Is Justice Scalia right about freedom of religion?

  • Thread starter Thread starter Dan_McVay
  • Start date Start date
Status
Not open for further replies.
Everyone must obey the government when ever their wright or wrong so i wouldn`t see it against religion.

Religion for me anyway is more or less a human word for recalcitrance of faith.
 
Is Justice Scalia right that a generally applicable law that requires a person to violate his conscience is not a violation of freedom of religion? Or does his opinion represent an assault on freedom of religion?

law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0494_0872_ZO.html
Well, Scalia was delivering the opinion of the Court, so he was “right” in the sense that it is the final word on US constitutional law. Will he back track? Probably. Scalia is driven more by ideology and issue-advocacy than jurisprudential principles (though he likes to disguise his judicial activism as originalism).

The thing is, the law is pretty clear. The HHS mandate really never was a violation of religious liberties. But Scalia is an activist, so he will change his stance on the law to suit whatever way the wind blows.
 
Is Justice Scalia right that a generally applicable law that requires a person to violate his conscience is not a violation of freedom of religion? Or does his opinion represent an assault on freedom of religion?

law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0494_0872_ZO.html
This is not a complete presentation of Scalia’s views.

In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal (2006) Scalia, siding with a unanimous Court, affirmed the applicability of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to federal laws (not state laws). The opinion was written by Justice Roberts. The Act states in Section 3:

“In (a) In General: Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b).
(b) Exception: Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person–
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”

See also Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah (1993) with which Scalia concurred.
(It strikes down a city ordinance against Santaria animal sacrifice.)
Under the Free Exercise Clause, a law that burdens religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest if it is neutral and of general applicability. However, where such a law is not neutral or not of general application, it must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny: it must be justified by a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest. Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied.
 
Everyone must obey the government when ever their wright or wrong so i wouldn`t see it against religion…
Nope.

Are you saying that Rosa Parks SHOULD have been a good little black girl and just sat in the back of the bus? Or that the Underground Railroad should NOT have existed?
 
Fr of Jazz, I interested in Catholics, views of whether Scalia was right on the 1st Amendment, so a case decided under RFRA is not relevant, and the animal sacrifice statute was specifically directed at a religious practice.
 
Fr of Jazz, I interested in Catholics, views of whether Scalia was right on the 1st Amendment, so a case decided under RFRA is not relevant, and the animal sacrifice statute was specifically directed at a religious practice.
The point your are trying to make is not clear to me. Can you spell it out?

I am observing that the RFRA lays down the requirements for a law to burden behavior under the Free Exercise Clause of the 1st Amendment. This would seem to be on point.

Also both before and after RFRA Scalia is consistent and takes into account more than just universal applicability, i.e., he includes compelling governmental interest and least restrictive means. Scalia also affirms RFRA’s applicability to federal law.
 
RFRA goes beyond the protections of the 1st Amendment. Just because a law violates RFRA does not mean it violates the 1st Amendment.

Did you read Scalia’s opinion? He specifically excludes a compelling government interest. Read part B of his opinion. That is why Congress passed RFRA, to grant statutory rights beyond the 1st Amendment.

Yes, Scalia recognizes RFRA, but that does not change his opinion on the 1st Amendment. RFRA gives beyond the 1st Amendment.
 
RFRA goes beyond the protections of the 1st Amendment. Just because a law violates RFRA does not mean it violates the 1st Amendment.
The whole point of Supreme Court jurisprudence is to interpret the law. In ascertaining the Constitution’s meaning and application tests are arrived at. An interpretation is, by definition, words beyond those of the original text. But for those of us who are constructionists an interpretation does not go beyond the intent and meaning of the Constitution even though it may apply it to circumstances beyond the foresight and imagination of the framers. If that’s what you mean by going beyond the protections of the 1st Amendment understood as the literal words of the Free Exercise Clause, I guess you’re right.

As it espressly states, RFRA restores the two traditional tests in Supreme Court Free Exercise jurisprudence of compelling governmental interest and least restrictive means in deciding Free Exercise cases as opposed to merely neutrality and general applicability.

“(2)(b) Purposes: The purposes of this Act are–
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; . . .”

Just before this it said in 2(a)(5): “the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.”
Did you read Scalia’s opinion? He specifically excludes a compelling government interest. Read part B of his opinion. That is why Congress passed RFRA, to grant statutory rights beyond the 1st Amendment.
Yes, Scalia recognizes RFRA, but that does not change his opinion on the 1st Amendment. RFRA gives beyond the 1st Amendment.
Scalia wrote the opinion in neither case I mentioned.

