statements about being.

Any attempt to claim otherwise is to make a commitment to ontological irrationality; that two essentially different things can exist as one thing that is not essentially different.

And thats the end of rational discourse.

 

[JDaniel]

TS:

(Well, your definition of definition is certainly interesting.) Anyway, from our previous discussion, and our first definition, we can tunnel down somewhat further and say that motion can be defined as the act of both the action and the passion, but each in a different way. And, that’s the reason why this second definition is important. Imperfect act, like perfect act, is an emergent from the material cause, because nothing really passes to or into the patient from the agent. Motion is, therefore, truly one in being but different in relation. It is by the agent; it is in the patient. Motion is in the receiver as an effect. The purpose of the foregoing was to show that the implications of action and passion cannot be dismissed, or, simply forgotten about, when considering a series of causes where one thing affects another until some final effect is produced. From experience we notice that there are at least two different kinds, or species, of motion. These kinds of motion are derived from reality and correspond with our previous definitions.

Motion can be divided in two ways: according to its kinds or species, such as local motion and qualitative change; and, according to it quantitative parts, such as halves, and quarters. The first and most fundamental division is that between essential and accidental motion, and the basis for making this division can be one of three things: (1) the mobile being itself; (2) the mover; and (3) the termination or term of the motion: the attained term which is the new form, or the relinquished term which is the old form, in other words, the privation of the new one. – Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Physics, Bk. V, lesson 1, no. 1236 Accidental motion is easy to describe: a grapefruit turns yellow and falls to the ground. In this example that which is yellow falls to the ground. Here that which is yellow undergoes local motion in an accidental way. The yellow grapefruit does not fall to the ground because it is now yellow, but because it is a body that has mass. The fact that that which turned yellow fell to the ground is accidental to the qualitative change that the fruit underwent to become yellow. The fruit fell because of the weight of the fruit that yellow happened to be accidentally associated with. The yellow color added no appreciable mass to the grapefruit. This is just one of many examples of accidental motion or change that strike our senses every day.

As far as mobile being is concerned, there are two kinds of essential motion: one refers to a part of the mobile being and the other refers to the whole mobile being. To say that a man is now well because his diseased arm is healed is to ascribe to the whole man only that which refers to a part. In other words, the man may be moved in an essential way but only according to one of his parts. When a man dies, the cause of death is not due to that which is primary and proper to him, to his essence as a rational animal. He does not die because of his reason, nor even from his animal nature. Rather, he dies from something that is not of either of these natures. He died from something from his material body, from his matter. But, again, it is clear that he died from but a part of him.

The second kind or division of essential motion on the part of mobile being is motion according to its whole being. The motion of radioactive decay is motion on the part of the whole element. When the hydrogen and oxygen in air reaches the dew point, they form water. This is not an accidental change; it is an essential change and it is not on the part of its parts, but rather their whole beings are changed, and a whole new being results. (Obviously, I am not speaking here of the movements of the quantum particles that make up the atoms, but of the atoms as wholes themselves, otherwise I would have spoken of the atoms.)

Now, as regards the agent, when we speak of accidental change, an example immediately comes to mind. Consider the accomplished golfer who builds a house. He builds the house as a builder not as a golfer. Being a good golfer is accidental to house building, regardless of whether he builds a good or a bad house. And, as explained previously with regard to essential motion, the agent, or mover, can also be divided into part or whole. Such things as *coming to be ** (e.g., a human baby), radioactive decay, the effect of ash (e.g., the heating of wood by fire) are examples of essential change on the part of a whole.

Often motion is spoken of the human intellect and the will, but, in the proper sense of the word, accretions to these cannot be called motion. Potency always involves privation, i.e., some kind of loss. In a thing moved, the old form is lost to the extent that a new form is acquired. But for their proper operations human knowledge and will do not involve privation. Old knowledge is not lost when new knowledge is acquired; rather, old knowledge is not only retained but is strengthened. Even acts of virtue do not entail privation or loss, instead they entail a strengthening in the same way as knowledge. They are operations, or actions, where there is no substantial loss or gain as there is in the aging of a man. Knowledge and virtue are strengthened by corollaries, i.e., other referents and pointers as additives. But, I diverge.

continued . . .*

 

[JDaniel]

continuation . . .

