Is God the esse of all contingent essences? (Debate)

[polytropos]

There is only one act of reality and that is God.

Yes, we will have to disagree on that point.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

God is not the esse of contingent essences, He is the cause of their existence or their act of being, to state it differently, and the act of being of created beings is not the esse of God. The esse that is God is absolutely distinct from and other than the esse or act of being of created beings. If God’s esse were the act of being of created beings, God would be One with His creation and that would be Pantheism.

Support for this contention is found throughout the writings of St. Thomas. For example, we find in the Summa Contra Gentiles the following in Book 1, ch 25:

          THAT GOD IS NOT THE FORMAL BEING OF ALL THINGS

I apologize to those who looked up this reference to the S.C.G. It is from chapter 26, not 25.

But I also want to include the rest of this chapter where Thomas discusses how those who held this view could have possibly been led to this error. This is discussed in pars 19-13 of ch 26 and reads as follows:

" 10] Four factors seem to have contributed to the rise of this error. The first is the warped interpretation of certain authoritative texts. There is in Dionysius this remark [De caelisti hierarchia IV, 1]: “The being of all things is the super-essential divinity.” From this remark they wished to infer that God is the formal being of all things, without considering that this interpretation could not square with the words themselves. For, if the divinity is the formal being of all things, it will not be over all but among all, indeed a part of all. Now, since Dionysius said that the divinity was above all things, he showed that according to its nature it was distinct from all things and raised above all things. And when he said that the divinity is the being of all things, he showed that there was in all things a certain likeness of the divine being, coming from God. Elsewhere Dionysius has rather openly set aside this warped interpretation. He has said: “God neither touches nor is in any way mingled with other things, as a point touches a line or the figure of a seal touches wax” [De divinis nominibusi II, 5].

[11] The second cause leading them to this error is a failure of reason. For, since that which is common is specified or individuated through addition, they thought that the divine being, which receives no addition, was not some proper being but the common being of all things. They ignored the fact that what is common or universal cannot exist without addition, but is considered without addition. For animal cannot be without the difference rational or the difference irrational, although it is considered without these differences. What is more, although a universal may be considered without addition, it is not without the receptibility of addition; for, if no difference could be added to animal, it would not be a genus. The same is true of all other names. But the divine being is without addition not only in thought but also in reality; and not only without addition but also without the receptibility of addition. From the fact, then, that it neither receives nor can receive addition we can rather conclude that God is not common being but proper being; for His being is distinguished from all the rest by the fact that nothing can be added to it. Hence the Commentator says in the Book of Causes that, out of the purity of its goodness, the first cause is distinguished from the rest and in a manner individuated.

[12] The third factor that led them into this error concerns the divine simplicity. God is at the peak of simplicity. They therefore thought that the last point of resolution in our way of seeing things is God, as being absolutely simple. For it is not possible to proceed to infinity in composition among the things we know. Their reason also failed because they did not observe that what is most simple in our understanding of things is not so much a complete thing as a part of a thing. But, simplicity is predicated of God as of some perfect subsisting thing.

[13] A fourth factor that could have led them to their error is the mode of expression we use when we say that God is in all things. By this we do not mean that God is in things as a part of a thing, but as the cause of a thing that is never lacking to its effect. For we do not say that a form is in matter as a sailor is in a ship. "

And of course there are many references in Scripture that show that God is in no way the being of created creatures. ( I will try to find a few later)

And of course Catholic doctrine also holds that God is in no way a part of His creatures, such ideas have been condemned in one way or another.

And one closing remark. The work of St. Thomas is held in the highest regard by the Church, as is the work of many others like St. Augustine, Boethius, Albert the Great, etc. Nevertheless, no Catholic need accept their philosophical works as absolutely essential to hold. You can be a good Catholic and not accept all of what they had to say. However it would be very imprudent to dismiss them out of hand. Before dismissing them on some point or another, one must be certain one understands what they are saying - and that takes a lot of work and reflection. So those who are wise would do well to reflect long and hard on their work.

