Being one of the good guys puts us at a disadvantage against the bad guys who will use any means to an end, good or bad. Deliberately telling an untruth to deceive is always
wrong. Dipping into the bad guy’s playbook is a no-no, no matter what the TV shows like
The Shield and
24 tell you.
Two wrongs don’t make a right.
So will you two agree, then, that by your standards we are all profitting from living in an immoral system in which the police are allowed to use immoral means to achieve a moral end? What do you intend to do to change that?
If convictions were thrown out because the police lied, then lying by the police would drop sharply. Are you advocating, then, that the law should be changed if possible so that if the police deceive suspects in order to catch them, the guilty parties should not face prosecution?
Now mind you, I am not saying that morality must be based on what is practical. The poverty inherent in morality is that if you can’t obtain something by moral means, you muddle on without. I think police deception can be seen in the same realm as lying to the Nazis—in other words, if I were hiding Jews during the time of the Gestapo, I wouldn’t just lie to them but also to anyone I was remotely unsure I could trust—but I am still listening here. Let me go on the record, though….I don’t think that a moral man gives the Jews a sad shake of the head with the claim that a moral man must never seek to deceive even the evil one.
Just to crank up the debate, I found the following piece on the Internet.
lib.jjay.cuny.edu/cje/html/sample1.html
Here’s a quote from the conclusions (the italics are mine…I’m not sure the cut-n-paste worked perfectly):
If there is a distinction between investigative and interrogatory trickery and deceit, it has to be based on situational ethics, the morality of practical necessity. Practically speaking, it is impossible to enforce consensual crime statutes, bribery, drug dealing, prostitution; without employing deception.
This need for deception may not be as clear at the interrogation stage. Often, evidence can be produced independently of confessions, and occasionally, false confessions are elicited.
But confessions may also be practical necessity in many cases, particularly when dealing with the most serious sorts of criminals, such as murderers, rapists, and kidnappers. Miranda himself, it may be recalled, had confessed to the forcible kidnapping and rape of a nineteen-year-old woman. Why should situational ethics permit lying to a drug dealer, but forbid custody incustody conversational questioning of a forcible rapist? That question can be answered on historical and constitutional grounds, but it is hard to see how to make consistent common sense out of it.
I cannot here reconcile such inconsistencies, nor am I writing to lobby the Supreme Court. But I would like to conclude by suggesting that apparent inconsistency makes law look more like a game than a rational system for enforcing justice. Because of this appearance of inconsistency, police are not likely to take the stated rules of the game seriously and are encouraged to operate by their own codes, including those which affirm the necessity for lying wherever it seems justified by the ends.
And just in closing: I think it makes all the difference in the world that all of us, including those of us who commit crimes, have every opportunity to know the law concerning the circumstances under which the police may or may not deceive, and by what methods. Those rules are set up to expose crime and yet protect the innocent.