On the part of its terms, motion again may be accidental or, in a twofold way, essential. – St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Physics, Bk. V, lesson 1, no. 1240 ff.
The same division into accidental and essential, and into part and whole may also be said of motions known by their terminations, or terms. Of the two terms of motion, the attained term, terminus ad quem, is the one that is of interest here; the relinquished term, terminus a quo, is the result not of the motion now taking place but of some previous motion. It is not helpful to know how the eggs got into the basket before finding them in their cartons. The motion in question concerns how they got from the basket to the cartons. How they got into the basket was a different motion. The important point here is that the term is acquired. We are not looking at where it was relinquished from. Rather, we look at where to it is going, or has gone. It is no mere accident of language, then, to name a motion from its acquired term. Our naming convention actually parallels the very nature of motion’s principles. For example, we do not say that a person has lost his former height, but rather, that he has grown taller. We do not say that the meal has lost its former coldness, but rather that it has been cooked.

The attained term or form is the principle of organization in the knowing of any motion because it is the principle of organization in things themselves. We can truly say that it is actually the cause of causes.

Scientific knowledge is not interested in accidental causing. It is concerned with, in my opinion, essential causes and causing. And more so, it is interested in what is primary and proper in any motion or change. (I’m sure the foregoing has been long and dreary. But, although I have abbreviated it quite a bit, it is essential to understanding what motion is.)

So, now to how we can falsify part or all of it. Despite your idea that definitions are mere tautologies, I hope that there was nothing in the forgoing that was indicative of a true tautology, that is, the double use of the same meanings in the same sentence. Instead, I have tried to explain motion according to what is taking place in nature, (rather than how our minds might distort it) in the framework of Aristotle and Aquinas. And, as you can see, motion entails more than the mere local motion of a mobile being from one locus to another. It is a defining of motion and change into its minutia in much the same way as is expected by science. It is up to science now to explain it structurally, as this was not intended to be physics.

Now to Saint Thomas’ first proof, that there must be a Prime Mover: the falsification of this is potentially twofold: first, that there is no first mover (that a first mover is unnecessary), and, second, that there might well be two, or a multitude, of initial movers. But, if there were no first mover, there would be no motion/changing taking place now. That we exist in the midst of already occurring and recurring motion is not the fault of the first mover, rather, it just happens to be the propensity of finite mobile beings: that at some point in time, along the continuum, in a universe primarily consisting of motion/change, someone(s) and/or something(s) has/have to be somewhere down the road, so to speak. That we, as mobile-beings-someplace-down-the-road can’t see or otherwise sense the First Mover is a problem of our “whens” rather than being a problem of the First Mover. (Yes, yes, I know – but, it’s still the truth.) As I have shown, all motion requires a prior situation in either the moved or the mover that when acting or when acted on, a mover already in being must begin (cause) the change. So, the picture of a world with no secondary movers or, more importantly, no First Mover, is a world that is motionless, timeless, and non-replicating.

But, the more important falsification of Saint Thomas is said when motion is considered to be infinite, rather than finite. This is a falsification that may not easily be de-falsified. Consider, however, that we know that mobile being is finite. How? From the facts of time and space. We can postulate a world that somehow, along an infinite continuum, the end of which is not even close to being upon us yet, where we have somehow appeared, like virtual exigencies – continuously popping in and out of existence. However, if this were so, shouldn’t we be able to see such occurrences when they happen? Further, shouldn’t there be a point in infinite time when all of space is occupied by beings, so thickly that we are unable to move or function? Or, has that point in time not arrived yet? (Perhaps that gives new meaning to the theory of universe contraction! It is one thing to consider these questions from a perspective of poor definitions; it is quite another to ponder them from the perspective of proper definitions, is it not?)

To consider the universe as merely something that is a part of something else – that just always was – is a postulation. The problems inherent in a concept of a multiverse that is infinite brings us back to the problem of that point in time when a suffocating infinity of beings could have existed somewhere along the way. I think it is safe to say that even a multiverse would have to be finite. For, if all of this was infinite, then there is no good reason that we are here now, nor any good reason that what is here has not undergone a complete suffocation (and annihilation) by an infinite multitude of material beings. There cannot be any infinity of matter or material beings that does not cause the ultimate and utter internment of all mobile beings.

continued . . .

 

[JDaniel]

continuation . . .

But, Saint Thomas speaks against an infinite regression of movers: why can there not be an infinite regression of movers? Can there be? (I’ll leave this question open.)