Linus2nd

 

[empther]

polytropos ’ s post 51:

Your conduct is not helping anyone. Your 16 year old is wondering why you are attacking a belief rather than trying to disprove it.

I see.

Go back to post 12, my post:

Quote:

1. Out of nothing comes nothing.

… unless God creates it. You gratuitously dismiss this possibility.

Quote:
2. Therefore esse (the act of being real) cannot begin to exist from nothing

… unless God creates it. You gratuitously… oh, I already said that.

Quote:
3. Esse cannot begin to exist.

Since 1 and 2 are false, 3 is no good either. And there is no point in going on with this.

I was the first person to show why Linux’s points 1 and 2 were false,
that is, because they ignored the question of whether God could create something out of nothing,
and obviously if he could Linux’s entire OP argument falls apart.

I did that, nobody else, although I gave people plenty of time to point out this glaring omission in Linux’s pts 1 and 2,
*and I even invited people to do so in my post 2 * :bigyikes:

…as follows…

The “argument” ( cough, choke! ) of the first post is easily torn apart,
and has been many times on this forum,
but I’ll let others have the fun,
if they think it’s worth bothering at this late date.

 

[Linux]

I was the first person to show why Linux’s points 1 and 2 were false,
that is, because they ignored the question of whether God could create something out of nothing,
and obviously if he could Linux’s entire OP argument falls apart.

“If” he could. Asserting that he can merely because you are compelled to by what you interpret as Dogma is not a rebuttal. Its an assertion and the possibility is certainly not self evident. To speak of any being as having the power to create new acts of reality with absolutely no pre-existing materials is a strong statement that certainly does appear contradictory even if you pretend that it is not for the sake of your faith." It contradicts the absolute distinction between something and nothing. In fact it sounds like magic disguised in a metaphysical argument.

At least my idea does not insult the concept of a rational God.

 

[empther]

To speak of any being as having the power to create new acts of reality with absolutely no pre-existing materials is a strong statement that certainly does appear contradictory even if you pretend that it is not for the sake of your faith." It contradicts the absolute distinction between something and nothing. In fact it sounds like magic disguised in a metaphysical argument.

There has already been a lot said on this forum and elsewhere on the internet, much of it written by myself,

about the impossibility of an infinite regress.

The universe clearly changes all the time. A change is an event. Any event happened a finite time ago. There could not be an “infinite past”. There could be an eternity, a state of timelessness for there being no change and no event, but that’s very different from an infinite past which is impossible.

So the universe wasn’t always here. Nor could it have started itself by “accident” , “chance”, or a “quantum effect” as the atheists claim, because all three of these require that something already exists.

So we must conclude either that the universe is an illusion or a being created it.

-===================================

That’s just an outline of all that has been said on this subject.
But you ignore it all because it doesn’t fit into your impossible theory.

 

[polytropos]

I was the first person to show why Linux’s points 1 and 2 were false,
that is, because they ignored the question of whether God could create something out of nothing,
and obviously if he could Linux’s entire OP argument falls apart.

I did that, nobody else, although I gave people plenty of time to point out this glaring omission in Linux’s pts 1 and 2,
*and I even invited people to do so in my post 2 * :bigyikes:

I was referring to your post #2.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

polytropos ’ s post 51:

I see.

Go back to post 12, my post:

I was the first person to show why Linux’s points 1 and 2 were false,
that is, because they ignored the question of whether God could create something out of nothing,
and obviously if he could Linux’s entire OP argument falls apart.

I did that, nobody else, although I gave people plenty of time to point out this glaring omission in Linux’s pts 1 and 2,
*and I even invited people to do so in my post 2 * :bigyikes:

…as follows…

Right but he may not be interested in " God. " He may be interested an " Ultimate Being" as a kind of demiurge. Who knows, I’m not sure he believes in our God at all.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

God is not the esse of contingent essences, He is the cause of their existence or their act of being, to state it differently, and the act of being of created beings is not the esse of God. The esse that is God is absolutely distinct from and other than the esse or act of being of created beings. If God’s esse were the act of being of created beings, God would be One with His creation and that would be Pantheism.