RFRA was in response to Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith (1990) regarding a generally-applicable state criminal law because it spawned fears that this would be applied to federal law. The RFRA applies to federal law. It’s application to the states was rejected in City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), but application to the federal government upheld in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal (2006) with which Scalia sided.

In his concurring opinion in Church Of Lukumi Babalu Aye V. City Of Hialeah (1993) he notes that “the Court analyzes the “neutrality” and the “general applicability” of the Hialeah ordinances in separate sections (Parts II-A and II-B, respectively), and allocates various invalidating factors to one or the other of those sections.” He makes no claim that it should ALWAYS limit itself to this test.

Therefore I do think it is safe to say his view of the Free Exercise Clause of the 1st Amendment goes beyond the general applicability test.
 
Since I’m not the ablest scholar of legalese, I have to preface my argument here by saying I honestly don’t fully understand the implications of the aforementioned ruling. However, it seems to me that as Fr of Jazz has in my view correctly observed, the Obamacare contraceptive mandate does not seem to apply to fit the exeception provided by Scalia and is unconstitutional insofar as:
  1. Compelling state interest?
I can’t identify the compelling state interest identified by coercing through the power of the state religious institutions that provide services to the general public to provide a commodity that is already commercially ubiquitous, and often, free of charge. Bottom line, access to contraceptives does not seem to be an issue in the United States.

I think the stat being bandied about over “98 percent” of Catholic women using contraceptives for contraceptive purposes (which I don’t believe, but one that proponents of the mandate seem to find persuasive) lends sufficient credence to the notion that access to birth control is not a problem. If this IS a compelling state interest there are better ways to pursue it, rather than going after the ministries or organized religions like the Catholic Church and others.
  1. Narrowest and least burdensome way?
This does not seem to be the narrowest and least burdensome way of discouraging unplanned pregnancy, because it forces institutions to enable acts that it defines as morally reprehensible. Something akin to a religion teaching, as a hypothetical example, “Smoking is evil, but here take this voucher and buy free cigarettes if you want.”

A narrower way of discouraging unplanned pregnancy might be for the government to mandate abstinence only education in parochial AND public schools, since abstinence is the only way completely eliminate the risk of becoming pregnant and/or transmitting sexually transmitted diseases.

How about providing lavish tax breaks to encourage more couples to marry before they have children?

Or how about incentivising unwed mothers to put their unwanted children up for adoption?

According to the National Council for Adoption there are 1.3 million couples waiting to adopt a child. Because roughly the same number (1.3 million) of children are being killed by abortion, only 50,000 children are available to these loving parents. For every available child, thirty are killed.

If the government wants to grow it’s tax base, which is a KNOWN state interest, I would suggest re-criminalizing abortion and sending these children to the matching number of families waiting to adopt.

Those are just THREE ways. My point is that this mandate is far from the least burdensome way of pursuing this interest.

3. Obama’s about face: only insurance companies that service religious employers have to provide free access to contraceptives and abortafacients:

This doesn’t protect conscientious employers who are members of churches that condemn the use of contraceptives and abortafactients, eg the Catholic owners of a hardware store or a bed-and-breakfast.

Objections?
 
The whole point of Supreme Court jurisprudence is to interpret the law. In ascertaining the Constitution’s meaning and application tests are arrived at. An interpretation is, by definition, words beyond those of the original text. For those of us who are constructionists an interpretation does not go beyond the intent and meaning of the Constitution even though it may apply it to circumstances beyond the foresight and imagination of the framers. If that’s what you mean by going beyond the protections of the 1st Amendment understood as the literal words of the Free Exercise Clause, I guess you’re right.

AS it espressly states, RFRA restores the two traditional tests in Supreme Court Free Exercise jurisprudence of compelling governmental interest and least restrictive means in deciding free exercise cases as opposed to merely neutrality and general applicability.

“(2)(b) Purposes: The purposes of this Act are–
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; . . .”

Just before this it said in 2(a)(5): “the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.”

Scalia wrote the opinion in neither case I mentioned.

RFRA was in response to Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith (1990) regarding a generally-applicable state criminal law because it spawned fears that this would be applied to federal law. The RFRA applies to federal law. It’s application to the states was rejected in City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), but application to the federal government upheld in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal (2006) with which Scalia sided.
Just one question: The HHS mandate is definitely generally applicable, no questions there. I’ve seen a thread where someone tries to say, essentially, that it does not meet the second criteria you’ve set forth- namely, that it also does NOT refer to a specifically religious practice.

