Is modalism logically wrong?

[belorg]

God has the ability to do whatever is not intrinsically impossible nor in conflict with one of His divine decrees. Therefore, it is impossible for God to make a square circle, since this is an intrinsic impossibility.

The Trinity is not intrinsically impossible. The above definition of the trinity as “one being is [sic] the same time three separate beings” commits the straw man fallacy, by imputing a false doctrine of the Trinity. The Trinity consists not of three beings that are at the same time one being, but rather the Trinity consists of three persons who are one in being.

The Trinity is mysterious, but one of the fundamental qualities of the divine mystery is that it can be rationally understood as not being intrinsically impossible.

As evinced by belorg’s post, the Trinity is a frequently misunderstood doctrine. I hope this explanation helps to clarify any misconceptions.

As I have already explained, God cannot ‘consist’ of more than one thing, that is a violation of divine simplicity.
And it’s not because Christians tend to obfuscate things by given things different names that there is any reason to treat then as the names of three different things.

 

[jmcrae]

Are you now saying that ‘humen being’ consists of 7 billion perosns who are all ‘one in being’?

We are not “one in being” because we don’t share the same will or the same mind together.

However, all human persons together make up one human race.

 

[jmcrae]

An exact same substance cannot be three distinct identities without violating the LNC

Clay is one simple substance, but you can make more than one thing out of it, and indeed, there are billions of objects made from clay.

One substance; billions of objects.

 

[belorg]

Clay is one simple substance, but you can make more than one thing out of it, and indeed, there are billions of objects made from clay.

One substance; billions of objects.

OK. Take a lump of clay and make a ball out of the complete lump of clay and simultaneously make two other balls of clay each out of the same lump, and for ecah ball use tyhe complete lump of clay. Now let the three balls dry and use them to play billiards.

If you can do that, the trinity is logically possible.

 

[belorg]

We are not “one in being” because we don’t share the same will or the same mind together.

However, all human persons together make up one human race.

Oh, now I see, God is actually a race.

 

[jmcrae]

Oh, now I see, God is actually a race.

Actually, more like a family.

 

[Alindawyl]

An exact same substance cannot be three distinct identities without violating the LNC.

Stated in a purely logical manner, the principle of non-contradiction says that contradictory statements cannot both be true at the same time. “God is one being” only contradicts “God is three persons” if being and person are identical. But they are not.

Being is what. Person is who. What and who are NOT identical concepts.

Are you now saying that ‘humen being’ consists of 7 billion perosns who are all ‘one in being’?

Of course not. Humans don’t exist in the same manner as God. The one common human nature is possessed fully by each human person in a separate and distinct body/soul unity from all other human persons. Each of us has a separate physical/spiritual substance, a separate intellect, a separate will. That’s part of what it means to be a human.

The one common divine nature is possessed fully by each of the three divine persons without differentiation. They have the same substance, the same intellect, the same will. That’s part of what it means to be divine.

The modalist, as you are doing, insists on talking about God as if He exists in the same manner as a human. He “explains” the three persons by claiming they are one person operating in different modes in order to avoid what he sees as a contradiction between the amount of what and the amount of who. A contradiction which, as has already been said, does not exist because what and who are different concepts.

 

[PJM]

=javid;8568309]Hi. Accoriding to our faith to Catholic Church, we believe that moldalism is a innovation.

But do we have some reasons that show it is logically wrong?

For example why these ones are wrong:

A: God in trinity is like unto H2O: some times appears as water, some times as steam and some times as ice.

B: God in trinity is like a man who is father to his child and is husband for his wife and is son for his parents.

Thank you.

Why do you say it’s an innovation. Seems to me., like grace itself, it is a gifrt from God.

God Bless,
Pat

 

[stanczyk]

Stated in a purely logical manner, the principle of non-contradiction says that contradictory statements cannot both be true at the same time. “God is one being” only contradicts “God is three persons” if being and person are identical. But they are not.

This is exactly correct, and very well put.

 

[Lisa44]

Stated in a purely logical manner, the principle of non-contradiction says that contradictory statements cannot both be true at the same time. “God is one being” only contradicts “God is three persons” if being and person are identical. But they are not.

Being is what. Person is who. What and who are NOT identical concepts.

Of course not. Humans don’t exist in the same manner as God. The one common human nature is possessed fully by each human person in a separate and distinct body/soul unity from all other human persons. Each of us has a separate physical/spiritual substance, a separate intellect, a separate will. That’s part of what it means to be a human.

