Is lying to the enemy during war a sin?

[Verbum_Caro]

1. Lying is not always wrong
   I find this difficult to accept. Most likely you have run across the argument in your research that lying is a statement (or representation) at variance with the mind. As such it would seem a direct offense against the virtue of truthfulness. When uttered (or otherwise represented) it seems to do violence to the very nature of language (or communication) which is ordered to conveying the truth. For that reason I would follow Augustine and Aquinas, and what I have taken to be the common moral teaching that lying is always wrong.
2. If lying is always wrong, then when faced with two sins, choose the lesser

Unfortunately this solution seems unavailable. It is not morally permissible to directly choose evil, even to accomplish a good. As such a legitimate decision between “lesser of two evils” would involve only a choice between two good or indifferent actions both of which have not only good effects but also secondary evil effects. In that case choosing the good or indifferent act that involved a secondary effect of lesser evil would be appropriate.

But, again, if lying is always a sin, then choosing it is not option regardless of the effects it would have.

I think the most fruitful area to discover some sort of solution is along the lines of “mental reservation”. Another possible approach is some sort of theory analogous to “assumption of the risk” whereby the unjust and violent questioner should know that by the circumstance of his questioning that equivocation is expected. In this sense a statement which is made that has equivocal meaning or includes some mental reservation would not be strictly at variance with the mind. For instance in certain situations all parties involved know that language (or representations) are not strict representations of one’s mind. Players in a play and audience members would be one example.

What are your thoughts?
VC

 

[Texas_Roofer]

This is strictly an attempt to assist you

You may understand my question, but not me. I don’t feel tied one way or the other.

Given you are sighting " esteemed theologians" it would seem you are not developing a case to oppose them?

I am in the process of trying to learn and come to a conclusion that is consistent with other, larger truths.

When you say most reject as false, can you tell me who those people are?

This seems confusing because when one writes for the Church the man with the pen is not a true author, he is a scribe, the subject is from theological consensus so it is the work of the group and not a ‘who state that’

However to assist you subject of lying] *There is some difference of opinion among the Fathers of the Christian Church

St. John Chrysostom held that it is lawful to deceive others for their benefit, and Cassian taught that we may sometimes lie as we take medicine, driven to it by sheer necessity.

St. Raymund, with the added reason that it is allowable to deceive an enemy.

The gloss on the chapter, “Ne quis” (causa xxii, q.2) of the Decretum of Gratian, which reproduces the common teaching of the schools at the time, adopts the opinion of St. Raymund, with the added reason that it is allowable to deceive an enemy.*
newadvent.org/cathen/09469a.htm

Where did you get the idea that I was condemning anyone? Did I say that somewhere? I think all of my examples were performed exactly the way I would have done them. I just wanted to hear how to reconcile with the belief, at least by some esteemed theologians, that lying is always immoral.

If “laying is always immoral” and this is from" esteemed theologians" then natural application would be in order.

I never said what they did was a mortal sin, or they were going to hell, or even that it was, indeed, a venial sin.

but you did clear say their actions of lying are immoral via esteemed theologians.

I am asking if anybody could explain the contradiction.

BINGO, what contradiction exists?

I assumed that one of two answers would be something like:

1. Lying is not always wrong

I gave you my opinion clearly earlier, feel free to reject it

or​

2. If lying is always wrong, then when faced with two sins, choose the lesser

another poster covered this quiet well for you

Do you understand now?

That is the essence of my questioning.

If one asked, “How would someone who believes the following examples are not sins, explain the contradiction to Thomas Aquinas?” That is a different question than asked in this thread.

Similarly if asked "Since lying is always wrong how could these examples be justified as sin?’ That is a different question than asked in this thread.

If one asked " Was Thomas Aquinas thinking about all forms of lying or differentiating some form of lying?" That is a question which cannot be answered.

btw One of the theologians in the article say tell the true and let your enemy kill the innocent. In essences he saying you are not culpable for the enemies action.

hope that helps

 

[CentralFLJames]

It may be interesting to see how the opinions vary if one looks at the other side of the equation. Is it morally permitted to withhold the full truth and does that constitute a lie?