Support for this contention is found throughout the writings of St. Thomas. For example, we find in the Summa Contra Gentiles the following in Book 1, ch 26:

" THAT GOD IS NOT THE FORMAL BEING OF ALL THINGS

[1] …[5] Moreover, that which is common to many is not outside the many except by the reason alone. Thus, animal is not something outside Socrates and Plato and the other animals except in the intellect that apprehends the form of animal stripped of all its individuating and specifying characteristics. For man is that which truly is animal; otherwise, it would follow that in Socrates and Plato there are several animals, namely, common animal itself, common man, and Plato himself. Much less, then, is common being itself something outside all existing things, save only for being in the intellect. Hence, if God is common being, the only thing that will exist is that which exists solely in the intellect. But we showed above that God is something not only in the intellect but also in reality. Therefore, God is not the common being of all things…[9]…

I think the error of the O.P. is that it misinterprets the meaning of the word " participation, " which is a favorite of Thomas but no where defined. It is obvious from the above quotation that " participation, " in the context of the " act of being of created beings is a sharing of the " common esse, " which is proper to created beings but which is not the esse of God.

So there is no such thing as one esse for God and for created beings. There is the esse of God and the " common esse " of created beings, which are two absolutely distinct and separate realities. And the " common esse " of created beings is the esse they " participate " in.

I need to correct this. There is no " common esse " for created beings. As Thomas points out, it is only a mental concept. In reality actually existing created beings or share or participate in being in the sense that each has a certain perfection of existence distinct from every other created being by the limiting factor of the beings form. Each has an act of existence; so, in that sense, they all share in or participate in the act of existence. But that act of existence isn’t just sitting out there waiting to be grabed, it is given by God when He creates the individual beings according to the nature or form or essenc of each.

Sorry if I misled.
Linus2nd

Linus2nd

 

[empther]

Right but he may not be interested in " God. " He may be interested an " Ultimate Being" as a kind of demiurge. Who knows, I’m not sure he believes in our God at all.

Linus2nd

I don’t think he does.

In his latest thread: “Proof of ultimate reality in 3 steps”, he seems to think that “objective truth is a function of existence” as if existence creates truth. There doesn’t seem to be much room for God in that system.

Now of course Aquinas and Aristotle say truth is the agreement of the mind with outside reality, but this is in consideration of created intellects, angels and men. With God, whose mode of existence is very different from ours, truth and existence will work differently in ways above our understanding. It’s a system of the supernatural world controlling the natural world.
Linux, however, tries to reduce the system to some kind of mechanism in the natural world, but can’t even clearly explain it himself. Nice try, Linux, but this is a dead-end street.

I tore apart his argument in that thread in post 19.

 

[Linux]

I don’t think he does.

In his latest thread: “Proof of ultimate reality in 3 steps”, he seems to think that “objective truth is a function of existence” as if existence creates truth. There doesn’t seem to be much room for God in that system.

Now of course Aquinas and Aristotle say truth is the agreement of the mind with outside reality, but this is in consideration of created intellects, angels and men. With God, whose mode of existence is very different from ours, truth and existence will work differently in ways above our understanding. It’s a system of the supernatural world controlling the natural world.
Linux, however, tries to reduce the system to some kind of mechanism in the natural world, but can’t even clearly explain it himself. Nice try, Linux, but this is a dead-end street.

I tore apart his argument in that thread in post 19.

This is a perfect example of a straw-man. I really hope that you are not a university teacher of philosophy. Poor students.

Wait a minute…oh yes I forgot…you wouldn’t make it pass the front gate. Thankfully.

 

[prodigalson2011]

I see where you’re coming from now, but I think there are still a few unqualified leaps being made in your argument.