The one common divine nature is possessed fully by each of the three divine persons without differentiation. They have the same substance, the same intellect, the same will. That’s part of what it means to be divine.

The modalist, as you are doing, insists on talking about God as if He exists in the same manner as a human. He “explains” the three persons by claiming they are one person operating in different modes in order to avoid what he sees as a contradiction between the amount of what and the amount of who. A contradiction which, as has already been said, does not exist because what and who are different concepts.

I would suggest that the contradiction between what and who are constructs or, inventions, of the trinity concept. A modalist view doesn’t even distinguish between who and what. One being, and one identity.

Who is God: that would be God’s name. “hallowed by thy name”. (I’ll let you decide what God’s name is.)
What is God: Our Father who art in Heaven.

 

[belorg]

Stated in a purely logical manner, the principle of non-contradiction says that contradictory statements cannot both be true at the same time. “God is one being” only contradicts “God is three persons” if being and person are identical. But they are not.

Being is what. Person is who. What and who are NOT identical concepts.

It is not becauqz you put a different tag on something that it becomes distinct.

The one common divine nature is possessed fully by each of the three divine persons without differentiation. They have the same substance, the same intellect, the same will. That’s part of what it means to be divine.

Then in what way are they distinct? There must be something different about them, but I don’t see what it is. You seem to be violating the LNC here once again. What else does ‘personality’ mean if not intellect, will and substance?

Besides, isn’t God supposed to be ultimately simple and not composed? That’s the Thomist doctrine anyway, but maybe ‘Saint Thomas’ was wrong in this respect. How can an uncomposed being be composed of three different persons?
Probably not a contradiction, just a ‘mystery’ because I am quite sure you are going to claim that God is not really composed but that has to be seen in a different way etc.

Bottom line: if you don’t want to be accused of heresy, stop thinking and just do as you are told.

The modalist, as you are doing, insists on talking about God as if He exists in the same manner as a human. He “explains” the three persons by claiming they are one person operating in different modes in order to avoid what he sees as a contradiction between the amount of what and the amount of who. A contradiction which, as has already been said, does not exist because what and who are different concepts.

 

[jmcrae]

Then in what way are they distinct?

God the Father is the origin.

God the Son proceeds from the Father as Word.

God the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son together; He is the personification of their love for one another.

God the Son (neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit) became Man and dwelled among us.

God the Holy Spirit (neither the Son nor the Father) is the soul of the Church.

 

[belorg]

God the Father is the origin.

God the Son proceeds from the Father as Word.

So, the son is just one of God’s words becoming real. So, he is one of God’s creatures, just like you and me. Instead of a holy trinity, there is actually a holy several-billionity

God the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son together; He is the personification of their love for one another.

And you and I also “proceeded” from the love of God hence , again a several-billionity.

God the Son (neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit) became Man and dwelled among us.

For an immutiblel being God seems to change a lot, don’t you think?

 

[stanczyk]

So, the son is just one of God’s words becoming real. So, he is one of God’s creatures, just like you and me. Instead of a holy trinity, there is actually a holy several-billionity

And you and I also “proceeded” from the love of God hence , again a several-billionity.

For an immutiblel being God seems to change a lot, don’t you think?

This is another straw man, as it imputes a position that does not exist. The person of the Son proceeds from the Father and is of the same substance as the Father. Both are persons of God, as it the Holy spirit; they are the same substance existing as three distinct persons. This is not the same as a created being. Created beings differ in substance from God; whereas the three persons are distinct yet of the same divine substance. The three persons of the Trinity are consubstantial, created beings are not.

 

[belorg]

This is another straw man, as it imputes a position that does not exist. The person of the Son proceeds from the Father and is of the same substance as the Father. Both are persons of God, as it the Holy spirit; they are the same substance existing as three distinct persons. This is not the same as a created being. Created beings differ in substance from God; whereas the three persons are distinct yet of the same divine substance. The three persons of the Trinity are consubstantial, created beings are not.

There really is no diffrence. God is the dcreator of everything and since ex nihilo nihil fit, everything else comes from God’s substance. So, you, I and everybody else has the same substance as God’s, but just in another form. God’s being extends to all creatures, who are one in being with God, but distinct ‘persons’. A sevarl-billionity, as I said.

 

[Alindawyl]

I would suggest that the contradiction between what and who are constructs or, inventions, of the trinity concept. A modalist view doesn’t even distinguish between who and what. One being, and one identity.