Here we have situations where Jesus himself was constantly being “set up” by a line of questions that were designed to entrap him (e.g. does one pay a tax to Caesar or not?). To me speaking the truth or even relating to another in a context and expectation of Charity should imply that the interaction is not compelled out of disingenuous intentions. Jesus had a perfect human intellect that was not clouded by original sin. So he was able to avoid such traps and disingenuous lines of questioning by responding with parables that had layers and dimensions of meaning and truth. Is He responsible for the fact that these parables perfectly encapsulated “the truth” at all levels of meaning but his inquisitors did not have the intellect to discern the full dimension of truth and probably glommed onto whatever they wanted to hear?

Successful communication implies a relational aspect and a bi-directional trust between the parties involved. If that assumption is not valid can any truth be spoken and properly heard? Is it disingenuous to speak over the heads and hearts of those one is forced to speak with or with those one chooses to speak with?

Do we have a general principal here to answer the question?

I think I can say that sometimes there is privileged information that is not proper to be revealed (and may be harmful to the other). There are some questions that imply an authority to ask that is not valid. And there are some that simply in the interest of dignified human interaction should not even be impolitely asked for - certainly not demanded under duress or false relational expectations (e.g. ‘yes there is an end time but only the father knows the hour - be ye always prepared’) . In this aspect in a manner anyone who forced answers by compelling duress invites a “low quality” answer that is devoid of the benefit of deliberate and rational consideration. We humans are after all fragile and can under stress make mistakes not only in judgement but also in convictive recollection.

I’d say the determination of disingenuousness begins in the motives for dialog and if its a uni-directional or bi-directional expectation of beneficial interaction. If the interaction begins spontaneously as disingenuous then the person initiating that interaction has already manifest the lie and the occasion to sin has already occurred. That person is the guilty one. I’d try hard to avoid being a willing party to that further continuance in these cases since its a hostile interaction.

James

 

[Daniel_Marsh]

Hebrews 11:31 By faith the prostitute Rahab, because she welcomed the spies, was not killed with those who were disobedient.

Joshua 2
Rahab and the Spies

1 Then Joshua son of Nun secretly sent two spies from Shittim. “Go, look over the land,” he said, “especially Jericho.” So they went and entered the house of a prostitute [a] named Rahab and stayed there.
2 The king of Jericho was told, “Look! Some of the Israelites have come here tonight to spy out the land.” 3 So the king of Jericho sent this message to Rahab: “Bring out the men who came to you and entered your house, because they have come to spy out the whole land.”

** 4 But the woman had taken the two men and hidden them. She said, “Yes, the men came to me, but I did not know where they had come from. 5 At dusk, when it was time to close the city gate, the men left. I don’t know which way they went.** Go after them quickly. You may catch up with them.” 6 (But she had taken them up to the roof and hidden them under the stalks of flax she had laid out on the roof.) 7 So the men set out in pursuit of the spies on the road that leads to the fords of the Jordan, and as soon as the pursuers had gone out, the gate was shut.

8 Before the spies lay down for the night, she went up on the roof 9 and said to them, “I know that the LORD has given this land to you and that a great fear of you has fallen on us, so that all who live in this country are melting in fear because of you. 10 We have heard how the LORD dried up the water of the Red Sea ** for you when you came out of Egypt, and what you did to Sihon and Og, the two kings of the Amorites east of the Jordan, whom you completely destroyed. [c] 11 When we heard of it, our hearts melted and everyone’s courage failed because of you, for the LORD your God is God in heaven above and on the earth below. 12 Now then, please swear to me by the LORD that you will show kindness to my family, because I have shown kindness to you. Give me a sure sign 13 that you will spare the lives of my father and mother, my brothers and sisters, and all who belong to them, and that you will save us from death.”

14 “Our lives for your lives!” the men assured her. “If you don’t tell what we are doing, we will treat you kindly and faithfully when the LORD gives us the land.”