I disagree with your definition of “nature”; it seems unnecessarily narrow. Working through this section point by point, it does not seem necessary to me that the act of being real must be an eternal act unless the act in question is the very foundation of all reality. The brick needs ground upon which to be set, but that doesn’t mean that the brick is only real insofar as it participates in the reality of the ground.

Second, I would argue that becoming, actuality and dissipation can all be a part of something’s nature. I don’t see why we should assume that natures must be static. They must be fixed inasmuch as they must be consistent throughout each individual permutation, i.e. a dog is a dog is a dog, but permanence does not seem to be a necessary prerequisite for an independent esse, in my opinion.

I don’t see a contradiction in this. By analogy, while there is a logical distinction between being born and unborn or, perhaps more appropriately, conceived or unconceived, a transition from the latter to the former does not entail a contradiction.

If we assume God to be an omnipotent force, why should we limit his ability to create lesser realities/actualities, distinct from and yet dependent on Him?

It seems to me it would make the dog a figment of God’s imagination. And that, I believe, is why this really amounts to pantheism. If the dog… no, more to the point, if the human being does not have its own actuality, whence comes its freedom? Abstractions cannot have will, and if the only actuality is God, what other will can there be? The will, by definition, actualizes. And actualization, as the very term implies, requires actuality. Hence, in order for the individual self, as well as free will, to be real, they must be distinct in both essence and esse.

Then they are not truly distinct. Are your thoughts distinct from you? No, they are only real insofar as they are conjoined to your esse, and thus have no independence.

See my second to last response.

Not necessarily so. This is only the case if you are working with a very limited God. Further, God is not creating in the absence of realness. His reality is the foundation upon which other realities are built. Think back to the brick and the ground. To illustrate further, for the sake of analogy, let’s set the implications of your argument aside and imagine a conjurer, if you will, who can cause his thoughts to become manifest realities. Suppose he thinks of a rabbit and the rabbit appears. Though the rabbit is the product of an idea in the mind of a conjurer, it now has a completely separate existence.

No thoughts on these points, Linux?

 

[Linux]

No thoughts on these points, Linux?

I do. I will get back to you eventually.

 

[Linux]

I disagree with your definition of “nature”; it seems unnecessarily narrow. Working through this section point by point, it does not seem necessary to me that the act of being real must be an eternal act unless the act in question is the very foundation of all reality. The brick needs ground upon which to be set, but that doesn’t mean that the brick is only real insofar as it participates in the reality of the ground.

1. Whatever is identical to God, is not identical to contingent essences. It cannot be found in the essence of contingent things. In Contingent things you can only find that which is analogous to God.
2. Whatever is in God’s nature is identical to God, and whatever is identical to God is necessary. It does not begin or end.
3. The act of being real (which I call esse) is first and foremost - before anything else - an aspect of God insofar as being real is what God is doing and is therefore identical to God; is necessary.
4. That which is necessary cannot be identical to contingent essences and neither can it be created.
5. Given premise 1,2,3, and 4, I can logically conclude that the esse of created essences (the act of being real) is not identical to the essence of created things and is not created since it is already a necessary intrinsic function of God to be real. That which is necessary cannot be created.

Conclusion: Thus, the only rational explanation for the existence of contingent essences is that God is the esse (the act of being real) of all created essences (the distinct nature of contingent objects). Otherwise they cannot exist at all.

I really don’t see a way out of that argument.

Now any conclusion you draw from that argument such as “pantheism” is a matter of debate. Personally I think that, so long as the essence of God is not identical to the essence of created things, it is not pantheism (since pantheism makes no rational distinction between the essence of God and the essence of created things). I therefore view the idea of God being the esse of contingent essences as a valid and much more coherent theological alternative to the idea that God creates new esse. It certainly makes more sense of the idea that God is the sustainer of contingent things.