But NOT using any artificial contraception or participating in any form of sterilization or abortion (even by abortifacent pills) is very much a law of catholic faith! 🤷 A consistent** 2,000** year old law that was punished very severely with the most severe penances and ecclesiastical sentences from the very beginning! So much so that helping in the latter (abortion) results in the automatic application to the soul, of the Church’s MOST severe punishment- Ex-communication, which is exclusion from the means of grace in the church, and from the Catholic pov, is a very bad state of affairs to be in. More so, in Catholic morality (See CCC on morality), giving occasion to others to commit objectively grave immoral acts (like all those three things here), by enabling, helping, advising or even by bad conduct, is scandal- Itself a serious sin.

So, really, why would people conclude that this does NOT concern a specifically religious practice? :confused: For Catholics, it is definitely a matter of religious practice!
 
The whole point of Supreme Court jurisprudence is to interpret the law. In ascertaining the Constitution’s meaning and application tests are arrived at. An interpretation is, by definition, words beyond those of the original text. But for those of us who are constructionists an interpretation does not go beyond the intent and meaning of the Constitution even though it may apply it to circumstances beyond the foresight and imagination of the framers. If that’s what you mean by going beyond the protections of the 1st Amendment understood as the literal words of the Free Exercise Clause, I guess you’re right.

As it espressly states, RFRA restores the two traditional tests in Supreme Court Free Exercise jurisprudence of compelling governmental interest and least restrictive means in deciding Free Exercise cases as opposed to merely neutrality and general applicability.

“(2)(b) Purposes: The purposes of this Act are–
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; . . .”

Just before this it said in 2(a)(5): “the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.”

Scalia wrote the opinion in neither case I mentioned.

RFRA was in response to Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith (1990) regarding a generally-applicable state criminal law because it spawned fears that this would be applied to federal law. The RFRA applies to federal law. It’s application to the states was rejected in City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), but application to the federal government upheld in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal (2006) with which Scalia sided.

In his concurring opinion in Church Of Lukumi Babalu Aye V. City Of Hialeah (1993) he notes that “the Court analyzes the “neutrality” and the “general applicability” of the Hialeah ordinances in separate sections (Parts II-A and II-B, respectively), and allocates various invalidating factors to one or the other of those sections.” He makes no claim that it should ALWAYS limit itself to this test.

Therefore I do think it is safe to say his view of the Free Exercise Clause of the 1st Amendment goes beyond the general applicability test.
The Supreme Court ruled on what the constitution requires. Congress cannot override a Supreme Court decision on what the constitution requires with a statute, but they can add to what the constitution requires with a statutue. As Roberts wrote for the Court, "Under RFRA, the Federal Government may not, as a statutory matter, substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, “even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.” §2000bb–1(a). " RFRA’s requirements are statutory, not constitutional. [emphasis added]

And you wrote, “Also both before and after RFRA Scalia is consistent and takes into account more than just universal applicability, i.e., he **includes compelling governmental interest **and least restrictive means. Scalia also affirms RFRA’s applicability to federal law.” [emphasis added]
 
Deus_lo_vult said:
Welsh v. United States (1970).

Quakers and Johovah’s Witnesses are avowed pacifists, and are exempted from military service. These rulings applied to conscription, which was not directed specifically toward a religious organization, but was a GENERALLY APPLICABLE FEDERAL law that did not specifically target religious organizations but had unconstitutional implication frustrating the free exercise of religion. For the same reason, the general applicability of the Obamacare mandate does not make it constitutionally enforceable over religious organizations.
What I posted in the seemingly identical sister-thread. I believe selection for military service cuts across all segments of society and would, from a common sense perspective, seem to fit the definition of a compelling state interest that is generally applicable.

But I’m no legal scholar so you’ll have to address the points in which I might be mistaken on the letter of the law.
 
Just one question: The HHS mandate is definitely generally applicable, no questions there. I’ve seen a thread where someone tries to say, essentially, that it does not meet the second criteria you’ve set forth- namely, that it also does NOT refer to a specifically religious practice.

But NOT using any artificial contraception or participating in any form of sterilization or abortion (even by abortifacent pills) is very much a law of catholic faith! 🤷 A consistent** 2,000** year old law that was punished very severely with the most severe penances and ecclesiastical sentences from the very beginning! So much so that helping in the latter (abortion) results in the automatic application to the soul, of the Church’s MOST severe punishment- Ex-communication, which is exclusion from the means of grace in the church, and from the Catholic pov, is a very bad state of affairs to be in. More so, in Catholic morality (See CCC on morality), giving occasion to others to commit objectively grave immoral acts (like all those three things here), by enabling, helping, advising or even by bad conduct, is scandal- Itself a serious sin.