Now as regards the second falsification: that there could well be more than just one First Mover. This is also a tough one to de-falsify. Why can there not be multiple first movers, as some say? What would the world look like if there were? Well, it would look like consummate disorder. Unless . . . unless, one prime mover said to the others, “I’ll take this side and you guys can have the other.” Or, “I’ll move the radioactive particles and one of you guys can move the men and the animals.” Or, “I’ll take the top and you can have the bottom.” “But, it is most important that we all begin at precisely the same moment. Otherwise we’re just going to muck things up for whoever chooses to start ‘time’. And, oh, who’s handling ‘space’? Because that’s another potentially big problem for us. If I start making mobile beings and there’s not enough room for them, well, you get the point.” But, we know that the universe is ordered. Randomness does not betoken disorder, rather, it betokens order. In fact, it betokens a rather perfect order. And such order will remain perfect until and unless chance rears its head and modifies the prevailing order.

There is, however, a further extension to the Thomistic definition of motion. Consider on the one hand local motion: specifically, self-motion. Self-motion can be accomplished only by creatures that consist of parts. But, no self-motion can be accomplished by any being that does not consist of parts. A stone cannot propel itself. It can break down as it ages and crumble into sand particles. But, this is not properly self-motion. It is motion in the sense that I have previously defined. It is motion/change brought about by an efficient cause of some sort. The stone may be crushed by a man’s unwitting footstep. Or, it may disintegrate as it ages because the compacting of it when it was under pressure, is giving way due to weathering or water. But, further, the self-motion of coming-to-be cannot be accomplished by any being, even one consisting of parts. Replication is a process that appears, to all who witness it, to require efficient causes, or secondary movers. Now, what is a secondary mover? A secondary mover is a mover that required another mover in order for it to come to be.

But, how can the limitation on self-replication be falsified? It can be falsified by asserting that there exist creatures that undergo mitosis and some that undergo meiosis and that these are represented in forms of reproduction that don’t seem to require external agents, more particularly for those creatures that reproduce asexually: such as unicellular division. But, perhaps I should leave this question undeveloped.

(I will stipulate here that I am sure that I have missed some important parts of the definition, from Aristotle and Aquinas, which, upon referral I will attempt to explain.)

Finally, we can come a picture of a universe without a singular first mover, that consists of only timely changes for ever, that consists of nothing but secondary movers, that consists of change or motion merely as predicaments in space, that consists of no causes, that consists of no necessity or order, that consists of no hierarchy of beings, save one that is not productive of anything useful to us. These are the tests that atheism uses to “put Aquinas’ views at risk,” unless one chooses to acquiesce and concur with Aquinas. You say that there can be no tests of these definitions that can put them at risk, but I will say that the scientistic view of the universe is a gigantic attempt to falsify all of these dialectics. The majority of real science deals directly with the minutia of the structures involved in Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ much more general science of nature. Realize that at the quantum level is that which can be much more knowable, but is more difficult to attain. It must be, therefore, considerably more prone to falsification.

Sorry this took so long to get it to you, but, my dual employers just now began to ramp up their requirements on my time. I’m through.

God bless,
jd

 

[Touchstone]

Thanks, jd, for time and effort you invested in taking this up. I appreciate it, and wasn’t in a hurry, and am not, so no worries on this thread going slow. This is stuff we do in our free time, and we both have real duties and priorities that come first.

I did take time to read back through your “first part”, above, and your triptych here. There’s lots of interesting stuff to engage, but I want to focus on getting a clear summary drawn from this as to how the First Way is (or is not) falsifiable.

In reading back through the thread, I do have one point I should have made earlier, regarding circularity, which I’ll touch on, now: A circular definition and a circular argument are both self-referential in their elements, but they are not the same thing. A circular definition is valid, but not useful. A circular argument is problematic because it relies on production, not tautology. Circularity in an argument defeats the production of the argument, where it just renders a definition… trivially true (a=a).

Onward…

TS:

[section elided for brevity]

Often motion is spoken of the human intellect and the will, but, in the proper sense of the word, accretions to these cannot be called motion. Potency always involves privation, i.e., some kind of loss. In a thing moved, the old form is lost to the extent that a new form is acquired. But for their proper operations human knowledge and will do not involve privation. Old knowledge is not lost when new knowledge is acquired; rather, old knowledge is not only retained but is strengthened. Even acts of virtue do not entail privation or loss, instead they entail a strengthening in the same way as knowledge. They are operations, or actions, where there is no substantial loss or gain as there is in the aging of a man. Knowledge and virtue are strengthened by corollaries, i.e., other referents and pointers as additives. But, I diverge.

continued . . .

Heh. I think you meant ‘digress’, there (I’m not sure one can “diverge” – move in different directions from a common point – all by oneself, it strikes me as something like saying “I’ve tried sitting apart, it’s very painful”… diverging, like sitting apart is not a solo sport), but ‘diverge’ works in a strange way here, nevertheless, so maybe that’s precisely what you meant.