15 So she let them down by a rope through the window, for the house she lived in was part of the city wall. 16 Now she had said to them, “Go to the hills so the pursuers will not find you. Hide yourselves there three days until they return, and then go on your way.”

17 The men said to her, “This oath you made us swear will not be binding on us 18 unless, when we enter the land, you have tied this scarlet cord in the window through which you let us down, and unless you have brought your father and mother, your brothers and all your family into your house. 19 If anyone goes outside your house into the street, his blood will be on his own head; we will not be responsible. As for anyone who is in the house with you, his blood will be on our head if a hand is laid on him. 20 But if you tell what we are doing, we will be released from the oath you made us swear.”

21 “Agreed,” she replied. “Let it be as you say.” So she sent them away and they departed. And she tied the scarlet cord in the window.

22 When they left, they went into the hills and stayed there three days, until the pursuers had searched all along the road and returned without finding them. 23 Then the two men started back. They went down out of the hills, forded the river and came to Joshua son of Nun and told him everything that had happened to them. 24 They said to Joshua, “The LORD has surely given the whole land into our hands; all the people are melting in fear because of us.”**

 

[readsalot]

These are some interesting comments, but I think I must distinguish something here: When I am speaking of the issue of lying in the context I am trying to figure out, I mean overt lying, not implying or leaving something out or mental reservation. I mean that someone asks a direct question and the answer is a full lie, done intentionally.

As my original thinking had to do with war, here is another example.

In a just war, I may kill a soldier on the other side and it is not immoral. Now, let’s say I want to find out where their tanks are hidden in a village. I already know it is moral (providing I am on the right side of a just war) to go up and shoot the sentry at the outpost, killing him. But instead, I walk towards the city and he stops me. He asks me if I am authorized to be at the checkpoint and going into the village, and if I am, to show me his papers.

I can either shoot him in the head and kill him, which is moral since we are both legitimate soldiers and therefore legitimate targets, or I can directly lie to him, and show him false papers I created to get by him without any injury. But if lying is always a sin (as some, but certainly not all theologians have opined), then I am required to kill or let him kill me on the spot.

For those that say lying is always immoral, doesn’t this situation seem wrong?

If so, is it immoral for Catholics to be in the FBI, DEA, Undercover Police Departments, etc, if they are undercover? And yes, to be undercover, you must lie to the bad guy, directly and intentionally.

The unintentional misleading talk gets good people killed, which is why they lie.

 

[Verbum_Caro]

readsalot,

I think that it is possible that both of your examples (a soldier in war and undercover officials) could possibly muddy the waters for you.

The problem being that both cases involve those who are acting on public authority – not privately – and have authorization to do things that private individuals do not. It is in this sense that these individuals acting on public authority are able to intend to kill – and not in self defense, and certainly not appealing to the principle of double effect. This intention to kill under public authority can be morally permissible (the death penalty is properly understood this way, I think).

So, it is possible that those under public authority can resort to intentional lies. I think it could be a different case, however, when we ask whether or not, for private individuals, if lying is always sinful.

Thoughts?
VC

 

[readsalot]

readsalot,

I think that it is possible that both of your examples (a soldier in war and undercover officials) could possibly muddy the waters for you.

The problem being that both cases involve those who are acting on public authority – not privately – and have authorization to do things that private individuals do not. It is in this sense that these individuals acting on public authority are able to intend to kill – and not in self defense, and certainly not appealing to the principle of double effect. This intention to kill under public authority can be morally permissible (the death penalty is properly understood this way, I think).

So, it is possible that those under public authority can resort to intentional lies. I think it could be a different case, however, when we ask whether or not, for private individuals, if lying is always sinful.

Thoughts?
VC

I had not thought of it that way, but I guess that is where I was leaning. Being a fan of military history and Catholic theology, is was wondering how to reconcile the issue, but I think you may have hit on it.