So, really, why would people conclude that this does NOT concern a specifically religious practice? :confused: For Catholics, it is definitely a matter of religious practice!
For the same reason that banning the use of peyote is not specially directed or forcing the Amish to violate their religious beliefs by forcing to pay taxes is not specifically directed, because the interference with the religious practice is incedental to the law. The Obama administration did not create the mandate to force Catholics to provide birth control (or at least there is no evidence of that) just like Oregon did ban peyote to mess with religious practices and the Feds did not create incomes taxes to mess up the Amish’s practice. If the Obama administration had passed the mandate with the specific purpose of messing with Catholic practices, it would be unconstitutional.

"But the “exercise of religion” often involves not only belief and profession but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts: assembling with others for a worship service, participating in sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing, abstaining from certain foods or certain modes of transportation. It would be true, we think (though no case of ours has involved the point), that a state would be “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they display. It would doubtless be unconstitutional, for example, to ban the casting of “statues that are to be used [p878] for worship purposes,” or to prohibit bowing down before a golden calf.

Respondents in the present case, however, seek to carry the meaning of “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” one large step further. They contend that their religious motivation for using peyote places them beyond the reach of a criminal law that is not specifically directed at their religious practice, and that is concededly constitutional as applied to those who use the drug for other reasons. They assert, in other words, that “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” includes requiring any individual to observe a generally applicable law that requires (or forbids) the performance of an act that his religious belief forbids (or requires). As a textual matter, we do not think the words must be given that meaning. It is no more necessary to regard the collection of a general tax, for example, as “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” by those citizens who believe support of organized government to be sinful than it is to regard the same tax as “abridging the freedom . . . of the press” of those publishing companies that must pay the tax as a condition of staying in business. It is a permissible reading of the text, in the one case as in the other, to say that, if prohibiting the exercise of religion (or burdening the activity of printing) is not the object of the tax, but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended. Compare Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139 (1969) (upholding application of antitrust laws to press), with Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250-251 (1936) (striking down license tax applied only to newspapers with weekly circulation above a specified level); see generally Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 581 (1983)."
 
What I posted in the seemingly identical sister-thread. I believe selection for military service cuts across all segments of society and would, from a common sense perspective, seem to fit the definition of a compelling state interest that is generally applicable.

But I’m no legal scholar so you’ll have to address the points in which I might be mistaken on the letter of the law.
There is no constitutional need for a compelling interest, only a statutory need. I don’t know why you might think cutting across all segments of society would matter. The peyote restriction only burdened the religious practices of a small part of society.
 
There is no constitutional need for a compelling interest, only a statutory need. I don’t know why you might think cutting across all segments of society would matter. The peyote restriction only burdened the religious practices of a small part of society.
And conscription for military service only burdens a small minority of religious Americans, nevertheless, their conscientious objection is protected. Most of us don’t practice religions that forbid us from serving in the armed forces. I’m not sure that the size of affected minorities is the only criterion. What I was referring to when I said “cuts across…” was that a draft is generally applicable.

If not that, how should ‘generally applicable’ be defined? From what I’ve read in your previous posts general applicability is determined by the incidental way in which it affects conscientious objectors, as opposed to when those groups are TARGETED by federal law. Conscription incidentally affects Quakers and Jehovah’s Witnesses.

Furthermore, taken to the logical extreme, how is it determined when federal law directly infringes on specific groups? That’s an important question. Do groups need to be specifically named?
 
And conscription for military service only burdens a small minority of religious Americans, nevertheless, their conscientious objection is protected. Most of us don’t practice religions that forbid us from serving in the armed forces. I’m not sure that the size of affected minorities is the only criterion. What I was referring to when I said “cuts across…” was that a draft is generally applicable.
The mandate is generally applicable, too.
 
The mandate is generally applicable, too.
I edited my post substantially while you were replying. Perhaps you’d like to address those points.

Yes, it is. I agree. Therefore, with the **Welsh v. United States ** precedent in mind, I am certain that religious objections to the contraceptive/abortafacient mandate will be upheld on the same grounds that conscientious objection to military service is upheld. Although the case did not involve a religious plaintiff, so he was incarcerated for resisting the draft, but this case DID uphold conscientious objection religious or otherwise to a generally applicable law.

Conscription does not specifically target Quakers and/or Jehovah’s Witnesses. Yet their objections to conscription are protected under the 1st Amendment, according to jurisprudence.
 
I saw your previous post in which you cited the Universal Military Training and Service Act, and in which you cite it being a statutory requirement, however, you still have not eliminated the requirement that the mandate must be the least restrictive means of achieving the interest. Requiring Catholic hospitals to enable an act that is illicit according to Canon Law. Preposterous.
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top