Is God a Controller of the Universe?

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I don’t think you really get what i mean.
A temporal sequence by definition changes, but that is not the point. The point is that either sequence 1 is created as t1,t2,t3… or as t1,t2,t3b… but cannot be changed from having a t3 to having a t3b.
So, the classic interventionist theist God is impossible on an Aristotean God concept and also on a Thomistic God concept.
You keep pulling God inside of the time. He is outside. The sequence t1, t2, t3 is our point of view. From His point of view it’s already set sequence.
 
I don’t think you really get what i mean.
A temporal sequence by definition changes, but that is not the point. The point is that either sequence 1 is created as t1,t2,t3… or as t1,t2,t3b… but cannot be changed from having a t3 to having a t3b.
So, the classic interventionist theist God is impossible on an Aristotean God concept and also on a Thomistic God concept.
What is thought by God was/is the end goal, or plan. If the end goal necessitates changes to be made in a certain series at a particular point in time, it follows that change is only part of the plan to reach the end goal.

I think what is separating our views is that my position is accounting for perfect knowledge (which involves foreknowledge) while yours is not. Though, I can understand without accounting for perfect knowledge that your position is a logical course, but in the end not accounting for perfect knowledge is not logical when contemplating an eternal being.
 
You keep pulling God inside of the time. He is outside. The sequence t1, t2, t3 is our point of view. From** His** point of view it’s already set sequence.
That’s exactly why He cannot intervene, and is a deist God.
 
What is thought by God was/is the end goal, or plan. If the end goal necessitates changes to be made in a certain series at a particular point in time, it follows that change is only part of the plan to reach the end goal.I think what is separating our views is that my position is accounting for perfect knowledge (which involves foreknowledge) while yours is not.
I do not fully understand what you mean by changes to be made at a particular point in time. In a temporal sequence, changes are made all the time. What’s important is that you seem to realize that your position entails that every change is a result of God’s plan. You cannot get more deterministic than that…
Though, I can understand without accounting for perfect knowledge that your position is a logical course, but in the end not accounting for perfect knowledge is not logical when contemplating an eternal being.
I do not see why (fore)knowledge is relevant here, but I have no problem bringing foreknowledge into the equation if you wish.
I actually think it even makes your case worse because it in itself already precludes libertarian free will.
Perfect foreknowledge in this case entails that God determines everything and knows with absolute certainty how it will work out. If God does not have prefect foreknoledge, your position still entails that everything is determined by God’s initial (eternal) thought, but that even He does not exactly know the outcome. But in neither scenario is there any romml for libertarian free will.
 
I do not fully understand what you mean by changes to be made at a particular point in time. In a temporal sequence, changes are made all the time. What’s important is that you seem to realize that your position entails that every change is a result of God’s plan. You cannot get more deterministic than that…
Every change is a reponse to agents that have free will. If determinism is true then there would be no change at all or even privation for that matter.
I do not see why (fore)knowledge is relevant here, but I have no problem bringing foreknowledge into the equation if you wish.
I actually think it even makes your case worse because it in itself already precludes libertarian free will.
Perfect foreknowledge in this case entails that God determines everything and knows with absolute certainty how it will work out. If God does not have prefect foreknoledge, your position still entails that everything is determined by God’s initial (eternal) thought, but that even He does not exactly know the outcome. But in neither scenario is there any romml for libertarian free will.
I actually never have nor will defend libertarian free will/absolute freedom of the will. My position is self determinism.

I’ll quote this part of the Summa, this addresses both quotes and not just about free will.
Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.
 
That’s exactly why He cannot intervene, and is a deist God.
If you want to define ‘intervene’ in a way that contradicts God’s nature, then no, he cannot intervene.

How does that make him a deist god, though? Does a deist god interact with his creation?
 
Does a deist god interact with his creation?
Not really. A deist god is seen as responsible for the creation of the universe and the rules in it but doesn’t necessarily care or directly interact with the lifeforms in that universe. Gods such as Yahweh are seen as more anthropomorphic while a deist god doesn’t necessarily have human attributes.
 
Every change is a reponse to agents that have free will. If determinism is true then there would be no change at all or even privation for that matter.
What do you mean ‘if determinism is true there would be no change’?
If God created the Big Bang and the laws of nature and all circumstances, then every change following the Big Bang would be determined by those circumstances and the laws of nature.
I actually never have nor will defend libertarian free will/absolute freedom of the will. My position is self determinism.
OK, but how would you go about defending the Catholic idea of a rewarding and punishing God without libertarian free will?
I’ll quote this part of the Summa, this addresses both quotes and not just about free will.
Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act.
Ok so far.
But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause.
That’s seems obvious. One billiard ball can move another but the first ball is not the first cause. The first cause is the player handling the cue.
God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary.
God is the billiard-player, OK , I get that.
And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary:
That seems like an assertion to me. Aquinas seems to claim that the first ball is responsible for the second balls course and that the first ball can somehow decide on its own course.
but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.
So God moves the billiard balls but only in such a way as billiard balls move. They don’t go flying round the table.
 