I’m just going to note that I’ve not dismissed anything you’ve said here with this post; we can return to whatever we need here. But for the purposes of summarizing on the question of falsification, we don’t have anything in this post that offers a recipe or criterion for falsification.

-TS

 

[Touchstone]

[section elided for brevity]

Scientific knowledge is not interested in accidental causing. It is concerned with, in my opinion, essential causes and causing. And more so, it is interested in what is primary and proper in any motion or change. (I’m sure the foregoing has been long and dreary. But, although I have abbreviated it quite a bit, it is essential to understanding what motion is.)

Again, lots of stuff I’d like to respond to there, and maybe there will be time and cause for that, but up to here, falsification has not been addressed.

So, now to how we can falsify part or all of it. Despite your idea that definitions are mere tautologies, I hope that there was nothing in the forgoing that was indicative of a true tautology, that is, the double use of the same meanings in the same sentence. Instead, I have tried to explain motion according to what is taking place in nature, (rather than how our minds might distort it) in the framework of Aristotle and Aquinas. And, as you can see, motion entails more than the mere local motion of a mobile being from one locus to another. It is a defining of motion and change into its minutia in much the same way as is expected by science. It is up to science now to explain it structurally, as this was not intended to be physics.

Ok, now we have come to the issue of falisification, if just barely. I don’t see the defintion of motion per science as relevant here, and will point out that we are using the Thomist definitions here by your choice, correct? I’m always happy to ‘stick up for science’, and that’s tempting here, as I don’t recognize the expectations you mention here, but to stay on point, here you are noting the ‘motion’, per your Thomistic definition is more broad than just describing changes in spatial location.

OK, noted. But here, it’s fortuitous that MindOverMatter said what he did, because my reply is already in the record on this: you can’t falsify a definion. A definition is an assocation, and words mean whatever we choose them to mean. The associations are up to us. So when you say your definition of ‘motion’ is more broad – much more broad – than the physics defintion, I just nod. That’s fine. Nothing has been established about the real world, or tested against it. We’re just establishing our definitions.

When terms (and thus their definitions) get marshalled into an argument about reality, then we have something we can look to with an eye toward falsification. Propositions about the state of the world are at least potentially falsifiable. A definition is not. This is easy to get tripped up on because many definitions do point to concepts that are used in propositions about the real world. The physics definition of ‘motion’ itself is no more ‘true’ or ‘false’ than Aquinas’. But it refers to spatial dimensions, which also happen to be concepts physics uses (like motion) in it’s models, in its propositions about the the way nature works. So it’s easy to confuse the truth of spatial dimensions as concepts that correspond to our observations with the ‘truth’ of the physics definition of ‘motion’.

Now to Saint Thomas’ first proof, that there must be a Prime Mover: the falsification of this is potentially twofold: first, that there is no first mover (that a first mover is unnecessary), and, second, that there might well be two, or a multitude, of initial movers.

OK, here we come to a problem, ironically, involving definitions. I understand ‘there is no first mover’ or “I am not convinced there aren’t many ‘first movers’” to be objections, but not falsifications. To object is not to falsify. Falsification is dispositive, a conclusion that proceeds from the evidence. An objection may simply be ingorance, or disagreeability. It may be more, too, and still not falsification. Perhaps there are an infinite chaing of Prime Movers… could be.

But it doesn’t matter. That isn’t demonstrable any more than that there is just one, or that there are none. The objections you anticipate here are objections, but very good examples of what falsification is NOT. There is no demonstration, or appeals to evidence and the state of the world around us in either of those objections. None whatsoever, which place those objections in the same epistemic void that Aquinas has placed himself with the claim that there is a Prime Mover. Aquinas’ claim, and the objections are all ‘not even wrong’, as there is no way, even in principle to discover the falsity of any of them, if they were in fact false claims.

At this point, then, we have our first putative falsification, but as I understand it, confusion over what falsification entails, and conflation of objections with falsification. (An objection may potentially bring about falsification, but these objections hold out no such hope).

But, if there were no first mover, there would be no motion/changing taking place now. That we exist in the midst of already occurring and recurring motion is not the fault of the first mover, rather, it just happens to be the propensity of finite mobile beings: that at some point in time, along the continuum, in a universe primarily consisting of motion/change, someone(s) and/or something(s) has/have to be somewhere down the road, so to speak.