 

[Texas_Roofer]

readsalot,

I think that it is possible that both of your examples (a soldier in war and undercover officials)…

I had not thought of it that way, but I guess that is where I was leaning. Being a fan of military history and Catholic theology, is was wondering how to reconcile the issue, but I think you may have hit on it.

I ask you both to think some more, as I find this thinking disordered. The intent of the lie is to rid the imminent danger of criminal/enemy not to gain a personal benefit. It is this intent combined with the right of self defense which allows the lie not the government authority

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Texas,

Can you explain more your view about this being disordered?

I am curious about your use of the term “right to self defense”. Do you think that a theory of self-defense is the best theory to use in, say, battlefield situations?

VC

 

[Texas_Roofer]

Texas,

Can you explain more your view about this being disordered?

I am curious about your use of the term “right to self defense”. Do you think that a theory of self-defense is the best theory to use in, say, battlefield situations?

VC

In the regard to the “disordered” reference it seems completely out of all the church teachings I know to suggest and immoral action becomes morally neutral if one performs the action in uniform or as an employee. In fact I suggest the correct interpretation of immorality is actions against God’s law and the condition of human plays no role. The only contradiction I know of is the condition of intent. If one is immoral without intent to be so, then a large theological argument is made. So I must reject the concept as mentioned earlier that being a soldier changes the moral status of the actions. I say the thought is ‘disordered’ as it would allow one to commit immoral actions in large scale as a government official and only require the offender to stop acting immorally once their work shift ended.

Now concerning the self defense reference. The church teaches that one may use lethal force against an aggressor to preserve their life. In several of the scenarios listed the concept is the lie prevented the death of an innocent person. Now we are asked to consider this concept – Confronted with imminent danger of an innocent person, I can kill the aggressor to prevent the death of the innocent but I cannot lie preventing all death and allowing the aggressor an opportunity to be redeemed? I find this as a contradiction with catechism 2267.

Lastly the battle field, first a typical soldier serves on the field under the impression an imminent danger is present, and thus the war is just. Our soldier need not make the prudential judgment himself; he may follow the guidance of his officer. However if the soldier were to have knowledge no danger exists he should refuse to serve this action. This is known as conscious objector status. Now we should address the occurrence of the soldier following in command in an unjust war under the condition in which he does not personally known the war is unjust. This is the same as mentioned earlier, theologians do not agree on whether the action is morally neutral, or immoral

Hope that helps

 

[Scottgun]

Uttering known falsehoods is objectively wrong and that being the case, no subjective intent or relative circumstances can justify it.

 

[CentralFLJames]

If one is immoral without intent to be so, then a large theological argument is made. So I must reject the concept as mentioned earlier that being a soldier changes the moral status of the actions. I say the thought is ‘disordered’ as it would allow one to commit immoral actions in large scale as a government official and only require the offender to stop acting immorally once their work shift ended.

The concept of washing one’s hands from responsibility through indirection was the very thing Pilot did in his relationship to Rome. He admitted his personal culpability when he spoke truthfully “I find no fault in this man” but then went along with the injustice anyway thinking it was in Rome’s interest (and also his personal career progression) to do so.

The Nazi war crimes tribunal showed us at least from a human moral accounting - “wearing a uniform does not sever one from a personal consequence for compelling immoral behaviors”; even in the hell of battlefield. The US military academies used to teach that even in a “just war” there is a point where conduct becomes illicit. One is individually permitted to go against orders and is in fact required to stop behaviors that are contrary to our held societal moral standards and character. One is actually guilty of derelict of duty in not contravening a deteriorating moral conditon.

When killing becomes murder or when treatment of enemies becomes inhumane & dishonorable the line is crossed. There are no clear guidelines but its a “you know it when you see it” thing. There are always personal consequences to doing “the right thing” (to career or even potentially to one’s own life) . But the overriding factor is “what is the right thing” with respect to one’s own immortal soul. We would not want to “win the war” and lose our own souls. No nation has an immortal soul. Only individuals have immortal souls. We have the primary right to defend our own individual souls above and beyond the right to defend our country. If God forbid the country steps away from our values the war is already lost. But we should not fall on our swords and go to hell to prove our loyalty or patriotism to eternal damnation.

