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The problem of evil declares that there is a logical contradiction between the creation of the world by a perfectly moral being and the existence of evil in that creation. In order to be perfectly moral, a creator being would have to act to prevent or heal any evil that might occur or threaten to occur if it has the power to do so. Since evil clearly exists in our world, God is either not perfectly moral or lacks sufficient power to prevent evil. In either case, the traditional God of Christian theology does not logically exist.
The common response to this argument is that God cannot act to prevent all evil because it would necessarily conflict with the existence of free will in humanity. If it is impossible to choose evil, then that would make human beings robots rather than moral agents. They could neither be blamed for doing wrong or praised for doing right. Therefore, for the sake of attaining the greater good of the existence of moral agents, God must permit evil.
However, the free will response presumes that free will is most important when it is being used by human beings to do evil. The freedom of the oppressor or whomever must be preserved. But what about the victim? The victim has a will as well. The victim’s will is to be free of the oppressor. Does God not value that will? Christian tradition teaches that God stands on the side of the lowly and the despised. It would therefore be in character for God to stand on the side of the will of the victim, against the will of the oppressor. The “free will” defense to the problem of evil turns this picture on its head. God is made to stand on the side of the oppressor, because that is the de facto outcome of non-intervention. In this scenario, someone’s will is getting infringed upon, and the only question is whether God wants that infringed will to be the oppressor’s or the oppressed.
The common response to this argument is that God cannot act to prevent all evil because it would necessarily conflict with the existence of free will in humanity. If it is impossible to choose evil, then that would make human beings robots rather than moral agents. They could neither be blamed for doing wrong or praised for doing right. Therefore, for the sake of attaining the greater good of the existence of moral agents, God must permit evil.
However, the free will response presumes that free will is most important when it is being used by human beings to do evil. The freedom of the oppressor or whomever must be preserved. But what about the victim? The victim has a will as well. The victim’s will is to be free of the oppressor. Does God not value that will? Christian tradition teaches that God stands on the side of the lowly and the despised. It would therefore be in character for God to stand on the side of the will of the victim, against the will of the oppressor. The “free will” defense to the problem of evil turns this picture on its head. God is made to stand on the side of the oppressor, because that is the de facto outcome of non-intervention. In this scenario, someone’s will is getting infringed upon, and the only question is whether God wants that infringed will to be the oppressor’s or the oppressed.