Who is God: that would be God’s name. “hallowed by thy name”. (I’ll let you decide what God’s name is.)
What is God: Our Father who art in Heaven.

The problem the modalist is trying to explain is that God reveals Himself as three persons. Jesus claims to be God (the Father and I are one), Jesus promises to send the Spirit after He returns to the Father in the Ascension, etc. The modalist is unwilling to accept that God can be a single substance with three distinct identities, so decides that God is one identity Who only appears to take on three different identities when fulfilling a particular “role” in the economy of salvation because he finds that concept easier to grasp philosophically.

The modalist is, however, contradicting Divine Revelation by seeking a purely philosophical explanation of something which transcends the created order. Just like Adoptionism, Arianism, Nestorianism, Monophysitism, Apollinarianism, or any of the other heresies which appeared during the first few centuries of the Church, it arises because of an insistence on using philosophical terms such as persona, hypostasis, ousia, substance, and the like in a manner consistent with their roots in Greco-Roman tradition (which in many cases was not even consistent with that tradition but merely a false Hellenization of the words to suit someone’s personal agenda), but inconsistent with the content of Divine Revelation. That’s why the ecumenical councils of Nicaea, Constantinople, Ephesus, and Chalcedon made clear and definitive statements about what is meant by such words when they are used by the Church. Hypostasis could mean this or this, but we mean THIS. Ousia could mean this or this, but we mean THIS. And so on.

 

[stanczyk]

There really is no diffrence. God is the dcreator of everything and since ex nihilo nihil fit, everything else comes from God’s substance. So, you, I and everybody else has the same substance as God’s, but just in another form. God’s being extends to all creatures, who are one in being with God, but distinct ‘persons’. A sevarl-billionity, as I said.

The mistake here is the implication that being created by God is the same as being one in the divine substance. God is not of the same substance as His creations any more than an artist is of the same substance as his painting. They are distinct substances.

As for the invocation of the ex nihilo principle, the Catholic Encyclopedia gives a good explanation of why is not apt:

In every kind of production the specific effect had as such no previous existence, and may therefore be said to have been educed ex nihilo sui — from a state of non-existence — so far as its specific character is concerned (e.g. a statue out of crude marble); but what is peculiar to creation is the entire absence of any prior subject-matter — ex nihilo subjecti. It is therefore likewise the production totius substantiæ — of the entire substance. The preposition ex, “out of”, in the above definition does not, of course, imply that nihil, “nothing”, is to be conceived as the material out of which a thing is made — materia ex quâ — a misconception which has given rise to the puerile objection against the possibility of creation conveyed by the phrase, ex nihilo nihil fit — “nothing comes of nothing”. The ex means (a) the negation of prejacent material, out of which the product might otherwise be conceived to proceed, and (b) the order of succession, viz., existence after non-existence. It follows, therefore, that;
…]
it is not a procession within the Deity, like the inward emission of the Divine Persons, since its term is extrinsic to God;
it is not an emanation from the Divine Substance, since the latter is utterly indivisible;
newadvent.org/cathen/04470a.htm

 

[Alindawyl]

It is not becauqz you put a different tag on something that it becomes distinct.

What and who receive different names because what and who are different concepts.

Then in what way are they distinct? There must be something different about them, but I don’t see what it is. You seem to be violating the LNC here once again. What else does ‘personality’ mean if not intellect, will and substance?

Person, not personality. A person is a who.

Intellect and will are faculties (powers). They are possessed by a person.

Substance is the essential nature of a thing. It is also possessed by a person.

But the person is none of those. Those are part of the “what” of a person. The person is who.

Besides, isn’t God supposed to be ultimately simple and not composed? That’s the Thomist doctrine anyway, but maybe ‘Saint Thomas’ was wrong in this respect. How can an uncomposed being be composed of three different persons?
Probably not a contradiction, just a ‘mystery’ because I am quite sure you are going to claim that God is not really composed but that has to be seen in a different way etc.

When we say God is uncomposed, we mean God cannot be divided. All of God is essential. He has no parts which can be removed from Him. A human without a left arm, or without eyes to exercise the faculty of sight, is still a human; we have parts which are not essential to being a human. A car without a bumper or without a right front tire is still a car; it has parts which are not essential to being a car.

God has no parts because, by logical necessity, the divine substance cannot be broken into pieces. A perfect being cannot have anything removed from it and remain perfect. If something could be taken away from perfection, it would not really be perfection.