As ironic as it sounds, even in warfare there is a sustained descending hiearchy of moral principals that still compel a “do onto others as you would have them do onto you” rule. The golden rule applies even under the degraded condition of human conflict. In other words a moral combatant force does not purposely set out to mutilate corpses or torture combatants or humiliate wounded etc.

The clear pragmatics are that if we do such atrocities we invite or intensify the same conduct from the enemy. Thus we descend ever deeper toward hellish behavior where the moral conditon degrades to the point where there is no moral differentiation and a just war becomes invalidated and unjust. In other words it appears that it is not always permissible to win at any cost since we lost the moral imperative and the trophy for winning becomes “hell” on earth. On the other hand we firmly hold true the notion that good always eventually triumphs over evil and by holding the higher moral ground and sustaining a “just war” we trust that no matter the setbacks we can’t ever fully lose since God is with us.

Tying this back to the topic at hand - lying and deception to the enemy is not ever without personal or national consequence any more so than is wearing hunter orange on the battlefield instead of camouflage is a pragmatic way to invite fire - from either side (e.g. die by fratricide or by enemy fire). As a soldier, under defensive conditions we are permitted by the established norms to withhold the truth and only give our identities. But as a soldier in a declared war, having given fair notice of war we are also permitted to use tactics of deception and confusion since we have given the enemy fair notice that we are in mortal conflict. Under a banner of truce however we morally must speak genuinely in matters and not use covert deception or we invalidate the spirit of the truce that seeks peace. Likewise we should find it morally repugnant to ever offensively or initiate a preemptive attack on an enemy without giving fair and truthful warning of deteriorating conditions.

As Jesus mentions those who use the sword eventually die by it. Thus in the long run the choices eventually become only “Dead Right” or “Dead Wrong”. Given the implications of this we better be sincere in our self assessment of the campaign before starting it. War really better be “just” with respect to God’s opinion on the matter and we each better know personally where we stand with respect to the balance of tension between God’s mercy and His justice. Eternity rests on that balance. Given the double consequence to both life and after-life its easy to see why we should avoid war whenever humanly possible.

James

 

[The_Truthinator]

I only perused some of the comments, but there is a great biblical solution to your question (while it does leave a lot of the theological ramifications up for debate):

Rahab lied to the Canaanites to protech Israel’s spies. Rahab was rewarded and her life was spared; in fact, she even found herself in Jesus’ bloodline!

I think that it’s pretty clear from the scenarios you listed that such things would not be sinful, but in fact very good! When the only option is two evils, perhaps to pick the lesser of them is good.

Just my two cents.

 

[readsalot]

For those that say that lying is, in fact, always immoral, then I ask again, is it wrong for a Catholic to work undercover in the FBI, DEA, local police, etc? I am just curious because there are many here that have vague explanations but I am seriously looking for opinions to the specific circumstances like I have mentioned. So is it wrong for a Catholic to engage in these jobs for the greater good?

Another question for Texas Roofer:

When you said that putting on a uniform does not change the morality of an action, isn’t that what a just war does? Without a just war, you can’t go around blowing up people with tanks. In a just war you do just that, and kill people you don’t know. Aren’t they two different things because of war, one being a sin and the other not, or am I missing something?

Thanks

 

[Texas_Roofer]

…

Another question for Texas Roofer:

When you said that putting on a uniform does not change the morality of an action, isn’t that what a just war does? Without a just war, you can’t go around blowing up people with tanks. In a just war you do just that, and kill people you don’t know. Aren’t they two different things because of war, one being a sin and the other not, or am I missing something?