In fact, when people say that God creates new esse, it sounds to me like they are saying that God creates new Gods which is certainly heretical. So please don’t reject my argument merely because it sounds pantheistic, because I assure you it is not pantheism. I reject pantheism.

I don’t believe that this idea contradicts the catholic faith.

 

[prodigalson2011]

1. Whatever is identical to God, is not identical to contingent essences. It cannot be found in the essence of contingent things. In Contingent things you can only find that which is analogous to God.
2. Whatever is in God’s nature is identical to God, and whatever is identical to God is necessary. It does not begin or end.
3. The act of being real (which I call esse) is first and foremost - before anything else - an aspect of God insofar as being real is what God is doing and is therefore identical to God; is necessary.

Let’s stop here. Point 3 suffers from a failure of qualification: The esse of God is an act of perfect being, which is indeed unique unto Him.

1. That which is necessary cannot be identical to contingent essences and neither can it be created.

1. Given premise 1,2,3, and 4, I can logically conclude that the esse of created essences (the act of being real) is not identical to the essence of created things and is not created since it is already a necessary intrinsic function of God to be real. That which is necessary cannot be created.

As there is a distinction between God’s act of being (perfect, eternal) and the act of being of created things (imperfect, contingent), this does not follow.

But let’s suppose, for the sake of illustration, that your argument is correct. It necessarily follows that: no other minds can exist and no other wills can exist, as the possession of mind and will are both part of God’s essence. We are back to pantheism.

However, we clearly see that our minds and wills are qualitatively distinct (and vastly inferior!) from those of God’s, precisely because they do not share in the same degree of perfection. The same applies to our esse.

Conclusion: Thus, the only rational explanation for the existence of contingent essences is that God is the esse (the act of being real) of all created essences (the distinct nature of contingent objects). Otherwise they cannot exist at all.

I really don’t see a way out of that argument.

As I believe I have just shown, this is not so. Other esses can exist because they do not share completely in the perfection of God’s esse. Other essences can exist only for the same reason.

Now any conclusion you draw from that argument such as “pantheism” is a matter of debate. Personally I think that, so long as the essence of God is not identical to the essence of created things, it is not pantheism (since pantheism makes no rational distinction between the essence of God and the essence of created things).

An essence apart from an esse is a mere abstraction. An essence that subsists only in God’s esse is, at best, a thought in the mind of God. As God is indivisible, it has no reality of its own. It is Maya: illusion. To reiterate my point from my previous post, if anything is to be distinct from God, it must be actualized. That is, it must be given its own act of being.

I therefore view the idea of God being the esse of contingent essences as a valid and much more coherent theological alternative to the idea that God creates new esse. It certainly makes more sense of the idea that God is the sustainer of contingent things.

I don’t think it’s all that difficult to make sense of God’s sustaining power without resorting to such a theory. Simply stated: remove the foundation, and the structure collapses. The foundation of reality is God’s creative will. If God were to stop willing other things to exist, they would.

In fact, when people say that God creates new esse, it sounds to me like they are saying that God creates new Gods which is certainly heretical. So please don’t reject my argument merely because it sounds pantheistic, because I assure you it is not pantheism. I reject pantheism.

If people were to say that God could create other perfect esses, such would indeed be heretical, not to mention impossible, as they would be indistinguishable from God. However, it is perfectly possible for there to be esses distinct from God’s by degrees of perfection, i.e. whereas God possesses absolute goodness, absolute wisdom, absolute being, etc. we and other beings only possess these things by degrees. The order of being moves from God, to the lesser intellectual substances (angels and men), the sensitive (animals), the vegetative (plants), and so on.

I do not doubt for a moment that you are sincere in both your arguments and your personal rejection of pantheism. You are clearly a deep and rigorous thinker. However, even the most brilliant of minds can have its blind spots (ask Einstein about that one ), and I do believe that pantheism is implicit in your argument.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

1. Whatever is identical to God, is not identical to contingent essences. It cannot be found in the essence of contingent things. In Contingent things you can only find that which is analogous to God.
2. Whatever is in God’s nature is identical to God, and whatever is identical to God is necessary. It does not begin or end.
3. The act of being real (which I call esse) is first and foremost - before anything else - an aspect of God insofar as being real is what God is doing and is therefore identical to God; is necessary.
4. That which is necessary cannot be identical to contingent essences and neither can it be created.