I don’t think we have warrant to suppose this is the case, but I’m sticking to the summary, here: true or false, we have no way to identify. If what you say were false, you’d have no way to discover you were mistaken. There isn’t any evidence, experiment, or new circumstance that you could imagine that would falsify either your claim, or its negation; neither could we falsify the claim that there cannot be a Prime Mover and there must be an infinite chain of movers for there to be any motion at all, for motion necessarily is endowed from something else.

Breaking here…

-TS

 

[Touchstone]

jDaniel:

That we, as mobile-beings-someplace-down-the-road can’t see or otherwise sense the First Mover is a problem of our “whens” rather than being a problem of the First Mover. (Yes, yes, I know – but, it’s still the truth.) As I have shown, all motion requires a prior situation in either the moved or the mover that when acting or when acted on, a mover already in being must begin (cause) the change. So, the picture of a world with no secondary movers or, more importantly, no First Mover, is a world that is motionless, timeless, and non-replicating.

Here is an important distinction. Per your definition all motion requires a prior situation. And that’s fine (see upthread) as definitions go. But the definition is not the world, and a chosen definition may be highly compatible with what we observe in the world around us, or not at all, or somewhere in between.

Simply defining motion to be contingent on a mover establishes your defintion (and that’s useful for meaning and understanding), but it doesn’t correspond to the world until such correspondence is shown. For example, if I were to define ‘motion’ as ‘change in location through absolute space’, I can establish meaning and understanding with that definition – lots of natural philosophers of the past understood there to be some ‘aether’ or ‘absolute space’ (Newton was such a one) – but I haven’t reshaped reality with my definition. It either comports with our observations and empirical analysis or it does not.

Now, Newton and the rest of the ‘absolute frame’ crowd were shown to be mistaken with the success of GR developed by Einstein. Any definition of ‘motion’ depending on ‘absolute space’ was a problem as a model for our world, but remained just what it was in terms of meaning and clarity. As a definition, it still works great. It just doesn’t fit into the best physical models we now have.

To Newton’s credit, though, he advanced claims or hypotheses that were at least potentially false. He could have been wrong, and in this case, he was wrong, judging by the evidence we have available. Absolute space as a distinguished frame of reference or a means for identifying ‘absolute rest’ or ‘absolute motion’ has been falsified by modern physics.

I bring that out here as a example of what Aquinas’ claims here lack. There is no “Michaelson/Morley Experiment” to which Aquinas’ ideas are liable. Newton’s ideas were falsifiable, where as Aquinas’ are not, to the credit of Newton. If you can be shown wrong, possibly, you can possibly be right. If you can’t possibly shown wrong, ‘right’ is only a trivial label.

But, the more important falsification of Saint Thomas is said when motion is considered to be infinite, rather than finite. This is a falsification that may not easily be de-falsified.

Again, this may be an objection, but neither “motion is infinite” or “motion is finite” are falsifiable, even in principle. There is no state of the world we could point to where we have warrant for concluding the idea is shown to be false. This is a claim that is only verified by standing outside of our physical context; on the ‘inside’ of this universe, all motion can be explained as ultimately finite or infinite. One may object and deny the other. But they are toothless objections, inert claims. Neither is in any danger from the other. Neither can be shown to be false on the evidence we might possibly encounter.

Thus far, we have objections, but no means or tests for falsification to Aquinas’ argument in the First Way.

Consider, however, that we know that mobile being is finite. How? From the facts of time and space. We can postulate a world that somehow, along an infinite continuum, the end of which is not even close to being upon us yet, where we have somehow appeared, like virtual exigencies – continuously popping in and out of existence. However, if this were so, shouldn’t we be able to see such occurrences when they happen?

Don’t know. It’s not clear. There is no experiment we can even conceive of, let alone practically perform that would be decisive either way. There is no Michaelson/Morley available for the First Way. Any and all phenomena can be accounted for by either ‘mobile being is finite’ or its negation: ‘mobile being is NOT finite’.

Further, shouldn’t there be a point in infinite time when all of space is occupied by beings, so thickly that we are unable to move or function?

No, that is not entailed by infinite time, but it’s also not relevant to falsification, here. We can muse and wonder, and affirm or object as we think it fits with our intuition, but there is no way to adjudicate this question based on the evidence and tests we can apply from the world around us. For Newton and his distinguished frame, there SHOULD NOT have been results forthcoming from Michaelson/Morley as we observed (and have corroborated in a dozen and more separate ways as well). The “should” from Newton was objectively determined, and was entailed by his model. We can’t establish anything this way toward either ‘infinite’ or ‘finite’, per Aquinas, alas. Aquinas requires us to just… accept it if it comports with our intuition. Experiments and experiences in the real world can’t help.

Breaking again…

-TS