If you want to define ‘intervene’ in a way that contradicts God’s nature, then no, he cannot intervene.

How does that make him a deist god, though? Does a deist god interact with his creation?
No, a deist God does not interact with his creation. A deist God creates his creation and then stops interacting.
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Jaaanosik:
What’s your understanding of deist God?
God keeps the universe going. What do you mean He can not intervene?
As you said, Jaaanosik, it is, has been and always will be ‘set sequence’ from God’s point of view. So, the universe isn’t ‘going’, so God doesn’t need to keep it going. In fact, there is no way he can change anything inside the universe, He cannot even destroy the universe because then , from His point of view there would be a set sequence and no set sequence, which would be a violation of the law of non-contradiction.
 
No, a deist God does not interact with his creation. A deist God creates his creation and then stops interacting.

As you said, Jaaanosik, it is, has been and always will be ‘set sequence’ from God’s point of view. So, the universe isn’t ‘going’, so God doesn’t need to keep it going. In fact, there is no way he can change anything inside the universe, He cannot even destroy the universe because then , from His point of view there would be a set sequence and no set sequence, which would be a violation of the law of non-contradiction.
God’s creations change and their change is sustained by God.
This change is known to God from the beginning of time till the end. It’s His will.
He interacts with us. It’s His will to interact with us and every single point of interaction (past, present, future) is known to Him because He is outside of time. That does not change.

Edit: From our point of view He interacts with us all the time through our conscience.
 
What do you mean ‘if determinism is true there would be no change’?
If God created the Big Bang and the laws of nature and all circumstances, then every change following the Big Bang would be determined by those circumstances and the laws of nature.
Change, an example would be casting out Adam and Eve out of the garden. I don’t any reason why humanity would need to leave the garden if all actions were determined. If all things, including humans, were absolutely and truly determined, you’ll have an impossible time trying to argue that He intended this course of history since it would be more natural for Him to determine all things to perfection and never allow privation.

FYI, I’m following the Evidence for Design thread and the debate is crossing over into our conversation. Giving you a heads up if you didn’t notice it, it’s an interesting debate you might like.
OK, but how would you go about defending the Catholic idea of a rewarding and punishing God without libertarian free will?
Because we still have free will in the conditions we are confined in. We have to play the cards we’ve been dealt, it’s up to us how we respond to our conditions.

Also, “it is in our nature to desire our last end, which is happiness” (ST 1, 83 a1 re5). And to this, it necessitates man to this end naturally through voluntary act. “But necessity of end is not repugnant to the will, when the end cannot be attained except in one way: thus from the will to cross the sea, arises in the will the necessity to wish for a ship” (ST 1, 82, a1)
That seems like an assertion to me. Aquinas seems to claim that the first ball is responsible for the second balls course and that the first ball can somehow decide on its own course.
So God moves the billiard balls but only in such a way as billiard balls move. They don’t go flying round the table.
The above relates to these.
 
I mean, everything and everyone in this Universe is controlled by God.

Thoughts?
Cho:

What follows is not an analogy, neither is it analogous, but it serves to describe God’s absolute control of everything in the universe vs. man’s sinful predilections. It is from Father Saint-Jure’s scholarly work entitled, “Trustful Surrender to Divine Providence.”

“An example may make the matter clearer. A criminal is condemned to death by fair trial. But the executioner happens to be a personal enemy of his, and instead of carrying out the judge’s sentence as a duty, he does so in a spirit of hate and revenge. Obviously the judge has no share in the executioner’s sin. The will and intention of the judge is not that this sin should he committed, but that justice should take its course and the criminal be punished.”

This is how man’s freedom of will should be understood. I am amazed that so many Catholics are unaware of this. Here is precisely why Calvinism is incorrect: Calvinism sees all of the activities of man to be ordained by God. And, all of them are - except for his will. Man has choice (imperfect that it is). He can carry out his assignment, per the above: to execute a man sentenced to death, or, he can celebrate the execution of a personal enemy. It all rests on the intent.

The act of sex, which, I think, is often part of a rape, is, in and of itself, not evil. If it was, then all sex would be evil. It is only evil if the intention of one, or more, of the parties has “intentions” that may be understood to be evil. Perhaps he wants her to share in his HIV.