Really Linux, that is excellent , Neither Thomas, nor the Church could argue with it.
But you can’t get there through your " word problem. "

1. Given premise 1,2,3, and 4, I can logically conclude that the esse of created essences (the act of being real) is not identical to the essence of created things and is not created since it is already a necessary intrinsic function of God to be real. That which is necessary cannot be created.

This is where you get off the track. To say " the act of being real is not identical to the essence of created things." is fine, no Thomast would argue with it, the Church would not argue with it. But to say " it was not created since it was already a necessary intrinsic function ( very poorly worded, but I know what you mean) of God to be real,." is absolutley wrong.

If created substances have an essece which have no act of being of their own, as a principle of their existence, then you are forced into the fallacy of the " Forms " of Plato. God gives created substances an act of being as a principle of their existence. This act of existence cannot be " a sliver " of God’s own esse. God did not creat a fantasy world. He created a world to which he is entirely transcendent. That is what the Church teaches and that is what Thomas teaches. You cannot have it both ways, either we live in a make believe, fantasy world, or we live in a world that is real and is totally other than God in every way, including the act of being.

Thomas tells us that God created beings whole and entire and their existence was the first thing in the logical order of each being’s created substance. ( S.T. 1,45, Reply…), "
I answer that, … Now, to be made is directed to the being of a thing. Hence to be made and to be created properly belong to whatever being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to subsisting things, whether they are simple things, as in the case of separate substances, or composite, as in the case of material substances. For being belongs to that which has being–that is, to what subsists in its own being. "

Conclusion: Thus, the only rational explanation for the existence of contingent essences is that God is the esse (the act of being real) of all created essences (the distinct nature of contingent objects). Otherwise they cannot exist at all.

No. As I just replied, each created being " subsists in its own being." Although God does give the being " its own being ( act of existence). " If your notion were correct, we would be living in a make believe world which would be " real " only in the intellect of God.

Now any conclusion you draw from that argument such as “pantheism” is a matter of debate. Personally I think that, so long as the essence of God is not identical to the essence of created things, it is not pantheism (since pantheism makes no rational distinction between the essence of God and the essence of created things). I therefore view the idea of God being the esse of contingent essences as a valid and much more coherent theological alternative to the idea that God creates new esse. It certainly makes more sense of the idea that God is the sustainer of contingent things.

Of course its a matter of debate. But no one willingly walks across an iced lake with cracks in it. I do not see how you excape Pantheism or at least a pure Idealism, Plato’s world of " Forms. "

In fact, when people say that God creates new esse, it sounds to me like they are saying that God creates new Gods which is certainly heretical. So please don’t reject my argument merely because it sounds pantheistic, because I assure you it is not pantheism. I reject pantheism.

Yes it would be heretical but so is Pantheism.

I don’t believe that this idea contradicts the catholic faith.

And that is certainly debateable.

Linus2nd

 

[Linux]

Let’s stop here. Point 3 suffers from a failure of qualification: The esse of God is an act of perfect being, which is indeed unique unto Him.

Gods being is perfect precisely because his esse and essence are identical. Created things are contingent and therefore imperfect precisely because in everything other than God esse and essence is objectively distinct even after being conjoined. The esse and essence distinction is a real distinction, and not simply an abstraction.

As there is a distinction between the God’s act of being (perfect, eternal) and the act of being of created things (imperfect, contingent), this does not follow.

As the word perfect is being used to describe the fact that esse and essence is identical in God, i see your rebuttal as purely semantic. Gods act of existence is perfect for a reason, its not just an arbitrary fact.