God of course has “parts” in the sense that He has intellect, will, substance, etc. He’s not some blob of whatever. But God does not have “parts” in the same sense in which we normally use the word, as bits of a thing which have their own existence which continues if removed from the thing. You can remove a tire from a car and the tire will exist on its own. You can’t remove the divine will from God and have it exist on its own. All “parts” of God are essential and cannot exist outside of God, so it would not be correct to call them parts.

One of the characteristics of the divine substance of God is that it is fully possessed by three persons. God being more than one person is another logical necessity based on how God has revealed Himself to us. If God is eternal and existed before all of creation, then at some point (terms related to time are obviously being used in an analogous sense here), there was nothing but God. That means God, who is love, had nothing to love but God. If God is only one person, then God cannot be love. He would be narcissism. No, if God is love, then God must by logical necessity be more than one person.

All of which is completely beside the point, since you consider yourself to be an atheist and don’t believe in God to begin with. Just as everything we say comes from the presupposition “God exists”, everything you say comes from the presupposition “God does not exist”. As long as you hold to that belief, you will assume anything we say which claims God exists is wrong, and look for whatever excuse you can find to justify your belief that we are wrong. Even if it means doing something like claiming the concepts of what and who are identical concepts.

 

[belorg]

What and who receive different names because what and who are different concepts.

Person, not personality. A person is a who.

A who who is distinct from other persons by his personality.

Intellect and will are faculties (powers). They are possessed by a person.

Substance is the essential nature of a thing. It is also possessed by a person.

But the person is none of those. Those are part of the “what” of a person. The person is who.

Something with substance, intellect and will is a person.
Since in God, the intellect, as well as the will and the substance are the same, there is no distinction. What else does a ‘person’ consist of?

When we say God is uncomposed, we mean God cannot be divided. All of God is essential. He has no parts which can be removed from Him. A human without a left arm, or without eyes to exercise the faculty of sight, is still a human; we have parts which are not essential to being a human. A car without a bumper or without a right front tire is still a car; it has parts which are not essential to being a car.

God has no parts because, by logical necessity, the divine substance cannot be broken into pieces. A perfect being cannot have anything removed from it and remain perfect. If something could be taken away from perfection, it would not really be perfection.

That may be your view, but it isn’t the view defended by the doctrine of divine simplicity.

God of course has “parts” in the sense that He has intellect, will, substance, etc. He’s not some blob of whatever. But God does not have “parts” in the same sense in which we normally use the word, as bits of a thing which have their own existence which continues if removed from the thing. You can remove a tire from a car and the tire will exist on its own. You can’t remove the divine will from God and have it exist on its own. All “parts” of God are essential and cannot exist outside of God, so it would not be correct to call them parts.

Hence, God is NOT three persons.

One of the characteristics of the divine substance of God is that it is fully possessed by three persons. God being more than one person is another logical necessity based on how God has revealed Himself to us. If God is eternal and existed before all of creation, then at some point (terms related to time are obviously being used in an analogous sense here), there was nothing but God.

Sure

That means God, who is love, had nothing to love but God.

Which is no porblem whatsoever.

If God is only one person, then God cannot be love. He would be narcissism.

So, what. Since God is a mysyery, who is to say his ‘love’ is not narcissism?

No, if God is love, then God must by logical necessity be more than one person.

If God was perfect love ‘before’ creation, he wouldn’t have created.

All of which is completely beside the point, since you consider yourself to be an atheist and don’t believe in God to begin with.

Because I do not believe in logical impossibilities.

Just as everything we say comes from the presupposition “God exists”, everything you say comes from the presupposition “God does not exist”.

No, it comes from the presupposition “If God exists He cannot violate logic”

As long as you hold to that belief, you will assume anything we say which claims God exists is wrong,

There are lots of things about theism I consider ‘right’ in fact.

and look for whatever excuse you can find to justify your belief that we are wrong. Even if it means doing something like claiming the concepts of what and who are identical concepts.

The concepts of what and who are identical concepts. It’s just that ‘who’ has one faculty (or maybe more than one) more. A “who” has personality, a “what” doesn’t.

 

[Alindawyl]

The concepts of what and who are identical concepts. It’s just that ‘who’ has one faculty (or maybe more than one) more. A “who” has personality, a “what” doesn’t.

Your continued assertion that “who” and “what” are identical concepts, despite your own admission that there is at least one difference, means any further discussion serves no useful purpose.