The bullet leaving a gun and traveling gracefully to its target, another man for example, is not evil. It is made evil by the intent of the shooter, if the intent is to cause the harm a bullet can cause. The gun is not evil, neither is the bullet, and neither is the actual firing of the weapon.

This is nothing new. It was discussed in my Ethics/Morality class many years ago.

God bless,
jd
 
No, a deist God does not interact with his creation. A deist God creates his creation and then stops interacting.
Alright, then how do you propose that the Catholic God is a Deist God? The Catholic God is pure being, the being which interacts the most closely with all other beings.
 
Alright, then how do you propose that the Catholic God is a Deist God? The Catholic God is pure being, the being which interacts the most closely with all other beings.
I’m curious, what does “being” mean in this context? I did a search on the phrase and found a reference to “Hegel describes a dialectic of existence.” Is this the same thing?
 
I’m curious, what does “being” mean in this context? I did a search on the phrase and found a reference to “Hegel describes a dialectic of existence.” Is this the same thing?
It means that God is existence itself. For instance, you and I exist, but we are not existence – and for good measure, ‘existence’ does not mean ‘everything that exists’; ‘reality’ is ‘everything that exists.’

Existence precedes all other beings. Nothing can come to exist where existence was not there prior.
 
Change, an example would be casting out Adam and Eve out of the garden. I don’t any reason why humanity would need to leave the garden if all actions were determined. If all things, including humans, were absolutely and truly determined, you’ll have an impossible time trying to argue that He intended this course of history since it would be more natural for Him to determine all things to perfection and never allow privation.
Indeed, it would be more natural for Him. And that’s why if it turns out He didn’t, that’s a good indication of the flaws in Catholic thinking.
FYI, I’m following the Evidence for Design thread and the debate is crossing over into our conversation. Giving you a heads up if you didn’t notice it, it’s an interesting debate you might like.
I’ll see if I have time for that thread. Thanks for the suggestion anyway.
Because we still have free will in the conditions we are confined in. We have to play the cards we’ve been dealt, it’s up to us how we respond to our conditions.
If that’s true, we have libertarian free will.
Also, “it is in our nature to desire our last end, which is happiness” (ST 1, 83 a1 re5).
OK
And to this, it necessitates man to this end naturally through voluntary act.
Necessitates through a voluntary act seems like a contradiction. Is it necessary or is it voluntary?
“But necessity of end is not repugnant to the will, when the end cannot be attained except in one way: thus from the will to cross the sea, arises in the will the necessity to wish for a ship” (ST 1, 82, a1)
Again, if this is nevcessary, then I cannot see how volition plays any part in this.
 
Indeed, it would be more natural for Him. And that’s why if it turns out He didn’t, that’s a good indication of the flaws in Catholic thinking.
That’s where the henological argument comes in, perhaps another thread.
If that’s true, we have libertarian free will.
Before continuing, is your LFW position stating that your will is the first cause of itself and rejecting (what is written in another thread) “Free will means the causal chain culminating in our behavior can extend outside (e.g. prior to) us”?
Necessitates through a voluntary act seems like a contradiction. Is it necessary or is it voluntary?
Again, if this is nevcessary, then I cannot see how volition plays any part in this.
Necessity of the end not of coercion, but we are free to will this end or not. In order to attain our last end, it is necessary we move our will towards it voluntarily.
 
Before continuing, is your LFW position stating that your will is the first cause of itself and rejecting (what is written in another thread) “Free will means the causal chain culminating in our behavior can extend outside (e.g. prior to) us”?
Libertarian free will means that we are able to make a real choice between two alternatives and that those two alternatives are both possible before our decision is made.
IOW if my choice to drink coffee or tea tomorrow is a LF choice, then NOW it must be possible to do both things and that possibility must exist until the moment the decision is made.

If it means a ‘causal chain culminating in our behavior can extend outside (e.g. prior to) us’ then it presusspoes there is a causal chain resulting in our behaviour, which means our behaviour is determined by a causal chain. That is not LFW.
Necessity of the end not of coercion, but we are free to will this end or not. In order to attain our last end, it is necessary we move our will towards it voluntarily.
So, it’s if we want to reach this end X, we must do Y. I can agree with this. But there is more in what you (and Aquinas) claim, namely that this ‘end’ X is in our nature to desire.
So, bearing that in mind, there can be no-one who does not want to reach X.
Hence ‘wanting X’ is necessary and since the means to obtain X are also necessary, there simply is no room for any sort of free will.
 
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