But let’s suppose, for the sake of illustration, that your argument is correct. It necessarily follows that: no other minds can exist and no other wills can exist, as the possession of mind and will are both part of God’s essence. We are back to pantheism.

You make a good point. But in the first premise i spoke of creation as having in its nature things that are only analogous to God, and not identical in nature to God. A human will is analogous to Gods will just like a contingent nature is analogous to Gods existence. A contingent thing does not really exist in the sense that existence is something in its essence; it is only analogously real. To say that God is thinking is not essentially saying the same thing as when we say a human is thinking. The Human mind is analogous to God in the sense that one knowingly wills a particular teleological end. But the concept of God willing and knowing something is not essentially the same thing as that which we find in human beings either in degree or nature. Human freewill does not entail essentially the same thing as when God freely acts. God’s freedom is not same thing as our freedom, it does not essentially mean the same thing; our freedom is only analogous to Gods freedom.

We really don’t know what it is for God to have a mind or have knowledge for it is beyond our comprehension, but we must say that a human mind as we comprehend it is something analogous to the mind of God since a perfect being cannot essentially be less than his creation; for lack of a better word.

Secondly, if you are correct one would have to say that a human mind is only distinct from God in degree and not in nature; which is something like saying we are demi Gods or limited versions of God. But that which is perfect in nature cannot be limited. It is absolutely distinct in nature from anything that has limitations, since perfection is not a genus. Neither is existence a genus.

However, we clearly see that our minds and wills are qualitatively distinct (and vastly inferior!) from that of God’s, precisely because they do not share in the same degree of perfection. The same applies to our esse.

It makes no sense to me to speak of a real ontological degree of perfection, since perfection is not made of degrees just like infinity is not truly a quantity of something, it transcends quantity. A contingent horse is not a limited degree of a perfect horse. God is not a perfect horse.

As I believe I have just shown, this is not so. Other esses can exist because they do not share completely in the perfection of God’s esse. Other essences can exist only for the same reason.

We do not share any of Gods perfections in a real sense. We have only that which is analogous to Gods perfection. For example to speak of the universe as good is not to speak of something that is in the essence of the universe (that would be pantheism). It is to speak of our relationship to God as the creator. The universe is only analogously good.

If God were to stop willing other things to exist, they would.

I don’t see why that would be true if God has given them there own distinct act of reality.

 

[prodigalson2011]

Gods being is perfect precisely because his esse and essence are identical. Created things are contingent and therefore imperfect precisely because in everything other than God esse and essence is objectively distinct even after being conjoined. The esse and essence distinction is a real distinction, and not simply an abstraction.

Granted, but this doesn’t contradict my point.

As the word perfect is being used to describe the fact that esse and essence is identical in God, i see your rebuttal as purely semantic. Gods act of existence is perfect for a reason, its not just an arbitrary fact.

I agree, but again, this doesn’t refute my point.

You make a good point. But in the first premise i spoke of creation as having in its nature things that are only analogous to God, and not identical in nature to God. A human will is analogous to Gods will just like a contingent nature is analogous to Gods existence. A contingent thing does not really exist in the sense that existence is something in its essence; it is only analogously real. To say that God is thinking is not essentially saying the same thing as when we say a human is thinking. The Human mind is analogous to God in the sense that one knowingly wills a particular teleological end. But the concept of God willing and knowing something is not essentially the same thing as that which we find in human beings either in degree or nature. Human freewill does not entail essentially the same thing as when God freely acts. God’s freedom is not same thing as our freedom, it does not essentially mean the same thing; our freedom is only analogous to Gods freedom.

As regards the bolded statement: I would beg to differ. A contingent thing really does exist, but not in the same way that God does. God exists necessarily and eternally. A contingent being exists superfluously and temporally.

As regards the rest of the above, what you are describing is fundamentally the concept of “degrees of perfection,” wherein the perfection of all properties is found in God and to lesser extents in created things (effects bear the marks of their causes.)