Thanks

I am not sure I understand your question properly. A soldier in a just war may kill any opposing soldier during the war. He may not kill non soldiers unless they impose an imminent danger to him. So a position held by opposing soldiers can be blown up however a position held by civilians is not to be blown up. A soldier in other conditions as peace or in police actions can only kill if they are exposed to imminent danger. So soldiers in uniform have two real conditions in which killing others is allowed. One is unique the other is not. The unique position is just war when only an opposing uniform suffices. The second condition is common to us all that being to defend our self from imminent danger.

ewtn.com/expert/answers/just_war.htm
Catechism 2307-2317
-----selective passages -----------
*This is the right, and the duty, of those who have responsibilities for others, such as civil leaders and police forces. While individuals may renounce all violence those who must preserve justice may not do so, though it should be the last resort, “once all peace efforts have failed.” [Cf. Vatican II, Gaudium et spes 79, 4]

In this regard Just War doctrine gives certain conditions for the legitimate exercise of force, all of which must be met:
“1. the damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or community of nations must be lasting, grave, and certain;
2. all other means of putting an end to it must have been shown to be impractical or ineffective;
3. there must be serious prospects of success;
4. the use of arms must not produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated. The power of modern means of destruction weighs very heavily in evaluating this condition” [CCC 2309].*

I hope that helps

 

[Verbum_Caro]

Texas,

I think your most recent post comes close to what I was thinking of above regarding the permissibility of those acting under civil authority to kill.

Recall that lethal force used in self-defense (i.e. killing in self-defense) is traditionally morally justified by appeal to the principle of double effect. (The principle itself in raw form can be found in Aristotle’s Ethics but usually is traced back no further than Aquinas).

The principle of double effect applies if an act has two or more effects, one at least being good and the other evil. Furthermore the conditions to invoke the principle are:

1. The action(the moral object of the act) itself is good or at least indifferent.
2. The good effect is not caused directly by the evil effect.
3. There is sufficiently grave reasons for allowing the undesired evil effect.
4. The evil effect is not intended directly, but merely allowed.

Aquinas (and the Church) uses this principle to justify killing in self-defense (see CCC 2263).

The problem is, however, that in certain situations it seems obvious that the killing done does not fulfill the conditions necessary for the application of the principle of double effect. The killing cannot be directly intended (condition #4 above). It seems a bit disingenuous to say that soldiers do not intend to kill. Soldiers don’t need to be threatened with harm nor even need to be on the battlefield but can kill from afar. They do not merely “permit” the death of enemy combatants. On the contrary, it is often their stated objective.

So, in the case of soldiers it seems that they intend to kill, but also refer that action to the common good. It seems that this reference to the common good (not self defense or defense of another) AND the legitimate authority that the soldier possesses allows him to kill intentionally. (A similar argument can be made in the case of a state executioner.)

I think you can see this line of thought developed in the Summa.

For instance see II-II, 64, 3 "Whether it is lawful for a private individual to kill a man who has sinned?

it is lawful to kill an evildoer in so far as it is directed to the welfare of the whole community, so that it belongs to him alone who has charge of the community’s welfare. . .Now the care of the common good is entrusted to persons of rank having public authority: wherefore they alone, and not private individuals, can lawfully put evildoers to death.

And II-II, 64, 7 “Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?”

Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. Now moral acts take their species according to what is intended, and not according to what is beside the intention, since this is accidental. . . .Accordingly the act of self-defense may have two effects, one is the saving of one’s life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor. Therefore this act, since one’s intention is to save one’s own life, is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to everything to keep itself in “being,” as far as possible. . . . But as it is unlawful to take a man’s life, except for the public authority acting for the common good, as stated above, it is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense, except for such as have public authority, who while intending to kill a man in self-defense, refer this to the public good, as in the case of a soldier fighting against the foe, and in the minister of the judge struggling with robbers, although even these sin if they be moved by private animosity.

Its a fine point, but I think it is the only thing that makes sense in regard to the moral permissibility of both intentional killing in warfare and intentionally killing in capital punishment. Neither of those cases fall technically under “self-defense” (nor even defense of another as it is properly understood) because they violate the principle of double effect upon which self-defense is justified.

As far as the subject of this thread goes, I was purely speculating about whether or not a similar argument (legitimate public authority acting for the common good) could be used to justify lying, which would otherwise be immoral for the private individual.

VC