Contarini:
If one takes a Thomistic view, that’s sort of the case insofar as when you can prove a thing by reason you don’t need faith. But that’s hardly an “inverse relationship.” Rather, faith gives us a greater certainty than reason alone would give us.
Perhaps “inverse relationship” doesn’t quite do it justice, I agree. But your next statement is much more troubling. How can faith give you more certainty than reason?
To rationally demonstrate a belief is to show that it warrant acceptance according to the epistemological standards of human knowledge. You are claiming that faith is to be considered a reliable means of gaining knowledge, and even more reliable than reason. I know of a Thomist who represents the mind as a toolbox and says that reason and faith are tools that are compatible and achieve different tasks. But faith is more important because “faith perfects reason.” Is that what you say?
Contarini:
I don’t think it’s true that with “only logic” people are inclined to be atheists. Logic cannot give certain answers outside a very narrow range (you have to have very well-defined and clearly known premises to reach a sure conclusion using logic alone), so people can use logic and come to all sorts of conclusions. Atheism is one of those conclusions, true. But I don’t see it as being the most logical one. If I relied on reason alone I would probably believe that there is some sort of intelligence behind the universe but that it is unlikely to care that much about the welfare of individuals. In other words, I’d probably be some sort of deist. That’s the position that Anthony Flew appears to have reached in his old age.
Edwin
Yes, Antony Flew has reached an interesting conclusion, much like Aristotle’s or Voltaire’s. Perhaps his deism is the most logical decision. So why am I an athiest? The reason why I portray my views as “atheism” is not because I believe the supernatural realm to have been logically demonstrated false. Rather, it is based on pragmatist notions.
William James once wrote an essay titled “The Will to Believe.” In it he has a discussion of what he calls “live” and “dead” options. These terms are relative to the individual. A live option is one that you consider to be a possibility and a dead one is, of course, not a possibility (for whatever psychological/cultural reasons.) In India Hinduism is generally a live option, whereas in America it is largely dead.
At any rate, most of the gods are not worth believing in, especially if the prospect of them gives you no sense of awe, piety or holiness. The only gods I consider worthy of “believing in,” which is a dubious notion itself, are the gods that I grew up with: monotheistic gods. So, if the God of my fathers father’s can be demonstrated false—or at least shown highly likely to be false—then I consider myself to be an atheist as far as pragmatism is concerned.
The pragmatic atheist does not need to be convinced of the impossibility of every imaginable deity, but only the ones that seem “live” to him. That is to say, if my only live options were, say, X Y and Z, and these are all shown to be false, then I am without live options—until I discover more that pique my curiosity. This is very psychological, but did I make myself understandable?
But as far as deism is concerned, I think it very well may be true. But such a deity—if one can call it that—is not even worthy of being worshipped. It does not require piety or anything of the sort. So what does it matter if we say we “believe in it.” We cannot have a “relationship” with it either. It hardly matters at all. If it is pragmatic in any sense to believe in it, it is because it is an uncomplicated cosmological explanation.