We really don’t know what it is for God to have a mind or have knowledge for it is beyond our comprehension, but we must say that a human mind as we comprehend it is something analogous to the mind of God since a perfect being cannot essentially be less than his creation; for lack of a better word.

True: “Let us make man in our image.” “In the divine image He created them.”

Secondly, if you are correct one would have to say that a human mind is only distinct from God in degree and not in nature; which is something like saying we are demi Gods or limited versions of God.

"Is it not written, “I have said, you are gods?” But to address your point seriously, this is not so. While human minds are distinct from one another in degree only, such is not the case between man and God because the human mind cannot be considered apart from the essence of which it is a part. That essence, as we have established, is of a fundamentally different nature than God’s: namely, it is contingent and temporal.

Nevertheless, it is degrees of perfection that allow things to have different natures at all. But I’ll wait on that…

But that which is perfect in nature cannot be limited. It is absolutely distinct in nature from anything that has limitations, since perfection is not a genus. Neither is existence a genus.

Perfection is not a genus, but God contains the perfection of every genus. We can conceive of absolute truth, absolute knowledge, etc. These are perfections. We can equally see that different things possess greater or lesser degrees of truth, knowledge, etc. Therefore, we can say that things possess degrees of perfection.

Existence is not a genus, nor does it possess in itself a nature. Rather, it receives its nature from the essence to which it is conjoined. Thus, individual acts of existence will possess degrees of perfection according to their respective essence.

It makes no sense to me to speak of a real ontological degree of perfection, since perfection is not made of degrees just like infinity is not truly a quantity of something, it transcends quantity. A contingent horse is not a limited degree of a perfect horse. God is not a perfect horse.

Perfection is not a thing unto itself, but rather a property of something else. A square composed of 4 perfectly straight, perfectly equal lines is a perfect square. A square in which one or more of these elements deviates from that standard possesses a lesser degree of perfection. Perfection, unlike infinity, can be quantified.

We do not share any of Gods perfections in a real sense. We have only that which is analogous to Gods perfection. For example to speak of the universe as good is not to speak of something that is in the essence of the universe (that would be pantheism). It is to speak of our relationship to God as the creator. The universe is only analogously good.

A thing is good, or perfect, to the degree in which it fulfills its nature. As no created thing can share in the perfection of God completely (otherwise it would be God), it does so to the degree that it reflects God’s perfections. For instance, human beings can possess a degree of wisdom, truth, etc. Again, we can only possess these things to any degree or in any analogous sense because they exist, in their perfection, in God.

I don’t see why that would be true if God has given them there own distinct act of reality.

Because, “in Him, we live and move and have our being.” God’s creative act is the house, we are the inhabitants. If the house collapses…

 

[Linusthe2nd]

The O.P’s errors here and in other places seem to inspired by his thread of Jan 1, 2013 as follows: [/SDeeppak chopra: We Exist In God’s Mind

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I don’t agree with all of his conclusions, however he has some interesting points on what is and what is not objective physical reality. And I would like to discuss the implications of his thought.

A fruitful discussion will require you to watch the video. Thanks.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/deepak…_b_604476.html

And one error has led to another.

Linus2nd

 

[Linux]

Red herring.

 

[Linux]

The O.P’s errors here and in other places seem to inspired by his thread of Jan 1, 2013 as follows: [/SDeeppak chopra: We Exist In God’s Mind

---

I don’t agree with all of his conclusions, however he has some interesting points on what is and what is not objective physical reality. And I would like to discuss the implications of his thought.

A fruitful discussion will require you to watch the video. Thanks.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/deepak…_b_604476.html

And one error has led to another.

Linus2nd

This is a Red Herring.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_herring

“As an informal fallacy, the red herring falls into a broad class of relevance fallacies. Unlike the strawman, which is premised on a distortion of the other party’s position,[2] the red herring is a seemingly plausible, though ultimately irrelevant diversionary tactic.”